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SOME fifteen years ago it became my habit, whenever occasion offered, to discuss questions of grammar and 
linguistics with such of my friends as were interested, 
and it is under the influence of conversations with Miss 
Paget (Vernon Lee), Dr. Malinowski, and my former 
assistant, Mr. Battiscombe Gunn, that the first outlines 
of my linguistic theory were conceived. At a subsequent 
date I had various opportunities of discussion with the 
late Professor Sonnenschein and with Professor Rolf 
Pipping. The real impulse to the writing of this book 
was, however, given by Dr . Bertrand Russell, as he then 
was. A somewhat crude attempt to describe and analyse 
a single act of speech had been made in a paper of mine 
which failed to find acceptance when offered for publica-
tion. On my appealing to Dr . Russell he was good enough 
to express the opinion that the contents might fitly form 
the nucleus of a book. In another quarter, also, I received 
valuable encouragement, namely from my friend and 
Egyptological colleague, Professor H. Grapow. Spurred 
on in this manner, I finally decided to embark upon the 
present adventure . A number of unsuccessful efforts were 
consigned to the wastepaper-basket. At last, in 1928, the 
first chapter was written to my satisfaction, and the second 
was added in the following year. Both of these have been 
read by many friends, among them Dr . Ludlow Bull, 
Dr . A. de Buck, Dr. E. Classen, Professor Peet and Mr. 
Leonard Woolley, and to each and all I owe comments 
of interest. Later on, Mr. Gunn read the first four 
chapters with great care and sent me a number of notes 
which have proved very helpful. He considered that I had 
viii A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S 
understressed the mechanization of speech as usually 
practised, and in revising I have endeavoured to bear this 
criticism in mind. To Professor Peet I am especially 
indebted for the knowledge of Samuel Butler's witty essay. 
Unti l last autumn I imagined that some years of work still 
lay ahead of me. Two stimulating conversations with 
Professor Karl Bühler of Vienna convinced me, however, 
that it would be better to publish a first instalment with-
out further delay, so I set to work on the final revision. 
When the book was complete, Professor Morris Ginsberg 
had the kindness to read it through in its entirety, and 
to him I owe some valuable observations. I cannot 
sufficiently thank Mr . K. Sisam, of the Clarendon Press, 
for his interest and help. 
My old friends the Printers have expended their wonted 
skill upon the external appearance of my book, and I am 
correspondingly grateful. To Mr. Paul Jones I am indebted 
for the care bestowed on the drawings, and to my assistant, 
Mr. R. O. Faulkner, for much secretarial help and vigilance 
in reading the proofs. I am particularly happy to acknow-
ledge important aid from two members of my own family. 
As in the case of my Egyptian Grammar, my father has 
backed my work with the necessary financial subsidy. To 
my daughter Margaret my debt is particularly great. She 
has revised my typescript with me from beginning to end, 
and there is hardly a page but has benefited by her sensitive 
and acute criticism. To my many helpers I tender my 
sincerest thanks. 
A. H . G. 
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F O R E W O R D 
§ i. The crisis of grammar. It is in periods of transition 
like the present that the never-ending struggle between 
authority on the one hand, and the spirit of reform on the 
other, becomes most insistent and vocal. Belief in the 
established order being weakened, the number of those 
who advocate a wholesale clearance of what they regard 
as clogging traditional rubbish is correspondingly in-
creased, while a party of opposition automatically arises 
among those who feel that the achievements of the past 
are being jeopardized. This state of affairs, familiar in the 
contemporary world of politics, repeats itself in the smaller 
domains of science and art, so that the latter appear as 
veritable microcosms. The uninformed might be excused 
for assuming that so apparently tranquil a backwater as 
that of grammatical lore would be exempt from any such 
violent antithesis. In this assumption they would be 
wrong, however, for the science of language is, at the 
present moment, more than ever a storm-centre of con-
flicting theories and opposing cross-currents. Nothing 
could be more apparent to those for whom, during no 
inconsiderable part of their working lives, the supposed 
backwater is their actual world. On the one side we see 
the revolutionaries, as those scholars must be called who 
regard conventional grammar as a tissue of absurdities. 
Theirs is at least the merit of having recognized how in-
adequate, or on occasion positively false, are many of the 
definitions and explanations propagated in even the best 
of our school-books. Their weakness is an excessive readi-
ness to throw overboard such time-honoured grammatical 
categories as verb and noun, subject and predicate, adverb 
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and conjunction, sometimes substituting a terminology of 
their own to the defects of which they are completely 
blind. On the other side we find the traditionalists, the 
most open-minded of whom admit, perhaps somewhat 
grudgingly, the strictures of their opponents, and who 
seek to remedy the situation by more acute, more carefully 
reasoned, logical analysis of the facts. As exponents of the 
forward movement may be named Brunot1 and Jespersen,2 
while equally distinguished champions of the conservative 
party are the late Professor Sonnenschein3 and the German 
grammarian John Ries.4 It would seem that the differences 
between these eminent scholars could be reconciled, if 
at all, only by appeal to general linguistic theory. But 
although Brunot entitles his great work La pensée et la 
langue, and though Jespersen is author of a Philosophy of 
Grammar, neither is in truth a systematizer or a theorist. 
Both are scientific investigators and exponents of linguistic 
facts; the same is true of Sonnenschein, who would have 
claimed nothing different for himself. Ries is a theoreti-
cian less of speech or language than of grammar. Now it 
is quite in accordance with the present writer's outlook 
that the practical grammarians should be regarded as the 
protagonists in this controversy rather than the psycholo-
gists, logicians, and other more philosophically minded 
adepts of grammar. My own approach to linguistic theory 
1
 F. Brunot, La pensée et la langue, Paris, 1922. 
2
 O. Jespersen, Language, its Nature, Development, and Origin, London, 
1922; The Philosophy of Grammar, London, 1924. 
3
 E. A. Sonnenschein, A New English Grammar, Oxford, 1916; The Soul 
of Grammar, Cambridge, 1927. The latter work bears on its title-page the 
motto, 'Evolution, not Revolution'. 
4
 John Ries, Beitrage zur Grundlegung der Syntax, Prague, 1927-31, 
Part 1, Was ist Syntax?, 2nd edition, 1927 (first published in 1894); Part 2, 
Zur Wortgruppenlehre, 1928; Part 3, Was ist ein Satz?, 1931. 
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is from the side of specific grammatical problems, and I 
could wish that such a theory should be constructed purely 
on the basis of empiric observations. Unfortunately, most 
professional grammarians are too deeply absorbed in par-
ticular problems to be willing or able to look at the 
mechanism of speech as a whole. Their attitude is not 
unlike that of Delbrück, who, writing concerning the 
opposing schools of Sprachpsychologie represented by Paul1 
and Wundt2 respectively, declared that it was possible for 
the practical grammarian to live at peace with either.3 
Within its limits this standpoint cannot be disputed. 
The fact is that important progress in detail may still 
be made without reference to general theory. But it is 
another question whether all philological work would not 
be strengthened and deepened by the possession of a 
systematic and comprehensive theory of speech accept-
able, at least in its main lines, to all. The prevailing dis-
harmony leads one to suspect that the absence of such 
a wide theoretic view is the real root of the trouble. 
It is not to be denied that linguistic theory is nowadays 
attracting more and more attention. Every few months 
some new book dealing with the topic makes its appear-
ance,4 and the problem of the nature of speech seems to be 
slowly but surely nearing solution. But with a few honour-
able exceptions—and here the names of Wegener,5 de 
1
 H. Paul, Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte, 4th edition, Halle, 1909. 
2
 W. Wundt , Völkerpsychologie, vol. i, Die Sprache, Parts I—II, 2nd 
edition, Leipzig, 1904. 
3
 B. Delbrück, Grundfragen der Sprachforschung, Strasbourg, 1901, p. 44. 
4
 For a brief survey, with bibliography, see G. Ipsen, Sprachphilosophie 
der Gegenwart, Berlin, 1930, being Philosophische Forsckungsberichte, Heft 6. 
5
 Ph. Wegener, Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen des Sprachlebens, 
Halle, 1885. Philipp Wegener was born at Neuhaldensleben in 1848, and 
died in 1916 as Director of the Gymnasium in Greifswald. A sympathetic 
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Saussure,1 Erdmann,2 Sheffield,3 and Kalepky4 may be 
specially mentioned—the theorists of speech are mainly 
recruited from the ranks of psychologists and logicians. 
Among the psychologists Karl Biihler5 is the writer on 
linguistic theory with whose views I find myself most in 
sympathy. Many of his conclusions, reached along quite 
different channels from my own, coincide almost com-
pletely with those to be expounded in the present book. 
§ 2. The problem stated. What then is this 'linguistic 
theory' to which the foregoing section repeatedly made 
allusion, and which has given the present book its title ? 
Let me disclaim, without further delay, any intention of 
writing about origins. It has been found difficult, or at 
least inexpedient, to exclude all speculation with regard 
to the origin of speech, but the main argument neither 
depends thereon, nor yet is seriously affected thereby. 
Less than anyone else can a competent student of Egyp-
tian hieroglyphics believe that the language of his predi-
lection will teach him anything of value concerning the 
origins of speech. The old Egyptian language, like San-
skrit and Chinese, is a highly developed and sophisticated 
tongue, on a long view little less modern than French or 
English. Such information as Egyptian can yield to throw 
light upon the nature of speech is due not so much to its 
account of the man and of his career as a teacher is given by A. Leitzmann 
in Indogermanisches Jahrbuch, vol. iv, Strasbourg, 1917, pp. 246 foil. 
1
 F. de Saussure, Cours de linguistique generate, Lausanne and Paris, 1916. 
Posthumous work published by C. Bally and A. Sechehaye. 
2
 K. O. Erdmann, Die Bedeutung des Wortes, 3rd edition, Leipzig, 1922. 
3
 A. D. Sheffield, Grammar and Thinking, New York and London, 1912. 
4
 Th . Kalepky, Neuaufbau der Grammatik, Leipzig, 1928. 
5
 Various articles summarized and criticized by H. Dempe, Was ist 
Sprache?, Weimar, 1930. See especially K. Bühler, 'Kritische Musterung 
der neuern Theorien des Satzes', in Indogermanisches Jabrbuch, vol. vi for 
1918, Berlin and Leipzig, 1920. 
§2 THE PROBLEM STATED 5 
antiquity as to the difference of its structure from that 
of the languages most frequently studied by writers on 
general linguistics. At all events it is not the main source 
from which I have drawn my arguments. Tha t source is 
English, my mother-tongue. It is my conviction that every 
adult human being is the living repository of a profound 
knowledge of language. Not only does he possess a vast 
store of words, but even the veriest yokel is something of 
an artist in the matter of their employment. Here, then, 
existent in the consciousness of everyone, is an immense 
treasure of evidence available for the construction of a 
solid fabric of linguistic theory. 
The problem which I am setting before myself may best 
be indicated by a comparison. Suppose an intelligent boy 
to be inquiring how the telephone or the wireless works. 
If the question were rightly addressed, the answer would 
doubtless supply a clear account of the mechanism—an 
account which, without penetrating very deeply into the 
laws of physics, would satisfy the inquirer and carry with 
it immediate conviction. Could a like question be profit-
ably put to the ordinary philologist ? Could he be trusted 
to give a sensible reply to the inquiry what language is 
and how speech works ? A fairly wide acquaintance with 
the literature of linguistics has convinced me of the con-
trary, and indeed I have searched high and low without 
finding the problem either stated or systematically handled 
in this way. 
§ 3. The method to be employed. T h e problem here 
to be studied is, accordingly: How does speech work? 
And if now we ask ourselves by what method this problem 
should be tackled, the procedure of other sciences at once 
affords the answer: By the study of concrete, particular 
examples. Here, however, the practical grammarian will 
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intervene and object that his own way of approach is no 
other. On this point I cannot altogether agree with him, 
for though the grammarian certainly treats of specific 
words and types of sentences, it is only when he assumes 
the role of commentator that he is really concerned with 
particular occasions of speech. In what manner, then, 
does the method which I am advocating differ from that 
of the orthodox grammarian ? The botanist may be called 
upon to point the road. Words being so constituted as to 
be used over and over again, they are comparable, not to 
individual plants, but to the botanical species of which 
those individual plants are specimens. Similarly, syntactic 
forms and rules correspond, not so much to observed 
conditions appertaining to particular flowers or trees, as 
to the general inferences based on much observation of 
such conditions. But what botanist would think of attack-
ing his problems otherwise than by a minute examination 
of individual specimens, considered in relation to the soil 
in which they have grown, to the climate, in fact to 
their total environment ? So far as the philologist is con-
cerned, this way of procedure is, unless I am mistaken, 
nearly an untrodden path. Kalepky1 and others have, it 
is true, devoted some attention to individual samples of 
speech observed in their natural surroundings, but I am 
aware of no attempt, except my own, to analyse a single 
act of speech with fullness or exactitude. 
This, then, is my method: to put back single acts of 
speech" into their original setting of real life, and thence 
to discover what processes are employed, what factors in-
volved. For controversial reasons it seemed desirable to 
precede the analysis of a simple act of speech (Ch. II) by 
some discussion of its essential factors (Ch. I), and I have 
1
 Neuaufbau der Grammatik, p. 21. 
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found surprising and encouraging confirmation of my 
views at a lecture recently given in London. On that 
occasion Professor Karl Bühler, of Vienna, wrote upon 
the blackboard the four factors, (1) the speaker, (2) the 
listener, (3) the things referred to, and (4) the linguistic 
material, the interrelations of which I had declared, nearly 
ten years ago, to constitute the whole mechanism of 
speech.1 No more welcome indication that I have been 
upon the right track could have been desired than this 
independent testimony of one who is primarily not a 
grammarian, but a psychologist. 
On the view here advocated, speech is a human activity 
demanding at least two persons possessing a common lan-
guage and finding themselves in a common situation. The 
science to which linguistic theory thus ultimately owes 
allegiance is neither logic nor psychology, but sociology.2 
Logic is concerned with the relations of propositions to 
facts, and psychology with subjective states, observed or 
inferred. Sociology, on the other hand, has at least as a 
large part of its field intersubjective phenomena, the 
dealings of man with man, among which speech is one of 
the most important techniques. This formulation of the 
status of speech is not, of course, intended as a denial of 
the claim of the logician or the psychologist to regard 
certain aspects of linguistics as his own peculiar sphere. 
Much more questionable is, indeed, the claim of the philo-
logist to construct a linguistic theory without the help of 
experts in those abstract fields. My own feeling is that 
the philologist not only has the right to form a general 
1
 A. H. Gardiner, 'The Definition of the Word and the Sentence', in 
Brit. Journ. Psychol., vol. xii, pp. 354-5. 
2
 This has, of course, been recognized by many, but by none more 
clearly than Durkheim and his school, with Meillet as the leading philo-
logical exponent. See, too, J. Ward, Psychological Principles, p. 287. 
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conception of the nature of the material with which he 
deals, but that it is also his duty. To penetrate deeply into 
the psychological processes or philosophical truths which 
underlie the mechanism of speech is no doubt as much 
beyond his powers as to explain the ultimate mysteries of 
the telephone or the wireless is beyond the powers of the 
practical engineer. But surely every intelligent workman 
in any of these branches should possess a shrewd idea how 
the mechanism with which he is particularly concerned 
achieves its ends. His views will be based on elementary 
technical knowledge combined with common-sense observa-
tion, and will be expressed not in philosophical jargon, but 
in the language, and from the standpoint, of everyday life. 
Such, then, are the subject and the method of my book. 
§ 4. The practical results anticipated. T h e first 
benefit that may be expected from a sound general lin-
guistic theory, if attainable, is that it will teach us which 
of the old-accepted grammatical categories should be 
retained and which of them are really in need of modifica-
tion or rejection. On the whole, I believe it will be found 
that most of the traditional terms, though often badly 
named, correspond to real facts and distinctions in the 
linguistic material. It may be reasonably doubted whether 
a serviceable grammar which dispenses entirely with such 
terms as noun or verb will ever be written. The second 
benefit which I anticipate is, however, that the current 
accounts given of such categories will be substantially 
changed; to my mind it is not so much the traditional 
terms that are unacceptable as the explanations of them 
which are usually given. Common sense favours this view. 
It is a priori hardly likely that practical grammarians 
should have continued, generation after generation, to 
use terms utterly unsuited to the facts. In writing my 
§4 RESULTS ANTICIPATED 9 
Egyptian Grammar,1 I found no difficulty in fitting the 
material into the framework of the grammar which I 
learned at school. On the other hand, I derived con-
siderable benefit from the revised terms and even from 
the definitions provided by the Joint Committee on 
Grammatical Terminology. Nevertheless the commonly 
accepted definitions do, in very many cases, stand in need 
of serious revision. Even so great a scholar as Meillet 
could state, not many years ago, that the noun is a means 
of indicating things, while the verb is an indicator of 
processes (procès).2 Though these definitions are clearly 
approximations to the t ru th , as they stand they are 
either ambiguous or else definitely false. The second of 
them is rendered nugatory by the fact that assassination, 
flight, pressure are undoubtedly names of actions or pro-
cesses, but nevertheless are nouns, not verbs. And as 
regards the first, denominative verbs like to cage, to motor, 
and to censure, at the very least render the formulation 
inadequate. The linguistic theory set forth in this book 
will, I think, not only throw some light upon the reasons 
why these definitions are open to objection, but will also 
show how they may be ameliorated. All words whatsoever 
will be seen to be names of ' things', that term being under-
stood in the very widest sense as covering material objects, 
persons, actions, relations, concepts, and figments of the 
imagination. The so-called parts of speech are distinctions 
among words based not upon the nature of the objects to 
1
 A. H. Gardiner, Egyptian Grammar, Oxford, 1927. 
2
 'Le nom indique les "choses", qu'il s'agisse d'objets concrets ou de 
notions abstraites, d'etres reels ou d'especes: Pierre, table, vert, verdeur, 
bonti, cheval, sont egalement des noms. Le verbe indique les "proces", 
qu'il s'agisse d'actions, d'etats ou de passages d'un etat a un autre: il marche, 
il dort, il brille, il bleuit sont egalement des verbes.' A. Meillet, Linguistique 
historique et linguistique generale, Paris, 1921, p. 175. 
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which they refer, but upon the mode of their presentation. 
Thus the name of anything presented as a thing is a 'noun' , 
and the name of anything presented as an action, or, if 
Meillet's expression be preferred, as a process, is a 'verb'. 
In the verb to cage, reference is made to the thing called 
a cage, but it is not presented as a thing but as an action. In 
the noun assassination reference is made to an action, but 
it is not presented as an action but as a thing. The details 
of this topic belong to my second volume; here it need 
be added only that the terms 'verb' and 'noun' are not 
really incompatible, but that one and the same thing may 
be presented simultaneously as an action and as a thing, 
though possibly never with exactly equal emphasis. Thus 
grammar rightly distinguishes between verbal nouns, e.g. 
{the) murder, and nominal parts of the verb, e.g. {the) 
murdering. 
To some philologists the acquisition of a satisfactory 
linguistic theory will appear a worthy aspiration in itself. 
But it is not to be denied that many regard the quest upon 
which I am engaged as idle and nebulous. Before the eyes 
of such I must dangle a few more enticements not to throw 
my book in a corner even at this early stage. Every school-
boy is familiar with the phrases 'a noun used as an adjec-
tive' or 'an adjective used as a noun' . If these terms refer 
to function, why, our schoolboy may well ask, does his 
master not call the former an adjective, and the latter 
a noun, and have done with it ? T h e reasons why the 
accepted mode of expression is not merely legitimate, but 
even imperative, are among the things which I pledge 
myself to explain. Enticement the second. Wundt tells 
us that the boundary between the word and the sentence 
is shifting and uncertain.1 This standpoint is utterly false. 
1
 Die Sprache, vol. i, pp. 599 foll. See, too, L. Sütterlin, Das Wesen der 
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I shall prove that one and the same verbal expression may-
be simultaneously both a word and a sentence, but that 
there is no more difficulty about this than there is about 
a rat being simultaneously both a rodent and a nuisance. 
Enticement the third. Is it not something of a puzzle that 
especially in letters and in ancient documents of different 
kinds the meaning of the component individual sentences 
should often be perfectly clear, but that the reader should 
nevertheless be left in almost complete darkness as to what 
the document is really about ? At first sight this state of 
affairs seems almost a contradiction in terms. The position 
is one which the argument of my book will, I hope, com-
pletely elucidate.1 
§ 5. The present volume and remoter prospects. 
Critics acquainted with the treatises on general linguistics 
by Steinthal,2 Paul,3 von der Gabelentz,4 Marty,5 Wundt,6 
and a host of others will possibly be indignant at my 
implied pretension that the search for a comprehensive 
linguistic theory is something new. Far be it from me to 
decry or underestimate the very real merits of these learned 
and admirable works. Nevertheless the method here advo-
cated is relatively untried, and I believe that it holds out 
promise of greater success than previous efforts on account 
sprachlichen Gebilde, Heidelberg, 1902, p. 59: 'Zwischen Wort und Satz 
sind nach Wundt die Grenzen fliessend. Das ist nicht zu bezweifeln, und 
darum vielleicht stellt Wundt auch nirgends begrifflich fest, was das Wort 
eigentlich sei.' 
1
 See below, p. 61, the last paragraph of Additional Note B. 
2
 H. Steinthal, Abriss der Sprachwissenschaft, Part I, Die Sprache im 
Allgemeinen, 2nd edition, Berlin, 1881. 
3
 See above, p. 3, n. 1. 
4
 G. von der Gabelentz, Die Sprachwissenschaft, Leipzig, 1901. 
5
 A. Marty, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik 
und Sprachphilosophie, vol. i, Halle, 1906. 
* See above, p. 3, n. 2. 
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of its superior concreteness and its regard for all the fac-
tors of speech. The pioneer along this road was Philipp 
Wegener, a scholar whom I never had the honour of 
meeting, but to whose memory I venture to dedicate my 
book. Wegener1 was the first, so far as I know, to empha-
size the importance of the 'situation', and to determine 
the true reason for the dichotomy of 'subject' and 'predi-
cate'. His analysis of the 'verb' is equally valuable, and 
interspersed throughout his meagre and perhaps hastily 
written volume are illuminating remarks which reveal him 
as having possessed a linguistic outlook far in advance of 
his contemporaries. None, if I judge rightly, would have 
been fitter to expound a systematic and comprehensive 
theory of speech. In a sense, perhaps, he did expound such 
a theory, though I miss in his writings that analysis of a 
particular act of speech which to me seems the necessary 
point of departure. 
My own previous contributions to this topic have been 
confined to some general observations published in Man1 
and an article on the 'sentence' contributed to the British 
Journal of Psychology? My duties as an Egyptologist have, 
indeed, left but little time for any wider field of research. 
In a very literal sense the present volume is a parergon, 
having been written at the rate of about one chapter a 
year mainly during my summer holidays. At times I have 
been frightened at my temerity in making this incursion 
into a domain where I confess to being a mere adventurer. 
A number of colleagues and friends have encouraged me 
to persist. This first instalment outlines a general theory 
of speech and language, and deals with the sentence, both 
1
 In the book quoted above, p. 3, n. 5. 
2
 A. H. Gardiner, 'Some Thoughts on the Subject of Language', in 
Man, 1919, No. 2. 3 See above, p. 7, n. I. 
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form and substance, in some detail. T h e projected second 
volume, which at all events cannot appear for several years 
to come, will deal mainly with the word and its kinds, as 
well as with the various extensions of the word, in particu-
lar the phrase and the clause. I am, of course, well aware 
that there are important aspects of speech and language 
which I have as good as completely ignored. My interest 
being primarily semasiological, i.e. concerned with the 
function of speech as an instrument for conveying 
meaning, I have paid but small attention to either its 
sounds or its aesthetic bearings. 
Whatever the defects of the present work, I am confident 
that its method is sound and marks a real advance in the 
manner of regarding linguistic problems. It lay in the 
nature of the case that the treatment should be contro-
versial and tentative. My theory holding that all writing 
(written speech) implies an author addressing his public, 
I was less persuaded than are some of the virtue of an im-
personal tone. But I have the vision of three other books, 
more objective in their manner, to be written from a 
similar standpoint at perhaps no very remote date. The 
first of these will be an elementary grammar for children, 
free from the usual taint of abstraction and unreality which 
those hardest and sanest of critics are so quick to detect 
and condemn. T h e opening lesson will explain what men 
seek to achieve by speech, and how this is to be distin-
guished from language. Word and sentence will be con-
trasted as things fundamentally different, and the pupil 
will be made to recognize both of them as facts of daily 
experience; thus they will cease to be felt as figments 
expressly invented to torment the juvenile mind. In the 
hands of a good teacher, even such grim entities as nouns 
and adjectives may possibly come to be tolerated, or at 
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least no longer regarded with hostility. T h e second book 
I have in view will be a brief introductory treatise for 
young philologists, inculcating the right att i tude towards 
speech and language generally, and anticipating many of 
those illusions and fallacies which disfigure much of the 
technical linguistic literature of to-day. T h e last book of 
the future for which I look is far more ambitious in theme, 
and I hardly know how to foretell its trend. Its author 
will be, not only a consummate grammarian, but also 
a man of great intellect and wide humanity. His work 
will be addressed to all men of science, philosophers, and 
seekers after T ru th impartially, and will have as its starting-
point a very simple argument. No science or philosophy 
exists which is not presented in terms of written language. 
But the sentences and words used for this purpose are no 
more identical with that philosophy or science than a 
landscape framed and hung upon the wall is identical with 
the landscape seen from yonder hill. Every painter is well 
aware of the differences between his picture and what he 
set out to depict, and has at least some familiarity with 
the laws of perspective. Surely translation into another 
medium must involve much alteration and subjective bias. 
Is not a distortion similar to that of pictorial art inherent 
in all verbal description, and should not a solidly grounded 
linguistic theory be the recognized prolegomena to all 
serious thinking ? The position amounts to this: Does the 
present-day logician already possess a sound linguistic 
theory or does he not ? If not, the project on which I am 
now bent may well prove the seed-sowing for a new Logic. 
I 
SPEECH A N D T H E FACTORS INVOLVED 
T H E R E I N 
§ 6. The usual definition criticized. The objection to 
formal definitions is that, while they are seldom positively 
wrong, they are so often unhelpful, if not actually mis-
leading. Such is characteristically the case with the 
common definition of speech as the use of articulate 
sound-symbols for the expression of thought . Wi th slight 
verbal variations, this definition is found throughout the 
whole range of general treatises on language, old and new 
alike.1 And indeed, if the term ' thought ' be interpreted 
widely enough, there is little here to which one can take 
serious exception. Everything that is spoken of must, at all 
events in a metaphorical way, pass through the mind of the 
speaker before it is put into words. In this sense speech 
does really subserve the expression of thought . The main 
objection to the current definition is then, not that it is 
untrue, but rather that it leads nowhere, that it contains 
no fructifying principle. As applied to many samples of 
speech, the description is even grotesque. Consider a 
mother anxiously asking for news of her son, or a trades-
man driving a hard bargain. Or again, imagine an angry 
traveller hurling words of abuse at an uncomprehending 
porter, or a judge pronouncing sentence of death upon a 
murderer . Shall we say that these persons are expressing 
thought ? We may do so, of course, without departing 
from the strict t ruth, but such a statement would be, to 
1
 See the definitions by Paxil, Sapir, Sweet, Whitney, Wissler, and Wundt 
collected in G. de Laguna, Speech, its Function and Development, New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1927, pp. 12 foll. 
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say the least, singularly inept. There are, however, cases 
where this description is both natural and appropriate, as 
when, for example, a lecturer is explaining some scientific 
discovery or analysing some philosophic subtlety. This 
gives us the clue to the source of the definition here im-
pugned. Its academic origin is only too apparent, reflect-
ing as it does the habits of the teacher, so different from 
those of the man in the street. The dislike of the ordinary 
mortal for serious thinking is proverbial, and yet speech is 
one of his commonest occupations. If any normal, semi-
educated person could be brought to discuss the why and 
the wherefore of speech, he would probably say that it 
gives people the opportunity of talking about the things 
they are interested in, though he would admit that a good 
deal of conversation is about nothing in particular. He 
would assuredly scoff at the notion that speech serves 
mainly to effect the expression of thought. In order, 
therefore, to elicit the true nature of speech, we must 
survey the facts from a position more central and more 
commonplace than that of the philosopher or man of 
science. As a first approximation let us define speech as the 
use, between man and man, of articulate sound-signs for 
the communication of their wishes and their views about 
things. Note that I do not at tempt to deny the thought-
element in speech, but the emphasis of my definition does 
not lie on that element. The points which I wish to 
stress are, firstly, the co-operative character of speech, and, 
secondly, the fact that it is always concerned with things, 
that is to say with the realities both of the external world 
and of man's inner experience. 
§ 7. The social origin of speech: the listener. We are 
often warned, and wisely, against basing far-reaching con-
clusions on theories of origin. These are bound to be 
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conjectural in a high degree, and nowhere more so than in 
the cases of language and speech. Still, the philologist can 
barely escape from some working hypothesis regarding the 
genesis of speech, and it may be well here to point out that 
its origin cannot be conceived of otherwise than as the 
result of social conditions. True, the ultimate basis must 
be the involuntary cry of the individual animal. This was, 
I suppose, at the outset little more than the audible result 
of muscular movements due to the incidence of some 
external stimulus. The squeal of the trapped rabbit pro-
vides the type. But such emotional monologue is very far 
removed from speech, nor could any amount of variety 
either in the stimuli or in the reactions ever have given rise 
to anything resembling a real language. For the develop-
ment of a language we are bound to assume a purposeful 
use of articulate utterances in order to influence the con-
duct of others. Speech of a kind undoubtedly exists among 
many species of animals. Naturalists have observed and 
recorded the warning or courting cries of birds and 
monkeys, besides other cries connected with food or with 
the building of the home. It is by means of such signals 
that one member of the flock or family helps another or 
m turn profits by his companion's aid. Recent research 
becomes more and more unwilling to admit, or at least to 
assume, the purposive character of these signals. But it is 
generally recognized that they mark a stage in the evolu-
tion of speech, and that they do, in fact, perform the 
functions ascribed to them.1 Thus, the utility of animal 
cries as a means of communication is not in doubt, though 
their purposiveness is unproved. Apart from this, the 
chief difference between animal speech and human speech 
1
 See the careful formulation of the problem in J. Ward, Psychological 
Principles, Cambridge, 1920, pp. 287-8. 
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consists in the extreme poverty and vagueness of the 
former. The warning cry, for example, affirms the presence 
of a danger without specifying it, and at the same time 
serves as an exhortation to resist it. Such human utterances 
as the cry of Fire! still resemble the animal cry in the latter 
point, but are far more explicit as regards the former. 
Without indulging in any questionable speculations, we 
may be sure that the gradual building up of a well-stocked 
vocabulary, such as even the most primitive man pos-
sesses, advanced pari passu with the ever-increasing com-
plexity of tribal life, and was the outcome of the growing 
demand for more precise information as to the exact facts 
perceived, as to the exact emotions felt, and as to the 
exact responses desired. 
Thus at every stage the mutual interaction of speaker 
and listener is presupposed. We see how futile it is to 
describe the purpose of speech as the expression of thought . 
Why, after all, should men go about expressing their 
thoughts ? For their intellectual needs the mere thinking 
is enough. For the satisfaction of such desires as they can 
achieve unaided they have at their disposal muscles and 
limbs. And if the emotions should require some vocal out-
let, they can shout or laugh or shriek or groan. But speech, 
with its deliberate and calculated pointing at things, is 
emphatically not explained by self-expression. It is, on the 
other hand, easily accounted for by recognizing that man-
kind is gregarious and dependent upon co-operation. The 
impulse to seek the help of our fellow men is both powerful 
and universal. Nor will anyone deny that speech is the prin-
cipal means whereby, in fact, that help is obtained. The 
problem, then, must necessarily take the form: Is the co-
operative employment of speech primary and original, or is 
it only secondary and derivative ? A school of philosophy 
§7 THE L I S T E N E R 21 
fashionable at the present time equates aesthetics and 
linguistics, or in other terms asserts the identity of speech 
and self-expression. But it is significant that the pro-
tagonist of this view (Croce) undertakes no careful investi-
gations into the nature of the word and the sentence, 
but is content with dogmatic and, if the t ru th be told, 
very slap-dash assertions.1 At a later stage (§66) I shall find 
it necessary to make important concessions to the ex-
pressionistic standpoint, but this must not be allowed to 
eclipse the fact that speech is fundamentally a social 
activity. Those who have the patience to read my book 
to the end will have to admit, further, that language is no 
personal creation, but a codified science built up by a 
myriad minds with a view to mutual understandings. If 
language has proved necessary for thought of an abstract 
kind and for intellectual self-expression, that function is 
secondary and a by-product, so to speak; surely the 
primary function of speech was to facilitate co-operation 
in such matters as could not be indicated by mere pointing 
or gesticulation. Its vocal character is decisive : Why ex-
press oneself aloud, unless it be that inner thoughts are 
inaccessible to other individuals, while uttered sound-
signs are accessible to them ?2 Upon those who refuse to 
accept this view lies the onus of explaining how, if lan-
guage arose out of the individual urge to self-expression, it 
came to be employed later and secondarily for co-operative 
ends. To cut short this discussion, let it be noted that the 
expressionistic theory fails to account for either questions 
or commands. In asking for information the speaker tries 
to make use of the listener's knowledge, and in giving an 
order he exerts his authority over the listener to make him 
See B. Croce, Aesthetic, Engl, translation, London, 1922, especially 
PP. 142 foll. 2 See below, § 23. 
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perform some action desired by himself. The necessity of 
the sociological attitude to speech seems herewith to be 
finally vindicated, and the listener stands forth as an essen-
tial factor in its normal occurrence.1 
§ 8. The things spoken about. A still graver defect of 
the current definition of speech is that it makes no allusion 
to 'things'. Yet common sense and English idiom alike tell 
us that we can talk about 'things', and indeed that utter-
ances which do not refer to 'something' are not speech at 
all. The statement that speech serves to express thought 
simply ignores the fact that I can speak about this pen 
with which I am writing, about my house, my books, my 
family, and, in short, about everything else in the world. 
If linguistic theory is ever to make a wide appeal, it must 
clearly be placed upon a more realistic basis than at present. 
The rudest villager knows that he can talk about all the 
various things which he can see or touch . Why, then, 
should that t ruth be hidden from the theorist of language ? 
Let us, however, be just. The writers responsible for the 
definition here criticized are scholars whose acumen and 
ability have been proved by admirable researches. We 
must t ry to understand the reasons for which they have 
omitted to mention 'things'. I shall reserve for the next 
section my discussion of what I believe to have been the 
principal reason. Here I shall deal only with some of the 
more obvious lines of defence that might be adopted. In 
the first place it is true, as pointed out above, that every-
thing that is spoken about must, in a sense, pass through the 
speaker's mind; must, as one might say, be previously trans-
muted into thought. In the second place, material objects 
and sensible phenomena are not the only things to which 
we can refer; we can talk equally well about abstractions, 
1
 See Additional Note A at the end of this chapter, p. 57. 
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about feelings, or about creations of the imagination. Thus 
the term ' thought ' might seem required to cover the entire 
field of the subject-matter of speech. And, lastly, it must 
not be forgotten that all schools of grammarians are now 
agreed that the unit of speech is not the word, but the 
sentence. Consequently, when we inquire what a cer-
tain utterance is about, our question refers not merely to 
the nouns in the sentence, but is concerned with the 
signification of the sentence as a whole; and this can never 
be just a concrete object. Take, for example, the sentence 
Pussy is beautiful. From the standpoint just mentioned, 
what is spoken about is not merely Pussy, but the beauty 
of Pussy. Thus, even if it be admitted that speech may 
refer to concrete things, it will at least be said that speech 
always refers to them in a certain aspect. And aspects can 
(so the argument might run) better be described as 
' thoughts' or 'thoughts about things' than actually as 
'things'. 
I shall discuss these three possible lines of defence in 
inverse order. (1) The general t ru th of the argument 
about 'aspects' is undeniable, but it is irrelevant. To say 
that Pussy is beautiful may indeed be to express a thought 
about something, but there is no reason to deny that a 
thought about something is in itself a thing. For to 
describe the reference of a complete sentence as a ' thing' 
is not only in accord with common linguistic usage, but is 
also vital and fundamental for a satisfactory theory of 
speech. English permits us to say: That Pussy is beautiful 
is a THING which can be expressed in many different ways. 
Or again: Pussy beautiful? I never heard of such a THING! 
You said someTHING quite different a few minutes ago. 
Commands and questions may also be taken as 'things', 
e.g. The question lhow much did he spend?' is a THING you 
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are not entitled, to ask; The order to start work at 6.0 a.m. 
was a THING unparalleled. . . . With a little contriving it 
could be shown that the gist of any sentence could be 
described as a ' thing' without departing from the general 
usage of our native tongue and thought. But a much more 
cogent argument in favour of my contention is the fact 
that, as explained at the beginning of this section, a sample 
of genuine speech which does not deal with some 'thing' 
is impossible to conceive.1 
Now the ' thing' which is referred to in speech is as 
much outside it as are the 'speaker' and the 'listener'. 
These three are, indeed, factors of speech, though not parts 
of it. Being such, it is no positive duty of the theorist of 
language to prove their existence or explain their nature, 
except in so far as they affect, or are affected by, speech. 
Those factors of speech which are not speech lie outside 
the philologist's province, and in seeking to determine 
their characters he incurs the risk of trespassing upon the 
domains of other sciences. Nevertheless, in the present 
case that risk must be run, since the very existence of 
'things' as the object of linguistic activity seems to be in 
dispute. That 'things' to be spoken about are not simply 
illusory, and that , furthermore, they are extra-verbal (i.e. 
outside the words) is indicated by the two complementary 
facts that (a) one and the same 'thing' can be expressed 
1
 This book having been written in English, and primarily addressed to 
an English-speaking public, it has been impossible to take into account the 
difficulties which might arise in foreign languages over this wide concept 
of 'things'. German might make shift with Gegenstand, a general term 
covering both Sache and Ding. I fancy that French chose will serve in 
most cases. In English itself a strain is felt only through the inclusion of 
persons in the category of 'things'. That inclusion is necessary for my 
linguistic theory, and such a terminological awkwardness does not, of 
course, affect the substance of my argument. 
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(i.e. referred to) in various different ways (i.e. by several 
different sentences), and (b) that one and the same sen-
tence may, on separate occasions, refer to various different 
'things', (a) Instead of Pussy is beautiful there might be 
substituted Tour cat is very lovely; Minette est bien belle; 
Ihre Katze ist von einer fabelhaften Schonheit, &c , &c. If 
it be argued that these four sentences express, or refer to, 
four different things, it may quite fairly be retorted that 
they express one and the same thing, only this thing has 
been slightly diversified, or differently decked out, in the 
course of alluding to it.1 The argument is like that which 
asserts that Philip drunk is not the same person as Philip 
sober. It is, indeed, a true and lamentable fact that , in 
ultimate analysis, one cannot speak about anything with-
out altering it to some extent.2 In the present instance, at 
all events, I have had before my mind one particular 
'thing', and I feel satisfied that this ' thing' is adequately 
represented to my readers in each of the four sentences 
given above, (b) Again, the single sentence Pussy is beauti-
ful might refer to many different 'things'. The word 
Pussy might refer to a variety of cats, black, tabby, grey, 
Persian, &c.; and the quality of beauty intended might 
vary in like manner . In the context where I first employed 
this example Pussy served merely as substitute for any-
thing X denoted by a noun, and beautiful as substitute for 
anything Y denoted by an adjective. No real cat and no 
real beauty were involved. 
(2) I now turn to possible defence No. 2. It must first 
be pointed out that , though the unit of speech is the 
sentence and hence the ' thing' signified by every such unit 
1
 Here the principle which I have named 'Depth of Intention' comes 
into view. For this see below, §§ 17, 27, and p. 257. 
2
 This theme is developed at some length in my fifth chapter; see §§ 65-7. 
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is always of complex kind—a state of things, as we might 
say, or a Sachverhalt, if we prefer to use the convenient 
German equivalent1—yet that ' thing' may involve or con-
tain a number of other ' things' . Just as the ' thing' called 
a house comprises other things such as doors, windows, 
curtains, floors, so too the thing denoted by a sentence 
comprises as many things as there are words in it. When 
the sentence Pussy is beautiful is used of a real cat of flesh 
and blood, both the single word Pussy and also the sen-
tence as a whole may be said to refer to the ' thing' which 
is that cat. In similar fashion all material concrete objects 
can undoubtedly be talked about, and any theory of speech 
which glosses over this important t ruth is likely to suffer 
in consequence. At the present moment the contention 
which we are required to meet is that it would be better 
to substitute ' thoughts ' for 'things' in conformity with the 
usual definition of speech, seeing that abstractions, feel-
ings, and purely imaginary entities can all be spoken about 
no less easily than concrete objects, and that the former 
belong to the mental, not to the physical, world. Other-
wise said, the term 'thoughts' is preferred to 'things' on 
the ground that it is more comprehensive. To this I 
reply (a) that the term 'thoughts' is not really more com-
prehensive, and (b) that the term 'thoughts' presents a 
serious ambiguity. As regards the first point (a), note 
that English very often does employ the term 'thing' in 
reference to abstractions, as in the sentence: Religion is a 
THING of great value; in reference to feelings, as in What 
a wonderful THING is enthusiasm!; and in reference to 
pure fictions, as in Centaurs are not real THINGS. There is, 
1
 The term usually employed in English for Sachverhalt is 'content', but 
that term implies the very fallacy which I am attempting to controvert 
namely that the signification of a sentence is 'contained' in its words. 
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indeed, absolutely no ground for affirming that ' thoughts' is 
a wider term than ' things' , (b) In the second place, the word 
' thought ' shows a bifurcation in its meaning, on the one 
hand in the direction of 'that which is thought ' , on the 
other hand in the direction of 'processes or acts of thinking' . 
Now in distinguishing things like 'religion' or 'enthusiasm' 
or 'centaurs' from concrete objects like 'cats' or 'houses', 
and in qualifying the former as ' thoughts ' instead of 
'things', there seems to be some confusion between these 
two employments of the word ' thought ' . It appears to be 
implied that abstractions, feelings, and fictions, just be-
cause they are not objects of perception, are instantaneous, 
personal creations out of the void. Nothing could be 
further from the t ru th . Tha t 'religion' is a real thing, 
independent of any one individual mind that experiences 
it, is vouched for by the millions to whom it is an all-
pervading influence. Tha t 'enthusiasm' can be shared is 
a sign that it is no individual emanation. And 'centaurs' 
have amused and inspired generations of artists. 'Religion' 
and 'enthusiasm' and 'centaurs' are 'things' at least in the 
sense that they are elements in man's existence which have 
their appointed place and possibility of recurrence. 
(3) I come now to the argument that everything that is 
spoken about must first be transmuted into thought . But 
it is clear that this is only an inaccurate and figurative way 
of emphasizing the fact that speech cannot take place 
without some previous presentations in the speaker's mind . 
What is 'presented' is not for that reason ' transmuted' . 
There is no hocus-pocus in speech which can transform 
Pussy into a psychical enti ty; there she remains in her 
basket, purring quite unconcernedly. Instead of ' trans-
mutation', we might possibly use the term 'reflection', 
since man seems to be in the position of a being condemned 
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to look at the external world solely through the medium of 
mirrors. When a speaker refers to anything, he has first to 
see it mirrored in his mind, and similarly when a listener 
apprehends anything, he has first to see it mirrored in his 
mind.1 But perhaps it will be argued that abstractions and 
the like are not mirrored in the mind, but were there to 
start with. At this point in the controversy, however, the 
philologist will realize that he has been beguiled into a 
discussion which is outside his province. He will repeat 
that both common sense and our ineradicable habits of 
thought make it necessary to regard whatever is talked of 
as a ' thing' . He may perhaps hazard the doubt whether in 
this connexion ' thing' means much more than 'terminus', 
a goal or ending behind which we do not look. But he will 
also submit that, even though a debate might turn upon 
whether or not the moon is made of green cheese, the fact 
that several persons can simultaneously direct their atten-
tions to this topic gives it something of the appearance of 
fixity and externality which we are accustomed to associate 
with 'things'. And here he will surrender the issue to the 
tender mercies of the metaphysicians. 
§ 9. Words. Thus the speaker, the listener, and the 
things spoken about are three essential factors of normal 
speech. To these must now be added the actual words 
themselves. There has never, of course, been any risk that 
philologists would overlook this fourth factor. On the con-
trary, words have assumed such importance in the eyes of 
all who have dealt with speech and language that time and 
time again they have totally eclipsed the three other fac-
tors. This I believe to be the hidden fallacy lurking in the 
common definition of speech as the use of articulate sound-
symbols for the expression of thought. The error arises 
1
 For further discussion of this fact see below, pp. 142-3. 
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from the two-sidedness of words, from the fact that they 
indeed are, as speech in the current definition is supposed 
to be, sound on the one face, and thought on the other . 
And is it not , at first sight, a plausible view that words 
constitute the whole t ru th of speech ? A word or sequence 
of words is uttered, its sound is heard, and its sense appre-
hended. The transaction might seem as simple as the 
giving of a cheque in the place of cash. The scholar's habit 
of attending too exclusively to books has probably done 
much to encourage this illusion. In books speaker, listener, 
and things are well out of the way. Words alone are seen 
on the printed page, and they carry their meaning ap-
parently without recourse to the three factors which I 
would fain add to them. Gradually, however, writers on 
the theory of language have come to realize that actual 
speech is the source from which healthier views on the 
subject can alone be obtained. Speaker and listener have 
thus, in recent treatises, recovered much of the importance 
due to them. Things, on the other hand, are almost com-
pletely ignored, and to all but a few the doctrine of the 
distinction between the meaning of words and the things 
meant by them will come as a revolutionary thesis, if not 
as a damnable heresy. 
§ 10. Meaning and thing-meant. Yet the distinction 
is really incontestable, and seems to me essential for any 
true understanding of the nature of speech. In the case 
of material objects my contention will be quickly con-
ceded. When I Say to a friend Cake? holding out the plate, 
the thing meant by the word is eatable, while the meaning 
of the word is not. When I say Oxygen is an element, the 
thing meant by oxygen can be isolated in a test-tube, while 
the meaning of the word oxygen cannot . Take again the 
pronoun I. This has as its meaning the speaker in every 
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case; but when you are speaking, the thing meant by the 
word I is you. My point is perhaps less obvious in the case 
of abstractions, but there, too, it is not open to doubt. 
In the section dealing with 'things' (§ 8, p. 27) reasons 
have been given why religion should be regarded as a thing. 
But it is not the meaning of the word religion which stirs 
such emotions, which can create saints and inquisitors; 
only the thing meant by religion can do that. 
Let us look at the matter from another angle. We are 
here discussing speech and language, and are agreed, I 
suppose, that these are not ends in themselves, but 
methods of attaining certain ends. But the meaning of a 
word is something inherent in it, something inseparable 
from it. Word-meaning is, in fact, a purely philological 
affair. If speech is not to remain suspended in mid-air as 
indeed a means to an end, but without any visible end, 
then we must recognize the existence of things for speech 
to refer to . Nor are things factors of speech only; they are 
factors of our universe, of our life, of our whole being. 
The distinction between 'meaning' and ' thing-meant' 
runs through speech in all its manifestations, and applies 
equally to whole sentences and to the separate words 
which enter into their composition. Since it is impossible 
to expound a thesis of such wide application in all its 
bearings at once, my illustrations have hitherto been 
confined to nouns. However, we shall soon see that the 
distinction holds good, not only of spoken nouns, but also 
of spoken verbs and adjectives, and indeed even of those 
minor elements in our vocabulary which we somewhat 
contemptuously lump together under the heading of 
'particles' (see below, § 13). The applicability of the 
same distinction to whole sentences is obscured by the fact 
that 'meaning' in the sense here intended is customarily 
§10 M E A N I N G AND T H I N G - M E A N T 31 
restricted to words, and not extended to the total 'expres-
sion' of a sentence. Substituting 'expression' for 'meaning' 
we find ourselves on familiar ground. No difficulty is felt 
in contrasting the opinion or sentiment which is the gist 
of a sentence with the manner in which it is expressed. 
This opinion or that sentiment is extra-verbal in the sense 
that its expression may differ on different occasions, and 
that it may be entertained without being expressed at all. 
Such an opinion or sentiment is the ' thing-meant ' under-
lying the sentence which serves as its expression; and the 
expression is simply a sequence of words or purveyors of 
'meaning' strung together in the appropriate arrangement 
known, as we shall later learn (§ 50), as 'sentence-form'. 
Thus the distinction between 'meaning' and ' thing-
meant' applies no less to sentences than to single words.1 
The analysis of word-meaning will be the topic of the 
next few sections. Here we may profitably dwell a little 
longer on the ' thing-meant ' . In describing this as extra-
verbal, I do not declare it to be real or materially existent. 
It is existent, or accepted, merely for the purpose of 
speech. T h e world in which speech moves and has its 
being is a curious conglomerate of fact and fiction. When 
I untruthfully say The centaur is an animal found in Greece, 
the gist of my sentence is false, i.e. not in conformity with 
reality. But my listener accepts my ' thing-meant ' as 
something existent, not only for me, but also for himself. 
This is hinted by the form he gives to his words when he 
contradicts me. He then says, The centaur is not an animal 
found, in Greece. Similarly as regards the component words 
of these sentences. T h e 'centaur' is a creature of the 
imagination, while 'Greece' is a fact of the external world. 
For speaker and listener the centaur and Greece both 
1
 See Additional Note B at the end of this chapter, p. 58. 
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exist as possible subjects of conversation. This in-and-
out-of-reality is characteristic of all speech. Speakers and 
listeners treat the things with which they deal on the 
same level of reality. Or rather, the question of their 
existence or non-existence is ignored; if raised at all, it is 
raised, not during the act of speaking or understanding, 
but only at a later stage. 
There is nothing mystical, disputable, or recondite 
about the distinction here made when once it has been 
firmly grasped. Nor is it new, indeed; I am only trying to 
revive the old scholastic doctrine of suppositio, while keep-
ing it clear of the sophistries and hair-splitting to which it 
was subjected in medieval times.1 In plain English, all I 
am maintaining is tha t the things we talk about are to be 
distinguished from the words with which we talk about 
them. Things must occur to our minds before they can be 
clothed in words. This correlation of ' thing-meant' and 
'meaning' is itself variously described by the various 
scientific disciplines on whose territory linguistic science 
borders. The biologist will regard the thing-meant as the 
'stimulus' to which the meaning is the 'reaction'. Consider, 
for example, the warning cry of the chamois. This has 
the constant and inseparable meaning of 'Danger!' with 
which the chamois 'reacts' when 'stimulated' thereto by 
the approach of a huntsman or aeroplane. The term 
' thing-meant ' can be properly employed only when the 
purposive plane of speech has been reached (§ 7); but in 
so far as the cry of the chamois calls the attention of other 
1
 Of this doctrine a brief but luminous account is given in K. O. 
Erdmann, Die Bedeutung des Wortes, Leipzig, 1922, pp. 66 foll. The author 
of that admirable book is among the few who have recognized how neces-
sary the scholastic doctrine, at least in its broad outlines, is for the theory of 
speech, as well as for its practical interpretation. 
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field of possibilities is so narrowed that the guesser sees 
what is meant. 
In exactly the same way the function of words is to 
make the listener 'see what is meant'. They are, in fact, 
'clues'. The thing-meant is itself never shown, but has to 
be identified by the listener on the basis of the word-
meanings submitted to him for that purpose. It is true 
that most of the sentences to which we daily give utterance 
are much more complex than the simple operations evoked 
by me to illustrate the process. Still, the general t ru th of 
the account given above emerges from the consideration 
of such a phrase as your old brown hat. The word your 
indicates the possessor of the thing meant by the speaker 
but as yet unknown to the listener. Old and brown suc-
cessively indicate qualities of that thing which will assist 
in its identification. Hat affords the final clue; it is not a 
suit or a hand-bag of the type described by old and brown 
that is meant, though the listener possesses both. The 
thing-meant is an object belonging to the category of hats. 
The listener now has in his mind's eye the real article 
intended. 
§ 12. A preliminary account of word-meaning. No 
amount of pedantic advice is going to cure anyone of 
loose speech, for which it is a good defence that, so long as 
we can make our audience understand what is intended, 
the language employed is a secondary consideration. An 
observatory chronometer need not be used to keep an 
appointment for tea. I do not imagine for a moment that 
the distinction established in the last two sections will pre-
vent even scholars from employing the term 'meaning' in 
the sense of ' thing-meant' . They will continue, as before, 
to designate both word-meaning and thing-meant by the 
same ambiguous term, and also to speak of the various 
§12 W O R D - M E A N I N G 35 
'meanings' of a single word. Such approximate statements 
are, in my opinion, no very serious offence, so long as the 
real facts of the matter are clearly grasped and are re-
membered when the problems of grammar come up for 
discussion. 
Can a word have more than one meaning ? This ques-
tion may be answered both affirmatively and negatively, 
according to the point of view. There is a very real and 
important sense in which each word has only one meaning, 
as I shall proceed to show. Every word is a heritage from 
the past, and has derived its meaning from application to 
a countless number of particulars differing among them-
selves either much or little. When now I utter such a 
word, I throw at the listener's head the entire residue of 
all its previous applications. Indeed, how could I do 
otherwise ? Most words are pronounced in a trice, and 
how should I be able, within so brief a space, to pick out 
from a multi tude of meanings just that one which will 
suit the present occasion ? In ut ter ing a word, the speaker 
necessarily offers to the listener the whole range of its 
meaning. So far as that one word is concerned he has no 
alternative, though he may, and often does, add other 
words which indicate what part of the meaning he had 
in view. To take an example: if I say ball, this word 
comes to my listener charged with the possibilities of 
cannon-ball, football, tennis-ball, as well as a dance, and 
much else. It remains for the listener to select from the 
whole range of meaning offered that aspect or part of it 
which suits the context or situation. If the words Help 
yourselves/ are heard in a sermon, a very different interpre-
tation will be given to the verb help than if the same words 
are heard at a tea-party. 
The meaning of any word may be looked at in two 
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animals to the huntsman or aeroplane, to that extent the 
one or the other is, on its own particular occasion, the 
thing-meant.1 The psychologist will insist upon the 'sub-
jective' character of meaning, and upon the 'objective', 
or at least relatively 'objective', character of the thing-
meant. The logician who discerns predication at the root 
of all use of words will discover a 'predicate' in my 'mean-
ing', and a 'subject' in my ' thing-meant ' . Lastly, the 
grammarian has his own metaphors for picturing to him-
self the correlation of 'meaning' and ' thing-meant ' . As he 
sees it, the meaning of a word or sentence qualifies the 
thing meant by it in the way that a predicatival adjective 
qualifies a noun. In the jargon of grammar speech is ad-
jectival, and the universe to which it refers is substantival. 
§ 11. The function of word-meaning. I now return 
to 'words' and 'word-meaning'. My argument having de-
prived words of some of their importance by denying the 
self-sufficiency of their meanings, it will naturally be asked 
what value I do attribute to them. My answer is that they 
are primarily instrumental, that their function is to force 
or cajole the listener into looking at certain things. The 
speaker may be compared to a commercial traveller who is 
unable to show the actual wares in which he traffics, but 
who carries in his bag various samples and books of pat-
terns. Another comparison which will answer my pur-
pose equally well is the familiar game of animal, vegetable, 
or mineral. One of the party is sent out of the room, 
while the remainder decide upon something which he is to 
guess. The guesser, on his return, puts a series of questions 
which may be answered only by Yes or No. Is it animal? 
Is it vegetable? Is it mineral? And so forth, until the 
1
 See the remarks on the technical meaning of the words sign, symbol, 
symptom, below, p. 101, n. 1. 
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different ways, either subjectively or objectively. The 
subjective or introspective way of looking at word-meaning 
is often very complex. Involved in the meaning of a noun 
like horse, apart from all the variations enumerated in the 
dictionary, are such grammatical implications as substan-
tiality and singularity.1 The way of introspection is the 
only way in which the quality of word-meaning can be 
felt and appraised. The external or objective way consists 
in noting all the different things-meant to which the word 
can be applied, for example, this brown cab-horse, that 
grey race-horse, the nursery rocking-horse, the horse of 
Troy, horse as a kind of meat, the gymnasium horse, the 
towel-horse. In point of fact the two methods of regard-
ing word-meaning are inseparable. Introspection alone 
can discern the identities and similarities which make 
possible a general survey, while a reference to the things-
meant is necessary if introspection is to perform its part 
adequately. 
We can perhaps best picture to ourselves the meaning 
of a word such as horse by considering it as a territory or 
area over which the various possibilities of correct applica-
tion are mapped out.2 Consequently, I shall often make 
use of the expression 'area of meaning'. If a short-sighted 
person points at a cow in the distance, and says Look at 
that horse! he will perhaps be understood, but no cow is 
among the things accepted as meant by the word horse. 
Cows are, in fact, 'off the map' so far as the word-meaning 
horse is concerned, or, otherwise put, the meanings of 
cow and of horse do not overlap.3 But within the legitimate 
1
 These implications of meaning will later be described as 'word-form', 
see below, § 41. 
2
 I do not know from what source I derived the notion of an 'area of 
meaning', but that the same comparison has occurred to others is clear 
from Erdmann, Bedeutung, pp. 4-5. 3 See below, p. 173. 
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range of the word-meaning horse the various things meant 
will be differently grouped, some rather near the border-
line, and others distinctly central. An eminent physio-
logist told me that the mention of the word horse always 
conjured up for him the image of a prancing white steed. 
To myself as a poor visualizer such a visual image would 
appear an obstacle to comprehension rather than a help, 
particularly when towel-horses or gymnasium horses are 
the subject of conversation.1 At all events such an image 
shows that , for that particular sujet parlant, prancing 
white horses were right in the centre of the word-meaning 
horse. Doubtless for most of us live horses of one kind and 
another are pret ty central. A slight strain is felt when 
horse is applied to toy horses, a greater strain when it is 
applied to the gymnasium horse, and a still greater strain 
when it is applied to a towel-horse. In terms of our map, 
these applications grow increasingly peripheral. 
§ 13. The relation of words to the things referred to 
in speech. The relation of word to thing-meant may be 
defined in two ways: either the word expresses the class 
of the thing-meant, or else it qualifies the thing-meant 
in the manner that a predicative adjective might qualify 
it.2 Both descriptions amount to the same in reality, but 
1
 For the different kinds of images under which words are conceived by 
different individuals see Th . Ribot, L'evolution des idées générales, Paris, 
1897. ch. iv. Visual or typographic images are commoner than the purely 
auditory; the commonest case is where the person questioned replies that 
the word represents to him nothing at all. Such images appear to me to 
have no importance whatever for linguistic theory, though doubtless they 
are closely connected with their possessors' dominating interests, and are 
consequently not without influence upon the choice of topics. 
2
 In this discussion I deliberately avoid the terms 'connotation' ('inten-
sion') and 'denotation' ('extension'), since these arise from a way of looking 
at speech different from my own, and accordingly bear only a superficial 
resemblance to my terms 'meaning' and 'thing-meant'. 
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it will be best to consider them separately. It belongs to 
the nature of a 'word', as that term is universally under-
stood, to be utilizable over and over again in many different 
contexts and situations. This being the case, it is obvious 
that every word is susceptible of referring to many differ-
ent particular things, to each of which it applies as a sort 
of common label. Hence every word without exception 
is a class-name; in uttering it the speaker is virtually saying, 
'Here is a class, and the thing I mean you to understand 
belongs to that class'. The class is known to the listener 
by his previous experiences, the word having been applied 
by others or by himself to many other things falling 
under the same class. The thing now meant may or may 
not have been among the previous experiences associated 
with the word. If it has been, the listener identifies it by 
sheer memory; if not , he recognizes it by its resemblance 
to some of those previous experiences. For example: My 
uncle has bought a new horse. The thing-meant is the 
actual horse recently bought by my uncle; this I have 
not seen, but I catch my first glimpse of it, so to speak, 
by comparing my previous experiences of what is meant 
by the word horse with my knowledge of my uncle's 
preferences in horseflesh. But the sentence might have 
been: My uncle has sold his old horse. Now I know that 
old horse, and have heard it often alluded to by my 
uncle as my horse. Here the thing-meant has for me 
been long included in the class horse, so that, aided by 
the context, I have no difficulty in identifying it once 
again. 
At the end of § 10 it was explained that every utterance 
is, and must of necessity be, virtually adjectival and pre-
dicatival. A word expresses the speaker's reaction to the 
thing spoken about. Thus when I say my old hat I am in 
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substance saying to the listener: 'Think of something 
which I have felt, and you will feel, as being-mine, being-
old, being-hat. ' The listener, having the power of identi-
fying things that are hats, and old, and mine, by their 
resemblance to one another as members of these classes, 
will find no difficulty in understanding what I mean. We 
must, however, forestall possible objections to this second 
way of describing the relation of words to the things 
meant by them . An objector might say: 'On your view, 
then, every word is an adjective; but that proposition is 
palpably false.' To this I should reply that the objector 
does not know what an adjective really is. In the Foreword 
(p . 9) I pointed out that the distinctions which we know 
by the incorrect name of the 'parts of speech' are really 
distinctions in the ways in which the things meant by 
words are presented to the listener. An adjective, on this 
view, is the name of a thing presented to the listener, not 
as a thing, but as an attribute.1 Beautiful, for instance, 
is a word displaying 'beauty' as the attr ibute of something 
else. Here, however, we are not discussing the things 
meant by words, but the relation of the words themselves 
to the things meant by them in speech, and we say that 
the words, or more precisely, the word-meanings, are 
adjectival to, i.e. presented as attributes of, the things-
meant. Thus the first objection is entirely irrelevant. 
A second objection that might be raised is of a similar 
kind, and admits of a similar answer. ' If , it might be 
urged, 'word-meanings are adjectival to the things-meant, 
then the things-meant must always be nouns, since adjec-
tives (if understood in our ordinary grammatical sense) can 
only qualify nouns. But ' , the objector will continue, ' the 
1
 For the present I ignore the fact that an adjective may function in-
congruently as a noun; see below, §§ 4--6 , for incongruent function. 
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things meant by in and is and very are not nouns. ' Now 
it is quite true that in actual speech, as in the sentence 
It is very cold in this room, the things presented to the 
listener by is, by very, and by in are not indicated by 
nouns. But it belongs to the very nature of a ' thing' that 
it can be looked at from different angles and in different 
aspects. As the things meant by is, by very, and by in are 
presented in the sentence It is very cold in this room, they 
are not presented as the things that they really are, but 
as verb, adverb, and preposition respectively. When, how-
ever, we are discussing the relation of these words to the 
things meant by them, we necessarily think of those things 
as things, i.e. in the substantival way which demands the 
use of nouns. It may help to elucidate this rather subtle 
point if I am able to show that the thing meant by any 
word in any sentence may always be described by a noun 
or the equivalent of a noun.1 In our illustrative sentence 
the thing meant by is may be fairly characterized with 
the words 'the affirmed existence of cold in this room', the 
thing meant by very with the words ' the high degree of 
cold in this room', and the thing meant by in with the 
words 'position in this room of great cold'. As regards 
those things it is quite correct to say that the meanings 
of is, very, and in are adjectival; is, in the here relevant 
part of its meaning, signifies 'being of the nature of an 
affirmation', very has the meaning 'being of high degree', 
and in has the meaning 'being inside'. It must be admitted 
that it would be rather hard to describe in the form of 
a noun the thing meant, for instance, by whom in the man 
1
 This is a good moment for remarking that all discussions about 'words' 
and 'things' suffer from the inherent vice that things cannot be displayed 
as such, i.e. in their crude substantival reality, but have to be represented by 
words, which deputize for them rather badly. 
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whom I saw, but one can at least discern the lines along 
which this could be attempted .1 
I am not at all sure that my answer to these two possible 
objections will not obscure the issue rather than clarify it, 
but in that case the last paragraph may be ignored. I now 
turn to the problem of proper names, and shall examine 
the question whether they too can be considered as class-
names, and whether their meaning must be conceived of 
as adjectival. A proper name, in so far as it remains a real 
proper name, is a word which refers only to one individual 
thing, usually a person or place. There is nothing self-
contradictory in the notion of a class of one, though such 
a notion is naturally only of theoretical interest. But, 
from the standpoint adopted at the beginning of this 
section, a proper name is not a class of one at all. Proper 
names resemble all other words in the fact that they are 
used, not on a single occasion alone, but over and over 
again. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that a 
given individual nickname has been used just five thousand 
times. Then, on its five thousand and first time of use, 
it is a class of five thousand members to which a new 
member is added. Nor indeed, if we scrutinize the matter 
more closely, is this member ever wholly identical, even 
if he is always the same person. Of necessity he is a day, 
an hour, or a minute older. At one moment he is calm; 
at another he is angry. He may be clothed or naked; 
moving or still; sitting or standing. To that extent the 
thing-meant designated by a proper name is for ever 
1
 The attempt shall be made: whom in this phrase means 'the man re-
ferred to previously as the man, but here indicated by a word making 
possible the addition of a clause descriptive of him; in which clause the 
word now indicating the man serves as logical subject and also as object 
of the verb saw'. The words in inverted commas are what grammarians 
call a noun-equivalent. 
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different, even though possessing a spatial, temporal, and 
physiological continuity and unity which provides the 
meaning of the name. 
Now we have it on the high authority of Mill that 
proper names are without meaning. It need hardly be 
said that in holding this view Mill was not talking sheer 
nonsense, but I maintain that he was using the term 
'meaning' otherwise than must be done by the theorist of 
language. A proper name is a word, and being a word 
partakes of the fundamental two-sidedness of words as 
possessing both sound and meaning. At first blush it 
would seem as though here the meaning of the word really 
were identical with the thing-meant, but a little thought 
will dispel that illusion. The meaning of a word is some-
thing mental, something which leaps into the thoughts 
whenever the word is heard or remembered. But Goethe 
the person does not leap into my thoughts when I recall 
the word Goethe. The word merely tells me that I must 
think of something 'being Goethe' , or in other terms the 
meaning of the name Goethe is adjectival to the real 
Goethe. The meaning of the name Goethe has been ac-
quired by me as a mental po6session in just the same way 
as other word-meanings have been acquired. I have read 
his life, seen his portraits, and studied his works. From 
these sources I have a distinct idea of Goethe. Conse-
quently, when the name of Goethe is mentioned, I know 
the kind of man that is meant. I can thus concentrate my 
attention on the man. Tha t a proper name is adjectival in 
meaning is proved, moreover, by the fact that it can be 
used as a predicate. The name of my daughter is Margaret. 
Suppose her to be playing in theatricals, and to be dis-
guised beyond all recognition. I point to her and say That 
is Margaret. What the listener gathers is that the person 
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yonder is the person having-the-personality-of-Margaret-
Gardiner, is in fact Margaret Gardiner. Enough has been 
said to show that proper names are not different in essence 
from other words.1 
The only real difficulty about viewing words as class-
names is that we usually think of classes as assemblages of 
individual things which are all alike in some particular. 
But the meaning of words often covers applications be-
tween which it is impossible to discover any point of 
resemblance. Thus the word file is applied both to the 
stiff, pointed wires on which documents are run for keep-
ing and also to front-rank men followed by other men in 
a line straight behind them. The resemblance comes into 
view only when it is realized that file is derived from 
Latin filum 'a thread' .2 We must, therefore, expand the 
statement made at the beginning of this section by adding 
that the utterance of a word is equivalent to saying to the 
listener: 'Here is a name representing something like A, 
like B, like C, or like D ' , where A, B, C, and D are the 
various types or subclasses of thing covered by the same 
comprehensive word or class-name. We have thus seen 
that, as regards the things meant by them, words are 
(1) class-names, and (2) adjectival. As previously remarked, 
these ways of describing the relation are really one, for 
a class is an assemblage of things united by virtue of a 
common attr ibute . There is no reason why that attribute 
1
 For an excellent account of proper names and the problems connected 
with them see Jespersen, Philosophy, pp. 64 foll. Another discussion, from the 
logical point of view, W. E. Johnson, Logic, Part I, Cambridge, 1921, ch. vi. 
2
 Beside the Romance noun file another, of Teutonic origin (mod. Germ. 
Feile) indicates a metal instrument for smoothing rough surfaces. T h e 
Oxford English Dictionary mentions several more that are obsolete or 
dialectal. The topic of homophones is reserved for my second volume, 
but is touched upon several times below, e.g. pp. 77, 120-1 . 
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should not take the complex form 'being of trie type A or 
B or C or D'. 
The considerations set forth in the last paragraph, make 
it evident that the meaning of a word is not identical with 
an 'idea' in the Platonic sense. At first sight it might seem 
plausible to describe the mechanism of speech as ' the indi-
cation of things by the names of ideas'; the scholastic 
formula runs Voces significant res mediantibus conceptis. 
Looking closer, we see that word-meanings possess nothing 
of that self-consistency and homogeneity which are charac-
teristic of 'ideas'. Ideas, if attainable at all, are the result 
of long and toilsome search on the part of philosophers. 
The metaphysician may ultimately arrive at an adequate 
concept of 'Tru th ' , and the physicist may define 'Force' 
in a way which will stand him in good stead. But these 
notions are not the word-meanings with which speech 
operates. If we consult the Oxford English Dictionary we 
shall find the meaning of truth set forth under three main 
heads, each with numerous subdivisions. The applications 
of the word range from personal faithfulness or loyalty to 
verified facts or realities. It is not as an 'idea' that the 
meaning of the word truth must be conceived, but rather 
as an area upon which the various potentialities of applica-
tion are plotted out.1 
§ 14. The mechanized elements in speech.2 It was 
hardly to be expected that in so old-inherited an art as 
that of speech one single explanation would account for 
all the instruments employed, or for all the operations 
1
 The difference between word-meanings and ideas (Begriffe) is 
admirably treated by Erdmann (Bedeutung, pp. 74 foll.): 'Man sagt: 
Worte sind Zeichen für Begriffe. Richtiger ist es wohl zu behaupten, dass 
Worte a u c h als Zeichen für Begriffe dienen müssen', op. cit., p. 4. 
2
 Jespersen has an excellent section on this topic, Philosophy, pp. 18 foll. 
For the theory see Wegener, Grundfragen, p. 73 . 
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performed. To describe the words of a sentence as 'clues' 
is only part of the story. At this juncture it would be 
premature, however, to lay much stress on the other uses 
of words, and to do so could only distract attention from 
their primary function as clues. But I must anticipate 
one obvious objection to the previous trend of my argu-
ment ; it cannot be denied that many of the words which 
we employ are relatively aimless and owe their place in 
speech mainly to historical reasons. T h e principle to be 
illustrated may be termed the mechanization of speech, 
though by another metaphor it might equally well have 
been characterized as the 'fossilization of words and 
phrases'. This topic will be considered under three 
heads. 
(1) Stereotyped formulas. In the traffic of daily life 
situations are constantly arising so closely similar that we 
do not hesitate to speak of them as the 'same situation'. 
Every language has its own fixed ways of coping with 
certain recurring situations. An expression of apology is 
met by the Englishman with Pray don't mention it! or 
Don't mention it! or the less refined Granted! In like 
circumstances the Frenchman will say Je vous en prie! 
and the German Ich bitte! or Bitte! or Bitte sehr! In 
effect, these formulas all mean the same thing, and to 
describe their component words as separate and successive 
clues, cumulatively working towards a given result, is 
obviously inappropriate. The like holds good of countless 
idiosyncrasies, for example that tiresome I mean, or the 
happily nearly obsolete Don't yer know? with which shy 
or foppish youths are prone to interlard their conversation. 
In social intercourse formulas are frequent. So at a dinner-
party: 'Have you been to the theatre lately?' 'We were at 
"Bitter Sweet" a few nights ago.' 'Rather good, isn't it?' 
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'Perfectly topping!' The sentences certainly mean some-
thing, but from a shifted angle question and answer seem 
to follow one another like the mechanical utterances of 
automata. What is said is of little account. The topics 
are conventional, and their expression is merely a means 
of establishing contact.1 
(2) Set phrases. Words originally separate, and still 
found with their own indicative force and utility in other 
contexts, tend to combine and to form set phrases. Such 
phrases are to all intents and purposes compound words, 
and to describe the component parts as 'clues' would 
clearly be beside the mark. Thus attach importance to or 
lay store by are phrases nearly synonymous with (to) value 
in one sense of the latter verb; to hold one's tongue or keep 
silence is equivalent to the Latin tacere; to trample under 
foot is to disregard; to split the difference is to compromise; to 
set the ball rolling is to initiate some action. All these expres-
sions come to the speaker ready-made. As composite units 
they are 'clues' which he can choose, but their component 
words are not 'clues' to anything except to the phrase itself. 
(3) Idiom. Languages differ greatly in the forms which 
they have adopted . No better example can be quoted 
than the varying extension of the definite and indefinite 
articles. In Latin their use is reduced to a minimum; for 
Rex regiaque classis una profecti English has The king and the 
royal fleet set out together, while Natura inimica sunt libera 
civitas et rex demands the rendering By nature a free state 
and a king are hostile. German and French agree, as 
against English, in using the definite article with abstract 
nouns, e.g. die Wahrheit, la verite, but English truth. 
1
 Malinowski has coined the term 'phatic communion' for converse of 
this kind, of which he gives a very interesting account. See C. K. Ogden 
and I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, London, 1923, pp. 477 foll. 
§14 I D I O M 47 
French and English cannot employ the definite article 
with personal names as is often done in German, e.g. die 
Maria. It is sometimes said that such relatively insignifi-
cant words are grammatical tools. But the function of 
tools is to achieve some specific end. Tha t is precisely 
what, in many cases, the article does not do, or at all 
events does only in a very slight and uncertain degree. 
Often it is mere useless ballast, a habit or mannerism 
accepted by an entire speaking community. 
Do the phenomena here exemplified contradict the 
account hitherto given of the nature of words and their 
mode of functioning ? I think not. The mechanization 
of words is a phenomenon characteristic of human activi-
ties generally. Habits grow out of acts which at the start 
were deliberately purposed and then possessed a real 
utility. In their later state such acts may become mere 
superfluities. In mechanized bits of language we can 
usually discern a rational intention at the outset. In the 
French ne . . . -pas the word pas, Latin passum, originally 
had emphasizing force; not a 'pace' further will he or she 
go. So, too, with the definite article; this has everywhere 
arisen from an identifying and locating demonstrative, 
while the indefinite article, originating in the numeral 
'one', has now chiefly the negative function of indicating 
to the listener that the thing it qualifies is in no need of 
closer identification. The teaching afforded by these 
examples may be generalized. In contemporary use it 
cannot be maintained that every single word has deliberate 
significance or semantic importance, but in all cases we 
may be sure that the historic original was properly moti-
vated and purposeful. The accumulation of old rubbish 
is so easy. As the Egyptians said in a different connexion: 
(Words are but) the breath of the mouth, they are naught 
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whereby one groweth weary. Words cost little, and it was 
unlikely that strict economy and purposefulness would be 
studied in all their employments. 
§ 15. Selective attention. It may have occurred to the 
reader that if an utterance is the complicated affair which 
it is here declared to be, involving speaker, listener, word 
(with sound and meaning), and thing, then it is a miracle 
that anything should ever be understood. And indeed it 
is a miracle, just as the structure of the human body is 
a miracle, and as everything about the constitution of man 
is a miracle. But proficiency both in speaking and in 
understanding speech is the result of hard and unremitting 
practice from earliest childhood. It is not for the philo-
logist to expatiate upon the psychical equipment which 
enables man to perform his linguistic functions, but men-
tion may at least be made of his power to compare and 
his power to select. In particular we cannot pass over in 
silence the most important result of the latter gift, namely 
the disappearance from, or great subordination in, con-
sciousness of all that is superfluous and not essential to the 
effectiveness of speech. When a word is employed, both 
speaker and listener are able, by dint of their selective 
attention, to push far into the background all those poten-
tial applications of the meaning which are irrelevant to 
the immediate context.1 Similarly, though through force 
of habit and sheer linguistic skill the speaker automatically 
adapts his words to suit the listener's comprehension and 
status, he very often forgets the listener's presence alto-
gether by reason of his deep absorption in his theme. So, 
too, the listener often takes the words of the speaker, not 
as though they expressed merely an opinion open to 
1
 Another, but more equivocal, name for 'selective attention' is 'abstrac-
tion'. For a simple account of this see Ribot, Idées générales, pp. 5 foll. 
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question, but as though things themselves were disclosing 
their own innermost nature. Perhaps the commonest 
phenomenon of all is that the words uttered are barely 
realized as such, only the things that they point at being 
descried. Thus on the surface speech often appears very 
simple—something is being said! But it needs only little 
change of stress to bring one or more of the underlying 
factors into the foreground. An incautious gesture may 
eclipse the things meant, and call into prominence the 
speaker. He almost invariably emerges into conscious 
presence when something false or absurd is asserted. 
A slightly stilted or eccentric phrase may lead to considera-
tion of the manner of speech rather than the matter. 
Such swift and unpremeditated shiftings of the attention 
are the best testimony that the four factors of speech 
which I have enumerated and discussed are always present, 
though often only latently so. 
§ 16. The situation. Not a factor of speech, but 
the setting in which speech can alone become effective, 
is what is here termed 'the situation'. All four factors 
must be in the same situation, that is to say accessible to 
one another in either a material or a spiritual sense. Some 
of the consequences of this doctrine are so trivial that 
they seem hardly worth mentioning. The speaker and 
listener must be in the same spatial and temporal situation. 
I in this room cannot speak to you in the country—save, 
of course, through the medium of writing or the telephone 
or the wireless. You yesterday cannot have heard what 
I shall be saying to-morrow. Again, the words employed 
must be in the situation of both speaker and listener. 
These two must, in fact, speak a common language.1 
1
 See Samuel Butler, 'Thought and Language', in Essays on Life, Art, 
and Science, London, 1904, pp. 206-8. 
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Here the reference is not merely to the mother-tongue, 
but also to details of vocabulary. A Hampshire yokel will 
not understand if I speak French to him, but he will also 
fail to understand if I employ the words psycho-analysis or 
binomial theorem, for alike in sound and in meaning these 
words are unfamiliar to him. 
Of far greater importance is the concept of 'situation' 
as applied to the things spoken about.1 Potentially every 
word that is uttered might refer to the whole universe. 
But words are chosen with a shrewd calculation of their 
intelligibility; the more remote the thing spoken about, 
the more clues must be offered in order that it may be 
identified. On the other hand, if the situation is tem-
porally and locally the same for both speaker and listener, 
then identification often requires but a single word or 
clue. The call of Encore! after a song in a concert-hall 
needs no further words for its interpretation. Fire! means 
different things when shouted aloud at dead of night and 
when pronounced by an officer in presence of his troops, 
but in both cases the single word suffices. I cannot insist 
too often upon the facts that words are only clues, that 
most words are ambiguous in their meaning, and that in 
every case the thing-meant has to be discovered in the 
situation by the listener's alert and active intelligence. 
The recognition of these truths disposes of the old and 
happily nearly obsolete view that one-word utterances 
like Encore! and Fire! are 'elliptic', i.e. that they need the 
addition of some other words ' to complete their meaning' . 
No amount of words will ever 'complete the meaning' of 
an utterance, if by 'meaning' is intended the thing-meant. 
The thing-meant is always outside the words, not within 
them. It is in the situation, but not within the utterance. 
1
 See particularly Wegener, Grundfragen, pp. 19 foll. 
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Thus in the sense that the exclamation Fire! is elliptic, 
every sentence whatsoever is elliptic.1 
It is for the philosopher rather than for the philologist 
to probe more deeply into the nature of the 'situation', 
as also of the 'things' meant by speech. For my immediate 
purpose these terms are sufficiently clear. It must be 
observed, however, that the situation of a sentence often 
involves several different times and several different places.2 
Consider, for example, the sentence: I remember your tell-
ing me that your father had travelled in Spain. Three times 
and at least two places are here involved, yet the thing-
meant is perfectly clear. It would perhaps tend to rid the 
'situation' of a certain mystical colouring if we here spoke, 
not of ' the situation', but of ' the situations' in the plural. 
To this there seems to be no serious objection. 
The situation can be of many kinds. The situation of 
the utterances Encore! Fire! might be called the 'Situa-
tion of Presence'. In Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo 
we might speak of the 'Situation of Common Knowledge'. 
Again, there is the 'Situation of Imagination', as when an 
anecdote is being related. Verbal context is not in itself 
a situation, but together with gesture and tone of voice 
is the principal means of showing the situation. Each word 
is like a beam of light, illumining first this portion and 
then that portion of the field within which the thing, or 
rather the complex concatenation of things (Sachverhalt), 
signified by a sentence lies. Sometimes the direction of 
the beams remains constant, each successive word merely 
narrowing the area covered by its predecessor. So in the 
last three words of I love my old hat, whereas the first word 
points to the speaker, and the second word to an emotion 
1
 There are, however, also legitimate uses of 'ellipse' as a grammatical 
term. See below, p. 270, n. 1. 2 See below, p. 194 with Fig. 7. 
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of very varied quality and intensity. All five words 
together combine with the extra-verbal factors of speech 
to indicate, not the thing-meant, but its situation. The 
thing-meant itself is left for the intelligence of the listener 
to discover. 
§ 17. Depth of intention. Under this name, which I 
fancy is new, reference is made to an exceedingly im-
portant aspect of the things meant by speech. As I 
understand 'things', no lifetime would be long, no mind 
penetrating enough, to comprehend the entire constitu-
tion of even the simplest of them. It belongs to the very 
nature of a ' thing' that the attention can dwell upon it 
and examine it from many different angles without ever 
exhausting its characters. In such a simple utterance as the 
vocative Mary! the thing-meant (always highly composite, 
as we shall see in the next chapter) is one upon which the 
mind can brood eternally. It involves both the person 
Mary and also the fact of, and the reasons for, my calling 
her . In this connexion we come across a dilemma to which 
the theory of speech is inevitably exposed. If we restrict 
our definition of the thing-meant to just so much of a thing 
as the speaker of the sentence intended the listener to 
see, then we are ipso facto precluded from analysing the 
thing-meant any further. If, on the other hand, we do 
analyse the thing meant, then we exceed the limits of the 
speaker's intention, and to that extent lose sight of the 
thing as so defined. For this reason it seems necessary to 
regard the things meant by speech as substantival and 
susceptible of never-ending analysis, but we must add as 
a rider that the theorist of speech is only concerned with 
so much of those things as is required to elucidate what 
the speaker intended the listener to see.1 
1
 What is said here may help to dispel a difficulty which the reader may 
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Such is human skill in speech, and such the sympathetic 
responsiveness with which speech is received by the listener, 
that the depth of the speaker's intention is usually dis-
cerned and acquiesced in. At the end of the last section 
I used as an instance the sentence / love my old hat, which, 
as it happens, is a fact—one, moreover, that I had in 
mind while choosing this sentence as an example. I have 
an old hat, and I love that old hat. But my purpose in 
writing the sentence was to illustrate the nature and 
function of the words, and the reader was intended to 
examine the thing-meant no further. He was not called 
upon to speculate which of my old and shabby hats was 
in my mind; his concern was solely with the philological 
bearings of the sentence. The nature of the term 'situa-
tion' as applied to linguistic theory is herewith further 
elucidated. Grammars and dictionaries and books like the 
present one have what might be dubbed a 'Linguistic 
Situation'. In the sentence I love my old hat it matters 
not a jot who I am, or what hats I may possess. My depth 
of intention stopped short at philology. 
§18. Word-consciousness. Intimately connected with 
the topics of the last two sections are the varying degrees 
in which, during the process of speech, words come to 
consciousness, or are thrust out of it. The instrumental 
character of speech ought by this time to be sufficiently 
apparent . But the notion ordinarily held of an instrument 
or tool is that of something which serves solely as a means 
of effecting certain results. When those results are 
have felt in connexion with my argument in § 13 (p. 40) about is, very, 
and in. The speaker of the sentence there quoted never intended the 
things meant by those words to be examined as things, but the theorist of 
speech is forced to examine them in that way, and can do so the more 
readily if he labels them with words presenting them as things. 
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achieved, the instruments are usually removed or at least 
ignored. A carpenter, having completed the window-
frame on which he has been working, packs up his tools 
and goes off to another job . Words are often instruments 
or tools in very much the same way. When some one asks 
the price of an article and is told Six and eightpence! he 
produces the money and the transaction is closed. The 
seller has employed the words Six and eight-pence! merely 
as a contrivance to obtain his price. The words themselves 
are of supreme indifference; the speaker may be uncon-
scious of uttering them, and the listener of hearing them. 
But not every use of language is of this simple type, though 
every use involves it. Frequently the word cannot be 
dismissed without serious injury to, or even total loss of, 
the vital features of the thing spoken about. Take the 
affirmation He was a very stately man. Around the word 
stately cluster memories and valuations of various and 
peculiar kinds, memories with which ethical and aesthetic 
judgements are inextricably mixed. In this region of 
speech words are paramount and there are no real syno-
nyms. Substitute dignified, majestic, or imposing, and the 
thing said, though not altogether different, is modified to an 
appreciable extent . Here, then, we have the tool figuring 
as a necessary and inseparable part of the manufactured 
goods. If words are always instrumental, sometimes at 
least they are instruments of a very exceptional kind. 
The fact of the matter is that many of the things about 
which one speaks are so intangible, so elusive, that the 
presence of the word itself is necessary if the thing is to 
be focused at all.1 When material objects are under dis-
cussion, the names for them can be dismissed or ignored 
1
 'Nomina si nescis, petit et cognitio rerum', a quotation used by Linnaeus, 
see Leo Spitzer, Hugo Schuchardt-Brevier, 2nd edition, Halle, 1928, p. 125. 
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without any damage to the speaker's intention. Any ab-
straction, however, can hardly be held in mind unless the 
word denoting it persists as its outward and perceptible 
sign. It is wholly impossible to comprehend what is meant 
by religion without the controlling and limiting conscious-
ness of the word itself. Of great importance for the theory 
of speech is the fact, already noted, that the verbal formu-
lation of all but the simplest things itself involves an 
alteration of them, a crystallization as it were. Everyone 
is familiar with the sensation of having something to say, 
but not knowing exactly what it is. And then the words 
come, and with them the feeling, not merely of expression, 
but even of creation. Words have thus become part of 
our mechanism of thinking, and remain, both for our-
selves and for others, the guardians of our thought . 
Let there be no mistake about it, however; even in 
abstract statements, the word-meaning can never be 
identical with the thing-meant, no matter how closely 
welded together the two may be. A word-meaning may 
crystallize in our minds a thought which has long eluded 
expression, but that thought is substantival in nature, 
and the word-meaning adjectival. The word-meaning can 
only describe what is meant—not be it. The fact of 
word-consciousness does not contradict the instrumental 
character of speech which I have been at such pains to 
demonstrate. 
§ 19. Style. In every act of speech the four factors of 
speaker and listener, word and thing, are inevitably 
present, but, as we saw in § 15, selective attention usually 
subordinates the first three to the matter in hand. While 
the thing spoken about stands forth luminously and in 
sharp definition, the speaker, the listener, and the words 
themselves are discerned, if at all, only ghost-like in the 
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surrounding penumbra. Subsequent reflection may, how-
ever, bring any one of them into prominence, witness such 
thoughts as 'Why did he say that to me ?' 'How beautifully 
he spoke!' Now the form of speech I have just described 
is the normal variety, but it may happen that the words 
employed are so cunningly chosen that they awaken in 
the listener, either immediately or later, distinct feelings 
of aesthetic admiration. The quality in a sequence of 
words which evokes such feelings we call 'style', and it 
may arise in connexion with either the sound of the words 
or their meaning; good style takes care of both . Here, 
then, we have word-consciousness in a new form; words 
may attain prominence not merely for their helpfulness 
or indispensability in focusing the thing-meant, but for 
their own sakes and on account of their own intrinsic 
worth . Style may be found in ordinary conversation no 
less than in an oration, but its real home is the written 
form of speech which we call 'literature' . In literature 
a distinction is made between poetry and prose, and it is 
generally agreed that the former is not to be equated with 
mere versification. To discuss the difference between 
prose and poetry is outside the scope of this work, but 
one trait must be emphasized. In poetry consciousness of 
the words is greater than in prose, for in poetry thought 
and expression are wedded in an indissoluble bond. You 
may change this sentence or that in prose without seriously 
affecting the whole. But alter a few words in poetry, and 
you no longer have the same poem. 
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Note A (to p. 22). Is the listener a necessary factor of speech? 
For a very deliberate and clear statement of what seems to me 
exactly the wrong view I commend to my readers the following: 
'What then is the essence or nature of Language, that which it is 
everywhere and always, and cannot not be, and therefore is, not 
what was or is to be, but is now ? What is the true conception 
of it? It is that it is not a practical nor a logical, but an aesthetic 
fact and function. That is its present and actual nature, and 
by that the manner of its origin is settled and its destiny pre-
ordained. It came into existence in order that Man might express 
himself, might project before his inward view what moved or 
stirred him, so giving to it clearness and distinctness and a certain 
independency of being, and might furnish himself with objects to 
delight in; this is still the chief service it performs for us, and so it 
will be so long as Man's nature and world endure.' (J. A. Smith, 
'Artificial Languages', in S.P.E. Tract No. XXXIV, 1930, p. 472.) 
Confronted with such assertions one can only feel as Darwin may 
have felt when faced by the dogma of special creation. As a counter-
blast to such purely academic assertions I would recommend 
Samuel Butler's brilliant and entertaining reply to Max Müller in 
his paper 'Thought and Language', in Essays on Life, Art, and 
Science, pp. 176 foll., from which I quote the following extract: 'It 
takes two people to say a thing—a sayee as well as a sayer. The one is 
as essential to any true saying as the other. A. may have spoken, but 
if B. has not heard, there has been nothing said, and he must speak 
again. True, the belief on A.'s part that he had a bona fide sayee in 
B. saves his speech qua him, but it has been barren and left no fertile 
issue. It has failed to fulfil the conditions of true speech, which 
involve not only that A. should speak, but also that B. should hear.' 
Another writer who believes that the making of sentences is per-
formed by the speaker without regard to a listener is John Ries. 
His painstaking and learned book, Was ist ein Satz? (Prague, 1931), 
defends this thesis with a clarity and a vigour which leave nothing 
to be desired. In the course of his argument he goes so far as to say 
(p. 46): 'Die Eigenart keines Gegenstandes, keiner Erscheinung, 
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keiner Tätigkeit hängt davon ab, ob und wie diese beobachtet, in 
welcher Weise, auf welchen psychischen Wegen sie von einem 
Beobachter aufgenommen oder wie weit sie von ihm erfasst werden'. 
Has the learned Professor ever reflected upon the nature of a sale, 
or upon the technique of courtship f 
Note B (to p. 31). Has the distinction between 'meaning' and 
'thing-meant' really been ignored hitherto? 
Those of my readers who are here studying linguistic theory for 
the first time will find it barely credible that so obvious a distinction 
can have been overlooked. Still, it is a fact that plain statements 
on the subject are very hard to find. Paul's view is variable. At 
moments he realizes that things outside speech can be spoken about, 
and that the use of words consists in subsuming them under their 
kinds; the formulation quoted from him below, p. 256, n. 2, could 
hardly be bettered. No trace of this doctrine appears, however, in 
the sections devoted to word-meaning (Prinzipien, §§51 foll.). 
Here he distinguishes between usuelle Bedeutung, the generally 
accepted meaning of a word, and okkasionelle Bedeutung, the mean-
ing which a speaker attaches to a word at the moment of utterance; 
outside these two he recognizes no objective reference. Wundt 
appears to lay it down as a principle that, in determining the nature 
of a sentence, no addition to what is expressed by the words should 
be assumed ihinzugedachi). Polemizing against this view, Paul 
maintains that such an assumption is 'usually' (meistens) necessary 
(op. cit., p. 130, n. 1). He should have written 'always', and it is 
precisely his failure to do so which proves that he has not grasped 
the truth. I have not succeeded in forming a clear conception of 
Jespersen's opinion on this matter. He evidently holds that words 
can refer to 'things', for, as we shall see (below, p. 286), he attempts 
to classify words according to the number of objects to which they 
can be applied. Some passages in his works seem to imply, however, 
a restriction of 'meaning' to the special meanings called by Paul 
okkasionelle Bedeutung, e.g., 'If I am asked to give the meaning of 
jar or sound or palm or tract, the only honest answer is, "Show me 
the context, and I will tell you the meaning." In one connexion 
pipe is understood to mean a tobacco-pipe, in another a water-pipe, 
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in a third a boatswain's whistle, in another one of the tubes of an 
organ,' Philosophy, p. 66. A very clear case of the omission of 
'things' in a general treatise by a first-rate scholar is in de Saussure's 
Cours de linguistique, pp. 28—9, where he uses the accompanying 
figure to illustrate the 'circuit' traced by a snatch of conversation. 
The process starts with a 'concept' in the speaker's mind; this dis-
engages an 'image acoustique': 'c'est un phénomène entièrement 
psychique, suivi a son tour d'un procès physiologique: le cerveau 
Fig G. 1. A circuit of speech. 
Redrawn from de Saussure, Cours de linguistique, p. 28. 
transmet aux organes de la phonation une impulsion corrélative à 
l'image; puis les ondes sonores se propagent de la bouche de A à 
l'oreille de B : procès purement physique. Ensuite, le circuit se pro-
longe en B dans un ordre inverse: de l'oreille au cerveau, trans-
mission physiologique de l'image acoustique; dans le cerveau, 
association psychique de cette image avec le concept correspondant. 
Si B parle à son tour, ce nouvel acte suivra—de son cerveau à celui 
de A—exactement la même marche que le premier. . . . Cette 
analyse ne prétend pas être complète ; on pourrait distinguer encore : 
la sensation acoustique pure, l'identification de cette sensation 
avec l'image acoustique latente, l'image musculaire de la phonation, 
&c. Nous n'avons tenu compte que des éléments jugés essentiels; 
mais notre figure permet de distinguer d'emblée les parties physiques 
(ondes sonores) des parties physiologiques (phonation et audition) 
et psychiques (images verbales et concepts). Il est en effet capital 
de remarquer que l'image verbale ne se confond pas avec le son lui-
même et qu'elle est psychique au même titre que le concept qui lui 
est associé.' The passage is too long to quote in its entirety, but 
the continuation shows beyond a doubt that de Saussure was 
6o SPEECH AND LANGUAGE Note B 
attempting to describe a complete act of speech, or rather two com-
plementary acts of speech, without omitting any essential features. 
Of 'things' referred to there is not a hint. If so acute a thinker 
as de Saussure has failed to note the necessity of 'things' to every 
linguistic act, we may be sure that the same error is widely held. It 
is for this reason that I have singled him out for special criticism. 
Happily there are a few philologists who have diagnosed the facts 
more clearly. Among these Wegener, as usual, leads the way. The 
account which he gives of the listener's procedure in deducing what 
was meant, partly from the words, and partly from the situation, 
proves that he saw the truth in its main features (Grundfragen, 
passim, and especially pp. 19 foll.). But Wegener's terminology 
differs in detail from mine. How far Erdmann shares Wegener's 
opinions is rather obscure, but at least he has seen the virtues of 
the scholastic doctrine of suppositio, see above p. 32, n. 1. Kalepky 
(Neuaufbau, pp. 6-7) recognized, perhaps more clearly than anyone 
except Wegener, that speech can deal with real things and real 
events, and that its method of referring to them is through 
'analysis' and 'subsumption'. Only unhappily he equated 'meaning' 
with 'ideas' (Begriffe), an error on which I have commented at the 
end of § 13. Another scholar who has not lost sight of 'things' is 
E. Wellander (Studien zum Bedeutungswandel im Deutschen, Part I, 
Upsala, 1917, pp. 9 foll.), but he fails to make use of it owing to his 
neglect of the 'situation', which alone can effectuate the reference 
of a word, see op. cit., p. 19, and for a mere passing mention of the 
'situation', p. 21, bottom. Wellander appears to me to have been 
misled by the high degree of mechanization which interpretation 
has acquired. 
I am too little familiar with the literature of logic to discuss how 
far modern logicians are aware of the distinction here under dis-
cussion. The contrast made between 'connotation' ('intension') 
and 'denotation' ('extension') has some similarity to my distinction 
between 'meaning' and 'thing-meant'; but to say, as logicians often 
do, that such-and-such a term is used in connotation, while another 
is used in denotation, suggests that the mechanism of speech has 
not been properly understood; on this point see below, §§ 67-8. 
Among logicians, Husserl has rightly formulated the position; in 
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one passage (Logische Untersuchungen, Halle, 1913-21, vol. ii, Part 1, 
p. 49) he pronounces the verdict that 'der Ausdruck bezeichne 
(nenne) den Gegenstand mittels seiner Bedeutung'; cf. the scholastic 
formula quoted above, p. 44. A number of Husserl's contentions 
appear to me, however, either wrong or else obscurely worded. For 
a summary of his position, see C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The 
Meaning of Meaning, London, 1923, Appendix D, § I (pp. 418 foll.). 
Finally, commentators, literary critics, and the general public. 
The distinction between meaning and thing-meant is quite familiar 
in practice, but not having been firmly grasped as a necessary 
theoretic view, is frequently lost sight of at critical moments. It 
finds expression in statements such as, 'We have been arguing only 
about words' or 'His meaning (i.e. the thing meant by him) is per-
fectly plain, but the expression is defective'. A curious position 
sometimes confronts the commentator of letters or ancient texts. 
The sentences hang together and yield a sense which is satisfactory 
and certain up to a point, but no further. To the audience ad-
dressed by the author the background of fact was known, so that he 
could 'see what was meant'. But the interpreter is left perplexed 
and baffled, because for him that background is unascertainable. 
II 
T H E A C T O F SPEECH. T H E SENTENCE A N D 
T H E WORD. SPEECH AND L A N G U A G E 
§ 20. Summary of the argument. In the first chapter I 
sought to show that speech is no mere bilateral affair, 
consisting of articulate sounds on the one hand, and 
thought or meaning on the other, but rather that it is 
quadrilateral, and requires for a true comprehension of 
its nature the four sides, or factors, of speaker, listener, 
words, and things. T h e necessity of thus refuting, at the 
outset, an erroneous assumption all the more insidious 
because seldom categorically stated, had the disadvantage 
that speech could not simultaneously be depicted as the 
highly complex, purposeful, and individual mode of human 
action which it essentially is. It will be the task of the 
present chapter to rectify this omission. We shall see that 
the impulse to speech, at least in its more fundamental 
forms, arises in the intention of some member of the com-
munity to influence one or more of his fellows in reference 
to some particular thing. Speech is thus a universally 
exerted activity, having at first definitely utilitarian aims. 
In describing this activity, we shall discover that it con-
sists in the application of a universally possessed science, 
namely the science which we call language . With in-
finite pains the human child learns language in order to 
exercise it as speech. These two human attributes, lan-
guage the science and speech its active application, have 
too often been confused with one another or regarded as 
identical, with the result that no intelligible account could 
be given of their ultimate elements, the 'word' and the 
'sentence'. Not the least important conclusion which 
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will emerge from our discussion is that the 'word' is the 
unit of language, whereas the 'sentence' is the unit of 
speech. 
§21 . Silence and speech. In waking hours the mind 
of man is never at rest. His thoughts and musings flow on 
in unbroken sequence, showing a discontinuity only when 
some external event or interesting recollection stirs to 
greater alertness, perhaps ultimately evoking a deliberate 
reaction. But man is not always talking. When he is alone, 
the wayward reflections pursue their course in silence. 
Indeed, we can even say that an individual silently ex-
presses to himself his thoughts by the mere fact of having 
them. In the absence of a companion it is difficult to see 
why speech should ever arise. And in fact, monologue is 
not natural to man. The mutterings of the deranged pro-
vide no argument to the contrary, and the babbling of 
children is not so much speech as the early private re-
hearsal of later conversational performances.1 If, at 
moments of unusual emotional stress or intense intellectual 
endeavour, words spring to the lips or even come to actual 
utterance, this is merely for the relief they give to the 
feelings, or for the aid which they afford to precise think-
ing (§18). A corollary to this statement is that for normal 
speech the presence of some second individual is necessary. 
But even in that case speech does not always occur. 
Noticing that I am without a teaspoon, I may prefer to 
fetch one myself rather than trouble a companion. In 
1
 The first articulate utterances of children are play activity, and con-
sist simply in exercise of the organs of articulation. These utterances are 
without meaning, and are clearly to be distinguished from meaningful 
emotional cries. A few months later, however, the speech-sounds begin to 
share in the significant function of such cries. See Bühler, Theorien des 
Satzes, pp. 1-2. At the subsequent stage envisaged in the text, imitation of 
grown-ups has become a factor. 
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fact, the occurrence of speech depends normally upon the 
presence of two conditioning circumstances: (1) the per-
ception of something interesting enough to incite to 
action, and (2) the desire somehow to involve another 
person in that perception. The commonest motives in-
ducing speech are the desires to inform somebody of 
something, to ask somebody about something, to exhort 
somebody to do something, or to win sympathy from some-
body in respect of something. In conclusion, whereas 
thought comprises only two factors apart from the process 
of thinking, namely the thinker and the thing thought of, 
speech comprises three factors besides the actual words, 
inasmuch as it adds to the thinker, now become the speaker, 
and to the thing thought of, now become the thing spoken 
of, a second person, namely the listener. 
§ 22. The act of speech at once social and individual. 
The facts set forth in the last paragraph establish beyond 
a doubt that the act of speech is a social act, seeing that 
it necessarily involves two persons, and may possibly in-
volve more, if there be a number of listeners. But it must 
be clearly recognized that, speaking of a social act, I do 
not mean a collective one. On the contrary, every act of 
speech is individual in the sense that it springs from an 
impulse or volition on the part of a single person. It is 
true that speech has become so easy and frequent a per-
formance, that to describe it as the result of a volition may 
seem exaggerated. But at least we must admit that it is 
always open to the speaker to speak or to be silent. The 
initiative is always his. On the other hand, we must guard 
against the supposition that the part of the listener is 
wholly passive. He is a recipient rather than an initiator, 
no doubt, but the act of understanding is one which 
demands considerable mental effort. We saw in the last 
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chapter (§ II) that in the course of actual speech, the 
words serve mainly as clues. It is upon the listener that 
devolves the duty of interpreting those clues, of finding 
the thing-meant . Accordingly, also from the standpoint 
of the listener's activity, the act of speech is individual as 
well as social. Sometimes the part to be played by the 
listener greatly transcends the mere effort of compre-
hension. In questions and commands a definite responsive 
movement is expected of him . This responsive movement 
lies, it is true, outside the speaker's own linguistic act, but 
in a sense it belongs to it, questions and commands being 
otherwise inexplicable. 
Speech is, of course, not the only human activity with 
at once a social and an individual aspect. The relations of 
master and servant, or those of buyer and seller, are on 
much the same footing as the relations of speaker and 
listener. The social character of speech is, however, 
rendered specially prominent by the ease and frequency 
with which the roles are there interchanged. In conversa-
tion, the person speaking at one moment becomes the 
listener at the next, and vice versa. 
§ 23. The ultimate basis of speech. The activity of 
speech is so familiar to us that we seldom stop to consider 
what a remarkable type of behaviour it is. If an inhabitant 
of some other planet, ignorant of speech, but gifted with 
an intelligence resembling our own, could visit the earth 
and observe the conduct of its denizens, would he not be 
amused and puzzled by this peculiar traffic in articulate 
sounds, with its accompaniment of excited manual 
gesture, and its strange effect upon the emotions and 
conduct of its adepts ? Sun and stars speak not, neither 
do minerals nor plants. Even among the higher animals 
speech is rudimentary and dubious. Alone for the human 
3920
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race speaking is a universal daily habit. How is this habit 
to be explained ? 
The growth of intelligence and the importance for con-
duct of conscious mental processes are evidently part of 
the explanation. But man can act purposively so as to 
influence the actions of others even without speech. 
When handing the apple to Adam, Eve intended that he 
should eat it. However, the things to which human 
beings seek to evoke responsive movements are seldom as 
simple as an apple, nor are they often so easy to present 
to the attention of a companion. Among concrete things 
in respect of which a specific course of action is desired, 
some may be momentarily absent or not within the 
individual's power to manipulate. Think of an enemy 
whose approach is seen by one savage but unperceived by 
another, or of a pair of spectacles which has been left 
downstairs in the dining-room. Moreover, it is often 
necessary to indicate exactly what kind of action is re-
quired; the man who needs the help of another may have 
to reveal his own feelings or the nature of his wishes. 
It is difficult to find a general formula to cover all the 
things which desiderate speech for their communication. 
In rare cases words are employed to stress or enhance 
feelings shared at the instant of utterance by both parties; 
so in greetings, congratulations, and expressions of con-
dolence. But apart from these exceptional kinds of 
utterance, the speaker usually assumes the listener to be 
ignorant of, or momentarily not concerned with, what he 
himself is wishing to make the object of common interest. 
The things meant by speech are mostly complex. Or if 
they are simple, then the need for words is due to the 
personal and emotional character of that in respect of 
which help or sympathy is desired. 
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The ultimate basis of speech is the fact that individual 
thoughts and feelings are, as such, entirely inalienable. 
One man cannot think the thoughts of another, or behold 
an object with another's mental vision. Nor can anyone 
take his enjoyment of a sunset and transfer it directly to a 
companion's mind. It is the penalty of individuality that 
the inner life is solitary, that perceptions and feelings can-
not actually be shared. Sympathy and understanding are 
indeed possible, but two minds cannot interpenetrate one 
another in any literal sense. From this follows the im-
portant consequence that a physical substitute has to be 
found whenever anything intellectual or emotional is to 
be imparted . Such physical substitutes are called signs, 
and are subject to the conditions (1) that they should have 
a pre-arranged 'meaning', or associated mental equiva-
lence, and (2) that they should be handy objects of sense 
transferable at will. Any material thing which conforms 
to these two conditions will serve as a 'sign', and any system 
of signs is a kind of language. Examples are the manual 
signs employed by deaf-mutes and the somewhat similar 
gesture-language that has been observed among the native 
tribes of America and elsewhere.1 Other languages are of 
a more artificial and improvised character; there is the 
'language of flowers'; also 'money talks'. Samuel Butler 
quotes the snuff-box which Mrs . Bentley, wife of the 
famous Dr . Bentley of Trinity College, Cambridge, used 
to send to the college buttery whenever she wanted beer; 
as Samuel Butler demonstrates in his own inimitable way, 
the snuff-box was, for that particular purpose, very good 
language indeed.2 
1
 See Ribot, Idées générales, pp. 4.7 foll., 59 foll. 
2
 Samuel Butler's outlook on language and speech is so sound, that I 
reproduce the entire passage below, pp. 104-5, Additional Note C. 
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Before closing this section, brief mention must be made 
of the human attributes from which speech obtains its 
driving-force. These are the twin, but contrary, attributes 
of self-seeking and altruism.1 The former impels us to 
enlist the brains and muscles of our fellows for our own 
advantage, while the latter, born of sympathy, causes us 
to study the interests of others—interests often well-
served by information, persuasion, or even commands. 
§ 24. The superiority of spoken language to all other 
systems of signs. It was inevitable that the system of 
signs which the human race would adopt in preference to 
all others for its communicative aims should be the sound-
signs which we call 'words'. Since the signs had to be 
susceptible of production at will and without delay, it was 
likely that they would make use of the natural movements 
most nearly akin to reflex action. Such are facial expres-
sions or grimaces, manual movements or gestures, and 
emotional cries together with such semi-volitional sounds 
as grunts and laughter. All these have survived as frequent 
accessories to speech, where their chief function is to 
indicate the nature and intensity of the speaker's feelings 
towards the thing spoken about and towards his audience. 
Facial expressions are so valuable for the display of emo-
tion, that it would have been a pity had they been schooled 
to the more unimpassioned task of representing external 
phenomena, even if they could have developed the needful 
variety. Movements of the hands are too useful for prac-
tical purposes to have been specialized for the function of 
communication, apart from the objections that they need 
light to be seen by and claim a corresponding direction of 
the listener's eyes. Articulate sounds, on the other hand, 
have the advantage of giving employment to an organ 
1
 This point is rightly stressed by Wegener, Grundfragen, p. 68. 
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which would otherwise be idle except when engaged in 
eating. They have the further advantages that they are 
susceptible of almost infinite variety, and that they reach 
the other person in spite of himself, since he cannot shut 
his ears as he can shut or turn away his eyes. Furthermore, 
they are equally effective in the light of day and in the 
darkness of night.1 
§ 25. Words not really objects of sense, but psychical 
entities. Our next step is to observe that it is only in-
accurately, though by a sort of necessary inaccuracy, that 
the name of 'words' is given to the articulate sounds which 
pass between speaker and listener. There is no more 
fundamental t ru th in the entire theory of speech. To use 
a metaphor, the sounds of speech are not aeroplanes in-
vented for the purpose of carrying thoughts as their 
passengers between man and man . It must be repeated 
that psychical life is completely inalienable. The impossi-
bility of transferring thought is absolute and insurmount-
able. Only by an inference from his own thought can the 
listener conclude that the speaker has been thinking of the 
same thing . What passes in speech between the two per-
sons concerned is mere sound, bereft of all sense. Now as 
I have pointed out more than once (e.g. §§ 9, 15), 'words' 
are two-sided in their nature, one side being that of mean-
ing or sense, and the other that of sound. It follows that 
the physical results of articulate speech, not possessing the 
side of meaning, cannot be actual words. But there are 
other important reasons why the same conclusion must be 
drawn. In the first place a word can be used and re-used 
on many different occasions; and in the second place the 
same word can be employed by all the different members 
1
 For the whole of this section see Ribot, Idées générales, pp. 62-3; 
Ward, Psychological Principles, pp. 290-1. 
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of a linguistic community. It can be learnt by study or 
looked up in a dictionary. It is, in fact, something rela-
tively permanent, widespread, and capable of being pos-
sessed in common by a multitude of individuals. All these 
considerations prove, beyond possibility of contradiction, 
that words transcend, and are altogether less evanescent 
entities than, the sounds which issue from a speaker's 
mouth and vanish into nothingness soon after they have 
reached the listener's ear. As words exist in the possession 
of every individual, they are psychical entities, comprising 
on the one hand an area of meaning, and on the other hand 
the image of a particular sound susceptible of being 
physically reproduced whenever wanted . We now see, 
therefore, that the description of words as having a side 
of meaning and a side of sound, though the simplest and 
most practical description at the stage when it was given, 
is slightly misleading, inasmuch as it implies that words are 
partly psychical and partly physical. In reality they are 
wholly psychical, matters of knowledge and learning, 
though on one side of their nature they point to a physical 
occurrence reproducible at will. 
What then shall be said of the articulate sounds which 
are uttered and heard in speech ? What is their relation to 
the 'words' which exist in the minds of all potential 
speakers and listeners ? The articulate sounds appear to 
be physical, audible, copies of one aspect of their psychical 
originals. It is only the sound-image connected with 
words which can be reproduced in a physical copy. When 
a word is 'pronounced', its meaning stays with the speaker. 
All that the listener receives is the sound, which he then 
identifies as belonging to a word in his possession, this 
identification enabling him to pass immediately to the 
meaning associated with the sound. 
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In practice, to refer to the sounds heard in speech as 
'words' is unavoidable. Indeed, it is even desirable; we 
cannot always refer to them as copies or reproductions of 
words. To do so would be worse than pedantic, it would 
often be wilfully misleading. Nothing is less desirable in 
speech—however little logicians may relish this assertion— 
than a misplaced accuracy. Accuracy of that description 
often serves only to lay the stress in the wrong place, and 
so to prevent the listener from seeing the ' thing-meant' . 
§ 26. The 'modus operandi' of a simple act of speech. 
An act of speech, as conceived of in this book, is no mere 
set of words capable of being repeated on a number of 
separate occasions, but a particular, transient occurrence 
involving definite individuals and tied down to a special 
time and place. Hence the example which I shall conjure 
up to illustrate the principles involved in all speech must 
describe in detail a particular 'situation' (§16). A certain 
James Hawkins is sitting in his study in the afternoon of 
the 18th of April, 1931, together with Mary his wife. 
Both are reading and completely absorbed in their books. 
At a given moment James becomes aware of a continued 
beating upon the window-pane, which he identifies as the 
sound of rain, a conclusion verified a moment later by a 
glance towards the window. The perception of the rain 
reminds him that his wife and he have decided to walkover 
to Riverside for tea, should the weather hold. Another 
glance convinces James that this is no mere shower and 
that the idea of the walk must be abandoned, as Mary 
ought not to sit about with wet feet. Since she, however, 
shows no signs of having noticed the rain, her husband 
decides to call her attention to it, which he does with the 
simple ejaculation, Rain! Hearing that word, Mary looks 
up, sees the rain falling in torrents, realizes the effect that 
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this is going to have on her afternoon, and replies, What a 
bore! 
The act of speech here described comprises a series of 
events, the succession of which can be distinguished with 
some degree of clearness. There are five principal stages, 
in which the parts played by the two actors alternate with 
purely external, physical happenings, as follows: (1) down-
pour of rain; (2) speaker's reaction; (3) speech-sounds as a 
physical event; (4) listener's reaction, culminating in (5) 
verification of the rain by a glance at the window. The 
part of the proceedings which interests us begins with the 
perception of the rain by James Hawkins. That perception 
would have been impossible, of course, without previous 
experiences of rain, such as are summed up in the meaning 
of the word rain. The question as to whether thought 
does or does not involve language must, I suppose, amount 
to the following: Perception, or the recognition of some-
thing external for what it is, undoubtedly involves a revival 
or use of past experiences of similar things. But those ex-
periences are associated in the mind with the sound of a 
particular word. Is it possible for perception to take place 
without some consciousness, however dim, of the associated 
word ? This is clearly a question for the psychologist, and 
I shall not at tempt to decide whether the word rain 
emerged in James's mind now or only later in the proceed-
ings. At all events the perception has set in motion a whole 
train of thoughts, the recollection of the proposed walk, 
its undesirability in Mary's interest, and the need, there-
fore, to inform Mary of the probable change of plan. The 
entire situation is now clear to James, but many possi-
bilities confront him as he makes up his mind to address 
Mary . He might point to the window and say, Look! or 
simply, Mary!; or else he might choose a more wordy 
FIG. 2. The visible aspects of a typical act of speech. 
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method of achieving the same result, as by the sentence 
Look at the rain! or What a storm! But our analysis is 
concerned only with the course actually taken by James, 
which is to indicate the central fact in the whole business, 
i.e. the rain itself. The word rain rises automatically to his 
lips as he goes on to name the falling water which he sees. 
Let us be certain that we understand what the process of 
naming the rain really is. It is not the choice of some 
arbitrary new sound to represent this particular new 
happening. On the contrary, James does not really name 
the new rain at all; what he names is only his previous ex-
periences of rain, as represented in his memory by the class-
name 'rain'.1 Tha t name is, in fact, the one which he has 
always used, and heard other persons use, for similar ex-
periences in the past. Otherwise expressed, the presently 
perceived rain is recognized as a member of the class of 
things associated with the sound-image rain. It is this 
sound-image, therefore, which rises to James's lips. 
But there within James's lips the sound-image might 
have stayed but for his decision to articulate it and to 
send it forth as a physical complex of air-waves. Now in 
practice the decision to speak invariably assumes the form 
of an intention to affect the listener in a particular way, and 
it is this intention which, as I shall later show, makes of 
every genuine act of speech a 'sentence', not merely the 
use of words or a word. It is true that the status of 'sen-
1
 The previous experiences may sometimes be restricted to a single 
occasion, as when some one is introduced by name, and the name is em-
ployed a few moments later. Moreover, as Mr. Gunn points out, the 
experiences need not be direct. I may speak of an earthquake without ever 
having experienced one, its nature being known to me by descriptions, i.e. 
through the experiences of others. Such cases do not affect my point, 
which is that the word-sign used did not, at the moment of its choice for 
utterance, yet include in its meaning the thing in course of being referred to. 
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tence' is not usually conceded to single nouns pronounced 
exclamatorily, but the view just expressed proclaims me 
an adherent of the opposite opinion. In the present 
instance James's intention is to convey information to 
Mary, to make her 'see' the rain and its implications. 
Grammarians call such a sentence a 'statement', a term 
which rather unfortunately conceals the speaker's evident 
desire to coax the listener's attention in a given direction. 
Allusion has just been made to a subsidiary device em-
ployed by James for the accomplishment of his particular 
purpose. He does not simply pronounce the word as 
though it were a matter of indifference, but utters it in a 
rather high-pitched voice, with sforzando attack, sinking 
at the finish to a slightly lower note. In writing we must 
suggest this difference of intonation by an exclamation-
mark; Rain! says James, not simply rain. Differences of 
pitch and intensity are always used in actual speech to 
convey such differences of sentence-quality. If James, on 
hearing the sound at the window-pane, had not looked up 
and satisfied himself as to the cause, he might conceivably 
have uttered the word Rain? with the rising intonation 
which indicates a question. But in the case before us, 
James is not asking a question, but making an assertion. 
To render the interpretation of the utterance still clearer, 
yet another auxiliary to speech might have been invoked, 
either a nod of the head or a raising of the hand towards 
the window. 
T h e passage from volition to action, and the method by 
which the muscles connected with the organs of speech 
were innervated, are psychological and physiological 
events beyond my competence. So far as I am concerned, 
therefore, James's role in the act of speech is now ended, 
and we may turn from him to the physical occurrence 
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which he has created. Unable to transfer his thought as 
such, and unable, therefore, to adopt that means of 
attracting his companion's attention to the object of his 
thought, his articulated word-sign has brought about cer-
tain changes in Mary's environment which work upon her 
in a way similar to that in which the rain worked upon 
James. The principal change is, of course, the emergence 
for Mary of what, alike to herself and to James, appears as 
'sound'. This nomenclature combines, in a fashion which 
strictly is inaccurate, the actual physical occurrence, the 
creation of a certain complex of wave-lengths in the air, 
with the auditory sensations of the persons present. For 
my purpose, all that has to be observed is that, from the 
listener's standpoint, what constitutes and renders effec-
tive the act of speech, is not any modification of the 
speaker's thoughts, but an external audible occurrence, 
reinforced by other external occurrences of a visible kind. 
We now pass on to examine the part played by 
Mary Hawkins. By way of contrasting her role with that 
of her husband, I call her the listener, though without 
implying that she had been expecting any words to be 
addressed to her. On the contrary, she is so immersed in 
her book as to be totally oblivious of everything around 
her. All the more remarkable, therefore, is the alertness 
with which she lends ear to James's ejaculation. This 
readiness to attend is an important and almost invariable 
feature in the operation of speech, though I shall not 
allude to it again. It arises, partly from the general 
recognition of speech as a source of mutual advantage, 
partly from the habitual courtesy which social life has 
engendered. The auditory sensation caused by the sound-
waves which James's utterance has set in motion is im-
mediately identified by Mary as a familiar word. But 
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which word ? The sound of Rain! is very ambiguous, 
embracing all the possibilities of rain and rein and reign. 
For the listener there are, at the moment of audition, no 
homophones. In speech, though not in language, words 
which sound alike are, in effect, a single word. But Mary 
does not doubt that rain has been meant. To the generality 
of Englishwomen rain is a more frequent topic than reins 
or a reign, and long before her thoughts could travel to 
those more remote components of her vocabulary, Mary's 
mind will have become satisfied that rain has been in-
tended . The brevity of James's utterance, the incisiveness 
with which it has been spoken, and indeed the entire set 
of circumstances attending that curt exclamation upon 
that particular April afternoon, will already have con-
vinced her (through previous experiences of the like) that 
he was referring to some obvious thing physically present 
in the immediate environment.1 The word rain itself has 
potentialities of application which are very far from 
uniform; within its 'area of meaning' as known to Mary 
from her past experiences, are references not only to 
water-drops betokening a now occurring downpour, but 
also to a meteorological condition prevailing over an 
entire season (e.g. There has been nothing but RAIN this 
August) or even to any descent of small particles that can 
be compared with the natural phenomenon (e.g. a RAIN of 
ashes). Nevertheless, it is solely the first of these possi-
bilities which occurs to Mary. Since the possibility nearest 
to hand suits the situation, she has no reason for looking 
further afield. A glance at the window confirms her 
interpretation, and also shows her that her husband has 
1
 Mary may also have a dim consciousness, derived from the fact of a 
noun being used, that the thing-meant is to be viewed as a thing, (See 
below, pp. 144-5.) 
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rightly marked the state of the weather. And now crowd 
in upon her all the considerations which prompted James 
to speak, supplemented by feelings of her own not identical 
with any which have on this occasion been felt by him. 
James had shrewdly calculated the effect which his ejacula-
tion would produce, and though, as I have just noted, the 
total ' thing-meant' is not exactly identical for Mary and 
himself, still the similarity is close enough to convince him 
that his purpose has been successfully fulfilled. The act 
of speech chosen for analysis has come full circle. Mary has 
'seen' what James 'meant' , and that thing-meant forth-
with becomes the starting-point for a reply which takes 
shape in the words What a bore! 
§ 27. Once again the thing-meant. What exactly is 
it that James has 'meant' and Mary has 'seen' ? A complex 
'state of things' (Sachverhalt), as I characterized it in § 8, 
consisting of the rain at the window, the thought of the 
walk, the disappointment at its abandonment, and a good 
deal else as well. Mary also sees that James has meant her 
to see all this. The act of speech itself can no more be 
excluded from the thing-meant than the persons partici-
pating in the act. But, to employ a simile already used, 
not all parts of this complex state of things are equally 
illuminated. James has willed it that a brilliant beam of 
light should fall upon that constituent part of the whole 
which was its actual point of departure, namely the visible 
downpour of rain. Orthodox grammarians would, indeed, 
asseverate that the rain was all that the exclamation meant, 
so much and no more having been said. The most they 
would concede is that James had meant what formally 
correct parlance expresses by There is rain.1 So far as 
1
 The old logical doctrine demands that every sentence should be 
analysable into subject and predicate. 
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Rain! is taken as a 'word', no doubt the corresponding 
thing-meant must be circumscribed narrowly enough to 
obtain for it easy admittance into the class of things 
labelled rain; more briefly, rain as a word points to an 
instance of rain. But when we are called upon to state 
what was the thing meant by Rain! as a complete utter-
ance we are no longer thus cramped and confined. It 
has already been seen (pp. 74-5) that I have no compunc-
tion in viewing such an utterance as a complete and 
autonomous 'sentence'. If, then, I wished to explain what 
was meant by the sentence Rain! I should have no 
hesitation in recounting the whole course of James's re-
flections from the moment when he first perceived the 
rain down to the actual instant of articulation. The thing-
meant has increased like a snowball, every new considera-
tion which entered James's head adding to its bulk. To 
omit, for example, his fears for Mary's health would be to 
omit the very thing which provided him with a motive for 
speaking. The t ruth of my contention that the words of a 
sentence are but clues, and that their meanings are not to 
be confounded with the things meant by them, thus be-
comes more and more transparent. It is plain, moreover, 
that the words of a sentence need not point directly to the 
real heart of the thing-meant. They must merely provide 
well-chosen roads leading thither. Had James said, Look, 
Mary! or It has begun to rain, or We shan't be able to take 
that walk, almost exactly the same thing-meant would 
have been communicated, though through different 
channels. It is perhaps a fair summing up of the position 
to say that though Rain! and Look, Mary! and It has begun 
to rain and We shan't be able to take that walk are the very 
reverse of synonymous when regarded as 'words' or as 
combinations of words, yet the 'sentences' expressed by 
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them in this situation are very nearly synonymous, indeed, 
are only not completely synonymous by reason of what 
may be described as different effects of lighting. 
There is a further question with regard to the thing-
meant which cannot be entirely evaded. Was the thing 
seen by Mary really the same thing that James had meant ? 
In this question are involved deep metaphysical issues, 
upon which, for all their interest, we must resolutely turn 
our backs. My book has no other purpose than to in-
vestigate the nature of speech, and like all scientific 
inquiries, the plane upon which it moves is that of 
ordinary observation and common-sense assumptions. At 
the common-sense level the present question must be 
answered both affirmatively and negatively. Without the 
postulate that speaker and listener are able to direct their 
attention to the same thing, the very notion of speech is 
an absurdity, and any rational theory on the subject be-
comes impossible. But room must be left for such con-
tingencies as contradiction and differences of feeling as 
between speaker and listener. In the instance before us, 
an element in James's thing-meant has been the expecta-
tion that Mary would be disappointed, whereas in fact she 
might answer, / am quite glad, as I'm rather tired! A less 
likely circumstance is that James, being short-sighted, has 
wrongly identified the cause of the sound heard by him, 
so that Mary can reply sharply, Nonsense, it is not raining! 
To that extent the thing-meant may not be identical for 
speaker and listener. It is indispensable for the success of 
the utterance that Mary should see the thing meant by 
James in its essential lines, but her own counterpart may 
reveal a somewhat changed and deepened perspective. On 
account of this possible divergence of views, as well as for 
other reasons, e.g. word-consciousness (§ 18), the entire 
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act of speech, actors, words, and all, must be regarded as 
potential ingredients in the thing-meant, which thus runs 
the risk of being confused with the 'situation' (§ 16). At a 
word from Mary, James himself can be brought to see the 
thing-meant, as he would say, 'in quite a new light'. 
The principles enunciated in the first chapter will 
enable us to draw a sharp distinction between 'situation' 
and ' thing-meant' . In so far as the thing-meant is a 
' thing', there is no limit to the number of other things 
which subsequent thought may bring into connexion with 
it. Some of these super-added things are nearer, some 
more remote . All the nearer things, taken together, con-
stitute the 'situation'. But within this, and strictly limited 
by the speaker's 'depth of intention' (§ 17), is what has been 
actually 'meant'. Inasmuch as it is 'meant', the thing-
meant is only the volitionally illuminated part of the 
situation, namely that part of it which the speaker has 
intended to come to the listener's consciousness. Since 
every act of speech owes its existence to an exertion (how-
ever disguised by mechanization, § 14) of the speaker's 
will, it seems natural and right that the critic, if not the 
grammarian, should view the 'thing-meant' from the 
speaker's angle. But we must remember that it is by no 
means always the speaker's desire to divulge his private 
perceptions or emotions. He may deliberately wish to 
mislead, or may promise what he does not intend to per-
form. Or to take a subtler case, he may adopt a tone of 
certainty about what he knows to be doubtful. For all 
these reasons we dare not neglect the listener. The follow-
ing will probably be found a good working definition: The 
thing meant by any utterance is whatever the speaker has 
intended to he understood from it by the listener.1 
1
 A closely similar formulation was given in my article on Word and 
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§ 28. The material and the standpoint of the theorist 
of speech. Speaker and listener, uttered words and thing-
or things-meant, have all come to light in the typical act 
of speech selected by me for analysis. This act disclosed 
itself as a miniature drama, the action of which consisted 
in the interplay of those four factors. Tha t they are in-
volved in some examples of speech is thus conclusively 
demonstrated, but it would require a wide survey of other 
examples in order to justify generalization of the inference. 
For such an extended survey there is obviously no place in 
a book of this kind, and it must be left to the reader to 
discover, if he can, any instance of speech where the four 
factors are neither actually nor implicitly present. I shall 
deal in the next chapter (§ 36) with one or two cases 
which might seem dubious. Here I will mention only one. 
'Do you really maintain', some one may object, ' that your 
four factors are present in that volume of Thackeray 
standing upon the shelf? And yet it undoubtedly con-
tains written speech. I am ready to admit', he may 
continue, ' that the speaker is there, for I have named the 
author . But where is the listener, and where are the 
uttered words ?' Now I shall have to acknowledge that 
speaker and listener are not present in the flesh, so that the 
thing-meant, here an imagination of the former, is also 
absent, and similarly no words are being uttered, only 
Sentence, p. 360, though there I inexactly wrote 'meaning' for 'thing-meant'. 
Ogden and Richards (Meaning of Meaning, p. 315) criticize my view on the 
ground that ' "to be understood" is here a contraction. It stands for (a) 
to be referred to + (b) to be responded with +(c) to be felt towards refer-
ent+ (d) to be felt towards speaker + (e) to be supposed that the speaker is 
referring to +(f) that the speaker is desiring, &c , &c.' I agree. But far 
from considering the vagueness of the phrase an objection, I think that is 
just its virtue. As I have shown, the thing-meant is always very complex, 
and the listener's powers of understanding must be equal to coping with 
all the various purposes embodied in the speaker's utterance. 
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visible written symbols for them being present. All this is 
true, and yet implicitly not one of my factors is missing. 
The speaker has already been conceded, and any book-
seller might, if he would, indicate some 'listener' or other. 
The thing-meant is naught else than the story told, and 
the existence of this no one will deny. And lastly, what 
sort of symbols can those printed pages be, if they do not 
imply the utterances that they symbolize ? 
We may, therefore, regard the question of the four 
factors as settled, and proceed with good heart to inquire 
what further teaching our chosen act of speech can afford 
us. But a danger now arises lest we should be overwhelmed 
by the mass of information which closer analysis would 
impose. Accordingly, our next step must be to determine 
the exact problem which the theorist of speech sets before 
himself. A social act such as I have described calls for 
investigation from many different points of view. The 
psychologist might choose to consider it as a special type 
of behaviour, and might set himself to inquire what light 
such behaviour throws upon the workings of the mind. 
The physiologist will prefer to study the interaction of 
the organs of articulation, and the muscular movements 
involved. The task of the philologist differs from those 
of the psychologist and the physiologist, inasmuch as he 
is concerned only with the spoken words themselves, with 
the audible products of the act of speaking. Naturally he 
will take into account the three other factors, so far as 
they can help him to understand the special object of 
his efforts; but his researches will never wander far from 
the central region of words and sentences. Philology itself, 
however, comprises various branches or manners of ap-
proach. The phonetician seeks, among other things, to 
study the relations of the heard sounds to the exact place 
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and mode of their articulation. The commentator deals 
only with written speech, with particular texts, interpret-
ing the author's words and attempting to evaluate their 
aptness and aesthetic worth. The student of linguistic 
theory cannot, however, content himself with observing 
a given series or restricted total of linguistic acts. In 
search of general principles, he takes all possible utterances 
as his province, though he not only can, but also in my 
opinion must, use single and particular utterances as his 
points of departure . These utterances he treats solely as 
instruments of communication, as significant signs. His 
interest is, in fact, what has been variously called semasio-
logy, signifies, or semantics.1 It is a wide field, and when 
rightly understood, embraces the entire domain of both 
grammar and lexicography. But whereas the grammarian 
and lexicographer devote themselves to detailed and 
specific facts, the linguistic theorist has no other aim than 
generalization. His task will include the right differentia-
tion of all those strange entities which none whose business 
is with linguistics has ever been able quite to disavow. 
What is speech and what is language ? What is a sentence 
and what is a word ? What is a noun, a verb, subject, 
predicate, object, nominative, infinitive ? Such are the 
questions which the inquirer into linguistic theory must 
try to answer. And his answers will fail to carry conviction 
and will be sterile, unless he can relate them to a compre-
hensive system or conspectus, this to be broadly conceived 
and presented in clear and unambiguous outline. 
The standpoint of the linguistic theorist resembles that 
of the ordinary listener inasmuch as both are called upon 
to interpret. At all events the theorist stands nearer to 
1
 Among English writers, the term 'semantics' seems to have carried 
the day. 
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the listener than he does to the speaker. By the time that 
the utterance comes upon the stage, the speaker has already 
made his exit. His perceptions, motives, and decisions 
are no longer of first-hand importance, for these, as we 
have seen, are inalienable. It is the utterance alone which 
is the immediate subject-matter of all philologists, and 
the theorist of speech will be concerned with the speaker 
only to the extent that his utterances are incompre-
hensible without him. But the theorist differs from the 
listener in his detachment and his unconcern for particular 
things-meant. He is a scientific observer, looking down 
on realities from a height. But though he be detached, 
let him beware of lacking sympathetic insight. There are 
some modern philologists who go much too far in the 
direction of denying the validity of feeling as a serious 
grammatical criterion. To them external form is every-
thing, the felt quality nothing. I expressly reject this 
curious parallel to behaviourism in psychology. Everyone 
who is in the least sensitive to language knows the different 
feel of a noun, an adjective, and a verb. In linguistic 
matters feeling is of paramount importance. 
§ 29. How language enters into speech. I now return 
to James and Mary Hawkins, but shall henceforth take 
into account a second possibility, namely that James might 
say Look at the rain! instead of simply Rain! These 
alternatives have nearly the same signification, but the 
longer of them testifies to a somewhat greater effort on 
James's part, whether out of courtesy to his wife or for 
some other reason. In either utterance we can distinguish 
between elements belonging to the present, and elements 
derived from the past. From the past James has taken, 
not only the words which he employs, but also the particu-
lar tone of voice in which he pronounces them; further-
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more, in the case of Look at the rain! the order in which 
the words are arranged. The materials used by him are 
thus none of his making, though the choice of them out 
of the great multitude at his disposal must certainly be 
placed to his credit. But James's initiative itself is a 
momentary thing belonging exclusively to the present, 
and it has totally transformed the character of the word-
signs selected for his particular purpose. Dead or slumber-
ing these word-signs hitherto were, but by pronouncing 
them he has restored them to new life, imbuing them with 
fire and relevance. It is this double aspect worn by every 
utterance which has given to linguistics two of its most 
fundamental distinctions, that between speech and lan-
guage, and that between the sentence and the word. 
Speech has already been described, and I need only 
summarize the facts. It is a human activity which is called 
into being by an external stimulus subsequently forming 
the nucleus of the thing-meant. If the speaker considers 
the matter interesting enough to communicate to a 
listener, he uses word-signs for the purpose, articulating 
them and thus translating them into sound-waves, which 
the listener translates back into the word-signs of the 
code common to him and the speaker. 'Speech' is an 
abstract term, but can be used concretely and applied to 
the products of a speaker's articulations, as viewed from 
a standpoint similar to that of the listener (§ 28). The 
characteristics of speech in this sense are, firstly, that it 
is relevant to a particular occasion, listener, and thing-
meant ; and secondly, that it is due to the volition of a 
speaker, whose articulate utterance projects into reality 
the word-signs used, and endows them with a vitality 
absent from them at other times. It is clear that this 
description suits James's utterance Rain! or Look at the 
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rain! extremely well. Now as a generic name for utter-
ances like Look at the rain! grammarians use the term 
'sentence', and I shall show that there is no valid reason 
for refusing the same name to many apparently less com-
plete utterances, provided that they, like Rain! are felt 
to make satisfactory sense as they stand. Hence we arrive 
at a very important conclusion, namely that the sentence 
is the unit of speech. 
Thus far we have not found it necessary to avail our-
selves of the complementary notion of Language . But 
now language begins to be seen looming out mistily from 
behind every sentence, from behind every finished product 
of speech. Language is a collective term, and embraces 
in its compass all those items of knowledge which enable 
a speaker to make effective use of word-signs. But that 
knowledge is not of to-day or yesterday, for its main 
elements go back to early childhood. Our vocabulary is 
constantly being enriched, and the area of meaning belong-
ing to specific words being widened. Words, as the most 
important constituents of language, may fairly be regarded 
as its units, though it must be borne in mind that the 
rules for combining words (syntactic rules, as they are 
called), and the specific types of intonation employed in 
pronouncing words, are constituents of language as well. 
We may now supplement our dictum concerning the 
'sentence' with another concerning the 'word'. Together 
they run as follows: The sentence is the unit of speech, and 
the word is the unit of language. 
Let us test these generalizations upon the alternative 
utterances to which James either did or might have given 
vent. Though at first sight the terms 'word' and 'sentence' 
seem, in the case of a single-word sentence like Rain! less 
names of separate and overlapping entities than names of 
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distinct aspects of one and the same entity, yet many 
arguments prove this thesis to be wrong. The sentence 
Rain! is the private possession of James and Mary, whereas 
the word rain belongs to many millions beside them. 
Rain! being an example of speech, is uttered aloud, and 
has relevance both to a definite thing and to a definite 
listener; rain, as an item of language, has relevance to 
nothing except its own widely diffused area of meaning. 
And only one fragment of the area of meaning belonging 
to the word rain applies in the sentence Rain! It is, 
indeed, only by a sort of courtesy that the sentence Rain! 
can be said to 'contain' the word rain. The speaker of 
the sentence Rain! certainly 'utilizes' the word rain, and 
I have ventured to say that in utilizing it he also transforms 
it. But, strictly speaking, the word itself is not so easily 
altered, and the individual speaker, as we have seen, copies 
it rather than handles the original (§ 25). 
The lack of identity as between word and sentence is 
much more clearly seen in the alternative form of James's 
utterance . For here look is not a sentence, and the same 
is still more obvious as regards at and the. It would be 
nearer the mark, as we have just seen, to call these 'copies' 
of words, rather than actual words, but we may waive 
the inaccuracy and say that the sentence Look at the rain! 
contains four words. Hence look and at and the, when 
pronounced, are at best parts of a sentence, and con-
versely, the sentence Look at the rain! is at best a combina-
tion of four words. To the ear of a foreigner ignorant of 
English the sentence presents no discontinuity, and might 
well appear as a unity. But Mary has no difficulty in 
detecting four different words therein, though doubtless 
unaware that she has done so. These words she has known 
in very different contexts and situations, and if she paused 
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to reflect upon them, each would disclose its own indi-
vidual feel and associations. No doubt alike in her ex-
perience and in that of James, the identical combination 
Look at the rain! had often occurred before, but it is not 
as a mechanized unit that he has produced or she received 
it. Structure is perceptibly present in this sentence, an 
unmistakable putting together. And so it generally is. 
Sentences are like ad hoc constructions run up for a 
particular ceremony, constructions which are pulled down 
and their materials dispersed as soon as their particular 
purpose has been served. 
I have devised some diagrams which will help to display, 
in de Saussure's apt terminology, the 'diachronic' charac-
ter of words, and the 'synchronic' character of sentences. 
In Fig. 4 the utterances Rain! and Look at the rain! are 
shown as sentences containing words. The volition of the 
speaker is indicated by arrows, and the sentences passing 
between him and the listener are enclosed in heavy black 
lines. Discontinuity is, of course, impossible in a sentence 
consisting of one word of a single syllable, but also is 
imperceptible where there are several words. For this 
reason no black dividing lines have been shown within 
the sentences. In conjunction with the arrows, the oblong 
shape of the sentences hints at their occurrence in present 
time. Strictly speaking, present time exists just as little 
as a point exists, and moreover in the four-word sentence 
a sequence and duration are definitely noticeable. But the 
time occupied by such a sentence is as nothing compared 
with the whole lives of James and Mary, so that the term 
'present' must be allowed to stand. Entering into the 
sentences are the words employed, which have extensive 
areas of meaning here represented by dotted lines. Far 
back into the past they go, and only a tiny portion of the 
FIG. 4. How language enters into the sentences Rain! and Look at the rain! 
areas touches and is concerned with the sentences. For 
the dotted areas are to be interpreted as planes converging 
upon the sentences, each at a somewhat different angle. 
This is intended to show that the four words of Look 
at the rain! have not always been associated as here, but 
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have had their own separate applications and lines of 
development. 
In order not to complicate the diagrams, I have made 
no attempt to indicate either the 'form' or the 'function' 
FIG. 5. How syntactic and intonational form enters into the sentence 
Look at the rain! 
of the various words, attributes of them concerning which 
I shall have much to say at a later stage (§ 42). But since 
language has already been described as having other consti-
tuents beside words, it seemed desirable to make some 
attempt to depict these. In Fig. 5 the areas representing 
words have been omitted, but have been replaced by two 
areas representing Syntactic and Intonational Form 
respectively. On the left we see the rule that the verb 
precedes its object, congruently exemplified in the sen-
tence Look at the rain! (To all intents and purposes 
look-at is a compound verb, so that no exception must 
be taken to construing this sentence as verb and object.) 
Both James and Mary are well acquainted with the rule, 
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many examples of which have been encountered by them 
in the past, e.g. Lake a bite! Sell me a couple! Learn your 
lesson! Hence Mary, through her linguistic knowledge, 
has no difficulty in concluding the kind of relation which 
has been meant between the action denoted by look and 
the thing denoted by rain. In precisely the same way the 
intonation given by James to the words Look at the rain! 
recalls a similar intonation given on many past occasions 
to commands consisting of an imperative and a noun. 
These enable Mary to recognize the present sentence as 
a command, though she does so automatically, and with-
out referring it consciously to any type of previous ex-
perience. I will compare the part played in language by 
such forms and rules as these to the part played in astro-
nomy by celestial movements. In astronomy the units 
are the stars and planets, just as words are the units of 
language. But the existence of such units in both sciences 
does not exclude the co-existence in them of other consti-
tuent facts of a more abstract and intangible kind. 
§ 30. The nature of the sentence. We must retrace 
our steps a little and put to ourselves a question the answer 
to which has perhaps been assumed too lightheartedly. 
Are grammarians justified in postulating the separate 
existence of the two entities, or categories, which bear the 
names of 'word' and of 'sentence' respectively ? It is true 
that these terms go back to the earliest period of Greek 
grammatical analysis, but a long tradition is in itself no 
adequate ground for their further retention . What if the 
distinction were based upon fallacious linguistic theory ? 
What if there were solid reasons for banishing the names 
from our up-to-date linguistic terminology ? Doubts such 
as these constantly make themselves heard, and in principle 
are not only legitimate, but salutary. It is right that we 
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should be masters of the terms we use, not their slaves. 
And if there is nothing valid, or even useful, in the distinc-
tion of 'word' and 'sentence', by all means let us get rid 
of the one, or the other, or both. 
Of recent times there has been a tendency to emphasize 
the reality of the sentence at the expense of the word. 
The phoneticians in particular have been struck by the 
audible continuity of sentences. These, especially when 
they are short, flow on without a break, and betray no 
indication of being composed of words. Since most speak-
ing takes place unreflectingly, to assume the existence of 
components of speech which emerge only on reflection is 
to import extraneous elements into the utterance as heard. 
Hence, if words are not condemned out of hand as illusory, 
they are at least apt to be stigmatized as 'abstractions'. 
In point of fact, a word is no more and no less of an 
abstraction than the pound sterling. And who, especially 
in these days, would get any advantage out of calling the 
pound sterling an abstraction ? The analogy is almost 
perfect, and deserves meditation. I shall return to this 
topic later (§38) . But in the present part of my exposition, 
I am not really concerned with the word, but with the 
sentence. The reasons for regarding the sentence as an 
abstraction are little less serious than those for taking the 
same view about the word. As a general rule it is words 
that are catalogued in dictionaries, not sentences. There 
is no insurmountable difficulty, if we should really wish 
to do so, in regarding sentences as combinations of several 
words packed tightly together, with the result that some 
have become a little squeezed and unrecognizable in the 
process. Above all, against the existence of sentences one 
could cite the fact that they are only exceptionally remem-
bered. As I wrote in the foregoing section, they are ad hoc 
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constructions, run up for momentary use, and forgotten 
immediately after. 
Nevertheless, the 'sentence' is a reality, and an irrefut-
able reality. And that it is so shall be known, not from 
any arguments or logical considerations, but from its 'feel' 
(p. 86). There is a sense of satisfaction arising from sen-
tences which does not arise from any other samples of 
uttered speech. Suppose that James Hawkins had said 
Look at the . . . and no more, Mary his wife would have 
experienced a feeling of dissatisfaction, due to his having 
failed to complete the sentence. Suppose again that at 
some neighbour's party Mary chanced to overhear the 
words . . . one of James Hawkins's friends . . ., she would 
be left ill at ease and curious, unless she could ascertain, 
or sufficiently well divine, the remainder of the sentence. 
We thus see that the sense of satisfaction on the part of 
the listener corresponds to a quality of completeness in 
those utterances which we call sentences. But what is the 
secret of this completeness ? Wherein does it consist ? In 
the whole domain of linguistics there is no more debated 
problem. In his painstaking and instructive book on the 
sentence1 John Ries prints no less than one hundred and 
forty definitions culled from different works. The diver-
gences of these definitions would provide instructive reading 
for anyone who might imagine that this central problem 
of linguistics had been settled years ago. 
T h e discussion of the sentence will occupy the whole 
of my fourth and fifth chapters, where many earlier 
explanations will be mentioned. Here I shall do no more 
than present the arguments in favour of my own view, 
which is, briefly, that the satisfactoriness perceived in any 
1
 John Ries, Was ist ein Satz? (Part III of his Beiträge zur Grundlegung 
der Syntax), Prague, 1931, pp. 208-24. 
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sentence is due to the recognition of its perfect relevance 
and purposiveness. When Mary hears the words Look at 
the . . . she has no adequate idea what James is speaking 
about, or why he is speaking at all. When the words 
. . . one of James Hawkins's friends . . . catch her ear, she 
does not question the fact that a sentence has been spoken, 
but for her these words are no sentence, since she can 
make no sense out of them. More precisely, neither does 
she fully know the thing that was meant, nor can she 
discern the speaker's purpose in referring to it. No doubt 
she may form theories on the subject, and may reconstruct 
for herself a possible sentence in which these words played 
a part. But at most her reconstruction will be theoretical, 
and the chances are that it will be wrong. In fine, the 
spoken words . . . one of James Hawkins's friends . . . and 
Look at the . . . remain mere phrases, mere combinations of 
unintelligible words, until completed in such a way as to 
restore to them their original purposiveness and relevance. 
Judged by this standard, both Rain! and Look at the 
rain! are very good sentences indeed. Mary knows both 
what James is referring to, and what she, Mary, is to do 
about it. Some grammarians have declared that a sentence 
is an utterance which 'has meaning', or 'makes sense'. But 
it is clear that these definitions are highly ambiguous and 
open, in this form, to serious objection. It cannot be 
denied that the utterances . . . one of James Hawkins's 
friends . . . and Look at the . . . mean (i.e. refer to) some-
thing in the context or situation in which they appear. 
But they fall short of being sentences because they do not 
succeed, without further additions, in supplying any inti-
mation why the speaker should have uttered them. They 
fail to exhibit any communicative purpose on the speaker's 
part. They certainly have relevance to a thing-meant, 
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but they cannot aspire to the title of sentences because 
they show no sign of relevance to the listener. 
It is this combination of adequate relevance both to 
some definite thing-meant and to some definite audience 
or listener which alone can entitle an utterance to the 
rank of 'sentence'. And of the two qualifications it is the 
relevance to the listener which is the more essential. Thus 
. . . one of James Hawkins's friends . . . is a mere phrase, 
whereas Look at the . . . must be described rather as an 
incomplete sentence (§ 55). This point of view is con-
firmed by comparing with one another the four classes 
of sentence usually distinguished by grammarians. In 
order to keep within the bounds of the concrete, some 
further possibilities must be added to the alternative 
utterances hitherto attributed to James Hawkins. In 
exactly the same circumstances it would have been natural 
for James to have exclaimed Hark! or Hullo! Or again 
his comment might have taken the form of a question, 
Do you hear the rain? Yet again, his implicit statement 
Rain! might have been given the more explicit form 
It is raining. Statements, exclamations, questions, and 
requests—these are the main types of sentence. In ques-
tions and requests the relevance to a listener is unmis-
takable, for an immediate responsive action is demanded. 
The listener's part is less obvious in statements and ex-
clamations, but at least it is clear that the speaker is there 
drawing attention either to something objective or to a sub-
jective emotion of his own. But to say that the speaker 'is 
drawing attention' to anything is to imply a purposive att i-
tude towards a listener. An attentive and intelligent att i tude 
on the part of the listener is the correlate to the speaker's 
purpose, and is the minimum requirement of speech. 
I come back, therefore, to my dictum that the sentence 
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is the unit of speech. For a sentence to be uttered, the 
four factors of speech must be functioning harmoniously 
and adequately, and when they are so functioning there 
is no reason to withhold from the utterance the designation 
of 'sentence'. Thus James Hawkins's utterance Rain! is, 
in its own situation, just as good a sentence as Look at the 
rain! for its relevance both to Mary and to the rain on 
the window (with the attendant considerations) is evident 
and indisputable. Mary is perfectly satisfied by this brief 
utterance, and it is difficult to see why the grammarians 
should not be satisfied as well. Thus the door is opened for 
the admittance of countless short phrases and single words 
to the category of sentences, provided that they are spoken 
in such a way and in such a situation that their relevance to 
a listener is undeniable. At their own season and place, Yes! 
No! Hi! Very well! Naturally! If you please! As you were! 
George! To your good health! are all admirable sentences. 
I have refrained from giving a formal definition, but 
schoolboys have to be taught, and provisionally I am in-
clined to recommend the following: A sentence is a word 
or set of words revealing an intelligible purpose. In this 
definition there is no reference to speaker, listener, or 
thing-meant, because I hold that, if the grammarian has 
done his duty, these will all have been mentioned long 
before the topic of the sentence is reached. One defect 
will probably be felt, namely the omission of any quantita-
tive criterion. In the absence of this, my definition seems 
to suggest that Mary! Do look! It is raining! might be 
one sentence instead of three. I shall deal further with 
this objection in my fourth chapter (§ 55), and will here 
only add that those who prefer may extend my definition 
as follows: A sentence is a word or set of words followed by 
a pause and revealing an intelligible purpose. 
§30 N A T U R E OF T H E S E N T E N C E 99 
Let us now consider for a moment how the sentence was 
defined by Dionysius Thrax in the first century before 
our era. This ancient grammarian, the father of gram­
matical analysis, probably wrote as follows: λόγος εστι 
λέξεων σύνθεσις διάνοιαν αυτοτελη δηλουσα, 'A sentence is 
a combination of words displaying a self-sufficient mean­
ing.' 1 Here αυτοτελη is often rendered 'complete' (so 
already Priscian, ii. 45 sententiam perfectam demonstrans), 
and the entire phrase misinterpreted as 'expressing a com­
plete thought ' . But it is remarkable that Dionysius should 
have used an adjective compounded with ΤΈΛΟΣ 'purpose', 
and that the word διάνοια should cover the notion of 'inten­
tion', 'purpose' as well as that of 'meaning', 'signification'. 
Perhaps the Greek grammarian had a keener perception 
of the t ruth than the bulk of his modern successors. 
§ 31. The ambiguity of the word 'meaning'. Those 
who define the sentence as a word or set of words revealing 
a complete meaning—and note that the Swedish term for 
sentence is mening—are etymologically nearer the mark 
than they themselves may be aware. For in its original 
sense, ' to mean' (Anglo-Saxon maenan, modern German 
meinen) signifies 'to purpose', at the outset an exclusively 
human action. To this day, German draws a distinction 
between meinen said of persons, e.g. Er meint wohl etwas 
anderes, and bedeuten said of things, e.g. Dieser Satz be-
deutet wohl etwas anderes. In English the verb 'to mean' 
signifies either to intend an act (e.g. I MEAN to go) or to 
1
 The existing text of Dionysius Thrax (ed. Uhlig, p. 22, 5) reads: 
λόγος δέ εστι πεζης λέξεως σύνθεσις διάνοιαν αυτοτελη δηλουσα 'A sen­
tence is a combination of prose diction displaying a self-sufficient meaning'. 
T h e version given above is that considered by Delbrück (Vergleichende 
Syntax der indogermanischen Sprachen, p. 2) to have been the probable 
original. It has been obtained by re-translating into Greek Priscian's oratio 
est ordinatio dictionum congrua, but omitting the word congrua. 
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intend a reference (e.g. When I say a spade, I MEAN a 
spade). But this originally simple and straightforward 
word has suffered irreparable harm from its secondary use 
with the names of things as subject, e.g. But say, what 
MEAN those coloured streaks in heaven? Our habit of trans-
ferring verbs from human to neuter subjects is not at all 
harmful in itself, and may indeed prove a real economy in 
certain cases. Thus to say This knife CUTS very well or 
Tour flat WILL LET without difficulty makes it possible for 
us to concentrate our thoughts wholly upon the excellence 
of the knife or the flat, without reference to the person of 
its possessor. The same use is not uncommon when an 
object follows, as in This SHOWS the folly of extravagance, 
which is shorthand for One CAN SHOW by this example the 
folly of extravagance. 
Now I believe that all the senses in which linguistic 
theory must employ the term 'meaning' conceal a similar 
abbreviation, and that the intending, purposing speaker 
must always be looked for in the background. Thus when 
we allude to the 'meaning' of a word, what is signified is 
the multitude of ways in which a speaker may, if he will, 
legitimately employ it. And by the term 'thing-meant' , 
which I have invented for the convenience of my own 
theory, I wish to be understood whatever a particular 
speaker has intended on a particular occasion, both by way 
of reference to some objective thing, and by way of 
reference to the manner in which the listener should take 
his utterance. 
T h e common practice of stating that a sign or symbol 
or symptom 'means' this, that, or the other, has led to 
an esoteric and, in my opinion, altogether baneful way of 
regarding 'meaning'. Signs, symbols, and symptoms are 
dead things, and as such can 'mean' nothing at all until 
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human agents come to the rescue. Some element of pur-
pose and intention enters, not only into the act of speak-
ing, but also into the act of interpretation; hence the verb 
'to mean' may be applied to significant things, even if they 
do not owe their significance to active intention . For 
instance, the symptoms1 of a disease, which are but con-
current events the implications of which have been learnt 
by experience, can be said to 'mean' that the disease is 
present, but only because a doctor chooses to interpret 
them in that way. This employment of the verb gives it a 
new turn which we need not consider further. In language, 
at all events, the signs or symbols employed are all 'meant ' 
in the sense of being actively intended by a speaker for 
reference to one thing or another.2 Nor, as I have 
previously observed, does the fact that much speech has 
become almost automatic vitiate the t ruth that human 
will and endeavour he at the root of all language and 
linguistic usage. The transference of the verb 'to mean' 
from human to inanimate subjects appears largely re-
sponsible for the confusion between 'meaning' and 'thing-
meant ' . Grammarians state that the objects of verbs 
1
 Lite other words, symptom, sign, and symbol are highly ambiguous, 
with overlapping areas of meaning. For semantic theory the following 
distinctions may be recommended: 'Symptoms' are indications of a non-
psychical kind; hence the word excludes, not only intentional signs and 
symbols, but also significant cries and the like. 'Signs' and 'symbols' are, 
on the contrary, psychical, i.e. imposed by human beings or other living 
creatures, whether intentionally or unintentionally. Symbols are a sub-
class of signs in which some natural connexion exists between the sign and 
the thing signified, e.g. the cross is a symbol of Christianity. Among words 
only those which are onomatopoeic are symbols. 
2
 The trend of my argument shows that I disagree with Ogden and 
Richards's verdict (Meaning of Meaning, p. 318) that ' "Mean" as short-
hand for "intend to refer t o " is, in fact, one of the unluckiest symbolic 
devices possible'. In my opinion, human purposiveness lies behind every 
use of the verb ' to mean'. See further on this topic below, p. 147. 
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express relations of two different kinds. Either they 
designate something resulting from, or created by, the 
action named in the verb, as in He built a house; or else 
they denote some independent entity upon which the 
action is exerted or towards which it is directed, as in He 
bought a house; you do not create a house by buying it. 
These two kinds of object are sometimes called the 
'effected' and the 'affected' object respectively. Now the 
verb 'to mean', so long as it was predicated solely of human 
beings, as a rule took an 'effected' object, e.g. He meant 
mischief. Only when it came to be used in the sense of ' to 
intend a reference to' , as in He meant me, did it take an 
'affected' object. In these cases there could be no risk of 
misunderstanding. But when it began to be said that 
words 'mean' this or that, not only was the possibility of 
the signification 'to purpose' eliminated, but also a doubt 
was cast upon the nature of the object appended to the 
verb. Perhaps the words could now be conceived of as 
constituting and creating the very substance of the things 
meant by them. Just as a house is a 'building', so perhaps 
the things meant by words might be a 'meaning'. Cer-
tainly some such fallacious conception appears to underlie 
the terms often employed to indicate the thing 'meant' by 
a sentence. Philosophers have felt no scruple in describing 
that thing as the 'content ' (Inhalt) of the sentence. 
§ 32. Summary and conclusion. The ultimate neces-
sity for speech was shown to reside in the fact that 
thoughts and emotions are private to the individual, and 
not susceptible of communication in that purely psychical 
form. Hence if the desire should arise to acquaint a com-
panion with something in which psychical elements have 
a place, use must perforce be made of signs, that is to say, 
physical substitutes the meaning of which both user and 
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recipient know in advance. Articulate words were argued 
to be the most useful kind of signs, and evidence was 
adduced to show that these are nothing but copies of 
purely psychical counterparts. The elaborate account of 
a simple act of speech proved that word-signs could only 
represent classes of things similar to the thing now to be 
indicated, so that the discovery of the latter has to be left 
to the listener's active intelligence. The thing meant in 
any act of speech was defined as that which the speaker 
intends to be understood from it by the listener. The task 
of the theorist of speech was next investigated, and found 
to consist in the study of the various terminological 
entities necessary for the adequate description of speech 
and of the instruments employed therein. Behind indi-
vidual utterances loomed out a whole body of previous 
knowledge called Language, which thus contrasted 
markedly with Speech, an activity taking place in the 
present. Words were seen to be the principal units of 
language, though, beside these, syntactic rules and specific 
types of intonation have to be named as less tangible 
elements. Words, as such, are not units of speech, for they 
lack the vivifying breath and the will-power of a speaker 
requisite to call speech into being. The units of speech are 
known as sentences, and their peculiarity was shown to be 
a manifest purposiveness, corresponding to the possession 
of a purpose by the speaker. The purposiveness diagnosed 
in the sentence was analysed partly as concern with some 
definite thing-meant, but principally as concern with the 
listener. Lastly, the word 'meaning' was found everywhere 
to involve the notion of human purpose. 
By way of conclusion to this chapter let me stress the 
two points wherein the doctrine I expound differs from 
that usually expressed or implied by students of linguistics. 
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The section which dealt with the ultimate basis of speech 
(§ 23) is in effect a refutation of the assumption which has 
given to so many books the titles of 'Sprachpsychologie' and 
the like. Hardly anywhere is the slightest hint found 
that the authors know how insufficient psychology is to 
cover the entire field of linguistics. In choosing such titles 
they ignore the very reason for which language and speech 
exist, namely the fact that speaker and listener do not 
possess a common psyche, wherefore communication be-
tween them has to take place through the medium of 
sound. And now for my second point. Philologists have 
been puzzled by the coexistence in linguistics of two 
units. Mineralogy deals only with minerals, botany only 
with plants, astronomy only with celestial phenomena, 
psychology only with minds. Why, then, should linguistics 
have as units both the 'word' and the 'sentence' ? Passages 
could be quoted from the works of many scholars betraying 
uneasiness on this score, and revealing a tendency to deny 
either the one or the other. The mystery dissolves as soon 
as 'speech' and 'language' are sharply distinguished from 
one another, and when the sentence is seen to be the unit 
of the former, and the word the unit of the latter. 
ADDITIONAL NOTE TO CHAPTER II 
Note C (to p. 67). Extract from S. Butler, Essays on Life, Art 
and Science, pp. 201-4. 
'Anything which can be made to hitch on invariably to a definite 
idea that can carry some distance—say an inch at the least, and 
which can be repeated at pleasure, can be pressed into the service 
of language. Mrs. Bentley, wife of the famous Dr. Bentley of 
Trinity College, Cambridge, used to send her snuff-box to the 
college buttery when she wanted beer, instead of a written order. 
If the snuff-box came the beer was sent, but if there was no snuff-
Note c MRS . BENTLEY 105 
box there was no beer. Wherein did the snuff-box differ more from 
a written order, than a written order differs from a spoken one ? 
The snuff-box was for the time being language. It sounds strange 
to say that one might take a pinch of snuff out of a sentence, but if 
the servant had helped him or herself to a pinch while carrying it 
to the buttery this is what would have been done; for if a snuff-box 
can say "Send me a quart of beer" so efficiently that the beer is sent, 
it is impossible to say that it is not a bona fide sentence. As for the 
recipient of the message, the butler probably did not translate the 
snuff-box into articulate nouns and verbs; as soon as he saw it he 
just went down into the cellar and drew the beer, and if he thought 
at all, it was probably about something else. Yet he must have been 
thinking without words, or he would have drawn too much beer or 
too little, or have spilt it in the bringing it up, and we may be sure 
that he did none of these things. 
'You will, of course, observe that if Mrs. Bentley had sent the 
snuff-box to the buttery of St. John's College instead of Trinity, 
it would not have been language, for there would have been no 
covenant between sayer and sayee as to what the symbol should 
represent, there would have been no previously established associa-
tion of ideas in the mind of the butler of St. John's between beer 
and snuff-box; the connexion was artificial, arbitrary, and by no 
means one of those in respect of which an impromptu bargain 
might be proposed by the very symbol itself, and assented to with-
out previous formality by the person to whom it was presented. 
More briefly, the butler of St. John's would not have been able to 
understand and read it aright. It would have been a dead letter to 
him—a snuff-box and not a letter; whereas to the butler of Trinity 
it was a letter and not a snuff-box. You will also note that it was 
only at the moment when he was looking at it and accepting it as a 
message that it flashed from snuff-box-hood into the light and life 
of living utterance. As soon as it had kindled the butler into send-
ing a single quart of beer, its force was spent until Mrs. Bentley 
threw her soul into it again and charged it anew by wanting more 
beer, and sending it down accordingly.' 
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III 
T H E M U T U A L RELATIONS O F L A N G U A G E 
AND SPEECH 
§33. The antithesis of 'language' and 'speech'. The 
attentive reader will by this time have accustomed himself 
to think of speech as a form of drama needing a minimum 
of two actors, a scene or situation of its own, a plot or 
' thing-meant' , and as a last element the extemporized 
words. Such miniature dramas are going on wherever 
speech is practised, and it is little short of a miracle that 
the authors who deal with linguistic theory seem never to 
have thought of describing one of them. The plots are 
occasionally mentioned, and the words frequently so; here 
and there we hear of one of the actors, or both; and a few 
writers have insisted on the importance of the scene. But 
there has been a sort of conspiracy not to isolate or 
analyse in its entirety a single act of speech, instructive as 
such an analysis was nevertheless bound to be. Nor is it 
even easy to find in the indexes of the voluminous works 
on the philosophy or psychology of language any reference 
to 'speech' as the common name of the activity which 
unfolds itself in these linguistic dramas. If one is lucky 
enough to find any mention of speech at all, it is usually 
in the form, 'Speech, see Language', as if the two were 
identical. But no, I must correct myself. The com-
monest entry is 'Speech, parts of, whereas I shall be at 
pains to show that noun, adjective, and so on, are parts of 
language, and that the real parts of speech are subject and 
predicate. It is as though the critics were everlastingly 
discussing dramatic art without ever going to the theatre. 
One is tempted to conclude that philological science 
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abhors the concrete no less than nature abhors a vacuum. 
It is of no avail for the writers here censured to answer 
that the act of speech is implied on their every page, for 
the business of science is not to imply, but to state; its task 
is to bring the embedded and entangled facts into the light 
of day, to separate them out, and to expose them to the 
public eye. Possibly my own account of an act of speech 
(§ 26) will, on closer examination, reveal crudities of which 
I am unaware. But no small part of my purpose will be 
served if later writers recognize the absolute necessity of 
examining single acts of speech in their total environment, 
and if the distinction between language and speech is 
never again suffered to fall into oblivion. 
It is some relief to find that, though linguistic theorists 
have, as a rule, ignored the distinction between 'language' 
and 'speech', most civilized languages have not made this 
mistake.1 In Latin we have lingua and sermo, in Greek 
γλωσσα and λόγος, in French langue and parole (or discours), 
in German Sprache and Rede, in D u t c h taal and rede, in 
Swedish språk and tal; so, too, in Arabic lisān, literally 
' tongue' (= lingua), and kalām, 'speech', 'conversation', 
and ancient Egyptian sometimes uses ro, 'mouth' , for our 
'language', while our 'speech' is represented by mūdet, 
'speaking'. In all these languages the equivalent of 'lan­
guage' serves as a collective name for an organized system 
of knowable linguistic facts, and the equivalent of 'speech' 
is a nomen actionis for the activity of which the most 
evident symptoms are articulation and audibility. Com­
paring one language with another, there are, it is true, 
strange cross-currents: German Sprache and Swedish 
See de Saussure, Cours de Linguistique générale, p. 31. This scholar 
stands almost alone in making a clear distinction between speech and 
language, and in keeping it to the fore throughout his work. 
108 SPEECH AND LANGUAGE §33 
språk are the same words as English 'speech', though the 
former couple are commonly employed in the sense of our 
'language'; Swedish tal means 'speech', but Dutch taal 
means 'language'. The words for language, like Greek 
γλωσσα, Latin lingua, French langue, English tongue, Arabic 
lisān, and Egyptian ro, 'mouth', connect it with one of the 
chief organs of articulation, perhaps seeking to stress the 
notions of continuity and permanence. French stands 
alone in possessing a word langage (from late Latin lingua-
ticum, 'appertaining to the tongue') which, being neither 
a collective nor yet the name of an action, can serve as a 
wider and vaguer term embracing both 'language' (Fr . 
langue) and 'speech' (Fr. parole). Apart from this special 
case, the names for 'language' and 'speech' always come 
before us as etymologically unrelated pairs, eloquent 
testimony to the soundness of untutored instinct in its 
divination of real differences. 
I have no desire to minimize the extent to which 
'speech' and 'language' are intertwined and mutually de­
pendent, and indeed the purpose of the present chapter is 
to elaborate that theme. To this intimate relation all 
languages bear witness, the meanings of the terms in 
question being everywhere extremely wide in area, with 
many overlapping applications. Thus in English one 
writer will prefer the phrase 'his native language', while 
another will prefer 'his native speech'. Beside the anti­
thesis between 'language' and 'speech', there is another 
between 'speech' and 'writing', to which immediate 
attention will be given in § 34. It is in a rather different 
connexion that the term 'language' is most frequently 
employed, for many different systems of words and lin­
guistic rules exist, to each of which this term can be 
applied. T h e collective word 'language' can thus be 
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specialized with an adjectival epithet and used in the 
plural, like other collectives. Compare 'language and 
speech' with ' the people and democracy', ' the French 
language' with ' the French people', and ' the languages of 
the earth' with ' the peoples of the world'. 
§ 34. Secondary forms of speech. So important for 
human life is the practical use of language that its employ-
ment could not for ever be confined to the articulate 
variety which we call 'speech'. An offshoot of pictorial 
art,1 'writing' at last came into existence as a means of 
translating audible speech into a visible but non-audible 
medium, whereby it was made relatively independent of 
time and space.2 Writing is a genuine, though secondary, 
form of speech, so that linguistic theory, if sound, will 
apply alike to the spoken and to the written form. This is 
t rue, in particular, of the sentence; I can state, question, 
or command in writing no less than in speech. In this 
book but little notice will be taken of the differences 
between articulate and written speech, though these are 
greater than often supposed. The absence of a common 
physical situation for writer and reader makes it necessary 
for the former (the whilom 'speaker') to be more explicit 
than he would be in conversation. T h e topics themselves, 
and the knowledge that writing gives a certain durability 
to what in utterance is evanescent, counsel the selection 
of choicer expressions. The help afforded by intonation 
and gesture has gone, and is but clumsily replaced by 
1
 For a recent comprehensive account see H. Jensen, Geschichte der 
Schrift, Hanover, 1925; for Ancient Egypt, A. H. Gardiner, 'The Nature 
and Development of the Egyptian Hieroglyphic Writing', in Journal of 
Egyptian Archaeology, vol. ii (1915), pp. 61 foll. 
2
 See the luminous essay by H. Bradley, Spoken and written English, 
Oxford, 1919, where it is shown that spelt words are, and of necessity must 
be, far more ideographic than phonetic. 
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punctuation and italicizing. It must suffice to name these 
few differences. 
Writing is not the only secondary form of speech. A 
derivative of writing is, for example, braille, in which the 
visible letters are converted into tactile signs for the use of 
the blind. Telegraphy and telephony have their special 
peculiarities, and telegraphy has even a style of its own. 
Gramophone records are now giving a permanence to 
articulate speech. May we anticipate, pleasurably or 
otherwise, a day in the near future when our correspon-
dence by letter will be transacted by means of dictaphone 
records ? The habits of reading and writing brought a 
welcome accession of silence into an unreasonably noisy 
world. There seems to be an unhappy likelihood that this 
boon will be ever increasingly diminished through the 
numerous mechanical devices for multiplying articulate 
speech. 
§ 35. Language as the product of speech. We have 
seen (§ 29) how language enters into speech, but the 
complementary proposition that speech is the sole 
generator of language has still to be discussed. In a given 
act of speech, the thing-meant stands wholly outside the 
utterance, the words comprising which are, as I have 
repeatedly said, summaries of previous experience, and do 
not actually include the present experience. But at the 
very moment when any word is spoken or, to employ my 
own technical phraseology, is applied to some thing-
meant, a fusion takes place and leaves a greater or less 
mark upon this particular item in the speaker's vocabu-
lary. If the word be used in complete agreement with 
tradition, as when what is being called green is the grass, 
the effect is merely to confirm and strengthen a central 
feature in the accepted area of meaning. Wrong and 
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repugnant applications of a word, even if intelligible from 
the situation or verbal context, have no influence upon 
its future, since they either meet with immediate correc-
tion or else are politely ignored. It is the slight departures 
from habitual usage which are the main sources of change 
in language. These departures rapidly find their imitators, 
the process being helped by the fact that 'every child, 
during the formative period of its speech habits, is more 
closely and intimately associated with children slightly 
older than itself than with adults, and is psychologically 
more receptive of influences from these children than from 
adults'.1 Circumstances and shiftings of the environment 
play a large part, word-meanings which were restricted to 
a single trade or profession gradually passing into common 
currency, or again terms of wide general application being 
specialized to a narrower circle.2 Most change is, no 
doubt, unconscious, but now and again conscious innova-
tion gives the first impulse. A number of English words 
can be tracked down to authors who were, in all proba-
bility, their creators or adapters.3 Much more often, how-
ever, the new coinage is anonymous. It must, of course, 
have been an individual wag who, struck by the peculiarly 
pungent fumes of Virginian cigarettes, first gave to them 
the name of gaspers. One thing, at all events, is clear. 
Every change in language, conscious or unconscious, great 
or small, whether of pronunciation or of meaning, has its 
2
 J. M. Manly, 'From Generation to Generation' in A Grammatical 
Miscellany offered to Otto Jespersen on his Seventieth Birthday, Copenhagen, 
1930, p . 289. 
1
 Cf. the fascinating study by A. Meillet, 'Comment les mots changent 
de sens', reprinted in his book Linguistique historique et linguistique 
generate, Paris, 1921, pp. 230 foll. 
3
 See the chapter on 'Makers of English Words' in L. Pearsall Smith, 
The English Language, London, 1912, pp. 109 foll. 
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-origin in some single act of speech, hence passing, if it find 
favour with the multitude, from mouth to mouth, until 
at last it becomes common property. 
Potent as are the factors making for change, those 
making for uniformity and stability are still more potent. 
It is the interest of the community to eliminate individual 
differences, which could, indeed, only render mutual com-
prehension more difficult. Such differences are to a large 
extent automatically effaced, because every speaker is him-
self equally often a listener, and hence forms his vocabu-
lary as much from the applications made by others as from 
those for which he is personally responsible. Parents, 
nurses, teachers are all only too ready to correct or deride 
unorthodox applications of meaning or defects of pro-
nunciation. T h e child gains his knowledge of the sound 
and meaning of any word by innumerable different appli-
cations, e.g. Look, here's Daddy! Kiss Daddy, Funny 
Daddy, Don't bother Daddy, Daddy's tired, No, that's not 
Daddy, that's Uncle Tom, and then, from the lips of the 
little girl next door, referring to a spruce male with raven 
locks so different from our own bald-headed parent, That 
is my Daddy, Have you a Daddy? But I will labour the 
point no further . There is no need for lengthier insistence 
on the universally recognized t ruth that language is, and 
can only be, the outcome of countless single examples of 
speech.1 
§ 36. Is all use of language of the type already 
described? It is difficult to believe that any one ac-
quainted with the literature of linguistic theory will fail 
to find a large measure of t ruth in my complaint concern-
ing the general neglect of the aspect of linguistics called 
'speech'. At the same time a suspicion may perhaps haunt 
1
 See H. Paul, Prinzipien, pp. 18 foll. 
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his mind that I, on my part, have exaggerated the im-
portance of this aspect. He will doubtless agree that writ-
ing is a form of speech, and so include the 'writer' within 
the technical meaning of the term 'speaker' as here em-
ployed, and similarly the 'reader' within the meaning of 
the term 'listener'. But he may still feel that there are 
some uses of language in which the whole paraphernalia 
of speaker, listener, situation, and so forth can legitimately 
be dispensed with, as in such simple generalizations as Two 
and two make four, or in the formulation of scientific 
truths like the following random example: A liquid, at rest 
takes the shape of the lowest part of the vessel containing it, 
and has a horizontal surface. Such statements are couched 
in a form which makes them relatively independent of any 
particular situation, and certainly the t ru th or falsehood 
of their import holds good without reference to any 
particular speaker or listener. It might seem, therefore, 
that there are some samples of speech which elude the 
kind of analysis demanded by ordinary conversational 
utterances. What if such exclamations as Rain! proved 
untypical of the use of language when viewed from a 
broader and more comprehensive standpoint ? Is it not 
possible, after all, that sentences like Two and two make 
four may simply 'contain' their meaning, and that here, in 
the most highly developed employment of words, we have 
the pure linguistic article purged of all such contaminat-
ing circumstances as speaker, listener, and the rest, and 
showing the true metal liberated from the dross of its 
native ore ? 
Suppositions of this kind are nothing but illusions 
due to neglect of that selective attention which I have 
described in § 15. Deeper thought will show that no use of 
language whatsoever is emancipated from the shackles of 
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interpretation, that interpretation demands an interpreter 
who is the 'listener' of linguistic theory, and that unless 
the words had once been put together by some rational 
'speaker' there would be nothing to interpret. To say that 
Two and two make four holds good in any situation is not 
to say that this statement holds good without any situation, 
nor indeed is the former assertion true. Put two drops of 
water in a test-tube, and add two more; so far as immediate 
observation goes, the result is one. Put two male rabbits 
in a hutch with two female rabbits—but it is unnecessary 
to insist. The fact of the matter is that, on hearing or 
reading the words Two and two make four the listener or 
reader at once attunes his mind to the 'Situation of Mathe-
matical Verities', as we might call it. He has heard the 
statement many times before, and has no difficulty what-
soever in understanding and as added to and make as yield 
the number. 
It may be objected, however, that Two and two make 
four, being a cliche, is by no means a suitable touchstone 
for ascertaining the t ru th about speech. The scientific 
formula quoted above will perhaps serve better. Here it is 
undeniable that the words contain their own unequivocal 
meaning in the sense that it is difficult or impossible to 
attach to them any rational interpretation other than that 
intended by the writer. But how do the words come by 
their 'meaning', as untechnical parlance has it ? Obviously 
only through a complex process of rapid deductions by any 
reader capable of understanding the words. In the lack of 
constructive intelligence nothing could be made of them. 
What, apart from such interpretative intelligence, is a 
sequence of words? Nothing but a sum of highly complex 
areas of meaning indicated by a string of sounds or written 
symbols. At the very outset the word a presents an almost 
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unlimited field of possibilities. By the time that a liquid 
at rest has been read the educated reader has already con-
jectured the trend of the sentence as a scientific formula-
tion . Through 'selective attention', and without being 
aware that he is doing so, he will have taken a in the sense 
of 'any', and treated liquid and rest as substantives, not as 
adjective and verb respectively. In short, he will have 
chosen out of each word-meaning whatever was requisite 
for the ascertainment of the thing-meant, just as the 
writer has chosen each word in order to illumine some part 
of the total thing meant by him . This account of the 
matter is not vitiated by the facts that the interpretative 
deductions are instantaneous, and that expression, by dint 
of long practice, is mechanized. The linguistic analysis of 
such a scientific formula must proceed on exactly the same 
lines as that of our type-sentence Rain! only the details 
will be more complex. T h e mind of the speaker or writer 
is set on the 'Situation of Scientific Verities' at the start; 
so probably is that of the listener or reader. The proposi-
tion to be expressed is perceived by the speaker with 
greater or less clarity before the words are fitted to it. 
These follow one another like a series of consecutive notes 
on a piano, each opening up a vista of possibilities, each 
simultaneously limited by what has preceded. The word-
clues pass to the listener or reader as a sequence of audible 
or visible signs bereft, as such, of all meaning. By him they 
are identified with those mental possesssions of his called 
words, and his intelligence makes busy with the search 
after whatever can have been meant by these clues. It is, 
perhaps, not always a very apt mode of description, when 
the more intellectual things-meant are in question, to say 
that the listener finds these in the situation, as happened in 
the case of the utterance Rain! Sometimes, as when the 
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speaker recounts a dream, the listener has, in order to 
fulfil the act of understanding, himself to reconstruct the 
thing-meant in his imagination. Still the fact remains that 
from the outset the thing-meant has always been a poten-
tial common object for both speaker and listener. To 
conclude, I see no possibility anywhere for any use of 
language essentially different from the sample discussed 
in § 26. 
§ 37. The undifferentiated word-sentence of pre-
human times. Since, then, failing some negative instance 
still to be adduced, all use of language involves the various 
factors of speech enumerated in Chapter I, we are free to 
continue our study of the mutual relations of speech and 
language without the fear of thereby deviating too widely 
from the main channel of linguistic theory. By way of a 
beginning, let us return for a moment to the highly 
problematic question of the speech of animals. Zoologists 
whom I have asked are strongly of opinion that animals do 
converse with one another by means of sound-signs, though 
I have found them unwilling to make any very definite 
pronouncements as to the degree or scope of these lin-
guistic attainments. For the purpose of contrasting it 
with human language, I propose to assume that all animal 
language is of the type exemplified by the warning-cry of 
the chamois or the nest-call of the pigeon. It will be 
further assumed that such cries only occur uncombined, 
that in fact there is among animals no such joining to-
gether of words to form sentences as is universal in human 
speech. This position may or may not be zoologically 
correct, but in either case it is instructive, if merely as a 
dialectic exercise, to consider what results would ensue as 
regards the relations of animal language and animal speech. 
The utterance would, on these assumptions, be of a kind 
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best described as the undifferentiated word-sentence.1 
Undifferentiated word-sentences of the type I am sup-
posing are represented in fully developed human speech 
by the class of words called interjections, like Yes! No! 
Alas! Fie! which do not readily and completely combine 
with other words in order to form a sentence. For though 
one can say Yes, I am going out! or Fie, you should know 
better! the words Yes! and Fie! here are little sentences 
in their own right, and what follows is merely corrobora-
tive explanation. I imagine that a very similar character 
should be attributed to the warning-cry or the nest-call. 
A fairly large vocabulary of different cries might be in 
the possession of a given species of animal, and the sum of 
these would constitute the language of that species. In 
such circumstances it would be almost nugatory to con-
trast speech with language as a separate aspect of animal 
linguistics, since speech would betray no construction or 
arrangement, but would simply be the close reproduction 
of the sound heard in all previous utterance of the same 
1
 The view that language originated in utterances where word and ; 
sentence were not yet differentiated from one another is now accepted by 
most authorities; see, for example, O. Jespersen, Language, pp. 428 foll.; 
G. A. de Laguna, Speech, pp. 259 foll.; J. Ries, Was ist ein Satz?, p. 41. 
We must beware of mis-statements to the effect that the sentence is prior 
to the word; for an example, surprising in so great a scholar, see K. Brug-
mann, Die Syntax des einfachen Satzes im Indogermanischen, Berlin-Leipzig, 
1925, p. 1: 'In der Tat geschieht alles Sprechen in Sätzen, und nicht zu 
bezweifeln ist auch, dass, was zuerst als sprachliche Äusserung aufkam, 
Ausruf, Wunsch, Befehl, Frage, oder Aussage, nicht "Wort" , sondern 
"Satz" gewesen ist, oder, genauer und vorsichtiger gesagt, dass sich im 
Bewusstsein der Sprechenden der Begriff "Satz" eher hat einstellen konnen 
als der Begriff "Wort" . ' The last part of this quotation is, indeed, a 
classical example of what William James called 'the psychologist's fallacy', 
the fallacy defined by J. Ward (Psychological Principles, p. 19) as 'a con-
fusion between the standpoint of a given experience and the standpoint 
of its exposition'. 
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cry. In fact, the unit of animal speech would be identical 
with the unit of animal language, except in so far as the 
former would require muscular effort and translation into 
sound. 
The same warning-cry and nest-call being constantly 
repeated, each in its own appropriate situation, these 
word-sentences would, like human words, acquire areas 
of meaning exhibiting (1) a certain attributive quality 
peculiar to each cry, and (2) an adaptability enabling it to 
be applied, without sense of strain, to any of a large num-
ber of different situations all exhibiting that quality. But 
such meanings would have an exceedingly wide range of 
application, and would in consequence wear an appear-
ance of extreme vagueness. As regards reference to things, 
the warning-cry, for example, could point equally well to 
the exciting stimulus, to the utterer, or (if it had any 
element of purpose) to the comrades addressed. Thus in-
cluded in its area of meaning would be the applications 
indicated in translation by 'it-dangerous' or 'it-frighten-
ing', 'I-afraid' or 'I-helpless', 'you-beware' or 'you-attack'. 
Similarly, if any intention as regards the listener were 
involved, it might often remain uncertain whether state-
ment, exclamation, or command was meant. All three 
might be combined, without bias on the part of the 
utterer in any single direction. At other times, however, a 
louder or more emotionally modulated pronunciation, 
accompanied by significant demonstrative movements, 
might be deliberately adopted with a view to specifying 
more closely the particular thing-meant . Thus on one 
occasion the warning-cry might be made to mean 'there 
is a dangerous animal in the neighbourhood', at another 
'gird yourselves for battle ' . Widely diffused meaning does 
not necessarily exclude more precise things-meant, and 
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indeed it can be taken as an axiom of linguistic theory that 
the variety of possible things which the speaker may intend 
is always far greater than the variety of the expressional 
means contained in his vocabulary.1 
In such a condition of affairs, linguistic change would 
in no way be improbable. As regards the sound of the 
cries, the young generation might fail accurately to repro-
duce the traditional notes. Differences of pitch, cadence, 
or tempo might lead to the evolution of new varieties of 
cry. On the side of meaning, external changes might effect 
new developments. The disappearance of some dangerous 
bird of prey, or the first experience of the crack of the 
rifle, might modify the area of meaning of the warning cry 
by this novel exclusion or inclusion. And lastly, specializa-
tion of a particular pronunciation to suit some particular 
class of thing-meant would result in enrichment of the 
vocabulary. 
§ 38. The word as a linguistic entity distinct from 
the sentence. Between the animal utterance and human 
speech there is a difference so vital as almost to eclipse the 
essential homogeneity of the two activities. For whereas 
the animal cry appears to be an indissoluble unity, the 
majority of the sentences spoken by mankind can be 
broken up at will into the smaller linguistic units called 
words. In detail, it is true, there are plenty of difficulties 
in connexion with this breaking up of sentences into words, 
since the spoken sentence flows on without audible dis-
continuity and its divisions are, therefore, not directly 
observable. Nevertheless, the existence of the word is 
not in doubt, since obviously examples like but, wrangle, 
boy cannot be regarded in any other way. I have already 
1
 For Locke's classical treatment of this topic see Additional Note D at 
the end of this chapter, p. 176. 
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remarked upon the futility of calling the word an 'abstrac-
tion' (p. 94). If all that is meant is that the word is a 
psychical rather than an audible entity, then I agree (see 
above, § 25). But more is often intended than this, one 
scholar actually telling us that words are nothing but the 
result of scientific analysis.1 Any dictionary can testify to 
the contrary, for I need hardly say that the words have 
not been manufactured for the sake of the dictionary, but 
rather the dictionary compiled for the purpose of register-
ing the words. There is, however, just one element of 
t ru th in the view here criticized. The unreflecting user 
of language makes no difference between homophones, at 
least so long as they are written alike.2 It is only the 
historian of language who is interested to find separate 
words in (e.g.) the resinous gum and that gum in which the 
teeth are embedded, the helm of a ship and the helm which 
protects the head, the capers cut by a mountebank and the 
capers used in the sauce. But for everyone, the word boy 
1
 J. Ries, Was ist ein Satz?, p. 60: 'Laute, Worte und Wortgruppen sind 
künstliche Einheiten der Grammatik, gewissermassen Abstraktionen; der 
Satz ist eine natürliche Einheit und eine sprachliche Wirklichkeit; jene 
sind nur die durch eine zu wissenschaftlichen Zwecken erfolgte Zerlegung 
gewonnenen Bestandteile der Sprache, die aus ihrem natürlichen Zusam-
menhang herausgelost sind und für sich allein kein wirkliches Leben haben.' 
See too Weliander, Bedeutungswandel, Part I, p. 15: 'In der Wirklichkeit 
existieren nur Wortindividuen. Das Wort, von dem man in dem Worter-
buch oder in der Grammatik spricht, ist eine Abstraktion aus vielen Wort-
individuen, die zu verschiedenen Zeiten gesprochen und gehort worden 
sind.' No one denies, of course, that words originate in speech and have 
obtained their characters of sound and meaning from that source. I repeat, 
to call 'words' in the lexicographic sense 'abstractions' is to convey an 
utterly false impression. They exist as necessarily presupposed mediums 
of linguistic exchange, and differ from sixpences and halfpennies only in 
being psychical, rather than physical, coinage. 
2
 See R. Bridges, On English Homophones, being Tract No. 11 of the 
Society for Pure English, Oxford, 1919. 
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is different from the word wrangle, the word but from the 
word moreover. 
As a matter of fact, the spoken word can usually be 
obtained by asking a speaker to repeat quite slowly some 
sentence that he has ut tered; be he parson or be he 
peasant, he will in all probability separate off the words 
in exactly the same way as a grammarian. Since, however, 
the influence of education might always be suspected in 
any such test, and since this predominance of the word, 
undoubted in the classical and modern European tongues, 
might not necessarily hold good in more remote linguistic 
fields, it is interesting to quote the testimony of an expert 
in American Indian languages who is exceptionally well 
qualified to offer an opinion. 'Linguistic experience,' 
writes Professor Sapir,1 'both as expressed in standardized, 
written form and as tested in daily usage, indicates over-
whelmingly that there is not, as a rule, the slightest 
difficulty in bringing the word to consciousness as a psycho-
logical reality. No more convincing test could be desired 
than this, that the naive Indian, quite unaccustomed to 
the concept of the written word, has nevertheless no serious 
difficulty in dictating a text to a linguistic student word 
by word; he tends, of course, to run his words together as 
in actual speech, but if he is called to a halt and is made to 
understand what is desired, he can readily isolate the words 
as such, repeating them as units. He regularly refuses, on 
the other hand, to isolate the radical or grammatical 
element, on the ground that it "makes no sense".' I my-
self am able to add a tittle of evidence from a different 
source. Egyptian hieroglyphic writing is in the main 
phonetic, but a large number of ideographic or directly 
pictorial signs occur signifying the actual thing or kind of 
1
 E. Sapir, Language, London, 1921, p. 34. 
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thing meant. Among such pictorial signs are those known 
as 'determinatives', which stand at the end of phonetically 
written words to indicate their meaning, whether general 
or specific. Most, though not all, phonetically written 
words have determinatives, which effect, therefore, the 
practical result of dividing up sentences into their com­
ponent words. For example, in the sentence 
pr•k r pt, mз•k ntr im, ' thou goest-up to 
heaven, and seest the god there', the words pr 'go up ' , 
pt 'heaven', mз , 'see', and ntr , 'god', all end in 
determinatives, whence the division of the sentence into 
words is seen to correspond precisely to that which every 
European philologist would demand. A broad survey of 
hieroglyphic texts shows that Egyptian feeling in this 
matter coincided almost exactly with our own. The only 
exceptions are some grammatical endings, about which the 
scribes seem to have felt a doubt whether they should take 
them as part of the word or whether they should not; for 
sometimes these endings follow the determinative, while 
sometimes they precede. 
§ 39. The emergence of words in the many-word 
sentence. Throughout the preceding argumentation 
there has run, as a kind of Leitmotiv, the thought that the 
essential function of words is to serve as clues. But that is 
practically equivalent to saying that every sentence con­
taining more than a single word is fundamentally a suc­
cession of little one-word sentences or predicates. As each 
of these falls upon the listener's ear it exhorts him to seek 
in the situation something corresponding to the class 
indicated by the word. 1 On this showing, a sentence such 
as He likes pudding would ultimately signify 'Look out for 
a him! Look out for a liking! Look out for something 
1
 Wegener, Grundfragen, p. 100. 
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being-a-pudding! ' Well as this view agrees with the 
hypothesis that all human speech has developed out of the 
undifferentiated word-sentence, yet it clearly fails to do 
justice to the statement as a whole, which is felt as a unity 
composed of definitely related parts, and not as a series 
of disjointed predicates. The problem now before us is, 
accordingly, to find some explanation of the fact that the 
many-word sentence is felt as a single predication or as the 
presentation to the listener's mind of a single composite 
thing, the several parts of which are seen as of this or that 
particular character and as standing in particular relations 
to one another . The solution of this problem is a most 
formidable undertaking, but the general lines of a satis-
factory theory are traced in many passages of Wegener's 
epoch-making treatise. His book is a mine of wisdom 
whence philologists could draw inspiration for many 
valuable investigations. But probably owing to the cir-
cumstances of an over-busy professional life, the brilliant 
suggestions which he makes are presented in somewhat dis-
connected form, and I do not wish it to be assumed that 
he would have subscribed to all points of the argument 
which, having once again expressed my indebtedness, I 
shall now proceed to unfold. 
Towards the end of § 37 I sought to show that the 
animal cry, in spite of its extremely vague and diffused 
meaning, might in particular situations refer to a fairly 
definite and narrowly circumscribed thing-meant. Herein 
lay the possibility for the development of single-word 
sentences the meaning of which approximated to that of 
our own words. The evolution of communicative purpose 
would lead to the multiplication of significant signs, for 
conscious effort would be directed towards making oneself 
understood, and in all but the simplest conditions a single 
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sign would no longer suffice. It is remarkable how little 
attention to the broader semantic aspect has been paid 
by students interested in the origin of language. Their 
speculations have turned almost wholly upon how this 
particular notion came by that particular sound. Hence 
the famous hypotheses nicknamed 'the bow-wow theory' 
and 'the pooh-pooh theory' respectively. With that topic 
I shall not deal at all, the more so since English readers 
possess a sober and sensible discussion in Jespersen's recent 
book on Language.1 My immediate concern is with the 
emergence of the 'word' as an entity distinct from the 
'sentence'. Here Wegener's theory of exposition by suc-
cessive correctives is evidently of the highest importance.2 
No details can be seen distinctly, but the general trend of 
the process may be surmised from the stages to be ob-
served in the linguistic development of children. Between 
the ages of eight to thirteen months the little son of the 
Serbian scholar Pavlovitch could talk only in isolated 
word-sentences. At this stage pàpā signified 'I am going 
for a walk', 'One is going for a walk', 'I want to go for a 
walk', 'Go for a walk', and 'Papa is going for a walk' 
indiscriminately.3 When the child heard his father's foot­
steps on the stairs he would cry tata, but the same cry, 
accompanied by a demonstrative gesture, served to ex­
press the request 'Papa, give me this or that ' . 4 Clearly, 
this kind of speech, if the listener were no more highly 
developed than the child-speaker, could meet with suc-
1
 O. Jespersen, Language, pp. 412 foll. 
2
 This thought occurs in various connexions in Wegener's Grundfragen, 
e.g. in the discussion on the importance of the situation, pp. 19 foll.; again 
in dealing with apposition and relative clauses, pp. 34 foll.; best of all in 
his summary of conclusions, p. 181. 
3
 M. Pavlovitch, Le langage enfantin, Paris, 1920, p. 143. 
4
 Op. cit., p. 145. 
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cessful response only in the most favourable circumstances. 
From the fourteenth month onwards, combinations of two 
sound-signs begin; tato-vōde was now used for 'Papa, give 
me water', and tato-cecela for 'Papa, give me sugar'. T h e 
additions vole and cecela here serve as corrections to the 
indefiniteness of tata alone, and would effectively indicate 
the child's desire even if the things in question were absent 
from the room. The least intelligent of listeners, drawing 
rapid deductions from the clues successively given, and 
combining them with a deduction drawn from the physical 
situation, could not have failed to conclude that the child 
wanted a glass of water or a lump of sugar. 
But the transition from utterances consisting of one 
member to utterances consisting of two or more would 
bring about a remarkable transformation both of the 
whole and of its parts. An essential feature of Wegener's 
theory is the stress it lays upon the psychical effects of 
mechanization. T h e listener would soon no longer be 
aware that he was drawing separate deductions from suc­
cessive clues, but viewing the utterance as a whole, would 
seize its signification in a flash. T h e entire utterance 
would now appear as effecting a single purpose, and would 
thus be felt as a single sentence, not as two. And simul­
taneously the component parts, if their separate existence 
became the subject of reflection, would be viewed as the 
names of things, the things meant by them relating them­
selves to one another in the listener's mind as the situation 
showed that they were related in fact. 
When a transformation such as this has taken place, so 
closely interlinked have the words and the things meant 
by them become, that the words themselves seem to be 
related.1 Thus in the sentence Fetch me my hat, the words 
1
 See below, § 44. 
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my bat are said to be the object of the verb fetch, whereas 
in t ruth it is only the thing meant by hat which is the 
object of the action denoted by the imperative fetch. But 
now, when this stage has been reached, the speaker is able 
to communicate things much more remote than the things 
perceptible in the immediate 'Situation of Visible Presence' 
(die Situation der Anschauung). The worlds of imagination 
and memory are henceforth potential common objects for 
individuals in association with one another. The less easily 
accessible the things spoken about, the more clues or 
explanations that must be offered. But once the method 
of the many-word sentence has been found there is no 
assignable limit to the intellectual wealth which, by the 
help of speech, human beings may share with one another. 
The custom of uttering two-word or three-word sen-
tences having been firmly established, the variety of com-
binations into which each sound-sign could enter would 
greatly increase its individuality and definiteness. Pavlo-
vitch expressly states that what was destined later to 
appear as a vocative meaning 'Daddy!' was at first mixed 
up with various verbal notions. It is evident that with 
each new combination the common element of meaning 
'daddy' would receive reinforcement, while the variable 
associated verbal notions would sink into the background. 
But those notions would not disappear without leaving 
a trace; rather would they appear as qualifications of the 
common nucleus, lending it character and definiteness. 
Daddy would now become familiar as someone constantly 
present, who went out for walks, who brought sugar or 
water when asked, and so forth. Thus word-signs would 
be more and more clearly revealed as means of reference 
to 'things', and the things meant by words—not neces-
sarily what we know as things, but also actions, qualities, 
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relations, the forerunners of verbs, adjectives, and pre-
positions—would gain in significance with every new 
application. The area of a word's meanings becomes very-
complex by reason of its many applications. And just on 
account of that complexity, words acquire the indivi-
duality and feeling-tone which adheres to persons. Take, 
for example, the word respectability. We come to think 
we know as much about 'respectability' as we know about 
any of our friends or enemies, and according to our 
temperaments we like or dislike that thing. 
The foregoing paragraphs need be read neither as a 
theory of origins, nor yet as an incursion into child psycho-
logy. If they contain anything of interest in either direc-
tion, it is because the general conditions of speech remain 
the same at all times and all places. Wegener's standpoint, 
like my own, is dominated by the notion of the importance 
of the 'situation'. In simple situations a single-word 
sentence, or else an utterance in which word and sentence 
have not yet been differentiated, would suffice for the 
fulfilment of the speaker's purpose, and in such circum-
stances a single sound-sign is still often employed. But to 
indicate anything more remote, i.e. in a situation of time 
or place different from the present, or anything more com-
plex, the many-word sentence is a necessity. A listener's 
comprehension is based primarily upon the situation 
in which he finds himself; this provides the foundation 
for all his deductions. If now the speaker wishes to refer 
to something not immediately deducible from the present 
situation, he must employ one or more 'clues' or sound-
signs to supplement the latter. When more than one 
sound-sign is used, a divorce between word and sentence 
occurs. The separate sound-signs are not sentences, be-
cause singly they do not accomplish the speaker's purpose. 
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The utterance as a whole is not a word, because it contains 
a reference, not to one thing, but to several. We can see, 
moreover, how the sentence becomes the unit of speech 
and the word the unit of language. A combination of 
sound-signs is obviously of less general utility than a single 
sound-sign, since the situations in which it can be effec-
tively employed are less numerous than the situations in 
which the component sound-signs can be used. Hence the 
combination of sound-signs, as such, perishes from the 
memory, while the single sound-sign is retained as a 
permanent means of reference to some thing. In this 
capacity it is a 'word'. 
§ 40. The many-word sentence as a whole. Viewed 
from a certain angle, all the words of a sentence are on 
a par. Each consists of a larger or smaller complex of 
articulate sound, each is a class-name embracing a wider or 
narrower area of meaning, and each, when employed in 
speech, has a particular thing-meant corresponding to it. 
And if again we consider the different things meant by the 
various words of any sentence, we shall note that they 
seem to stand at a certain dead level of superficiality. 
Take once more the example Pussy is beautiful as spoken 
in reference to some definite living cat. So far as this 
sentence is concerned, Pussy is not that complete, interest-
ing, and versatile creature we know so well, but is merely 
herself in the aspect of being beautiful. I do not know how 
more aptly to describe what is meant by the words of any 
sentence than by saying that they have no profundity, no 
dimension of depth . Pussy is not beautiful all through, but 
only in the way that cats are said to be beautiful, namely 
externally; neither her character nor her inside are in-
cluded in the predication. Again, beauty is undoubtedly 
involved in the sentence, but not all that wondrous 
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attribute which manifests itself in landscapes, in music, in 
women, but only the beauty of fur, of whiskers, and of 
gambollings. It is by virtue of this superficiality of speech 
that we can say in two consecutive sentences, Alice is grow-
ing quite a big girl and Alice's parents live in a dreadfully 
small house. The smallness of the smallest human abode 
would be a bigness if predicated of a girl. In fact, as used 
in speech, word-meanings are applied in an entirely one-
sided way. Speech seems to skate but lightly over the 
surface of things.1 
Arguing along these lines, we might conceive of the 
many-word sentence as a mere sequence of clues having 
each the same importance and functional power, com-
parable, let us say, to the even ticking of a watch, where 
every second resembles every other with a dead monotony. 
It suffices, however, to enounce this possible thesis in 
order to realize its falsity. The various words of any 
sentence differ enormously among themselves in point of 
importance, as well as in other respects. In a very real 
sense the whole of Pussy does enter into my statement 
Pussy is beautiful, and what is more, there is something 
about the word Pussy which makes us feel it. And again, 
will any one seriously affirm that, in the sentence Sutton is 
almost a mile from here, the words almost and is are as 
important and significant as the word mile ? The lilt and 
rhythm of speech, and the way in which speakers scurry 
over some words and dwell with emphasis upon others, 
give the lie to any assertion of equality among spoken 
words. And the like is true when one sentence is compared 
with another . There are differences both in importance 
and in quality, and the principal problem before us is to 
investigate in detail wherein these differences consist. 
1
 Examine in this connexion the examples quoted by Paul, Prinzipien, § 56. 
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§41. Word-form. As regards the relative importance 
of the words in a sentence, some differ, then, from others 
simply through the whim or the need of the speaker. He 
knows what things he desires to emphasize and what 
things are only contributory to his purpose, and he uses 
the resources of word-order, modulations of the voice, 
speed of utterance, and so forth, to mark these differences. 
But apart from such occasional and momentary differences 
between words there are others which are constitutional, 
and which are connected with distinctions in word-
form.1 As here to be understood, word-form is the name 
of a special kind of meaning which attaches to words over and 
above their radical meaning. This additional meaning is of 
various kinds, but its characteristic feature is that it is 
always subsidiary to the meaning of the root or stem. 
Word-form may be simple, as in the cases of in, lo, and 
gently, where it amounts to no more than the feeling 
associated with these words that they are a preposition, 
an interjection, and an attributive adverb respectively. 
Or else word-form may be intensely complex, as in 
puerorum, vidissem, flurimae. The first of these conveys, 
in addition to the root-meaning 'boy', notions of (1) being 
the name of something presented as a thing, (2) referring 
to several boys, not to one boy only, and (3) the fact that 
the boys stand to something else in one or other of a 
number of cognate relations of which possessorship and 
authorship are two. In grammatical terms, puerorum is the 
genitive plural of the noun puer. In saying that the form-
meaning of a word is always subsidiary, I do not imply that 
it is ever lacking in importance. All I wish to state is that 
1
 An extremely interesting and valuable account of word-form is given 
by Sapir, Language, chs. ii, iv-v, but this scholar unfortunately draws no 
clear distinction between 'speech' and 'language'. 
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such importance as the form has is dependent on the 
root-meaning. It would be useless to know that puerorum 
is a plural unless it were simultaneously known what it is 
the plural of. In view of its subsidiary nature, word-form 
may be compared to the overtone of a musical note. 
In understanding 'word-form' as the name of a kind of 
meaning I am deliberately opposing the view of certain 
grammarians that external differences of inflexion are the 
really fundamental feature of 'word-form', and that where 
such external differences are absent a word is without 
form.1 But true enough it is that differences of inner 
word-form, as I shall call the semantic aspect, are often 
accompanied by outer word-form, and that the term 
'word-form' owes its origin to the latter. In order to be 
sure that I have made myself clear, let me say that in my 
terminology the sounded or written word puerorum, with 
its inflexion in -orum, constitutes the outer word-form of 
puerorum, while the three subsidiary notions specified 
above constitute its inner word-form. When I speak of 
word-form without qualification, I shall refer primarily 
to whatever subsidiary meaning a word may possess, and 
only secondarily to the external marks, if any, whereby 
this subsidiary meaning is shown. Thus both the Latin 
omittunt and its English equivalent omit have the word-
1
 The standpoint of Jespersen, expressed in the following quotation, 
may be regarded as on the whole sound, at least as a practical counsel: 
'While we should be careful to keep out of the grammar of any language 
such distinctions or categories as are found in other languages, but are not 
formally expressed in the language in question, we should be no less averse 
to deny in a particular case the existence of distinctions elsewhere made in 
the same language, because they happen there to have no outward sign,' 
Philosophy, p. 51 . But this formulation does not cover the distinction in 
form between, e.g., the Latin preposition in and the Latin conjunction an. 
Ultimately, felt inner word-form is decisive, if only we can make certain 
of its presence. 
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form of verbs, since both are felt to present the action of 
omitting as an action, not as a thing. But of the two, only 
the Latin word has outer word-form, namely the ending 
-unt which marks it as present indicative active, 3rd 
person plural. 
The term word-form (together with the related collec­
tive term morphology, from the Greek μορφή 'form') arose 
in connexion with the outer forms or inflexions seen in the 
ancient classical languages. In the non-linguistic sense 
'form' properly means 'shape', and refers to physically 
visible appearances. Both 'form' and 'shape' are attributes 
belonging to single objects, and these single objects can 
have only one form at a time. A vase, for example, has 
only one form, though a lump of putty of a particular 
form may be squeezed into a number of forms. By a 
natural extension, the word 'form' came to be used of 
constituent characters other than those which were visible, 
as in musical form, the democratic form of government. Now 
though 'form' ostensibly refers to the character of a single 
thing, in practice the word is employed only when the 
thing in question is one of a class of similar objects; thus 
a crystal hexagonal inform or of hexagonal form is so called 
because a class of hexagonal objects has been segregated by 
experience; we talk of the democratic form of government 
because among governments several have been compared 
with one another and recognized as democracies. Apply­
ing these notions of 'form' to linguistics, we must suppose 
that first of all the term was applied to identical inflexions 
such as rosam, casam, iominam; cantas, amas, rogas. It 
should be carefully noted that at no period have merely 
visibly identical or rhyming endings been deemed suffi­
cient to constitute a class of word-forms. Incifite and 
limite are not of the same form, nor in English are rill, fill, 
§41 WORD-FORM 133 
still, ill. Form in the grammatical sense doubtless applied 
from the outset only to those resemblances among words 
which combined identity of inflexion with identity of the 
kind of subsidiary meaning above described. Rosam, 
casam, and dominam were said to have the form of the 
accusative case, or more shortly, to be accusative forms, 
because they could all be used in one or other of the ways 
in which accusatives are used, namely as direct objects of 
verbs, after certain prepositions, and the like. This being 
so, there could be no objection to extending the term 
'form' to other groups of words which were externally 
different in appearance but semantically identical; thus 
not only rosam and casam are accusative in form, but so too 
are dominum, ignem, and mare. Once this stage had been 
reached, little difficulty could be felt in extending 'form' 
still further to words from which inflexions had disap-
peared, or in which they had never been present. Thus it 
can be said that the singular and the plural forms of the 
word sheep are identical, or again that boy is singular in 
form. It must not be forgotten that the concept of 
grammatical form arose among grammarians of the 
classical languages. Calling oves a plural and puer a singular 
form, they would naturally do the same to the modern 
translations of these Latin words, without troubling them-
selves with the nicer theoretic questions which are our 
concern in this book. 
Since common practice countenances the use of the 
term 'form' in certain cases where there are no outer 
marks to show it, that term is certainly permissible as a 
description of the felt character enabling us to assign 
words to this or that word-class. Accordingly I shall not 
hesitate to say that give is a verb in form, table a noun, and 
upon a preposition. Expressing this view as a generalization, 
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I maintain that the so-called 'parts of speech' are dis-
tinctions of word-form. Much more disputable is the 
legitimacy of employing the term where, when a word is 
quoted out of context, its 'form' can be neither felt nor 
heard. This topic is reserved for my second volume, where 
it will become a vital issue in connexion with the contro-
versy whether English distinguishes several cases in the 
noun, or only two, or none. To anticipate my conclusion, 
I must confess myself unable to agree that in He gave the 
boy a book the word boy should be called a dative case or 
form, though it seems to me quite correct to say that the 
boy here 'functions as a dative'. 
I now come to a fact of high grammatical importance. 
The form of a word, like its meaning, is a fact of language, 
not of speech. Word-form belongs to a word permanently, 
and is no merely temporary qualification which becomes 
attached to it in the course of speaking. This is obvious in 
some of the examples already quoted, such as lo, vidissem, 
puerorum. As these words stand, linguistic tokens to be 
hoarded or put into circulation at their possessor's 
pleasure, they have each a particular form-meaning as 
well as a radical meaning. The first is felt as an exclama-
tion, the second presents sight as an action which at some 
past moment was both contingent and prospective, with 
the speaker as its performer, and the third—puerorum— 
possesses the additional notions already described. But in 
other cases, such as the Latin pueris or the English like, the 
word-form presents itself in the guise of alternatives: 
pueris is either dative or ablative plural, like may be an 
adjective or an adverb or a noun or (with a different 
radical meaning) a verb. This ambiguity of certain word-
forms does not, however, vitiate the statement that word-
form belongs to language, not to speech. Wundt, quoting 
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the very word like which I have just used as an example, 
takes up the curious position of asserting that, while 
'outer form', i.e. inflexions and so forth, belongs to lan-
guage, 'inner form' belongs to speech. Of course he does 
not express his standpoint in this way, since the distinction 
between language and speech is not in his purview. 
The following is a translation of what he actually says: 
'Nevertheless there can be no doubt that such a word (as 
like or the German gebe or Gabe) has on each occasion the 
meaning of a definite word-form, that of a noun, a verb, an 
adverb, &c , and that under suitable conditions the mean-
ing of a definite case, tense, or number may adhere to it. 
Yet it acquires that meaning only through the relation to 
other words into which it enters in the course of speech. 
This conceptual definiteness which is lent to the word 
through its position in the sentence we may call "inner 
word-form".'1 But how exactly this conjuring trick of 
lending conceptual definiteness to a word is performed, 
1
 Die Sprache, vol. ii, p. 2: 'Nichtsdestoweniger kann es keinem Zweifel 
unterliegen, dass ein solches Wort jedesmal die Bedeutung einer ganz 
bestimmten Wortform, eines Nomens, Verbums, Adverbs usw., hat, und 
dass ihm unter den geeigneten Bedingungen eine bestimmte Kasus-, 
Tempus-, Numerusbedeutung usw. zukommt. Doch es gewinnt dieselbe 
erst durch das Verhaltnis, in das es im Zusammenhang der Rede zu andern 
Wörtern tritt . Diese dem Wort durch seine Stellung im Satze verliehene 
begriffliche Bestimmtheit können wir hiernach die innere Wortform 
nennen.' In fairness to Wundt let it be admitted, however, that in the 
sentence preceding my quotation he appears to have noticed that the 
application of like is restricted to a limited number of possibilities (pp. 1-
2): 'Vollends ein Wort wie das englische like (gleich, Gleiches) kann Adverb, 
Adjektiv, Substantiv oder (in der Bedeutung 'gern haben') Verbum sein, 
ohne dass der Wortform diese verschiedene begriffliche Stellung anzusehen 
wäre.' Mis-statements analogous to that of Wundt are not rare. For 
example, see J. Vendryes, Le langage, Paris, 1921, p. 111: 'C'est seulement 
lorsqu'on dit l'aurore est belle ou I'abîme est profond que les mots aurore ou 
abîme ont un genre'; but possibly this was not intended to be taken quite 
literally. 
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Wundt does not explain. The fact of the matter is that 
he has not really wrestled with the problem as to how 
language works in its practical application as speech, nor 
was this indeed possible for him without adopting the 
sociological standpoint. To those who do so the form of 
words such as like presents no more difficulty than does 
their radical meaning. We saw in the first chapter that 
the meaning of a word is a complex area of often quite 
heterogeneous potential applications. When a speaker 
says horse he leaves it to the listener to infer from the con-
text whether a live race-horse, a gymnasium horse, or a 
towel-horse is meant. In just the same way the speaker who 
utters the word like leaves it to the listener to infer from 
the context in what way the word is to be taken, whether 
as an adjective or an adverb or a noun or a verb. Indeed, 
the speaker has no choice in the matter, for the word occurs 
to his mind complete with all its various possibilities of 
application, among which he cannot pick and choose. This 
is true as much of radical meaning as of word-form. But 
both the speaker who selects the word and the listener who 
has to interpret it are guided by their knowledge of the 
kinds of word-form which it has displayed in their past 
experiences of its use, and it is only to one or other among 
these kinds of word-form that the word itself can actually 
point.1 For example, a speaker cannot without some sense 
of strain use like as an interjection or the listener interpret 
the word as such, since the interjectional use of like is not 
prescribed by language. I do not deny, of course, that 
speakers sometimes make innovations in employing words, 
but that is quite another story.2 As a rule, words are used 
1
 For a practical demonstration as to how the form applicable to a given 
context is elicited see below, pp. 144-5. 
2
 We shall see later (§ 44 foll., and particularly § 47, first paragraph) that 
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as language has decreed that they shall be used, and this 
applies alike to radical meaning and to the additional sort 
of meaning designated by the term word-form. 
On several previous occasions I have voiced my convic-
tion that the practice of philologists has generally been 
sound even where their theory may be at fault. This 
thesis is well illustrated in the present connexion. What 
happens to word-form in a dictionary ? Turning up like 
in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, I find the following 
entries: 
l ike1 , a. (often governing noun like trans, p a r t . ; more, most, rarely 
or poet , -er, -est), p rep . , adv. (archaic), conj. (vulg.), & n. Similar, 
resembling something . . . 
l ike2 , v.t . & i., & n. Be pleasing to (archaic or facet. ; . . . ) ; find 
agreeable, congenial, or satisfactory . . . 
Now a dictionary is a catalogue or synopsis of the wealth 
of words which any linguistic community possesses, ap-
pending to each word itemized some account of its range 
of applications. The entries quoted above show that some 
of the leading authorities in English philology have been 
in no practical doubt whatsoever as to the status of word-
form. For them it is a fact of language, not a chance 
adhesion which may come about in the course of speech. 
Otherwise the word-forms would not have been given in 
this dictionary, the purpose of which was to state what 
is vouchsafed or dictated by the English language, and 
which fulfilled that purpose, first by naming the word-
form, and then by describing the area of meaning. The 
reasons for distinguishing between homophones such as 
the two different words like will be discussed in my 
second volume. 
'incongruent function', as I shall call it, is always accompanied by a feeling 
of difference between form and function. 
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We are now in a position to give a definition of word-
form which will suit the requirements of our present quest. 
In doing so I shall disregard the outer aspect altogether, 
and look at word-form solely in its inner or semantic 
aspect. As so seen, word-form is a kind of meaning per-
manently attached to words over and above the meaning of the 
stem, intimating the formal character in which the listener 
may expect the speaker to have intended the thing-meant to be 
taken. It is highly important to realize that all linguistic 
form arouses an expectation of use. The reason is that 
language is only a name for established habits of speech, 
built up out of innumerable repeated acts of the same 
type. A habit, once formed, excites in any observer the 
expectation that its owner will act in the same way on all 
new occasions. That expectation may not be fulfilled, and 
then a position arises which will be discussed in the next 
few sections. 
I have attempted to show that language is the outcome 
of single acts of speech (§ 35), and it is now necessary to 
illustrate this t ru th in connexion with word-form. For 
this purpose, however, I shall deal only with the so-called 
'parts of speech', which are really different kinds of words, 
or more precisely, words differing permanently from one 
another as regards their inner word-form. At rock-bottom 
there can be no doubt that the distinction between nouns 
and verbs, to take an example, is based upon differences in 
things-meant, in the things talked about . There is a sound 
reason grounded in the very constitution of the universe 
why we should prefer the mode of speech Did you hear that 
horse neighing? to Did you hear that neigh horsing? though 
we can easily both speak of the neigh of a horse, the bray 
of a donkey, the roar of a lion, and the moo of a cow, and 
also form verbs from the names of animals, as to monkey 
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with, to ferret out, to fig it. The fact is that horses are 
insistent things, always requiring that we should speak of 
them as being so and so, as having been treated in such 
and such a way, or as things in relation to which other 
things stand thus and thus . Grammatically stated, horses 
are always obtruding themselves either as subjects of pre-
dication, as objects of verbs, or as cases after prepositions. 
Neighing, on the other hand, seldom comes before us 
except as emanating from some horse which was its cause. 
Because the horse is constantly presenting itself to us in 
live form we predicate neigh of the horse, rather than the 
horse of neigh. But something of which we are constantly 
predicating something else is not only a thing, but is also 
felt to be substantival, i.e. to possess the substance of a 
thing. We see that horses are big and spirited and steam-
ing and thirsty, we can ride them, pat them, or spur them 
on. Objects of sense, and among them living creatures 
most of all, are things naturally predestined to be viewed 
as things. The names of the objects of sense are the natural 
nouns. 
But since, according to my creed, everything which a 
word can be employed to designate is a thing, there is 
obviously no reason why it should not also, in suitable cir-
cumstances, be viewed as a thing. When such a view 
becomes a fixed habit, the word is felt as a noun, and 
whether the view does or does not become habitual 
depends upon the vagaries of human interest and con-
venience. The emergence of abstracts—attributes con-
sidered as things—is a comparatively recent development 
in linguistic history; I refer to definitely independent 
substantives, like beauty, poverty, goodness, as distinct from 
nomina actionis or infinitives, which are of very ancient 
date. But even such insignificant words as prepositions 
140 SPEECH AND LANGUAGE §41 
and conjunctions may gain currency as nouns or verbs, e.g. 
But me no buts, the ins and outs of the matter, pros and cons. 
Around these purely intellectual substantival creations, 
however, there clings a hollowness absent from the natural 
substantives described in the last paragraph. 
Natural fitness, therefore, and human caprice are the 
two sources to which nouns trace their origin. The same 
is true, mutatis mutandis, of the other parts of speech. 
Slowly the form of words is built up, by one act of speech 
after another, until it becomes sufficiently characteristic 
of them to merit mention in the dictionary. 
In the above account of word-form, little attention has 
been paid to its outer aspect, since in speech inner word-
form alone is of decisive importance. Language itself 
seems particularly careless of uniformity in outer word-
form, as witness pairs of words with identical inner word-
form like the following: amat, monet; pulchra, fortis; lisez, 
dîtes; geschrieben, beendet; came, walked. Nevertheless, 
outer word-form is of high importance for linguistic 
theory as the means which the habit of speech has invented 
for exhibiting inner word-form. But the details of outer 
word-form are only of historical interest; moreover, it is 
only from history that their eccentricities obtain an ex-
planation. The principal sources of outer word-form are, 
firstly the fusion of two words to become one, e.g. French 
du from de illo (through de illum); finirai from finire habeo; 
German schmerzvoll from schmerz and voll; English lovely 
from love and an old Teutonic noun *likom 'appearance'; 
and secondly, analogy or a conforming of one word to 
another based on the fact that other pairs of word-forms 
from the same stems are identical in appearance. Analogy 
has as motive simply the desire for uniformity. Its opera-
tion is seen, for example, when a French child says vous 
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disez. in place of vous dîtes, assimilating it to vous lisez on 
the strength of the identical endings in je dis, je lis; nous 
disons, nous lisons; dire, lire. Beside the two sources of 
outer word-form mentioned above, some others of less 
importance have been suggested.1 To these, however, I 
shall pay no attention . In linguistic theory outer word-
form is a datum with which we start and, beyond a general 
statement how it came about, no further details as to its 
historic evolution are required. 
§ 42. Word-form and word-function as correlated 
linguistic facts. We have seen that word-form is a fact 
of language; the corresponding fact in single acts of speech 
is word-function. Etymologically, 'function' is only a 
rather grand synonym of 'performance', but it is often 
used in a peculiar way to designate the capacity in which 
something acts in subservience to a certain aim. Thus a 
nail driven into the wall can function as, or have the func-
tion of, a peg to hang one's hat on. Two conditions 
govern this use of the word: firstly, that some particular 
type of service should be named to indicate the capacity 
in which the functioner acts; and secondly, that the aim 
or purpose subserved should be that of a human employer. 
These notions reappear in the linguistic use of the term, 
where it has reference to the results achieved in the course 
of a particular act of speech. In such an act the speaker's 
aim is to draw attention to something, and the words are, 
as it were, his functionaries whose office it is to present 
the thing-meant as possessing some particular formal 
character. However, grammarians seldom avail themselves 
1
 For fusion of independent elements and analogy as the two main 
sources of outer word-form see the essay entitled 'L'evolution des formes 
grammaticales' in Meillet, Linguistique, pp. 130 foll. But see further 
Jespersen, Language, ch. xix, and particularly its § 13 on 'secretion'. 
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of the term 'function' in reference to the general duties of 
a word in the fulfilment of its inherent 'form' or capacity. 
The term comes into play only when details of the work 
done have to be described, or when the word is found 
doing work which is not, properly considered, its own. 
For example, in the phrase the boy king the word boy is a 
noun, but functions as an adjective; or again, the rhetorical 
question Have I ever done you an injury? is a sentence 
having the form of a question, but functioning or serving 
as a denial. Such conflicts between form and function 
will concern us greatly in the sequel. For the moment I 
will leave on one side incongruent function, as I shall call 
it, and will concentrate my attention upon the more usual 
cases where function is congruent, i.e. where form and 
function agree. 
But a preliminary difficulty must be faced before we can 
proceed successfully with the discussion of word-function. 
I regret the necessity, because it compels us to take a view 
of the things meant by speech somewhat different from 
that of the ordinary man, whereas my endeavours have 
been directed towards confining linguistic theory to the 
plane of common sense. It was seen in § 8 that speech deals 
with things of the most heterogeneous kinds; material 
objects, abstractions, figments of the imagination—all 
these indifferently are grist to the speaker's mill. The 
reason, which hitherto needed but passing mention, is that 
in reality the things spoken about are not external pheno-
mena, but the reflections of these, immediate or mediate, 
mirrored in the speaker's mind. If I ask for a piece of cake, 
the thing I refer to is primarily the piece of cake as per-
ceived by me, and only secondarily the piece of cake itself. 
So long as we were dealing with the thing-meant apart 
from linguistic form, it would have been foolish to compli-
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cate matters by emphasizing this point. The ordinary man 
believes he can speak about a piece of cake directly, and it 
was better not to disturb him in his illusion. But at the 
present stage he must be disillusioned, as I shall show by 
reverting to James and Mary Hawkins and to the words 
which passed, or might have passed, between them. Out-
side the house in which they are is the rain, and no way in 
which James may refer to it will alter its nature by a hair's-
breadth. But the form in which the rain may be presented 
to Mary's mind differs according to James's caprice. If he 
says Look how it rains! the rain is presented as an action, 
as full of movement and activity. If, on the other hand, 
he says Look at the rain! then he presents the rain as a 
thing, i.e. as though it were a fixed object with a vague 
similarity in this respect to a table or chair. Hence we 
have to conclude that the things referred to in speech are 
always mentally conditioned, and that the conditioning 
of them is subject to the speaker's will. I hope that no 
reader will imagine me to be maintaining that we cannot 
really speak of external things at all. An illustration 
already employed in connexion with the general meaning 
of the word 'form' will here stand us in good stead. Putty, 
it was said (p. 132), can be moulded into different forms. 
Human agency can effect this change for its own purposes, 
but the put ty remains the same all the time. So, too, it is 
with the things spoken about. When spoken about, they 
have already assumed a particular form in the speaker's 
mind, and he presents them in that form to the listener. 
But the listener, though he has received the thing as a 
mental reflection, can subsequently deal with it according as 
the possibilities connected with it permit. I ask my wife for 
a piece of cake. My wife receives the piece of cake from me 
as a mental reflection, and hands it back to me as a reality. 
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Word-function is the work which a spoken word has to 
perform in order to present the thing meant by the speaker in 
the formal character in which he must be supposed to have in-
tended the listener to see it. In order to ascertain the func-
tion of a spoken word in a given situation, the forms of all 
the other words in the sentence have to be taken into 
account. Paying careful attention to these and to the 
situation as a whole, the critic will usually be able to judge 
the way in which the speaker intended the thing named 
by the word to be taken. In the sentence Look at the 
rain! the three words look, at, and the together indicate 
with high probability the formal character that the thing 
named by rain was meant to assume in the listener's mind. 
Look alone is insufficient to bring about this result, since, 
though one looks at 'things', yet the alternative possi-
bility Look how it rains! shows that the real object of the 
looking may be presented in the character of an action, not 
in that of a thing. However, the word at awakens the 
expectation that a noun, i.e. the name of a thing presented 
as a thing (pp. 9-10), will follow, and still more is this true 
of the. Those expectations are involved in the forms of the 
words at and the as preposition and definite article re-
spectively. The word rain itself is ambiguous in the 
expectation which it arouses, but at least it tells us that 
the thing meant by the speaker ought to be taken either as 
an action or as a thing. The best dictionaries distinguish 
two different words rain, the one a noun, and the other a 
verb.1 In the present context the listener has not the 
slightest ground for suspecting that rain is being used in 
1
 In point of fact O.E.D. always uses the term 'substantive' in place of 
'noun'. I have adopted the latter in deference to the recommendation of 
the Joint Committee on Grammatical Terminology (see their Report, 
London, 1917, p. 18), though I believe 'substantive' to be free from objec-
tion, if properly defined. 
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incongruent function. The preceding words point to 
something presented as a thing, and the word rain itself 
offers that conclusion as of equal possibility with the 
presentation of the rain as an action. Consequently, the 
grammarian will pronounce the verdict: 'Here the noun 
rain is being used.' This is the usual manner in which 
congruent function is announced. Unless there are strong 
reasons for the contrary view, it is always assumed that 
words are functioning in accordance with their form. 
James, if consulted upon the point, would undoubtedly 
admit that he meant the noun rain, not the verb rain. 
We have just seen that when function is congruent, it 
often suffices to mention the form of the word which is 
used. But the use of the term 'function' becomes desirable 
when the specific work done by the word in a particular 
sentence has to be emphasized. Thus in There are several 
-persons here of the name of Miller, the noun miller is said 
to 'function' as a proper name. I shall proceed to show 
that the term 'function' often provides the most scientific 
way of describing the subdivisions habitually made by 
grammarians in order to define the scope of a particular 
word-form. For example, among other kinds of present 
tense, grammarians of English distinguish the Habitual 
Present, e.g. He TAKES sugar in his tea, and the Historical 
Present, e.g. Now on each side the leaders | GIVE signal for the 
charge; \ And on each side the footmen | Strode on with lance 
and targe. To illustrate the implications of such sub-
divisions I shall take two particular applications of the 
Latin genitive as my illustrations. It appears that the 
original function of the genitive case was to express author-
ship rather than ownership, but the matter is uncertain 
and of no importance for the question here to be investi-
gated. Whatever the original meaning of the form, it is 
3920 
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clear that this was extended gradually and doubtless un­
wittingly so as at last to cover a large number of uses or 
functions, the connexion of which with the starting-point 
is often barely perceptible. Thus the grammarians dis­
tinguish a Genitive of Respect, a Genitive of Price, and 
so forth. In amor hominum in te, 'the love of men for thee', 
hominum is said to be a Subjective Genitive, because the 
thing meant by it bears to the thing meant by amor the 
same relation as exists between the subject and the finite 
verb in a sentence like Homines amant Balbum. In amor 
patriae, 'love of country', on the other hand, patriae is 
called an Objective Genitive, because the relation involved 
is that subsisting, e.g. between Balbum and amant in the 
sentence just quoted. Now to say that hominum is a Sub­
jective Genitive in the first case, and patriae an Objective 
Genitive in the second, suggests that Latin morphology 
has here two separate forms in precisely the same way that 
it has two in the genitive aulae and the dative aulae. But 
this is not true. Apart from the fact that at an earlier 
moment Latin distinguished the genitive aulāī from the 
dative aulai (with -ai as a diphthong), in countless other 
words (e.g. mentis, menti) there is a difference in outer 
form between genitive and dative.1 Any Roman who had 
any grammatical consciousness at all would doubtless have 
felt the genitive aulae and the dative aulae as two separate 
forms, the outward coincidence of which was purely 
accidental. In all probability he would have had no such 
feeling about hominum and patriae in the above examples. 
Even if well aware of the semantic differences between 
them, he would have declared merely that the genitive 
was present in both cases. T h e uneducated Roman would 
almost certainly have spoken the two words without a 
1
 See Jespersen, Philosophy, p. 177. 
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suspicion that different relations were described. But 
scientifically it is highly undesirable to make the terms we 
use rest upon speculations as to the feelings of a remote 
people of foreign race. This can be avoided by recourse to 
the term 'function', behind which always lies the verdict 
of a skilled interpreter . The proper way of describing 
hominum and patriae is to say that the first functions or 
serves as a Subjective Genitive, and the second as an 
Objective Genitive.1 
Exception may perhaps be taken to the course just 
recommended on the ground that my own definition de-
prives the term 'word-function' of the detached scientific 
quality which I am seeking to attribute to it. It is true 
that in the definition I refer to ' the formal character in 
which' the speaker 'must be supposed to have intended the 
listener to see' the thing-meant. But I maintain, not only 
that to assume intention in the speaker is essential for 
linguistic theory, but also that at the moment of utterance 
the speaker may not be aware of what he intends. On the 
common-sense plane intention is always presupposed by 
the listener, and a speaker can usually be brought by 
questioning to state 'what he really meant'. I do not 
dispute that speech is often nearly automatic. Habit pro-
vides short-cuts to many results which, despite all apparent 
absence of feeling, we really desire, and linguistic form 
1
 Another method which may, however, sometimes serve better is to 
use the phrase 'refer to ' and to describe, not the word-function, but the 
factual character of the thing-meant. For example, the Egyptians seem to 
have distinguished in their verb-forms only the two 'aspects' (Aktionsarten) 
of (1) repetition or continuity, (2) simple action. It is therefore doubtful 
whether they ever rose to a conception of 'tense' at all. For this reason I 
have been careful, in my Egyptian Grammar, not to state (e.g.) that the 
Imperfective tense has past, present, or future 'meaning', but to say merely 
that it may be employed 'in reference to past, present, or future actions'. 
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is simply inherited habit. We shall see that when educated 
persons talk consciously, their word-consciousness fre-
quently consists in applying certain grammatical rules 
without awareness of the deeper-lying factual relations 
which these grammatical rules imply (§ 44). If the right 
words have been chosen, those factual relations can be 
revealed to consciousness by a careful analysis of 'what 
was really meant', the surrounding words and the situation 
forming the basis of the deduction. Accordingly, the 
function of words is, after all, something objective and 
scientifically ascertainable. 
§43. The application of words. The diagrams on 
p. 151 (Fig. 6) are designed to illustrate the application 
of three words discussed in the last section, namely rain in 
Look at the rain! patriae in amor patriae, and boy in the boy 
king. Both stem-meaning and word-form are taken into 
account, but since the sole object has been to elucidate 
the very difficult topic of word-form and word-function, 
only one possibility in the application of word-meaning 
has been envisaged, namely the case when this is acceptably 
and correctly applied. The application and function of 
the words are represented by dotted lines connecting the 
large areas of meaning and form on the left with the things-
meant on the right. I must explain that the terms 'applica-
tion' and 'function' have roughly the same signification, 
inasmuch as both designate the work done by words in 
pointing to things-meant. But since 'form and function' 
is a familiar antithesis, it seemed desirable to restrict the 
linguistic term 'function' to the work accomplished in the 
way of attributing grammatically formal character. The 
meaning (stem-meaning) of the words is represented by 
lines of medium thickness, and seeing that their form (ffff) 
is constant and adheres to them in every conceivable 
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application, the thinner lines representing word-form 
follow the meaning wherever it goes. If the rectangles 
were completed, we should have the words as they exist 
in language, as yet unapplied but possessing form (f) as 
well as meaning (m), i.e. possibilities of varied application 
(abcde). When a word is applied in speech, one particular 
tract of its area of meaning becomes protruded, as it were, 
to characterize the thing-meant; the latter is represented 
as an area enclosed by thick lines. The word-meaning and 
word-form must be conceived of as casting jets of light 
upon the thing as intended by the speaker, revealing its 
true characters as so intended or meant. These characters 
are twofold, meaning-character (C) and formal character 
(Fc). Corresponding to them in the protruded part of 
the word are the specific meaning of the word as applied 
(x), and the specific capacity in which the word functions 
(F) as attributor of form. Note that in examples of correct 
and wholly congruent application the pairs x : C and F: 
Fc correspond exactly, but we must beware of equating x 
with C, or f with Fc, for x and F are characters of the 
words, whereas C and Fc are characters of the things. 
To turn now to the separate diagrams. In the topmost 
the word rain (m) in its character of designating-visible-
rain (x, see p. 77) applies admirably to the rain (T) ; the 
rain (T) is suited to the word which describes it (m) in its 
character of being-visible-rain (C), Correspondingly, the 
word functions congruently in the capacity of a noun 
(F = f ) , inasmuch as it presents the thing-meant in its 
true character of being-thought-of-as-a-thing (Fc). 
In the middle diagram, we again have correct and con-
gruent application, but the congruence of function is of a 
special type represented by y. In patriae the capacity (x) 
in which the word functions is that of a genitive, but just 
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FIG. 6. Diagram to illustrate the application or functioning of the words: 
(1) rain in Look at the rain! (2) patriae in amor patriae, (3) boy in the boy king. 
Thick lines indicate the thing-meant or characters of it. 
Medium lines indicate word-meaning (stem-meaning). 
Thin lines indicate word-form (formal word-meaning). 
Dotted lines indicate the functioning or application of a word. 
Roman letters denote the thing-meant or characters of it. 
Greek letters denote the characters (capacities) in which a word is applied 
or functions. 
Italic letters denote the meaning (stem-meaning or formal meaning) of a 
word. 
T = the thing-meant. 
C = the character of the thing-meant as expressed by the stem-
meaning. 
Fc = the formal character of the thing-meant. 
m = the area of meaning belonging to a word. 
abcde = the field of possible applications belonging to a word. 
ffff = the area of word-form. 
x = the specific stem-meaning in a given application. 
F = a specific form as the capacity in which the word is functioning. 
y = the same, more closely specified. 
S = the Syntactic Form, position between article and noun, see p. 160. 
F' = the capacity in which the Syntactic Form is functioning. 
FIG. 6 {see opposite) 
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as the tract of the meaning-area applicable in the present 
instance is only a special tract in the entire area of the 
word's meaning (fatherland as a lovable entity, i.e. almost 
personified), so too only a special tract of the genitive-
area, namely the tract where dwell all objective genitives 
(y), comes into play. The formal character (Fc) of the 
thing here meant is awkward to express in words, and this 
is the reason why the grammarian chooses the easier course 
of indicating it in terms of the word's functional capacity. 
But if we follow the more exacting path, our formulation 
will read as follows: The formal character of the thing 
meant by patriae is the being presented as a thing towards 
which is directed another thing, to wit, an action pre-
sented as a thing denoted by the word amor. I am 
distressed to inflict so clumsy a characterization upon my 
readers, but to do so seems preferable to deliberately 
evading a statement of fact because it cannot be made 
palatable. 
In the lowermost diagram, the word boy functions in-
congruently. Each of the things-meant to which it can 
correctly be applied is a boy, and since we are assuming 
here the correctness of the word's application, this 
assertion must hold good also in the present instance. 
And indeed, the king here designated was a boy at his 
accession—I am thinking of King Edward VI—as is 
well brought out if we paraphrase the words the boy king 
by the king who was a boy when he ascended the throne. But 
a noun-function on the part of the word boy was not a vital 
part of the speaker's intention . He intended to present the 
thing meant by the word, not as a thing, but as an attri-
bute of the thing meant by king, and in this intention he 
succeeded. Whence came that success ? Clearly it came 
from somewhere, and so I have depicted the attribute-
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character (Fc) of the thing meant by boy as proceeding 
from a linguistic form (S) outside the area of the word boy. 
The capacity (f1) in which the said form acts or functions 
is that of conferring on the thing meant by a given word 
the value of an attribute, and I shall return to it again 
in §45 . 
To make the lowermost diagram complete, some device 
ought to have been discovered for showing a faint stream 
of light proceeding from F, the functional capacity of the 
word boy, towards the thing meant by the word . For 
although the speaker did not primarily intend the thing-
meant to be regarded as a thing, yet he is unable to prevent 
the word chosen by him from exerting some of its innate 
power. The word has been correctly applied, and if we 
look at the thing meant by it, we note that in a secondary 
way the thing is indeed presented as a thing . This we have 
already seen. Tha t Edward VI was a boy when he came 
to the throne is admitted, and at all events the speaker did 
not intend the fact to be disguised. In choosing the noun 
boy he may even have meant to imply this fact; but if 
so, he meant it less than he meant the attributive function 
of the word. Hence the grammarian will rightly sum up 
the position by saying: The noun boy here functions as an 
attributive adjective. 
§ 44. Form and function become grammatical. The 
starting-point for my discussion of word-form and word-
function was the inquiry whether or no all words are on an 
equal footing, whether they resemble one another in in-
trinsic value and functional power (§ 40). The result has 
been to show that, apart from all considerations of outer 
Word-form, words do differ greatly among themselves by 
reason of certain varying over-meanings known as 'inner 
Word-form'. But inner word-form was found to consist in 
3920 X 
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qualities of words permanently attaching to them, which 
were simply prophecies of certain characters in the things 
meant by the words, whenever the latter should be cor-
rectly or congruently used. The differences between words 
might thus seem, at first sight, to be differences merely 
in the things meant by them. There is some element 
of t ru th in this proposition, and it is one so often over-
looked that to lay excessive emphasis upon it would do 
more good than harm. Few practical grammarians realize 
that the formal characters belonging to words are ulti-
mately and fundamentally formal characters belonging to 
the things meant by them. The diagrams explained in the 
last section have, it is hoped, helped to reveal this t ruth. 
To add a new example, aedificare is called a transitive 
verb, and is said to 'take after it ' an object in the accusative 
case. Behind this purely grammatical statement lie the 
facts that aedificare means 'to build', and that the physical 
act of building brings into existence an effected thing, a 
wall for instance, such as demands a noun in the accusative 
case for its expression. In Balbus murum aedificavit, 'Balbus 
built a wall', the true cause of the relation between aedi-
ficavit and murum is that the thing meant by aedificavit, 
i.e. Balbus's past act of building, effected or brought about 
the thing meant by murum, i.e. a wall. Similarly, in amor 
patriae the relation between the two words depends on 
the factual love of some person or of people in general for 
the real thing known as his or their fatherland. Every 
relation between words rests genetically upon a relation 
of non-verbal fact.1 The historian of grammar attempts 
to unearth and prove these relations between the things 
meant by words, though he may be unable to give a correct 
1
 Wegener and Kalepky seem to stand alone among grammarians in 
emphasizing this. 
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theoretical account of his practice. Thus when he explains 
that, in Latin fruor with the ablative, the case is really 
instrumental, his explanation implies that historically 
fruor meant something like 'I enjoy myself and that 
(e.g.) in fruor vita the ablative vita referred to life in its 
aspect of being the instrument or means of my enjoy-
ment . 
But to insist unduly upon the semantic character of all 
grammatical forms and constructions is to ignore the 
equally important fact that , through the gradual mechani-
zation of speech, through the establishment of those 
fixed habits which we call language, the words themselves 
and the relations of these with one another have undergone 
a profound change. This can be proved by various argu-
ments, still without recourse to the criterion of outer form. 
In the first place, the inner form of words makes itself felt, 
sometimes with unpleasant insistence, in uses of them 
which are incongruent or wrong. If we hear someone say 
Mary and John's down with the 'flu, the slurred over and 
abbreviated is jars upon us for all its unobtrusiveness, even 
though the thing-meant is quite unmistakable. Again, 
in the boy king the word boy is not felt to be on the same 
footing as good in the good king. There is a sense of boy 
having been somehow diverted from its true use, and that 
true use gives a peculiar flavour to the combination. It is 
perfectly well understood that boy is here used as an attri-
bute, not as a thing presented as a thing, but the word has 
a character of its own which can no longer be taken from it. 
From the boy king arises a certain feeling of two persons 
being identified with one another, not merely of one per-
son being provided with an attr ibute . We must conclude 
that the development of language has made the word boy 
differ from such a word as good. They belong to different 
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classes, and are tenacious of their rank in every circum-
stance and situation. 
The same point may also be demonstrated by the fact 
that some words have inner word-form which no longer 
bears any relation to the things designated by them. The 
peculiar linguistic phenomenon of gender is here particu-
larly instructive. It is not to be imagined that the Romans 
really thought of every flower as masculine, but Latin flos 
is masculine. Opinions differ as to how grammatical 
gender originated, but no one doubts that, at some distant 
moment in the dim past, it arose in some dual (or triple) 
classification of the things meant by words.1 In historic 
times, however, the inner word-form known as gender is 
dead or half-dead as a semantic reality; only half-dead, 
perhaps, because humans and animals of female sex are 
still named by feminine words, and males by masculine 
words, so that these exceptional cases still reveal a felt 
correspondence between observed character in the things 
and grammatical form in the words. The example quoted 
is the more interesting because the French derivative fleur 
(from florem) is feminine, and this change of gender is due, 
not to any change of conception with regard to the sex of 
flowers, but to analogic assimilation of the word to other 
words ending in -eur; in French these words are feminines 
(e.g. chaleur, douleur), except such of them as are names of 
agents (e.g. joueur from Latin *jocatorem). 
Word-form thus becomes a fact mainly of grammatical 
import. Words have grammatical status, and this now 
determines their relations to other words to some extent 
independently of the things to which they refer. In a 
combination like cette belle fleur, the separate words may 
1
 For an excellent discussion of grammatical gender, with bibliographical 
indications, see Vendryes, Le langage, pp. 108 foll. 
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be analysed to mean 'this (female person) + beautiful 
(female person) + flower (as a female person)'. But no 
Frenchman, in saying cette belle fleur, goes through the 
mental process here indicated. Whenever his speech is 
not purely automatic and unconscious, he strives to use 
his words congruently, i.e. in the forms dictated by lan­
guage on the one hand, and by the context on the other. 
But the congruence which is now his goal is a congruence 
of grammar, no longer one of meaning. Instead of making 
cette and belle agree with his conception of the thing of 
which an attr ibute is thereby denoted, he makes them 
agree with the word fleur, with the separately expressed 
name of that same thing. Concord, together with its 
subtler variety 'sequence of tenses', takes place directly as 
between word and word, without reference to the factual 
character which the two words signify in common. 
Thus, in developed speech, one word fixes the form of 
another, and schoolmasters teach their pupils, not to fit 
word-forms to the things spoken about, but to talk gram­
matically and idiomatically. The reasons for given modes 
of parlance are historic rather than semantic. For English 
'by him' the Roman said ab eo, but the Greek υπ' αυτου; 
nor is there any reason except established idiom why 
the former should have used the ablative, and the latter the 
genitive. Grammar tells us simply that a, ab 'takes' the 
ablative and υπό the genitive.1 Objection is sometimes 
raised against the grammatical phraseology that one word 
1
 T h e old Indo-European ablative has not survived in Greek, and is 
there absorbed by the genitive. In Latin the agent of a passively conceived 
action seems to have been thought of originally as its 'source', so that the 
ablative, which conveyed a notion of coming from a distance, was the 
obviously suitable case. But the Roman of the Augustan era will have 
associated no such conception with ab eo; to him this will have seemed 
merely the natural and right way of indicating the agent. 
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'governs' another, or that the second is 'dependent upon' 
the first. Nevertheless these terms are exact and unim­
peachable presentations of the t ruth. The practice of 
grammarians here scores yet another victory over defective 
grammatical theory. 
In Balbus murum aedificavit it is, therefore, quite 
legitimate to say that murum functions as object of 
aedificavit. Every Roman knew, as a matter of practice, 
that aedificare took the accusative and automatically 
followed that rule. Nevertheless, the sense is sometimes 
chosen as a guide rather than grammatical precedent, as 
is proved by instances of conflict between the two. From 
such conflict arises the linguistic phenomenon which 
grammarians call 'construction according to the sense' 
(constructio ad sensum, κατα σύνεσιν), a term which testifies 
eloquently to the predominance in educated prejudice of 
grammar over meaning. A Latin example is omnis aetas 
currere obvii 'every age ran to meet them', where obvii is 
congruent in sense, but grammatically incongruent as 
failing to agree with aetas in number and gender; cf. in 
Greek Ω ΦΊΛΕ ΤΈΚΝΟΝ. Similar anomalies are frequent in 
English, e.g. None of them WRITE well; The lowing herd WIND 
slowly o'er the lea; Your committee ARE of opinion. 
§45 . Syntactic and intonational form and function. 
In connexion with the genitive patriae and the accusative 
murum it was impossible to avoid discussing the relation of 
each to another word in their respective contexts, whence 
it is evident that word-form and syntax cannot always be 
kept apart. Syntax (Greek ΣΎΝΤΑΞΙΣ 'a putting together 
in order') may be defined as the study of the forms both of 
the sentence itself and of all free word-combinations which 
enter into it.1 By an act of grace one-word sentences are 
1
 See J. Ries, Was ist Syntax? Ries has the merit of having realized 
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included under the head of syntax, though etymologically 
the term does not sanction their admittance . Much that 
is syntactic would have to be included in a descriptive 
work on morphology (word-form), but the same material 
would require to be reviewed again in a treatise on syntax. 
There, however, the angle of vision would be changed, 
each word being regarded as a member of a combination, 
not as an individual. Such combinations of words would 
be seen to have syntactic form, which like all linguistic 
form is a fact of language, built up out of countless 
syntactic functionings of words in single acts of speech. 
Like word-form, syntactic form is a kind of meaning heard 
as an overtone above the stem-meanings and wordform-
meanings imparted by the component words. Thus from 
the good king a listener unconsciously concludes that good 
designates an attribute of the person referred to by king. 
This particular syntactic form has as its outer manifesta-
tion the word-order (1) article (or demonstrative)+(2) 
adjective (or word serving as such)+(3) noun, and in the 
example quoted the syntactic combination functions with 
perfect congruence, since good denotes goodness as an 
attribute of the king in question—naturally I am assuming 
some particular situation in which the words are uttered. 
Here again we find 'form' and 'function' as complementary 
terms, the one belonging to language and the other to 
speech. I will not dwell on syntactic form at length, since 
it was illustrated diagrammatically in connexion with 
Look at the rain! (p. 92, with Fig. 5), and since many 
that the combinations of words called 'phrases' or 'clauses' are no mere 
component parts of the sentence, but substitutes for words deserving study 
for their own sakes. Hence the equation of syntax and Satzlehre is fallacious. 
In my definition the word free is added to exclude purely mechanized 
phrases, which are already, to all intents and purposes, actual words. 
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other examples will be discussed in the second half of this 
book. 
Yet another type of linguistic form and function re-
ceived illustration in the diagram just alluded to. Interna-
tional form is the name given to those differences of tone, 
pitch, stress, &c, with which combinations of words 
having a certain syntactic over-meaning are habitually 
spoken. Statements, questions, commands, and so forth 
have all their specific intonational forms, and it is a strange 
fact—to receive further comment in the next chapter— 
that intonational form always functions congruently. C'est 
le ton qui fait la musique, we can appropriately quote, 
leaving further discussion to a later stage (§ 54). 
T h e two new varieties of linguistic form and function 
gain an added interest for us, when we note that they 
throw considerable light on incongruent function. The 
word-order (1) definite article, (2) attribute-word, (3) 
noun is, indeed, the source from which the thing denoted 
by boy in the hoy king obtained its attributive power, and 
this is the particular syntactic form which is depicted in 
cylindrical shape (S) in the lowermost diagram of Fig. 6 
(p. 151). We saw above that the good king is another con-
gruent example of the same form. A second incongruent 
instance would be the then king, for the word then is, as 
an adverb, not naturally entitled to serve as attribute to a 
noun. Nevertheless, when placed between the article and 
a noun, it has attributive force conferred upon it in the 
same way as boy in the boy king. 
On this single type of incongruent function I shall 
venture to base two important inferences, which others 
must test for themselves. The first is that, where incon-
gruent function arises in speech, it is more often than not 
due to the conflict of two linguistic forms. In the boy king 
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word-form commands the word boy to function in one 
way, and syntactic form commands it to function in an-
other. I come now to my second inference. Which of the 
two mandates is to be obeyed ? I believe that syntax 
always secures the victory. Word-form goes on feebly 
asserting its rights, but syntax proclaims its t r iumph in no 
uncertain voice. Such at all events is the result in the boy 
king. But further, I believe that intonation has a similar 
priority everywhere over syntax. This position will be 
demonstrated later so far as sentence-function is con-
cerned (pp. 204-5), so that here it is advisable to adduce a 
different type as evidence. Let us suppose two schoolgirls 
to be debating their preferences in English history. One 
of them says, I prefer the BOY king, stressing both I and 
boy. In this sentence boy ceases to be the simple epithet 
that the syntactic form intended it to be, and by virtue of 
its intonational emphasis secures for the combination in 
which it occurs the status of logical predicate, the highest 
dignity which speech has to bestow. The sentence may be 
paraphrased The king whom I prefer is the BOY king, a form 
in which the logical predicate is displayed as also part of 
the grammatical predicate (see below, § 69). Observe, in 
conclusion, that the stressing of BOY does not cease to 
make it an attribute of king, though this syntactically 
functional character of the word is somewhat obscured, 
much in the same manner as its noun-quality sank into 
relative obscurity when syntax claimed it for an attribute. 
For interpretational purposes intonation, syntax, and 
word-form thus seem to exert influence in this hierarchical 
order. 
§ 46. Final remarks on incongruent word-function. 
It may be thought that, in devoting so much space to in-
congruent word-function, I am insisting unduly on what, 
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after all, is a comparatively rare and exceptional linguistic 
phenomenon. My answer is that nowhere else can the 
interaction of speech and language be better exhibited. 
Here language is seen dictating, and speech ever so mildly 
rebelling. And if the cause itself be good, very possibly the 
rebellious utterance may win through, and gain recogni-
tion as a fact of language. 
Incongruent word-function is not necessarily an indi-
vidual twisting of word-form, though it may be such. 
When a friend once wittily described my lawn-tennis as 
Doherty strokes with Gardiner results, he was using my sur-
name incongruently, though not altogether incorrectly; 
and he was using it in a manner not heard by me before 
or since. This is an example of purely individual incon-
gruence. The use of boy in the boy king is, on the other 
hand, quite common. In the limited sense of 'being a boy', 
the word boy can be employed freely in the capacity of an 
adjective, cf. boy friend, boy actor, boy lover, boy cousin. 
One particular case of this use, namely boy-scout, has 
recently become so mechanized that it must be regarded 
as a compound word, not a combination of two. In the 
other sense 'pertaining to boys', the attributive function 
is considerably rarer, but boy-kind and boy-nature have 
been quoted . In all these employments, however, a certain 
recalcitrance on the part of the word can be felt, and the 
Oxford English Dictionary is, accordingly, fully justified 
in refusing to it the rani of adjective beside that of noun. 
The position is there accurately characterized by the 
statement that in combinations 'boy often approaches the 
force of an adjective'. For the senses 'pertaining to boys' 
and 'boy-like', 'puerile', there is a derivative adjective 
boyish, e.g. boyish pastimes, boyish vanities. Contrast now 
with boy as an attribute the adjective silver. The same 
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dictionary rightly classifies this word as both noun and 
adjective. In the latter capacity its range is very wide; 
compare the various types of application in a silver needle, 
silver mines, silver standard, silver chloride, his silver beard, 
silver laughter. Nevertheless, there appears to be no 
doubt that silver originally was only a noun, and that, in 
becoming an adjective as well, it passed through various 
degrees of incongruent function. 
These examples suffice to illustrate the way in which 
all new linguistic form comes about. Single acts of speech 
gradually push some old form in a new direction, and a func-
tion once completely incongruent at last becomes wholly 
congruent. In the case of word-form, analogy may then 
move the word with the altered form to assume some of 
the outer characteristics of its new colleagues. Jespersen 
writes: 'The Latin adjective ridiculus according to Bréal 
is evolved from a neuter substantive ridiculum "objet de 
risée" formed in the same way as curriculum, cubiculum, 
vehiculum. When applied to persons it took masculine and 
feminine endings. . . .' Jespersen continues, '. . . and it is 
this formal trait which made it into an adjective; but 
at the same time its signification became slightly more 
general and eliminated the element of " th ing" . ' 1 Surely 
this is putting the cart before the horse. The reason why 
the old noun ridiculum ultimately took on the masculine 
and feminine endings is that its originally incongruent 
function as an attribute of persons had become congruent. 
Ridiculum had in meaning acquired the status of an adjec-
tive, and for that reason was declined as such. Inner 
word-form is always the cause of outer, not vice versa. 
There is, however, another kind of incongruent function 
which can never lead to new form, and for which the 
1
 Jespersen, Philosophy, p. 76. 
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future holds in store nothing but extinction. This is found 
in the employment of words that have been, or are in 
course of being, superseded by others of different outer 
form. Thus mine as an epithet has given place to my, 
though retained in poetry before vowels, e.g. mine eyes. 
But mine sometimes occurs incongruently in conversation 
as a playful substitute for my, which it can then hardly 
fail to suggest to the listener's mind; so in mine host, mine 
enemy. Analogous in the field of stem-meaning are the 
occasional applications of words in obsolescent senses. An 
elderly person might easily speak of a quill as that fen, 
and though this employment is etymologically far more 
correct than the current usage, it would doubtless sound 
strange in the ears of a boy for whom a fen is a fountain-
pen; he would expect to hear the quill referred to as that 
quill. We must realize, therefore, that incongruence may 
be felt in employments which are perishing, no less than 
in those which are of recent birth. Incongruence is the 
mark of transition. In both varieties a feeling of strain is 
perceptible, and there is some impression of an alternative 
possibility. But in the one case the incongruence is due 
to innovation, in the other to archaism. 
In conclusion, let it be noted that, subject to the view 
of linguistic intention defined above, p. 147, incongruent 
function is seldom quite motiveless. It is a correct but 
unusual mode of parlance, and is frequently chosen be-
cause there is no suitable alternative. In the boy king, the 
adjective boyish obviously would not fit. But often some 
stylistic motive operates in addition. Thus in God made 
the country, man made the town, the word man is preferable 
to men for two reasons. Firstly, it hints better than the 
plural would have done that the creation of towns is the 
outcome of man's perverted nature; the singular acts 
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almost as though it personified the idea or concept of 
human nature . Secondly, the choice of the singular dis­
plays two individuals face to face with one another, the 
one acting wisely, the other foolishly. T h e antithesis is 
dramatically impressive. 
§47. Metaphor.1 I now turn to a linguistic phenomenon 
which plays, in the domain of word-meaning, much the 
same part as incongruent word-function in the domain of 
word-form. Metaphor, from the Greek μεταφορά 'a trans­
ference', signifies, in its technical use, any diversion of 
words from their literal or central meanings. The chief 
point wherein metaphor resembles incongruent word-
function is the sense of a blending, of a mixture, which 
arises from it ; not a disharmony, however, since the feeling 
excited is that of enrichment rather than the contrary. 
The one ingredient of the mixture is derived from speech 
and from the thing-meant; the other from language and 
from established semantic usage. Metaphor and incon­
gruent word-function can be described by a common 
formula: speech obsessed by language. There are, more­
over, other points of resemblance having a deep interest. 
Each of these two linguistic phenomena starts as an iso­
lated occurrence in a single act of speech. Sometimes it 
takes place almost unconsciously, as the mode of parlance 
most naturally suited to the occasion; sometimes very 
deliberately, with specific rhetorical intention. Each is 
subject to many degrees, proportional to the popularity 
acquired by a particular metaphor or an incongruent 
word-function. T h e new meaning introduced by speech 
1
 For 'metaphor' see Paul, Prinzipien, §§ 68-9; Wundt, Sprache, vol. ii, 
PP. 554 foll.; [H . W. and G. Fowler], The King's English, Oxford, 1906, 
PP. 200 foll.; the same and A, Clutton-Brock, Metaphor, being Tract 
No . XI of the Society for Pure English, Oxford, 1924. 
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gradually gains the upper hand over the old meaning 
imposed by language. If at last the old meaning ceases to 
be felt when the word is used, incongruent word-function 
becomes congruent, and metaphor dies. A new word-
form or a new word-meaning has become established. 
Speech has become language. 
A distinction has been rightly drawn between natural 
or spontaneous metaphor and metaphor as a carefully 
planned artistic device. But in practice the distinction is 
difficult to maintain, since the early stages of the former 
are always hidden. The principle involved is best illustrated 
by reference to a very common type. Here something 
which is more remote, less concrete, less vivid, is referred 
to in terms of something similar which is more familiar, 
less abstract, more pictorial.1 Natural metaphor often 
comes before us only at so advanced a stage, that the 
presence of imagery demands philological scrutiny for its 
recognition. We are scarcely aware of the image in speak-
ing of the arm of a chair, the foot of a table, the mouth of a 
river, the neck of a bottle, or the veins in a piece of marble. 
Metaphor is moribund when we say that prices sink or 
rise, that a voice is high or lou, that someone's character 
is hard or coarse. So, too, in descriptions of mental happen-
ings: to feel tired, to grasp a thought, to imagine a situa-
tion, to direct one's attention. 
1
 Not all metaphor is of this type, however. Sometimes the thing com-
pared is no less concrete and vivid than the comparison, e.g. the frequent 
metaphors by which the Egyptians, for adulatory reasons, compared the 
Pharaoh with a lion, a hull, and so forth. Sometimes the metaphor may 
even be more abstract than that to which it is applied, e.g. in Siegfried 
Sassoon's poem describing the impressions left by an evening in the com-
pany of archaeologists; he refers to the moon, 'But, as her whitening way 
aloft she took, I thought she had a PRE-DYNASTIC look' Metaphor of this kind 
is rare, and dictated by very individual and unusual aims. 
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For my present purpose, the illustration of the relations 
between speech and language, deliberate metaphor is far 
more instructive. The most full-blooded form of the 
tendency underlying this is seen in parable or allegory. 
Here the prophet or teacher has a message to deliver, but 
conceives the best way to the hearts of his audience to be 
through the description of some homely incident embody-
ing the lesson to be taught or the truth to be inculcated. 
The method is analogous to the personification of abstract 
notions. The same process is exemplified in similes, where 
the less pictorial fact is first explicitly named, and then 
brought home to the listener by means of a highly coloured 
parallel introduced by some word marking the comparison 
as such. Many elaborate instances are found in Homer, 
e.g. They two in front of the high gate were standing like 
high-crested oaks on a mountain, which abide the wind and 
the rain through all days, firm in their long roots that reach 
deep into the earth. It has sometimes been said that meta-
phor (i.e. the metaphor of individual speech) is a shortened 
simile; for instance, Rebellion blazed forth might be taken 
as a shorter version of Rebellion spread abroad, even as when 
afire blazes forth. If this explanation is offered in illustra-
tion of the psychological principle involved, no fault can 
be found with it. If, on the other hand, it is offered as a 
statement of historical origin, it is certainly false. Meta-
phor, as we have seen, is so natural a phenomenon, that 
it frequently takes place unbeknown to its employer. It 
would be little wonder, accordingly, if the effectiveness of 
this natural device became consciously recognized and if 
it were adopted as a deliberate means of enhancing the 
interest of a sentence. But one more approximation to 
metaphor must be mentioned before we turn to the 
genuine article itself. It is a misnomer to apply the term 
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metaphor to the mixed mode of diction of which the 
Bible contains so many magnificent specimens: And there 
shall come forth a shoot out of the stock of Jesse . . .; and he 
shall smite the earth with the rod of his mouth, and with the 
breath of his lips shall he slay the wicked. Here the allegory 
and the prophecy allegorized are so closely interwoven 
that no separation is possible; a number of images are com-
bined in so rich a texture, that we are unable to discern 
which is the comparison and which the thing compared. 
True metaphor, at least in the lexicographical sense, be-
gins only where the thing-meant can be distinctly recog-
nized as such, though presented figuratively by a pictorial 
word conjuring up some other scene. 
If the account I have to give of metaphor marks any 
advance upon previous accounts, it will be because I 
display it as a phenomenon of language belonging midway 
between a word as used figuratively by an individual 
speaker and a word of stereotyped meaning from which 
imagery once present has completely vanished. The two 
extremes are separated by any number of intermediate 
stages. To witness the birth of metaphor we must turn to 
poetry. So well-trodden are the paths of literature that 
even among the poets entirely new figurative uses are not 
easy to find. An instance recently quoted from Thomas 
Hardy1 is In the waves they bore their GIMLETS of light, said 
of lamps on a sea-wall; this use of the word gimlet appears 
to be quite unprecedented, nor is it likely to be repeated. 
The following examples from well-known poems are far 
less individual: The frolick Wind that BREATHES the Spring; 
While the Cock with lively din, SCATTERS the REAR of Darkness 
1
 An interesting collection of unique words or uses of words in Thomas 
Hardy's poems is given by G. G. Loane in The Times Literary Supplement 
for 21st January, 1932. 
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THIN; Ever let the Fancy ROAM, Pleasure never is at HOME; 
Her mirth the world required, She BATHED it in smiles of 
glee. Even if we confine the term 'metaphor' to figura-
tive uses adopted by language, doubtless these will already 
come under that head. In commonplace writing, more 
hackneyed metaphors are often employed to give colour 
to drab surroundings: Contentment is the FOUNT of all happi-
ness; STEALTHILY the shadow of the house CREPT ACROSS the 
wall; My thoughts HOLD MORTAL STRIFE. If source were 
substituted for fount, and are in conflict for hold mortal 
strife, we should have metaphor well within sight of death. 
At this stage, however, the addition of some other word 
elaborating the image may still resuscitate i t : Contentment 
is the SOURCE whence all happiness FLOWS. Three-quarters 
dead metaphor, as H. W. Fowler has called it, can be 
brought to life again, but disastrously, by a mixture of 
images; he quotes a particularly crass example in All the 
evidence must first be SIFTED with acid tests. Apart from the 
final qualification, the sifting of evidence would barely be 
felt as metaphorical. Stone-dead metaphor, to borrow a 
phrase from the same writer, is exemplified in English 
ponder, depend, explain, examine, test, whence the Latin 
images of weighing, hanging, straightening out, swarming, 
and bearing witness have departed beyond recall. The dis-
appearance from a word of more concrete collateral 
possibilities of application may be the cause of a metaphor's 
death; the metaphor in towel-horse is kept alive by the 
application of horse to Derby winners. But imagery can 
nearly perish in a word if its secondary and metaphorical 
use be much more frequent than its literal sense; the slang 
employment of awful and dreadful for what is bad or un-
pleasant is scarcely felt as metaphorical, though the literal 
applications, 'awe-inspiring', 'fraught with dread', are not 
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quite extinct. The name 'dead metaphor', though 
illuminating as a means of realizing the phases through 
which many words pass, is not to be taken too seriously. 
A dead metaphor is a live word, but one which is a 
metaphor no longer. 
§ 48. Correct and faulty speech. The perspective 
must now be widened so as to afford a glimpse of faulty 
speech. The very mention of such a possibility implies a 
standard of language which individual utterance may 
neglect or fail to reach. First, therefore, we must ask what 
a language is and by whose authority rules of grammar and 
right usages of words are formulated and imposed. The 
questions are more easily put than answered, although a 
rough approximation is found in the statement that, just 
as a speaker stands behind every isolated product of speech, 
so, too, the linguistic community stands behind any lan-
guage as a whole. On looking closer, all kinds of diffi-
culties confront us. There are local dialects, and there are 
social classes, each with its own set of linguistic habits, 
often directly contradicting one another. And yet the 
belief in a definite standard is universal and ineradicable; 
this is English and that not English. Little more than a 
generation ago, the atti tude of philologists to language 
was purely normative; grammar had to teach rules of 
correct speaking, and the dictionaries declared, not only 
what words meant, but also what they ought to mean. The 
pendulum has swung far, perhaps too far, in the opposite 
direction. Linguistic treatises have become, for the most 
part, simply descriptive of usage, past or present. A 
French philologist has even had the happy idea of com-
piling a Grammaire des fautes, to show in what directions 
the French language is veering.1 The foregoing sections 
1
 H. Frei, La grammaire les fautes, Paris, 1929. 
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will have indicated the position which, in my conception, 
the theorist of language ought to adopt in regard to his 
subject-matter. It is a necessary assumption that the 
broad principles of linguistic theory are the same in all 
places and at all times. The theorist of language will, 
therefore, take his own linguistic habits and feelings as a 
basis. These, for him, are the 'language' of which he seeks 
the theory. But within his own language he will find much 
that is doubtful and indistinct. He may not be certain of 
the meaning of a specific word, and may not have made up 
his mind as to the validity of a particular rule. What is the 
exact significance of sardonic ? Should whose be employed 
in the sense of of which ? These examples are typical of 
the doubts which assail everyone interested in his mother-
tongue . 
If the theorist of language eliminates all such question-
able elements in his own linguistic outlook, there will 
remain a large nucleus of words and rules about which he 
has no hesitation whatsoever. Concerning these he cannot 
fail to think normatively, but his approval and condemna-
tion will have many degrees. In a given context one word 
may be more appropriate than another, though the second 
is not absolutely wrong . In the individual linguistic con-
sciousness the dualism of speech and language is always 
postulated, and the claims of each are settled by strong and 
often dogmatic feeling. No grammar or dictionary, there-
fore, is adequate to the facts unless it recognizes and 
records the degrees which lie between unquestionably 
correct and unquestionably faulty speech. The normative 
standpoint must be combined with the purely descriptive, 
corresponding to the t ru th that at any given moment the 
language of any particular individual is not only in being, 
but also in course of becoming. Thus even in his own field 
172 S P E E C H A N D L A N G U A G E §48 
of dispassionate scientific recording, the philologist is not 
entitled to overlook what I venture to call linguistic ethics. 
A few words require to be added in defence of the purists 
and their propaganda, now often unjustly reviled in the 
name of Science. If, as I have pointed out, there is an 
ethical element in all linguistic feeling, surely it is only 
natural and right that those who value their own language 
; should seek to influence others in the directions which 
seem aesthetically or logically preferable. In writing 
'logically' I touch upon a point which demands some 
emphasis. Scientific grammarians and purists of English 
will be ready to join hands in admitting an inherent, 
almost objective, ugliness in logical discrepancies. These 
sort of things is heard even from the lips of highly educated 
people, despite the existence of a simple alternative in 
things of this sort. Here obviously the purist should be 
encouraged to speak. But I will venture to suggest that 
even the ablest defenders of pure English occasionally 
spoil their cause by defective theory. The term 'split 
infinitive' is a case in point. Whatever the grammars may 
assert, to dig is not an infinitive, but only an infinitival 
phrase. No doubt the union of the component words is 
closer than in free combinations of preposition and gerund, 
e.g. in digging. But if an intervening adverb be per-
missible in the latter case, it is at least defensible in the 
former. Moreover, the prevalence of the 'split infinitive' 
shows that to + infinitive is not felt as a unit.1 Another 
example can be quoted by me the more conscientiously 
because here my feeling is in conflict with my opinion. 
My prejudice in favour of different from has increased with 
1
 I have no fault to find with the conclusions of the witty article on the 
Split Infinitive in H. W. Fowler's Modern English Usage, except that he 
omits to point out the petitio principii involved in the term. 
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years. But I believe it to be wrong-headed. If the 
commonly favoured different to has brought about a dis-
harmony with Latin, it has brought about a harmony in 
English itself; similar to, different to form a good pair. Is 
there any reason in common sense or good feeling why a 
live language should for ever hang upon the coat-tails of 
a dead one ? 
Mistakes in speech arise either from failure to envisage 
the thing-meant or else from incapacity to find the right 
word. Cases of total failure in one direction or the other are 
probably very rare; no one tries to name a cathedral and 
says electrically. Most errors are due to confusion or lazi-
ness. The short-sighted man who points at a cow and says 
Look at that horse! has in all likelihood had correct per-
ceptions of colour and movement, but will have jumped to 
an over-hasty conclusion. Often the speaker will not take 
the trouble to identify an object about which he desires 
to speak; laziness in respect both of thing-meant and of 
word gives rise to utterances like Pass that thingummy! 
Slovenliness of this kind has doubtless been a potent factor 
in the history of language. But linguistic theory is barely 
concerned with situations where the speaker has failed 
to envisage the thing-meant. It is, on the other hand, 
deeply interested in incapacity to find the right word, for 
this state of affairs illustrates the fundamental antithesis 
between language and speech. Such incapacity is of many 
kinds. Malapropism is a familiar variety; I recall a game-
keeper who said Them there birds is gone over th 'ill, and 
the CONSOLATION is we shan't get 'em to-day. Individual 
mistakes of this type are very frequent, and presuppose 
a common element of sound in the words confused. 
Especially conducive to error are words which resemble 
one another alike in sound and in sense; the interchange 
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of efficient and effective or of perspicuity and perspicacity 
suggest themselves as examples. Grammatical forms may 
be similarly confused; will and shall, German mir and 
mich. But it serves no good purpose to illustrate the 
various possibilities of incorrect speech. I will merely note 
that much change in language has its root in individual 
errors. Popular etymology is an obvious type, and it is 
only one among many. 
Finally, mention must be made of a fallacy which for a 
time enjoyed an unwarranted vogue—the fallacy of the 
mot juste. Some eminent authors have been pleased to toy 
with the illusion that there is only one correct way of 
saying a thing, and conversely, that each word has only 
one correct application. To hold such a view is to affirm 
the rights of language, but to deny those of speech. 
Individuality in speaker or writer is seemingly forbidden, 
and it is difficult to imagine, on this presupposition, how 
new thoughts could come to expression or old ones take 
on a new aspect. One of the most precious characteristics 
of language is its elasticity, which permits speech to 
stretch a word or construction to suit the momentary 
fancy or need. The true position is summed up by Walter 
Raleigh1 with great profundity: 'The business of letters, 
howsoever simple it may seem to those who think t ruth-
telling a gift of nature, is in reality twofold, to find words 
for a meaning, and to find a meaning for words. Now it is 
the words which refuse to yield, and now the meaning, so 
that he who attempts to wed them is at the same time 
altering his words to suit his meaning, and modifying and 
shaping his meaning to satisfy the requirements of his 
words. ' Without the notion of a give and take between 
speech and language, linguistic theory is an impossibility. 
1
 Style, London, 1898, p. 63. 
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§ 49. Conclusion. Instead of summarizing the argu-
ment of this lengthy chapter, I will bring it to a close with 
two similes which may help to keep in remembrance the 
principal results attained. Words do not all resemble one 
another. They may be likened to the stones in a builder's 
yard, of different materials and of different shapes. They 
have been hewn into diverse shapes for special purposes, 
some meant for this position in the building and some for 
that . In themselves they carry a presumption of their 
future use, but at the last moment the builder may change 
his mind, and use a particular stone in a way for which it 
was not intended . In skilled hands, a stone so employed 
may perhaps be even more effective than another originally 
destined for the same place. 
Language and speech are admittedly closely akin, but to 
ignore the distinction between them is to ignore the ever-
balancing principles of conservatism and reform which are 
the mainspring of development in linguistic, as in other 
matters. Language is the mother of all speech, educating 
it and by past example setting the standard it is expected 
to follow. But the youngster is vigorous and experimental, 
and will often go its own way. Wise is the mother who 
tempers discipline with good grace in yielding, for she in 
time will pass away and her offspring become the parent 
in turn. In the interest of the family fortunes, rules of 
conduct must always be open to revision, though it is 
inevitable that the transitional stages should reveal some 
trace of friction. 
IV 
T H E S E N T E N C E A N D I T S F O R M 
§ 50. Function as the criterion of the sentence. After 
the necessary excursion into the mutual relations of 
language and speech I return to the consideration of the 
sentence. This, as we saw in Chapter I I , is the unit of 
speech, by which must be understood that sentences come 
into existence only through purposeful acts of human 
beings seeking, for different reasons of their own, to draw 
the attention of their fellow-men to various matters of 
interest. In my preliminary account the sentence was 
viewed from a dramatic standpoint, with speaker and 
listener as the actors, and a given situation as the scene. 
But at the same time it was pointed out (§ 28) that the 
philologist as such is concerned only with the products 
of speech, and that the intentions, motives, and other 
psychical occurrences in the speaker, as well as the attitude 
of the listener, are proper objects of philological analysis 
only in so far as the spoken (or written) sentence is inex-
plicable without them. It is, therefore, with the concrete 
sentence itself, a meaningful compound of articulated 
words, sounds, and gesture, that I shall henceforth deal. 
And the standpoint to be adopted, as I have previously 
noted (§ 28), is that of an observer in a position similar to 
that of the listener (or reader), but outside the actual 
situation of speech. 
Regarded from this angle, the characteristic feature of 
the sentence, as opposed to mere unintelligible words, is 
its purposiveness, the satisfying sense which arises from it 
that the speaker has purposed or intended something 
(§30). Let us suppose that the words reasonably that, or 
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strength by lifting catch my ear. To me they are no sen-
tences, since I can imagine no reason why these words, 
taken in isolation, should ever have been spoken. A place 
in the domain of the sentence can be conceded to them 
only when it is realized that they formed part of the larger 
utterances He spoke so reasonably that everyone was con-
vinced and Show your strength by lifting this weight. And 
even then they are but parts of sentences, the title of 
'sentence' being reserved for those single words or com-
binations of words which, taken as complete in themselves, 
give satisfaction by shadowing forth the intelligible pur-
pose of a speaker. It is only when, in a given situation, a 
word or words betray such a purpose, seem fired or gal-
vanized by some reasonable communicative intent, that 
the dignity of sentence-rank can be conferred upon them. 
Such is the revolutionary view which has been steadily 
gaining ground of late. Psychologists like Bühler, as well 
as philologists like Wegener and Kretschmer,1 are agreed 
that_the sentence is a purposive structure though opinions 
differ as to the way in which this, its essential nature, is to 
be interpreted or defined. 
This view of the sentence is widely at variance with that 
practically universal half a century ago and still lingering 
on in many a school primer. According to the traditional 
view, which was a direct borrowing from formal logic, the 
sentence is simply a combination of words that can be 
analysed into subject and predicate; sentences like Romulus 
built a wall or Paris is a beautiful city were classified as such 
for no other reason. Thus, whereas modern theory makes 
purpose or intention the criterion, the old view regarded 
the sentence merely as a matter of outer form. For the 
grammarian this error had unpleasant consequences, 
1
 See Additional Note E at the end of this chapter, below, p. 237. 
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though they did not exist for the logician. In teaching to 
parse, the schoolmaster found himself obliged to draw 
a distinction between 'main sentences' ('principal sen-
tences') and 'subordinate sentences', though he could not 
fail to perceive that 'subordinate sentences', so called be-
cause they possessed a subject and predicate of their own, 
were in fact only parts of sentences. It was noted that 
these 'subordinate sentences' functioned as though they 
were single nouns, adjectives, or adverbs; they were, in-
deed, nothing but word-equivalents of a special outer 
form. To have smaller sentences serving as integral parts 
of larger sentences was naturally felt to be inconvenient, 
and English grammarians got over the difficulty by sub-
stituting the term 'clause' for 'sentence' whenever, within 
the body of a single sentence, it proved necessary to dis-
tinguish between the main clause and certain component 
subordinate clauses having a subject and predicate of their 
own.1 Unfortunately, German grammarians have not yet 
realized the practical necessity of inventing a term similar 
to the English 'clause', so that Hauptsatz and Nebensatz 
still persist beside Satz, the name given to the whole of 
which they are merely parts.2 In France a distinction is 
sometimes made between phrase ( ='sentence') and its 
component parts—the proposition principale and one or 
more propositions subordonnées; however, it cannot be 
denied that the name proposition in the sense of 'clause' is 
not particularly happy. 
The recognition that a 'clause' is not the same thing as 
1
 See On the Terminology of Grammar, being the Report of the Joint Com-
mittee on Grammatical Terminology, revised 1911, 5th impression, London, 
1917, p. 14, Recommendation VIII , n. 2. 
2
 The need for new terms in German is clearly recognized (e.g.) by 
Kalepky, Neuaufbau, pp. 16-17. 
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a 'sentence' ought to have led to the conclusion that the 
sentence cannot be merely a matter of outer form, but 
only a few theoreticians have taken this further step. In 
the present section I shall follow up this question of 
sentence-form, and shall show that the fallacy inherent in 
the old view was due to the failure to distinguish between 
language and speech, and can be laid bare as soon as that 
distinction is firmly grasped and utilized. The constant 
necessity of combining words for declarative or stating 
purposes would lead naturally to a particular outer form 
being adopted, and the outer form which has, in fact, 
everywhere been adopted may be represented by the 
formula 'subject + predicate'; I use this formula without 
reference to word-order, for some languages (e.g. Egyptian) 
normally place the subject after the predicate, if the 
latter is a verb. Thus there is such a thing as 'sentence-
form', and like all other linguistic forms, it is a fact of 
language, not a fact of speech. To take an example, he is 
well has sentence-form; on its 'inner' side that of a state-
ment, but evidenced outwardly by the presence of subject 
and predicate. If the words be considered apart from any 
context, they appear to state that some person referred to 
is in good health. More fully, they seem to embody the 
purpose of a speaker to convey the information that some 
one is in good health. They are clearly not a sentence by 
virtue of the outer sentence-form (subject 'he' + predicate 
'is well'), but only become a sentence when, in a given 
situation of speech, they actually do embody the said 
desire or purpose. It is function, not form, which makes 
a set of words into a sentence. And this is proved by the 
fact that the same form of words can be used, with some 
slight degree of incongruence, in another way. For in-
stance, in I hope he is well the words he is well are merely 
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a noun clause pointing to the object of my hope, or as the 
grammarian says, serving as object of the verb hope; here 
he is well is not a sentence at all. Why ? Because, though 
as a fact of language he is well seems destined to embody a 
speaker's declarative purpose, though indeed it is a state-
ment in form, both outer and inner, yet in function, i.e. 
as a fact of speech, it embodies no such purpose, but serves 
simply as a noun bereft of any purpose of its own apart 
from that of the entire sentence I hope he is well.1 Thus 
the distinction between language and speech, or what 
amounts to the same thing, the distinction between 
'form' and 'function', proves to lie at the root of the dis-
tinction between 'sentence' and 'clause'. 
§51 . General and special sentence-quality. The four 
kinds of sentence. Let us take a few complete utter-
ances: I thought you were dining at home this evening. Has 
any one telephoned? Hush! How stupid! You have only to 
ask. It is a fine afternoon. Every one has heard such 
utterances at one time or another, and when spoken they 
deserved the title of sentences because they both were, and 
were recognized to be, adequate expressions of a com-
municative purpose on the part of the speaker. As I have 
argued in § 30 (p. 97), the minimum qualification which 
makes a set of words pass muster as a sentence is that it is 
felt to be making a claim upon the attention of a listener 
in respect of the thing indicated by the words. The 
possession of this qualification might fitly be described as 
general sentence-quality. But it is not enough for a 
listener to be aware that the speaker has entertained the 
1
 Ries discusses almost the same example (I hope you are welt) in Was ist 
Syntax?, p. 33. together with its German equivalent, and rightly main-
tains, as against Kern, that you are well is a 'Nebensatz'. But he has not 
recognized the real reason. Nevertheless, his discussion is of interest from 
several points of view. 
3920
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general purpose of communication; as a rule he wishes to 
know further details with regard to that purpose, so as to 
shape his receptive attitude accordingly. And equally 
from the speaker's point of view it is desirable that his 
listener should know precisely what aim or intention he 
had in mind. In fact, it is not enough for an utterance to 
have recognizable function as a sentence, as the vehicle of 
the general purpose to make a communication; it must 
somehow reveal or hint at the special purpose entertained 
by the speaker. We shall have to study later the different 
ways in which special sentence-quality, as it may be 
called, is indicated. For the moment we are concerned only 
with the fact that sentences are used for many different 
purposes, and with the inquiry as to which of these are 
of grammatical interest. In sum, we want to know what 
different kinds of sentence ought to be distinguished. 
On a broad survey there might seem hardly any limit 
to the variety of purposes with which a sentence can be 
uttered . Sometimes a speaker makes an affirmation with 
intent to persuade, protest, or even deceive; sometimes he 
may give a description for his own amusement or for that 
of his audience; or again, he may speak merely for the sake 
of speaking. His sentences may be aspirations, prayers, 
promises, threats, judicial verdicts, sarcasms, witticisms, 
sneers, teasings, exhortations, complaints, flatteries, and 
much else. But although it would be interesting to know, 
if life were long enough, the various forms which these 
different types of sentence might assume in different 
languages, still neither the enumeration of them nor yet 
their further investigation is an urgent task for the theorist 
of speech. He would find the same form of words (e.g. 
I shall certainly do so) serving at different times under half 
a dozen or more different heads. The classification of 
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sentences along the lines mentioned above is possibly the 
business of the student of Rhetoric or 'Stylistique', to use 
a term that has become very fashionable on the Continent, 
but it is not the business of the grammarian. The gram-
marian and the theorist of speech are concerned only with 
the general principles governing the use of words. They 
have little to do with lexicographical matters, with the 
choice of words employed. They want to know the 
different kinds of sentence only from a formal point of 
view. Now if my argumentation be sound, every act of 
speech is the purposeful performance of a 'speaker' em-
ploying 'words' in order to draw the attention of a 
'listener' to some ' thing' . Is it not clear, then, that our 
classification must turn on the greater or less degree of 
prominence accorded to some one of the three factors 
other than the words ? All speech assumes the presence of 
'words', and in a sense the words are equally important 
whatever the kind of sentence. But the prominence of the 
speaker, the things spoken about, and the listener may 
vary greatly. Evidently we must make this variation the 
basis for our classification. 
Few would dispute my contention that practical gram-
marians have, as a rule, accomplished their task with 
instinctive common sense and soundness of judgement, 
and that grammatical analysis has usually gone astray only 
when misled by erroneous theoretic considerations. Is it 
not good testimony to the validity of my own linguistic 
theory that the classification of sentences now almost 
unanimously accepted can be shown to follow the lines 
indicated in the last paragraph ? The Report of the Joint 
Committee on Grammatical Terminology1 recommended 
1
 Recommendation X, p. 15. (For full title of this pamphlet see above, 
P. 183, n. 1.) 
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that sentences should be divided into the following four 
classes: (a) statements, (b) questions, (c) desires, which are 
explained to include commands, requests, entreaties, and 
wishes, and (d), as a less important group, exclamations. 
A like division is found in the writings of many gram-
marians and theoreticians outside England. For instance, 
Sheffield1 distinguishes between exclamative, imperative, 
assertive, and interrogative sentences, Bühler2 between 
Kundgabesätze ('proclamatory sentences'), Auslosungssätze 
('evocative sentences'), and Darstellungssätze ('descriptive' 
or 'depictive sentences'). The substitution advocated by 
Bühler of three for four classes has the approval of 
Kretschmer,3 but only because he has realized that the two 
equally important groups of 'questions' and 'desires' be-
long together as subdivisions of the larger class called by 
him Aufforderungssätze or 'demands' . His trio presents 
simpler names than those proposed by Bühler, namely, (a) 
Gefühlssätze ('sentences of feeling'), (b) Aufforderungssätze 
('demands'), and (c) Aussagesätze ('statements'). This ap-
pears to me a singularly neat arrangement, and fits in 
particularly well with my linguistic theory inasmuch as 
'sentences of feeling' are those in which the part played 
by the speaker looms largest, 'demands' those in which 
successful achievement of the speaker's purpose depends 
upon an action to be performed by the listener, while 
'statements' are more objective, lay no stress on speaker 
or listener, but concentrate their energies upon drawing 
attention to the thing or things spoken about. Still, as 
Kretschmer is well aware, we cannot refuse to distinguish 
3
 Grammar and Thinking, New York, 1912, pp. 178 foll. This writer 
seems at times to approach my purposive view of the sentence without 
stating it definitely or clearly. 2 Iheorien des Satzes, pp. 16 foll. 
3
 Sprache, pp. 61 foll., in Gercke and Norden, Einleitung in die Alter-
tumswissenscbaft, vol. i, part 6, Leipzig, 1923. 
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questions, i.e. those demands which call for information, 
from those other demands which call for an action, or it 
may be merely for some passive atti tude that can be re-
garded as an action, e.g. Stay!, the more so since questions 
possess sentence-form of their own closely akin to that 
of statements. Thus, while retaining the triple division 
advocated by Bühler and Kretschmer, we must divide 
'demands' into the two subclasses of (1) 'questions' and 
(2) 'requests'. I prefer the name 'requests' to the designa-
tion 'desires' favoured by the Committee on Grammatical 
Terminology, firstly because their term is somewhat 
colourless, and secondly because the common element 
quest- (from Latin quaero, 'demand') marks the kinship 
between the two subclasses. But the distinction between 
these is just as important as that between 'exclamations' 
(= Gefühlssätze) and 'statements' (= Aussagesdtze), so 
that in practice we return to the quadruple classification 
recommended by the English Committee . This may be 











T H I N G S 
(2) Statements 
It is no contradiction of my analysis, but an argument 
strongly in its favour, that the four classes tend to merge 
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into one another. For it is my contention that in all 
speech whatsoever, except in a few border-line cases like 
involuntary ejaculations (§ 21), all four factors of speaker, 
listener, words, and things are invariably interacting, so 
that any type of sentence cannot fail to possess, at least in 
rudimentary form, also the characteristics of the other 
types. A statement, for instance, is an exclamation to the 
extent that it never fails to voice the speaker's real or 
pretended sentiments, and a demand to the extent that 
it looks forward, with greater or less eagerness, to the 
listener's reaction, verbal or otherwise. I shall later deal 
with the four classes of sentence in some detail, and for the 
present will merely give examples to exhibit, on the one 
hand their real difference, and on the other hand their 
close relationship. A typical example of 'exclamations' is 
Alas!, of 'statements ' It is a rainy day, of'questions' Have 
you seen my spectacles? and of 'requests' Give me another 
helping, please! T h e following sentences, however, illus-
trate my point that the fourfold classification is only a 
classification a potiori, i.e. having as its principle the 
quality which predominates over the others. Exclamation 
and statement are separated from one another only by a 
thin partition in How well he sings! and He sings very well. 
Sentences like You are going out, I suppose! are almost as 
much question as statement . An exclamation like Hi! is a 
demand upon some one's attention, without indicating 
whether the person addressed is to reply verbally or to 
perform some action. Really? is at once exclamation and 
question. 
§ 52. The specific purpose of the speaker as a new 
kind of overtone. Description and implication the two 
methods of speech. If we now take an arbitrary selection 
of sentences, e.g. Did you give that poor beggar anything? 
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I gave him a shilling. How hind of you! Give him a shilling 
yourself! we shall note that one and all convey some 
specific intention on the part of the speaker, but that this 
intention is never directly named. Of the sentences 
quoted, the first is a question, the second a statement, the 
third an exclamation, and the fourth a request; but they 
contain no explicit acknowledgement that they are of 
these several qualities. For example, Did you give that 
poor beggar anything? is a question, but does not state 
that it is a question. Nor is this observation contradicted 
when the same sentences are prefaced by further words 
describing their quality;1 for I ask you, did you give that 
poor beggar anything? is at least primarily two sentences, 
of which the first does not tell us that it states, nor the 
latter that it asks a question. And again, if we transform 
the second half of this pair of sentences into an indirect 
question, viz. I want to know whether you gave that poor 
beggar anything, we now have a statement about a wish 
concerning a question, but no statement that this state-
ment is a statement. It is true that such additions do 
indicate descriptively the manner in which the speaker 
has intended his sentence; but with them comes a new 
importation of sentence-quality, the nature of which is 
not declared. Thus the attempt to assert the quality of a 
sentence within that sentence itself does but involve us in 
an infinite regress. 
Now in connexion with word-form (§ 41) we learnt that 
individual words may possess, in addition to the direct 
reference to things given by their stem-meaning, a sort of 
subsidiary meaning which is best compared to the overtone 
of a musical note . Thus the word boy, a noun, carries with 
it a feeling that the thing signified by it is substantival, is 
1
 For these see below, p. 226. 
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to be taken as a thing. In just the same way, sentence-
quality may be compared to a kind of overtone or harmonic 
spread over the whole of the sentence taken as a unity, and 
not necessarily or permanently attaching to the consti-
tuent words. Or to employ a different image, the purpose 
inherent in a sentence is like a thread running through a 
chain of beads, a means of binding them together and yet 
no part of them. 
But is sentence-quality really as distinct from the direct 
signification of the words of a sentence as the above account 
seeks to make out, and if so, what is the explanation? It 
must be acknowledged that in many sentences the speaker's 
purpose is so entangled with the thing denoted by the 
words that the two cannot but appear as continuous and 
inextricable. For example, in Please, pass the jam! the 
thing-meant loses its very core and heart if the notion of a 
request on the part of the speaker be amputated from it. 
Equally so with the question Have you seen my cousin? 
and perhaps even more with exclamations like Bother! 
or like the salutation Good morning! But there are other 
sentences—and they are extremely frequent—where the 
sentence-quality is felt as lying, so to speak, in an utterly 
different dimension from the actual drift of the sentence. 
Thus in He must have known that his speculations were 
bound to end badly we receive the impression of a speaker 
asserting something with warmth and energy, but this 
something, the knowledge possessed by a person perhaps 
many thousands of miles away, lies in a totally different 
situation from the assertion of that knowledge. The term 
'situation' which I have just employed will, on reflection, 
be found to provide the key to the linguistic mystery 
which we are seeking to run to earth . Sentence-quality, 
that character of a sentence which reveals the speaker's 
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specific purpose, is indeed nothing more than the linguistic 
indication of the particular relations of the four factors of 
speech constituting the present situation of the utterance, 
as the listener must deduce those relations to have been 
intended by the speaker. The matter referred to may be 
worlds apart from the speaker who is referring to it, worlds 
apart also from the listener to whom the speaker addresses 
himself, but a dim consciousness of those present factors 
arises out of the sentence, however remote the topic may 
be. In maintaining that sentence-quality is always per-
ceived out of a present situation of speech underlying the 
sentence I must explain that I do not mean an absolute 
present, but rather the kind of present which may be 
mentally imaged as a bridge connecting the speaker with 
his listener. Thus when I am studying Virgil the present 
situation of his verses is that which somehow links the poet, 
as he was when he lived and wrote, with me his twentieth-
century reader. 
A picture will perhaps explain my conception of sen-
tence-quality more comprehensibly than words can do . In 
this picture (Fig, 7) I have attempted to illustrate the 
thing meant by He must have known that his speculations 
were hound to end badly. In the situation which I have in 
mind a man is talking with his wife about a nephew of hers 
in Australia. The parties are aware that a discussion be-
tween them is in progress, so that the picture necessarily 
displays both husband and wife with some degree of 
distinctness. There is no great consciousness of the words 
spoken, and they are but barely discerned issuing from the 
speaker's lips. The thing spoken about, on the other hand, 
is indicated a good deal more boldly than the situation 
of speech (A) , and it is in an entirely different region (B) 
far removed from that situation. We see the nephew in 
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Australia contemplating an imaginary scene of closed 
shops, these divided from him by a certain lapse of time, 
even as he himself is separated from his aunt and uncle 
both temporally and spatially; see Situation c in the 
figure. 
FIG. 7. To illustrate the sentence He must have known that his 
speculations were bound to end badly 
To return now to the starting-point of this section, we 
saw that the specific quality of a sentence cannot be 
directly affirmed by the constituent words, but emerges 
from it as a sort of overtone. It is evident that the outer 
form of the sentence is at least in some degree responsible 
for the overtone which sounds in the listener's ears, and 
much of the remainder of this chapter will be devoted to 
investigating the various devices which language has called 
to its aid in the constitution of this outer sentence-form. 
But a number of preliminaries will have to be settled 
before starting on that lengthy undertaking, and to these 
it may be a useful prelude to indicate my opinion in a 
controversy which has recently arisen between two writers 
on the theory of the sentence, both of whom accept the 
view that this is a 'purposive structure' (Zweckgebilde). 
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Bühler maintains that the nature of the sentence cannot 
rest upon 'depiction' or 'delineation' (Darstettung) alone, 
although the part which that activity plays in speech is 
overwhelmingly important . Dempe takes the opposite 
view.1 It is hardly possible for an Englishman to partici-
pate in a controversy conducted on exactly these lines, 
since for him neither 'depiction' nor 'delineation' is a term 
suitable in reference to speech, and to render Darstellung 
by 'description' (in German Beschreibung) seems hardly 
justifiable. Consequently, the only course open to him is 
to change the issue, so as to make it debatable within the 
framework of English idiom. Here I shall follow up the 
problem with an eye more to my own linguistic theory 
than to the way in which it has been set by the two Ger-
man scholars. In my first two chapters I showed that the 
essential method of speech consisted in presenting to the 
listener successive word-signs each possessing a definite 
area of meaning. Employing these clues, the listener re-
constructs the thing-meant by an effort of his intelligence, 
using the situation as an additional source of inference. 
The method thus summarized corresponds closely to the 
idea suggested by the term description, with which my 
own feeling, at all events, associates notions both of deliber-
ate effort and of gradual approximation. But in the third 
chapter a new method employed by speech began to ap-
pear on the horizon. Words and sentences not only have 
immediate reference, resulting from intentionally directed 
meaning, but they also have 'form', a method of conveying 
knowledge by a sort of overtone, less well characterized by 
the term 'description' than by the term implication. 
Speech achieves its ends partly by describing, partly by 
1
 The argument forms the main subject of Dempe's book, Was ist 
Sprache? where the references to Banter's various articles will be found. 
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implying. The former method is the more direct and the 
more intentional; it instructs the listener as regards the 
kind of thing he has to attend to. 'Implication' is more 
subtle, and works less consciously. For example, the form 
of an interrogative sentence intimates that the speaker has 
intended a question, and if the situation warrants it, the 
listener draws that very conclusion without being aware 
that he has done so. Previous experience of similar form 
mediates the conclusion, and the listener reacts to it with-
out directly attending to the fact, much as we react 
involuntarily to a person's looks or general bearing. The 
speaker himself 'implies' without clear knowledge of what 
he is doing.1 At all events, the element of intellectual 
effort is far less marked in 'implication' than in 'descrip-
tion' . Apart from these two, so far as I can see, speech 
employs no other method . 
§53 . Sentence-quality, sentence-function, and sen-
tence-form. In the preceding argument use has been 
made of the three technical terms which serve as heading 
to the present section, and it is high time that we should 
examine their precise signification. All three are attributes 
of uttered words, and describe what they are, what they 
do, and what they appear likely to do respectively. In 
order to elucidate these attributes and to explain their 
relations to one another, it might have been profitable to 
give a diagram similar to that in which I attempted to 
exhibit the application of words (Fig. 6, p. 151); but since 
it would have been difficult to escape depicting the speaker 
and listener, as well as the utterance and the thing meant 
1
 'Implication' appears to me the last clear analogy left in speech to the 
animal's automatic cry of pain. But in such psychological questions I am 
out of my depth. Dempe's distinction between the spontaneous cry Ow! 
and the interjectional Ow! of language is here of interest; see the discussion 
in Was ist Sprache? p. 59; also below, § 75. 
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thereby, I have shrunk from the complexity involved, and 
shall at tempt to make myself comprehensible without a 
diagram. The attributes of the sentence being, however, 
completely parallel to those of the word, I would request 
the reader to keep in view the Figure afore-mentioned. 
With the help of this, it ought not to be difficult to gain a 
clear conception of the distinctions in question. 
All speech has as its task to call attention to something 
wearing an aspect chosen and intended by the speaker, and 
these three attributes of an utterance which refer to it as a 
sentence are all connected with the attitude intended by 
the speaker to be adopted by the listener towards the 
thing designated by the words. Since this att i tude to be 
adopted by the listener lies outside the sentence itself, it 
corresponds to what in Fig. 6 is represented as the formal 
character (Fc) of the thing-meant. For example, in the 
sentence Come! the atti tude which the speaker means the 
listener to adopt is the factual performance of the action 
designated by the word come. But the best way of describ-
ing this att i tude is in terms of the manner of utterance 
employed by the speaker in order to bring it about; the 
speaker is said to request, question, state, or exclaim. 
Correspondingly, the utterance itself is called a request, 
question, statement, or exclamation, and these descrip-
tions constitute its special sentence-quality (§ 51). It 
will now be apparent why I defined special sentence-
quality as ' that character of a sentence which reveals the 
speaker's specific purpose' . Here the word 'reveals' 
assumes that the listener has been successful in detecting 
the special sentence-quality of the sentence; if the listener 
has detected that quality, the speaker's purpose is ipso 
facto revealed to him. Clearly special sentence-quality 
corresponds, in the domain of the sentence, to what I 
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called 'functional capacity' in connexion with, the word 
(F in Fig. 6). Sentence-function now comes into view. 
This is the work which a given sentence does in the capacity 
indicated by its special sentence-Quality. A given sentence 
functions as a statement, as a request, as a question, or as 
an exclamation. Had a diagram been made for the sen-
tence as it was for the word, the sentence-function would 
have been indicated by dotted lines (see Fig. 6) connecting 
the spoken words with the thing they designate, and then, 
after running through it, connecting this again with the 
listener. 
Now the speaker may have had the best of intentions, 
but the listener may nevertheless fail to understand what 
was meant. In that event the sentence does not func-
tion, and its special quality has been in vain. The act of 
speech desiderates an intelligent act of understanding as 
its counterpart, and this, however much mechanized, is 
always a deduction from both the words and the situation. 
Wegener1 employs a very simple example to illustrate his 
contention that sentence-quality is always ascertained by 
a deduction on the part of the listener. A child is heard 
exclaiming Butterbrot! in a whimpering manner . But 
since bread and butter are not normally a cause of sorrow, 
and since the child's tone of voice recalls the tone of other 
exclamations uttered when something was wanted, we 
conclude that he desires some bread and butter . The sen-
tence expressed by the word Butterbrot.' has, accordingly, 
the special sentence-quality (§ 51) of an exclamatory 
request. Even without the whimpering tone the same 
conclusion might have been reached, if indicated by the 
entire situation. I will elaborate Wegener's argument by a 
further example. Suppose the child had given utterance 
1
 Grundfragen, pp. 16, 68, 70. 
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to the name of a dog instead of exclaiming Butterbrot! 
our conclusion would have been different; we might 
now infer that the dog had snapped at or otherwise 
annoyed the child. In this case the sentence would be an 
exclamatory statement. Thus the total situation, includ-
ing the nature of the thing referred to by the words, must 
always be taken into account in determining sentence-
quality, and the listener's interpretation is always a matter 
of reasoning. But through constant practice in speaking 
and listening to speech, the drawing of the right infer-
ence has become as nearly automatic as possible, and the 
listener is seldom aware that he has been engaged in any 
such logical process. 
On occasion an intelligent listener might be able to 
deduce the special quality of a sentence without the 
guidance of sentence-form. But it is doubtful if such 
cases actually occur. Even in a whispered exclamation like 
Thieves.1 the brevity is significant and the startled manner 
would suggest an exclamatory statement. Be this as it may, 
sentence-form is indisputably the main device by which 
speakers ensure the right acceptance of their utterances. 
All sentence-form has developed out of single utterances 
in the same way as word-form, to which it is parallel in 
almost all respects. Once constituted, it arouses the 
expectation that future utterances of similar form will 
have the same sentence-quality. As in 'word-form', the 
element 'form' in the compound 'sentence-form' must be 
taken as referring primarily to meaning, for we cannot do 
otherwise than regard special sentence-quality as a kind of 
meaning. It is proved by boy (a noun), great (an adjective), 
give (present indicative of a verb) that single words may 
possess 'form' without any outer mark to show it (§ 41). 
This is hardly possible with sentences except in so far as 
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single uninfected words like alas and fie have inherent 
sentence-form. Such exceptional instances at least rein-
force my point that 'form', whether of single words or of 
whole sentences, has reference primarily to meaning and 
only secondarily to outer appearance. Outer sentence-
form differs from outer word-form in being usually dis-
embodied. Concrete illustration will best explain my 
thought . The sentence Did you go to church yesterday? 
exemplifies a familiar type of question-form, of which 
Have you been to Rome? and Am 1 ever going to see you 
again? provide other instances. But we do not carry about 
in our minds a stock-example of this outer form of ques-
tion, as is proved by the hesitation which might be 
experienced in choosing one. So far as it depends upon 
words at all, outer sentence-form exists in the mind as a 
certain aptitude for putting the right words together in 
the right way so as to yield the appearance appropriate, as 
the case may be, to a statement, an exclamation, a request, 
or a question. For the purposes of grammatical teaching, 
we can exteriorize this aptitude or knowledge in two 
different ways: either by using a formula, as when we say 
that French questions for corroboration usually take the 
form verb + pronominal subject with or without further 
addition; or else by choosing illustrative examples such as 
Vient-il? Iras-tu? Jacques est-il malade? 
§ 54. Locutional and elocutional sentence-form. In-
tonation. In this chapter the only kind of sentence-form 
thus far explicitly named is that which is characterized by 
the employment of particular words (e.g. fie) or by the 
arrangement of its words in a particular way (e.g. he is well). 
The term 'verbal' is ill-adapted to designate sentence-
form of this type, since it has the ambiguity of meaning 
both 'connected with words' and 'connected with verbs'. 
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Some name must be found, however, as there exists a 
second type of sentence-form which has in previous 
chapters been described as 'intonational' (e.g. § 45). A good 
contrast will be obtained if we adopt locutional sentence-
form for the variety which depends solely upon words, 
and elocutional sentence-form for that which depends 
principally on intonation. As we shall see, the two are 
quite distinct, and may even contradict one another 
within the limits of a single utterance. 
Under the rubric of 'elocutional sentence-form' must be 
included all those variations of pitch, rhythm, and stress 
which differentiate one class of sentence from another; 
also, in case they should some day be scientifically studied, 
those peculiarities of manual gesture or facial expression 
which are characteristic of particular types of sentence. 
For the present, however, 'elocution' in the technical 
sense here proposed must be equated with 'intonation', the 
term usually employed. Many German writers prefer the 
more picturesque name 'sentence-melody' (Satzmelodie). 
The first thing to point out in connexion with 'intonation' 
is its essentially formal character. By this I mean that it 
falls into different types due to similar repetition in similar 
conditions. For example, ordinary affirmative statement in 
English has its own appointed mode of intonation. If that in-
tonation be heard without hearing the words, the conclusion 
is at once drawn that the speaker is affirming something. 
I can lay no claim to expert knowledge of this now 
much-studied subject, so that the following observations 
may seem amateurish to those better informed. The 
attempt must be made, however, to assign to intonation 
something like its true place in linguistic theory.1 Let it 
1
 For further details see H. E. Palmer, English Intonation, 2nd edition, 
Cambridge, 1924. 
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be noted that not only sentences, but individual words as 
well, possess their own elocutional form. For example, 
the various syllables of the word comfortable have certain 
relations of stress and quantity which vary little from 
context to context . But over and above the elocutional 
form attaching to words there exist differentiated schemes 
of sentence-intonation (mainly variations of pitch) which 
do not adhere to the component words of a sentence 
permanently, but are spread over the whole arbitrarily and 
as something extraneous, like butter upon bread. Intona-
tion-form of this kind is, indeed, the principal means of 
indicating special sentence-quality. The different types of 
sentence-intonation in any language are, of course, in-
finitely more numerous and more closely specialized than 
the four classes of sentence which we have elected to 
distinguish. Beside showing the relation of the speaker to 
the listener or to the things spoken about, intonation 
brings to light all manner of emotional attitudes, irony, 
pathos, argumentativeness, menace, and so forth. While 
the words themselves are openly proclaiming the nature of 
the things involved in the complex 'state of things' indi-
cated by the sentence, differences of pitch, stress and tempo 
are simultaneously infusing into the listener, by the subtler 
method of 'implication' (p. 195), all kinds of knowledge with 
regard to the speaker's purpose. Thence the listener learns 
how he is intended to demean himself, without having his 
attention lured away from the matter in hand. Intonation is 
less heard than overheard, and members of a linguistic com-
munity are apt to resent the imputation that this weapon of 
speech plays with them too important apart . Thus the Fin-
landers maintain that the Swedes sing when they speak, and 
the Swedes make the same accusation against the Finlanders. : 
1
 Wegener points out (Grundfragen, p. 72) that people are unconscious 
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To turn to the auxiliaries of intonation already men-
tioned in passing, namely manual gesture, facial expression, 
and the like. It seems impossible to assign these various 
non-intellectual elements of speech to watertight com-
partments, each having its own sphere of semantic influ-
ence. Manual gesture is perhaps more adapted to giving 
spatial indications than to exhibiting emotion, but we are 
familiar with the movement of the hand which brushes 
aside an argument, and with that which reinforces a 
warning. If a specialized function could be assigned to 
facial expression, it would have to be the indication of 
a speaker's mood. No mention has yet been made of a 
particularly important use of intonation, or rather of its 
subspecies known as stress. This serves, not only to show 
how the words in any at all complicated sentence are 
grouped, but also to indicate the 'logical predicate', that 
most important element in any sentence. Pauses too be-
long to intonation and, as we shall see, play a vital part in 
separating sentence from sentence. Further accessories 
of speech are such occasional accompaniments of it as 
laughter, clicking of the tongue against the teeth, throat-
clearings, and the like. All these maybe purposely utilized 
to produce special rhetorical effects. 
It is difficult to imagine a sentence completely devoid 
of elocutional form, whereas locutional form can easily be 
dispensed with. The moment has not arrived to deal with 
the numerous short sentences which are entirely form-
less from the locutional point of view, so I will pass them 
by and mention only a mode of speech which, paradoxical 
as it may seem, takes the further step of dispensing with 
of their own habits of intonation, and quotes as evidence the peoples of 
Thüringen and Pomerania, each of whom accuses the other of singing in 
their speech. 
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words altogether. Questions may be answered with, a nod 
or a shake of the head, and unpleasant subjects dismissed 
with a shrug of the shoulders. If these acts are not speech, 
I do not know where to place them; and it should be 
observed that the communicative means they employ are 
good elocutional form. There is, however, such a thing as 
eloquent silence, where words and gesture are alike absent. 
I am prepared to extend the term 'sentence' to a length 
which will scandalize old-fashioned grammarians, but here 
the line shall be drawn. 
A fact of great interest is the decisive character of 
elocutional form. When locutional and elocutional form 
are in conflict, it is the latter which dictates how a sentence 
is to be taken. This may be illustrated by picturing a 
young man who has gone to his bank to draw money. At a 
word from the clerk, the manager advances to the counter 
and tells him that his account is overdrawn. If the young 
man then exclaims, My account is overdrawn? he employs 
the locutional form of a statement, and the elocutional 
form of a question. The manager will certainly construe 
the sentence as a question, and will probably answer, Yes, 
I am afraid, it is! Suppose now the young man believed a 
large cheque to have been paid into his account on the 
previous day, he might conceivably say Is my account over-
drawn! with the locutional form of a question and the 
intonation of an exclamatory statement . This would be 
exceedingly ill-bred, but might nevertheless happen . The 
sentence would then have to be taken as the equivalent of 
a denial. The bank-manager might indeed respond to the 
locutional form professed by the words and might answer 
as before, but this does not alter the fact that the young 
man's implication was, If you will look again, you will see 
that my account is NOT overdrawn! 
§54 E L O C U T I O N A L FORM 205 
This example shows that elocutional form provides the 
dominant clue to the special quality of a sentence. In 
short, elocutional form always functions congruently.1 The 
reason doubtless is that intonation is much closer akin to 
natural reaction than is a spoken sentence. A speaker can-
not disguise his tone of voice so easily as he can dissimulate 
with words. Nevertheless, intonation is to a large extent 
a matter of convention. This is proved by the fact that 
French and English intonation differs immensely, while 
among members of the same country and race there is a 
similarity of intonation often amounting nearly to identity. 
To elicit how elocutional form has developed in any par-
ticular case would be exceedingly difficult, in all proba-
bility impossible. But we may be sure that particular 
attitudes on the part of speakers tend, on repetition, to 
carry with them the same tone and rhythm . Wherever 
opportunity of judging occurs, linguistic form is found to 
have originated in single acts of speech. Elocutional form 
is unlikely to be an exception. 
§ 55. Utterance the principal quantitative criterion 
of the sentence. Just as the choice of a particular type 
of intonation is decisive for the class to which a sentence 
should be assigned, so too the bare fact of utterance is, 
under ordinary conditions, decisive for the presence of a 
sentence. When an utterance is heard, but the words are 
not caught, it is always assumed that a sentence has been 
spoken. A companion is not held to be officious if he 
1
 It must be noted, however, that when locutional and elocutional 
sentence-form disagree, there is often some slight modification of the latter 
in the direction of the former. Thus Is my account overdrawn! starts 
almost like a question, though it clearly ends like a statement. Another 
reason for the congruence of elocutional form is the multitude of its 
varieties, making it possible to find the right intonation for every shade of 
rhetorical effect. 
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replies I beg your pardon? or What did you say? Indeed, 
it may be regarded as very doubtful whether utterance of 
words can occur without a sentence being spoken. My 
definition (p. 98) demands that a sentence should reveal 
an intelligible purpose. The purpose may be extremely 
tenuous, and there are all manner of border-line cases 
which it would be tedious to discuss at length. It may, 
however, be useful to cast a rapid glance at some. The 
listener need not be a living person, but a dog or a cat; a 
child may address a doll, and a poet apostrophize nature. 
Under the term 'utterance' writing must be included; 
authors address an unknown public, and a diarist may speak 
to his future self. Even in soliloquy utterance is not bereft 
of purpose. I have already met the objection that speech 
is often too mechanical to be called purposeful (p . 147). 
Consciously intentional utterance, at all events, cannot 
take place without a sentence being spoken. This may be 
tested, though perhaps not finally demonstrated, by ex-
periment. Let us try to speak some word or phrase with-
out uttering a sentence. The reader may suggest house of 
or to the. But either of these is an implicit statement: 
'house of (or to the) [is a phrase which I can utter without 
uttering a sentence]'. The statement is false, but it is a 
statement; and being a statement, it is also a sentence. 
It is not my contention, of course, that every part of 
an utterance is a sentence, but only that every finished 
utterance is a sentence. And here it has to be admitted 
that a sentence can be incomplete. An example has been 
quoted already; if James Hawkins had changed his mind, 
and had stopped short after saying Look at the , . ., this 
would have been an incomplete sentence (§ 30). Aposio-
pesis1 is a totally different phenomenon, and has great 
1
 Jespersen (Language, p. 251) points out that particular phrases used in 
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rhetorical effectiveness. The menace of Neptune in 
Virgil's Quos ego I leaves to the imagination the awful-
ness of the punishment to be inflicted on the aggressive 
winds. Aposiopesis can be combined with incompleteness, 
as when a person says But ! and, on second thoughts, 
decides that it is better not to formulate his objection. 
Here, however, the single word hut has conveyed the 
information that the speaker had an objection. It is an 
implicit statement, and having fulfilled its author's inten-
tion to raise an objection, must be regarded as a complete 
sentence. 
A pause after utterance is the mark of the finished sen-
tence, and indeed there exists no more conclusive testi-
mony that a sentence has come to an end. As a rule, 
spoken words are run together so closely that mere hearing 
will not reveal their division; hence those misconceptions 
which arise in childhood, and for which Jespersen quotes 
the instance of a child who asked her nurse why she always 
spoke of new ralgia, when it was such an old complaint of 
hers.1 The division of a sentence into its component words 
is further impeded by the fact that these are often clipped. 
Though the end of every sentence is marked by a pause, 
not all pauses have this effect or intention. Shorter pauses 
are frequently used to show how the words of complicated 
sentences are grouped, and there are also unintentional 
pauses due to hesitation, failure to find the right word, 
and so forth. However, human beings have such great 
experience in speaking and listening that they can readily 
judge what pauses are to be interpreted as evidence of the 
speaker's desire to conclude a sentence. Turning now to 
this way have become so stereotyped as to be real language-forms, e.g. 
Well, I never! I must say! Most curious of all is I say! with nothing 
following. 1 Language, p. 122. 
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the inner or semantic aspect of this 'outer general elocu-
tional form' constituted by the alternation of utterance 
and pause, we see that it consists in the effort to divide up 
whatever has to be said into lengths which will suit the 
convenience of the parties concerned. Both the speaker's 
breathing and the listener's powers of interpretative 
digestion have to be taken into consideration. In written 
speech, the second of these is of little account, and the first 
of none, so that longer sentences are permissible there . 
Both in speaking and in writing it is found practical to 
split up every long communication into sections of greater 
or less length . Books are divided into volumes, chapters, 
paragraphs, and sentences, just as a walking expedition 
may involve several halts for meals, occasional rests by the 
roadside, as well as single paces. The separate dishes and 
mouthfuls belonging to a meal are another parallel. The 
smallest section or unit of speech is the sentence, marked 
outwardly by a pause of suitable duration, and inwardly 
by evincing a communicative purpose recognizable as such 
—perhaps not the entire purpose of the speaker, but pre-
cisely that amount or portion which he thinks fit to 
accomplish before giving himself and his listener a rest. 
Thus the sentence is governed by purpose alike in its 
qualitative and in its quantitative aspect; and if a quanti-
tative definition of the sentence should be demanded, the 
following would perhaps prove acceptable: A sentence is 
cm utterance which makes just as long a communication as the 
speaker has intended to make before giving himself a rest. 
§ 56. Sentences without locutional sentence-form. 
In his recent book on the sentence,1 John Ries takes to task 
those grammarians who have, as he asserts, extended the 
name of sentence to utterances which are not sentences at 
1
 Was ist ein Satz? pp. 21 foll. 
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all. He admits the existence of a few cases where decision 
is difficult, but maintains as a general t ru th that everyone 
knows in practice what a sentence is, and can distinguish it 
from other linguistic phenomena unworthy of the name. 
The opinion that exclamatory utterances like Rain! Yes! 
Alas! No smoking! are sentences is anathema to him, and 
he accuses those who hold it, as I unhesitatingly do, of 
adding heterogeneous matter to that to be defined, and 
then serving up as the definition of the sentence a definition 
of what has been added. But such is not the true posi-
tion. Ries appears to me to refuse the name of 'sentence' 
to the utterances in question for no better reason than that 
it has not been accorded to them in the past. I am re-
minded of a singing-master who sat near me at an early 
performance of Debussy's Pelleas et Melisande and who, 
while evidently admiring the beauty of the work, com-
plained bitterly that it was called an opera. Scientific 
terms cannot be cribbed and confined in this way. Ries 
himself points out how greatly appreciation of the true 
nature of the sentence has been impeded by too exclusive 
attention to 'statements' ; 'questions' and 'requests' used 
barely to be considered sentences at all. I find myself in 
agreement with Ries at least as regards the method of 
investigation to be adopted. The first task is to discover 
the character possessed in common by those utterances 
which everybody recognizes as sentences, and not possessed 
by those to which the name is universally refused. This 
done, any further words or combinations of words 
possessing the said character must perforce be admitted 
as sentences. 
Here, however, our agreement ends. Ries's own defini-
tion is complex and obscure,1 though he cannot be denied 
1
 See Additional Note E, below, pp. 238-9. 
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the merit of having realized the difference between speech 
and language, and of having declared the sentence to be 
the unit of speech. The criterion of purposiveness empha-
sized by myself is completely overlooked by him, though 
its presence in statements, requests, and questions leaps to 
the eye. In a few exclamations there might be a doubt, so 
close are they to spontaneous natural reaction. But in 
most exclamations purposiveness is evident, so that this 
character must be admitted to belong to all four classes of 
sentence in common. It is absent, on the contrary, from 
clauses and mere phrases, if taken by themselves without 
regard to the wholes of which they are parts. Accordingly, 
intelligible purpose is the real differentiating attribute of 
the sentence, and we have now to consider whether that 
attribute can be justifiably applied to the various cate-
gories of utterances described by Ries as doubtful.1 In my 
judgement, it can be applied to one and all. What is more, 
there is hardly an example falling under these categories 
but may be allotted without hesitation to one or other of 
the four classes distinguished above in § 51. 
Some of Ries's categories of doubt will be exemplified 
in later sections. Here I will deal only with various short 
utterances in which locutional sentence-form is indisput-
ably lacking. Such are independent nouns like Rain! 
Rain? in the situation of § 26, answers like Of course! Per-
haps!', requests like Silence! Hands up!, labels and notices 
like Fragile! To let!, titles of books like Ivanhoe, advertise-
ments like Bovril. In all such examples the word or com-
bination of words possesses in itself no sentence-form, and 
may be employed in lengthier contexts where it is only 
part of the sentence. But—and here I come to the point 
of real importance—if these words be pronounced aloud 
1
 See the tabulation, Was ist ein Satz? p. 112. 
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in the way suggested by their employment as above indi-
cated, they will all be found possessed of unmistakable 
elocutional form. Some are statements, namely Rain! Of 
course! Perhaps! Fragile! To let! Ivanhoe (= This book is 
about Ivanhoe), Bovril (= This advertisement is about 
Bovril). Two are requests, viz. Silence! Hands up! One is 
a question, viz. Rain? And all, by reason of their brevity, 
partake of a certain exclamatory quality not found in 
longer utterances. Ries lays great stress on outer form, and 
one is perplexed and baffled at his seeming inability to 
recognize it here where it is so patent. Silence! spoken as 
a command is a very different thing from silence as a word 
slumbering in the mind. Further, the Silence! spoken by 
a schoolmaster's stentorian voice is a far more compelling 
request than a timid young prefect's Do please keep 
silence! Ries would at once admit the latter as a sentence. 
Can he refuse to do the same with the former ? If not, a 
home has undeniably been found for all those short and 
undistinguished utterances which he suffers to wander 
about unhoused like a legion of lost souls. 
I append a number of additional examples chosen almost 
at random, and doubt whether a more minute classification 
would have any scientific utility. But thus much is cer-
tain. Every grammar ought to state unambiguously that , 
in theory at least, any word or combination of words may 
serve as a sentence, provided that it makes sense and, when 
pronounced, is fortified with the appropriate elocutional 
sentence-form. 
EXCLAMATIONS: Heavens! Dear me! Woe! Bother! I who 
believed in him! 
STATEMENTS: ( 1 ) spontaneous and exclamatory: Murder! 
Glorious! Someone! (= Someone is coming!). Tour 
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health! (= I drink to your health!). The King's Arms 
(= This inn is named The King's Arms). Paradise 
Lost (title of a poem). 
(2) comments: Nonsense! True! Quite so! 
(3) replies to questions: (When are you leaving?) To-
morrow! (Will you take tea or coffee?) Tea, -please! 
(Are you ready?) In a moment! 
(4) replies to requests: (Come here!) No! (Give me your 
word!) If you really insist! At your service! 
QUESTIONS: ( 1 ) Headache? Hungry? Why so sad? 
(2) comments or replies: Yes? Really? Have you, in-
deed? At what O'clock? 
REQUESTS: Hush! Careful! Quickly! As you were! Hats 
off! One more fenny, please! 
Why is it that grammarians are so reluctant to accord 
the rank of sentence to utterances such as these ? I believe 
the reason is that syntax still labours under the domination 
of formal logic, despite all efforts to free itself. I shall deal 
later (§58) with the claim that every sentence must pos-
sess both subject and predicate. Meanwhile let it be noted 
that some of the utterances above-quoted really betray 
a certain incongruence. Brevity is perfectly normal and 
congruent in replies to questions, titles of books, and so 
forth. But laconic statements like Glorious! Someone! and 
abbreviated questions like Headache? Hungry? leave the 
impression of being substitutes for fuller utterances. The 
one-word sentence, as we saw, belongs to the childhood of 
speech. Such incongruence as these sentences show must 
belong, accordingly, to the type briefly discussed in § 46 
(pp. 163-4), where it has arisen through the displacement 
of an old mode of speech by one more modern. In polite 
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conversation too great terseness is considered barely 
courteous. Locutionally longer form is socially good form. 
§ 57. Sentence-form in the main elocutional. The 
lesson to be learnt from the last two sections is that in 
audible speech sentence-form is in the main dependent on 
intonation. No spoken sentence is without a particular 
elocutional form declaring its special sentence-quality, 
and it is to this source, rather than to the words them-
selves, that the grammarian must primarily look to find the 
outer character which distinguishes the sentence from the 
spoken word or phrase. The inconsistency and variety of 
locutional sentence-form have often been the subject of 
comment, and this peculiarity is certainly not due merely 
to the way in which the four classes of sentence shade into 
one another . The reason is, rather, that the proper task 
of words is to indicate as objectively as possible the things 
to which the speaker desires to direct the listener's atten-
tion, at the same time illumining their nature . The func-
tion of informing the listener how he is to take the words 
lies outside the special province of the latter, and being 
only of derivative importance, may be left to the less 
deliberate method of speech known as intonation . Never-
theless, the objective reference of sentences and the 
speaker's aim in speaking them are often so much entangled 
that they cannot be kept strictly apart. And so we find all 
kinds of implication concerning that aim creeping into 
verbal expression itself, thereby creating what I have 
termed 'locutional sentence-form'.1 
Elocutional sentence-form is eliminated when audible 
1
 Ries has seen clearly that no particular locutional criterion, such as the 
presence of a finite verb, is universal enough to constitute a conditio sine 
qua non of the sentence. But he insists, in my opinion wrongly, that some 
locutional form must be present, and that without this there can be no 
sentence. See Was ist ein Satz? pp. 92 foll. 
214 SPEECH AND LANGUAGE §57 
speech is converted into writing. There it finds an in-
adequate substitute in punctuation—the full stop, colon, 
and semi-colon for statements, the exclamation mark for 
exclamations and commands, the note of interrogation for 
questions. Minor groupings of words are marked by the 
comma. But even these imperfect elocutional instruments 
were absent from early writings, and the consistent em-
ployment of them, largely fostered by Aldus Manutius in 
the sixteenth century, is indeed quite a recent develop-
ment . Nevertheless, Phoenician inscriptions make them-
selves understood in spite of the lack of word-division and 
sentence-division, though there the duties of the inter-
preter are far more arduous than elsewhere. This being so, 
the help rendered by locutional sentence-form must not 
be underrated, even though we recognize that, of the 
two, elocutional sentence-form is the more important. 
§ 58. The claim that every sentence must consist of 
subject and predicate. It is clear that so well-established 
and passionately held a faith as that which asserts that 
every sentence 'consists of or 'can be analysed into' sub-
ject and predicate cannot be wholly without foundation.1 
The topic demands fuller treatment than I can give it at 
this juncture, but it must obviously be placed in the fore-
ground of any discussion of locutional sentence-form. 
Consequently I shall devote to it now just as much con-
sideration as is required for my immediate purpose, re-
serving closer investigation for my next chapter. To begin 
with, it is not by any means clear what the assertions above 
alluded to are really trying to say. If they mean that the 
sentence must comprise separate words representing sub-
ject and predicate respectively, this contention fails in 
1
 On this belief, not shared by Jespersen, see his boot Philosophy' 
pp. 305-6. 
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sentences like Latin Vixit or French Partons! If it be 
answered that the predicate resides in the stems vic-, part-, 
and the subject in the ending -it, -ons, then not only would 
we appear to have been mistaken in considering vixit and 
partons as single words, but also we can now refute the 
contention by quoting Dic! άγε, Komm! as negative in­
stances. These imperatives are devoid of inflexion ex­
pressing the second person,1 so that we here have sentences 
containing a predicate but no subject. My grammarian 
now shifts his ground and argues that Dic! stands for dic 
tu! But it is not legitimate, when defeated in an argument 
over something, to substitute something else claimed as an 
equivalent and to pretend that this proves the case. It is 
true that Dic tu! can be analysed into predicate plus sub­
ject, but the same is not true of dic! so long as we are 
considering outer form only. T h e line is now taken that 
in every sentence subject and predicate are present in 
thought . This restatement of the thesis I believe to be 
true in fact, as we shall see hereafter. But the interpreta­
tion which would be put upon it by orthodox grammarians 
I hold to be quite wrong. They would maintain, I sup­
pose, that in thought dic! is to be dichotomized into the 
words ' thou' and 'say'. But in the first place such an 
analysis leaves out an essential feature in the thought 
underlying this one-word sentence, namely the command 
or desire of the speaker; in any case, therefore, the analysis 
into subject + predicate would be incomplete. T h e second 
objection I have to make is far more serious. T h e dicho­
tomy to be assumed is not of words, but of things, and of 
these only one is referred to verbally. dic! signifies that 
1
 Philologists are agreed that singular imperatives (as also vocatives) in 
Indo-European languages present the bare stems without any inflexion. 
The same holds good in Semitic and Egyptian. 
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the person addressed is to perform the action indicated by 
iicere. Two things can be extracted from the utterance, 
but not two words. 
Thus far I have discussed only such single-word sen-
tences as every grammarian admits to be sentences. I hope 
to have shown that in some case or other of an undisputed 
sentence the analysis into subject+predicate distinguishes 
either too much or too little . I venture, therefore, to 
maintain that, though the great majority of sentences can 
and must be analysed into subject + predicate, neverthe-
less as against these, Vixit, Partons! Dic! and their con-
geners must all, on one ground or another, be excepted 
from that analysis. And since no grammarian will consent 
to Vixit, Partons! Dic! being deprived of sentence-quality, 
the analysability of utterances into subject + predicate 
cannot be made the touchstone of the sentence. Thus this 
criterion no longer affords any reason for refusing the 
name of sentence to utterances like Yes! Alas! and Balbe! 
What, then, is the source of the almost universally held 
conviction that every genuine sentence must consist of 
subject and predicate? In my belief, this conviction 
springs from a dim consciousness possessed by every user 
of language that the act of speech involves the two factors, 
apart from speaker and listener, of a thing spoken about 
and of something said about it. In my own technical 
phraseology, speech involves both (1) words having a 
meaning and (2) a thing-meant. Or again, speech consists 
in using words to put meanings upon things standing out-
side speech. Now when speech is quite explicit, it presents 
to the listener something corresponding to each of the two 
factors in question. The subject-word places before the 
listener a thing to which he is to direct his attention, and 
the predicate-word tells him what he is to perceive or 
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think about it. No sentence can do more, and there 
attaches to sentences with both subject-word and predi-
cate-word a completeness and finality which are absent 
from sentences not thus equipped. 
The greater satisfactoriness of sentences possessing words 
for both subject and predicate may be illustrated by an 
incident which sometimes occurs when a third person in-
tervenes in a conversation. Someone may have said Dread-
fully ill, I am afraid! and on hearing the new-comer's 
What's that? does not reply with his previous words, but 
substitutes I was just saying, Sarah's dreadfully ill. In this 
form the speaker's sentence leaves nothing to be desired. 
He proffers the information that he is saying or stating 
something, names the person whom it is about, and finally 
specifies what it is. 
In highly developed speech, and particularly in speech 
of a literary description, the presence of subject and 
predicate is so frequent that some excuse can be made for 
those who have regarded them as characteristic of all 
sentences. But even had that belief proved true, the 
possession of subject and predicate would still have been 
no infallible test by which a sentence could be recognized 
as such. For as we saw in § 50, there are some mere parts 
of sentences which possess both subject and predicate. 
These are subordinate clauses, and such a clause is rightly 
defined as 'fart of a sentence equivalent to a noun, adjective, 
or adverb, and having a subject and predicate of its own'.1 
It is undeniable, moreover, that by virtue of this possession 
all subordinate clauses have sentence-form, whether that 
of a statement, e.g. I hope HE IS WELL, or that of a question, 
e.g. HAD HE ARRIVED EARLIER, I should have invited him to 
1
 This is the definition recommended by the Joint Committee on 
Grammatical Terminology, see On the Terminology of Grammar, p. 13. 
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the concert. But if the possession of subject and predicate 
is an essential and differentiating attribute of subordinate 
clauses, the same is not true of sentences. Many sentences 
possess them, but many do not. This must be our final 
verdict. 
§ 59. The claim that every sentence must contain a 
finite verb. Equally untenable is the claim of some gram­
marians that every sentence must contain a finite verb. In 
discussing this new claim I shall follow the procedure of 
the last section, first demonstrating that the contention is 
not true in fact, and then seeking to discover the partial 
t ruth which gives it a certain plausibility. It is easy to 
prove that there are some undisputed sentences which 
lack a finite verb. For that purpose it would be necessary 
to quote only the evidence adduced by Paul 1 and Ries,2 
quite candidly by the former, but by the latter very 
grudgingly and without full admission of its bearing on the 
theory of the sentence. Often cited examples of sentences 
with subject and predicate, but without finite verb, are 
the Homeric Ουκ αγαθον πολυκοιναρίη and the Latin 
Omnia fraeclara rata. Such sentences without copula are 
known as nominal sentences, and t h e theory has been 
affirmed, though equally emphatically contradicted, that 
in Indo-European they represent an earlier type than the 
corresponding sentences with copula. It is not for a 
stranger to Indo-European philology like myself to pro­
nounce judgement in this controversy, but Ries seems to 
me to have done good service in pointing out that, so far 
as Greek and Latin are concerned, such sentences are 
restricted to proverbs and the like, and by no means con­
stitute a normal and generally employed type. But what­
ever the facts as regards the Indo-European languages, I 
1
 Prinzipien, p. 125. 2 Was ist ein Satz.? pp. 158 foll. 
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can aver with the utmost assurance that Old Egyptian 
dispensed with the copula in more than one common sub­
class of nominal or, as I prefer to call them, non-verbal 
sentences. Throughout the whole of the Old and Middle 
Egyptian periods sentences with a noun as predicative 
word regularly dispensed with the copula. In Old Egyp­
tian 'His sister is Sothis' would be rendered by santef Sapdet, 
literally 'His sister Sothis', while Middle Egyptian de­
velops a new form which admits of the inversion of subject 
and predicate thus, Sapdet pu santef, literally 'Sothis it, 
(namely) his sister'. Sentences with adjectival predicate 
are likewise without copula, e.g. nāfr ehras, 'Beautiful her 
face', i.e. 'Her face is beautiful'. When the predicate is an 
adverb or adverb-equivalent, usage varied: sash em paref, 
'Scribe in his house', is common enough, but appears to 
have been felt as more abrupt than yew sash em paref, 'Is 
scribe in his house' for English ' T h e scribe is in his house'. 
Similar evidence could be produced from Hebrew and 
Arabic, but I have preferred to quote from a province 
about which I can speak from long experience. 
However, it is needless to look so far afield. T h e obser­
vation that sentences like OΟυκ αγαθον πολυκοιναρίη and 
Omnia praeclara rara are found only in a rather special 
case does not ban them from the ranks of true sentences. 
Indeed, even a single instance of a sentence without 
copula or other finite verb, however rare and specialized, 
would be sufficient to demolish the thesis that every sen­
tence must possess a finite verb. And since the examples 
just quoted are accepted as sentences by everyone, Ries 
himself included, that thesis is actually demolished. Cer­
tainly it cannot be saved by maintaining that the copula 
is to be 'supplied' or 'understood'. Ries undermines any 
such defence by his admission that the absence of the 
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copula confers a gnomic character. Since the speakers 
presumably intended that gnomic character to be recog-
nized, it would seem to follow that they did not wish the 
copula to be understood. In point of fact, the omission of 
the copula or other finite verb lends a peculiarly pictorial 
quality to sentences, assimilating them to exclamations: 
Twilight and evening star, 
And one clear call for me,— 
Ries collects much evidence of the kind, rightly distin-
guishing many of the types in question from the nominal 
sentence proper. Thus he quotes from English, French, 
and German such cases as A wonderful man, your father! 
Inutile d'insister! Ein schöner Spass, das! Or again: Ars 
longa, vita brevis; Tel maître, tel valet; Least said, soonest 
mended. But instead of admitting that these, as they stand 
without alteration, are sentences, Ries takes up the strange 
and arbitrary position that they are 'pre-grammatical, or 
better still extra-grammatical phrases'.1 For my part, I 
wish for no more cogent evidence that sentences can exist 
without a finite verb, and that this criterion, therefore, 
cannot be employed to castigate those one-word or simple 
phrase sentences of which I have given a selection in § 56. 
What is the foundation of the false belief that every 
sentence must contain a finite verb ? Traditional logic is 
in part responsible, the sentence having been confounded 
with the proposition, of which the copula was deemed a 
1
 'Ich erkenne in ihnen vielmehr vorgrammatische oder besser ausser-
grammatische Fügungen, d. h. solche, die (noch) nicht zu einer vollkom-
menen grammatischen Formung gelangt sind', Was ist ein Satz? p. 181. 
But the mere fact that Ries is able to distinguish a large number of types 
among the verbless sentences so stigmatized is the clearest proof that they 
have attained full grammatical form. I fear that Ries, despite his protesta-
tions to the contrary (op. cit., pp. 95-7), is really under the influence of the 
old superstition that every sentence must contain a finite verb. 
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necessary constituent. But grammar could not for ever 
remain dependent upon a discipline which analyses gives 
as is a giver and gave as is one-having-given. I will not 
discuss further a standpoint now universally recognized to 
be obsolete, even though it may still linger on as an un-
acknowledged source of prejudice in the minds of some 
grammarians. But formal logic is by no means the only 
cause that the presence of a finite verb is considered essen-
tial to the sentence. Grammar has, in the past, paid ex-
aggerated attention to written speech, and particularly to 
that of Greek and Latin authors. And among them, it is 
less the writers of comedy who have been taken as the 
models of correct parlance, than poets and forensic 
orators. But in the writings of these, exclamations are 
rare, so that the only class of sentence which regularly 
dispenses with finite verbs is well-nigh eliminated. We 
have still, however, to inquire why the three other classes 
so persistently demand their use. This seems due to the 
complementary facts that most speech is concerned with 
actual, imagined, or desired changes in things, and that 
the finite verb is precisely that type of word which has 
been evolved for such purposes. Thus most sentences 
would naturally possess a verb of this kind, and I shall 
show how the remainder, which described what things are 
or should be, ultimately followed their lead, and adopted 
the copula as the variety of finite verb exactly suited to 
their requirements. 
Whatever may be thought of this at tempt to account 
for the prevalence of finite verbs throughout speech 
generally, certain it is that all such verbs have a large 
element of inherent sentence-form. Indicatives profess to 
state, subjunctives do the same in a more tentative and 
petitory spirit, imperatives command. There can be no 
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doubt that those words which present things as actions and 
which we call verbs have picked up this inherent sentence-
form in the same way that nouns have acquired noun-
form, adjectives adjective-form, and so forth. Constant 
employment in contexts where the speaker was stating, 
seeking concessions, or making demands is the source of 
the qualification of verbs known as mood. And out of 
this, together with the cognate qualification of tense— 
both to be discussed in my second volume—arises the 
copula, that peculiar phenomenon which in the modern 
languages of western Europe has become the concomitant 
of all non-exclamatory sentences not possessing any other 
finite verb. 
Much abuse has been heaped upon this unique element 
of language, the name of which ought, it is said, to be 
banished altogether from the vocabulary of grammar. It 
is true that the copula has been misused by logicians, but 
that is no reason for placing a taboo upon so excellently 
named a species of word. For the 'copula' is, in fact, a sign 
that two things of which one, at least, must be explicitly 
referred to by a word or words, are to be 'linked' together 
in thought. These two things are presented by the copula 
as standing to one another in the relation of subject and 
attribute respectively; and the word or words indicating 
the thing to be regarded as the attribute are known as 
'predicative' or, if the copula be taken with them, as the 
'predicate'. But beside this function of indicating the rela-
tion of a subject and its attribute, the copula has the office 
of attracting a superior degree of attention to the latter, 
and also of instructing the listener as to the manner 
in which he is mentally to entertain this relation of attri-
bution. If the indicative be employed, the listener is 
merely to accept the attribution, though the situation 
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must show exactly the mode of acceptance intended. If 
the subjunctive be employed, the attribution is to be en-
visaged as a possibility, desired or otherwise. If the copula 
be in the imperative, the listener is to act in such a manner 
as himself to become the subject of the attribution . Thus 
the authority and responsibility of the speaker lie behind 
the use of the copula, which accordingly is an effective 
instrument for shadowing forth his purpose. In statement, 
of course, this function is latent and normally unobserved, 
since statements are the most objective examples of 
speech, having as their purpose to make the listener look at 
some 'state of things' so far as possible without attending 
to the person who refers to them. Hence the force of the 
copula is here apt to manifest itself as a sort of inherent 
cogency, the source of which lies in the actual matter in 
hand. But that this cogency is in fact no more than the 
ipse dixit of the speaker, or in the case of scientific formu-
lae, of a consensus of authoritative speakers, comes to light 
in disputed or palpably false assertions like Two and two are 
five. The function of the copula as backing an utterance 
by the speaker's authority and purpose may be seen if we 
compare sets of words containing the copula with others 
omitting it. Let us take the exclamation Lovely, that song! 
pronounce it as much like a statement as possible, and com-
pare it with That song is lovely. In the latter case the 
speaker definitely declares, or gives as his opinion, that the 
song is lovely, in the former case his exclamation of en-
thusiasm merely implies it. To be strictly accurate, That 
song is lovely itself only 'implies' the judgement of the 
speaker, for we have seen (§ 52, beginning) that no sen-
tence can actually state its purpose, but conveys it only 
by the method of implication, as opposed to that of 
description. But it is no vain paradox to say that , as a 
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statement, That song is lovely is explicit in its implication. 
Relatively, and as compared with Lovely, that song! the 
statement That song is lovely does declare the speaker's 
purpose to impose that view. 
Similarly, Be careful! is more explicit than Careful! with-
out the copula. But conveyance of the speaker's desires as 
to the listener's attitude is not the only service rendered 
by this peculiar verb. It serves also to convey notions of 
time, person, and number, without the necessity of modi-
fying any of the other words in the sentence. One or more 
of these notions is shown by the outer inflexions of the 
copula, which has become in fact a purely instrumental 
word. Derived from various stems once having a definite 
descriptive force of their own,1 the copula, when used as 
such, has dropped this force entirely, and now serves 
merely as a carrier of the subsidiary notions above specified. 
Vendryes has given an admirable account of the gradual 
penetration of the copula, and I will translate a short ex-
tract from it:2 '. . . the introduction of the copula into 
the nominal sentence is easily explained. There is, indeed, 
one notion that the simple juxtaposition of subject and 
predicate is unable to express; this is the notion of time. 
A verb, inasmuch as this is the symbol of time, thus becomes 
necessary. To render " the sky was blue" the Hungarian 
is forced to say az ég kék vala, adding the imperfect of the 
substantive verb, which serves to mark the past, while at 
the same time playing the part of the copula. So too 
Homer employs the future ΈΣΤΑΙ in το δέ τοι ξεινήιον 
έσται.' Vendryes goes on to quote Homer's εις δέ τις 
αρχος ανηρ βουλήφορος έστω as an example of the use of the 
1
 English be comes from a stem meaning 'to grow'; Latin fuit is to be 
compared with Greek φύειν; French étant is derived from Latin stantem, 
'standing'; and so forth. 2 Le langage, p. 146. 
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copula to convey mood . All this agrees admirably with the 
evidence afforded by Old Egyptian . I have noted above 
(p. 219) how often the copula was there omitted when the 
time intended was the present. But as soon as future t ime 
had to be indicated, or any notion like that of a wish, use 
was made of a verb 'wnon which elsewhere signifies ' to 
exist'.1 Similar testimony could be quoted from the Semi-
tic tongues, and doubtless other languages are in the same 
case. However, Vendryes offers no explanation for the 
general employment of the copula in reference to present 
time, an employment which has become invariable in all 
modern languages of Western Europe. The true explana-
tion seems to emerge from the argument in which I 
pointed to the superior objectivity of statements inserting 
is or are. We saw that the omission of the copula gives a 
more pictorial or exclamatory turn to statements . Con-
versely, its insertion marks their greater intellectuality. 
The propositions affirmed seem abstracted from speaker 
and listener, and stand forth as though they were inde-
pendent of personal judgement or prejudice. 
The copula is the only verb from which the stem-mean-
ing has wholly faded out, enabling it to devote itself 
entirely to the functions indicated by its inflexions. But 
in become and grow, for example, this has occurred in par t ; 
upon somewhat similar lines, do serves to convey particu-
larly urgent requests, e.g. Do come! while it performs more 
intricate functions in negative and interrogative sentences, 
e.g. He did not come, When does he arrive? To conclude 
this section, I will add that the finite verb does not stand 
quite alone as a class of words having acquired through 
their associations an element of special sentence-form. 
Interjections (e.g. alas, fie) have inherent exclamatory 
1
 See my Egyptian Grammar, § 118, 2. 
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form, and so have vocatives in Latin (e.g. Balbe), though 
both, when employed, need the appropriate intonation of 
exclamations to give them that quality. Without such 
intonation they would be mere quoted items of English 
or Latin vocabulary. 
§ 60. Other words suggesting special sentence-form: 
Word-order. Certain other sources of locutional sentence-
form have not yet been named. There are many adverbs 
and adverbial phrases which have no other function than 
to indicate the degree of assurance with which statements 
are spoken, and which, consequently, are in themselves 
indications of statement-form; such are perhaps, certainly, 
of course, no doubt. Please is confined to requests, while 
pray is employed in both requests and questions. In Latin 
num., nonne and -ne, in Greek ΟΥΚΟΥΝ and μή are marks of 
questions, but also possess, like the interrogative pronouns, 
adjectives, and adverbs, more or less decided implications 
with regard to the answer expected (§ 73). How often 
prefaces an exclamation in English, like que in French, wie 
in German, and -wy as suffix of adjectival predicates in 
Old Egyptian. Closely related to these are the prefixed 
or affixed words with sentence-form which show the 
activities of speaker or listener in connexion with some 
particular sentence, e.g. Spare me, 1 PRAY; I TELL YOU, I 
will do no such thing; Nothing, I ASSURE YOU, was further 
from my thoughts. These additions are sentences function­
ing incongruently as sentence-qualifiers, and are pro­
nounced in such close conjunction with the utterances to 
which they refer, that they must be regarded as part of the 
same sentence. Note in this connexion that pray and 
prithee are shortenings of I pray and I pray thee. 
Word-order is another mark of special sentence-form. 
Here the best-known instance is the inversion of subject 
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and verb employed by many modern languages to indicate 
a question, e.g. Have you heard? Whom did you see? 
Viendra-t-il? Pourquoi fais-tu cela? Ist es gut? Wieviel 
kostet das? (see below, § 73). Similarly, the position of the 
adjective in front of its noun in Old Egyptian shows that 
it is to be taken as a predicate, not as an epithet, e.g. nāfr 
ehras 'beautiful (is) her face'. This is clearly a development 
of the exclamatory word-order seen in Lovely, that song! 
Beau, ce spectacle! Schön, ihre Stimme! 
§ 61. Locutional sentence-form in incongruent func­
tion. Having reviewed the various ways in which words 
have become adapted, through repeated use, to indicate 
special sentence-quality, I shall go on to show that the 
locutional sentence-form thus created can be used in incon­
gruent function, unlike its elocutional counterpart . In 
other terms, the struggle between speech and language, 
studied in the last chapter in connexion with word-form, 
is about to be seen re-enacted in connexion with the sen­
tence. Here there are two possibilities, which are best 
exhibited by means of an example. T h e words he is well 
have not only sentence-form, but also the particular 
sentence-form of a statement. When incongruently used, 
they may serve either (1) not as a sentence at all, or (2) as a 
sentence, but one of a kind other than a statement. 
(1) We saw in § 50 that a set of words having the form 
of a sentence, but not imbued with the vivifying purposive-
ness needed to make it into a real sentence, may do the 
work of a mere word, and is then called a 'subordinate 
clause'. T h e example I quoted was he is well in I hope he is 
well, where the words he is well function, in ordinary 
grammatical parlance, as a noun-clause object of the verb 
hope. T h e speaker here makes no affirmation that the per­
son in question is well, but uses he is well merely as the 
zz8 SPEECH AND LANGUAGE § 61 
name of the thing he is hoping . Consequently, these words 
no longer exercise the function which their form might 
have led us to expect, and to that extent their employment 
is incongruent. But since nothing unnatural is felt about 
this use, the degree of incongruence is very slight. Noun-
clauses of this type are common, e.g. I believe HE WENT , I 
think HE SAID so, I fear THE BOAT WILL BE LATE, It was 
proved HE WAS NOT GUILTY. I t would, therefore, be quite 
correct to regard he is well in I hope he is well as exhibiting 
the form of a noun-clause used in congruent function. 
Regarded as having sentence-form, he is well is here incon-
gruent ; regarded as having the form of a noun-clause, it is 
congruent. Thus we have an originally incongruent use of 
words that by force of continual repetition has grown into 
a new form—the form of a noun-clause—betraying its 
origin from statement-form and carrying with it a tinge 
of incongruence only because the use of the same form of 
words as a statement is even more typical of it, even more 
central in our feeling. It is probable, if not certain, that 
the use as a sentence is more frequent than the use as a 
noun-clause, but statistics being in the nature of the case 
impossible, we are thrown back on history and linguistic 
feeling for our verdict of incongruence. As a matter of 
history there can be no doubt that the use as a noun-clause 
is derived from the use as a statement, and not vice versa. 
The proper course for the writer of a grammar to pursue, 
in face of such a phenomenon, is to make a double entry 
in his Syntax. Under the heading of statements he will 
merely note that the form of a statement can be used as a 
noun-clause, and in the section devoted to noun-clauses 
he will deal with the fact in detail. 
In a grammar of modern English it would be wrong to 
accord a similar treatment to those clauses of condition 
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which, in the opinion of most scholars,1 originated in 
questions. For in a sentence like HAD HE DONE so, I should 
have been sorry, both the outer form of the protasis and the 
time implied in it, show that it has completely lost touch 
with the interrogative form from which it probably 
sprang. As a fact of present-day colloquial English the 
use of a question in place of a protasis is incongruent in 
the last degree, though one might just conceivably hear 
ARE YOU PLEASED, then I'm pleased too, with question and 
consequence run so closely together, and an answer so 
little expected, that are you pleased would have to be taken 
as the equivalent of if you are pleased. Accordingly, men-
tion of the supposed origin from questions of clauses like 
had he done so should be left to historical or genetic 
grammars, and should have no place in a descriptive 
Modern English Syntax. 
A much less incongruent English use is that of requests 
in the sense of a protasis, as in Laugh and the world laughs 
with you. Here laugh has the form of a request, but func-
tions as a clause of condition. The writer did not really 
ask her readers to laugh, but suggested that if they did so, 
they would not lack company. Tha t the form is still 
strongly felt as a command is shown by the and introducing 
the apodosis. Since the latter is presented as a co-
ordinated statement, it seems necessary also to take laugh 
as a sentence in its own right. Were I compiling a compre-
hensive work on English syntax, I should place this 
example under the heading of 'Requests' rather than that 
of 'Clauses of Condition', though I should point out that 
1
 e.g. Jespersen, Philosophy, p. 305. In Middle Egyptian, questions for 
corroboration introduced by in iw, 'is it (the case that)?' are sometimes 
employed as clauses of condition, and it is possible, though far from 
certain, that Coptic has extended this use to unfulfilled conditions. 
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the sense approximated to that of a protasis; and I should 
give a cross-reference under the latter head. 
I have dealt with these examples more fully than I 
otherwise should have done, because it is important to 
emphasize the fact that incongruence can have very many 
degrees. But on this topic more will be said before the 
present section is brought to a close. 
(2) A sentence having the form of one class may func-
tion incongruently as though it belonged to another. In 
considering this, we must remember that, if my theory be 
true, every sentence presents the rudiments of all four 
classes, so that the classification into exclamations, state-
ments, questions, and requests is only a classification a 
potiori (§ 51, end). Here it will be shown that sentences 
the locutional form of which clearly assigns them to one 
specific class may nevertheless clearly function as though 
they belonged to another. In dealing with the dominating 
importance of elocutional sentence-form I have already 
had occasion to quote two examples of locutional sentence-
form functioning incongruently; these were the apparent 
statement My account is overdrawn? serving as a question, 
and the apparent question Is my account overdrawn! 
serving as a statement (p. 204). Both examples belong 
to well-established types, and their incongruence has 
a peculiar rhetorical motive and effect in either case. 
Another instance similar to the first of these two would be 
He is well? Here the speaker does not just perversely use 
the form of a statement, when he ought to be using that 
of a question. His device is subtle: he is anxious for 
true information, and somewhat incredulous; accordingly, 
he echoes the words of the previous speaker with a 
tone of doubt in his voice, knowing that his hint of 
disbelief is bound to evoke a speedy answer. Just as boy 
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in the boy king did not lose all its force as a noun, when 
used as an adjective, so too here both statement and 
question emerge from the sentence unmistakably. This 
is incongruent function of the most live and characteristic 
kind. 
In other examples which I shall quote, new locutional 
sentence-form has already come into being, so that incon-
gruence is on the wane, and indeed in some cases is no 
longer felt. So well accustomed are we to recognize Thou 
shalt not steal! as a command, that it is none too easy to 
realize that the actual form employed is that of a state-
ment . The grammarian will naturally classify this under 
the rubric of 'Requests', though in that case he should ex-
plain matters by saying: 'The form of the statement may 
serve to indicate commands when the verb shall is em-
ployed. Similarly with the verb must, e.g. You must turn 
to the left at the -post office? Much more incongruent are 
orders in statement-form such as might be addressed to a 
child, e.g. You are coming home this very instant! Here we 
feel both the injunction and the assertion of the parent's 
determination to see it fulfilled. Requests in question-
form like Will you pass the salt, please? or Would you mind 
passing the salt? still sometimes evoke the answer Certainly! 
or With pleasure! accompanying the performance of the 
act. A rhetorical question like Who cares? functions as a 
statement, but the statement-sense I don't care is thrown 
in the shade by the defiant appeal to all and sundry; 
the sentence has less incongruence as a question than 
it has when interpreted as a statement. This balance of 
congruence in favour of the question-form is still more 
apparent in Have you lost something? addressed to a person 
fidgeting about the room. This is in effect equivalent to 
the request Do hurry up and go! 
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The last example is one used by Ries1 to show the 
absurdity of paying exclusive attention to meaning at the 
expense of form. Much as I disagree with this scholar in 
many of his conclusions, in the present issue I think him 
altogether in the right. Such an irritable question is too 
much the outcome of a special situation and too much tied 
down to the speaker's particular thought ever to become 
the model for a new form of request. The interpretation 
of it as a request would be a right deduction, but one which 
could not be made from other sets of words having the 
same form. The concern of grammar is with linguistic 
form, and particularly with that of the 'outer' kind, though 
not, as some grammarians seem to think, without reference 
to the semantic aspect; grammar is not interested in 
purely individual and exceptional function. We may now 
make an important generalization: Grammar is, in the main, 
concerned with linguistic form in congruent junction, and, 
treats of incongruent function only in so far as this is building 
up new form in which such function will be congruent. This 
is equivalent to saying that grammar is concerned solely 
with language, not with speech; but that, of course, does 
not mean that the grammarian must shut his eyes to 
speech, for speech is as necessary to language as language 
to speech. Every science must take a broad view of its 
subject-matter, and not exclude any extraneous fact or 
condition which may throw light upon it. 
It was seen in § 56 that out of single words and simple 
phrases lacking locutional sentence-form, sentences can be 
made by merely pronouncing them with the right intona-
tion . Having sentence-form on their elocutional side, 
these certainly deserve a mention in every grammar; but 
since grammars, at least as they are at present written, do 
1
 Was ist ein Satz? p. 31. 
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not enter into elocutional details, the mention should be 
quite summary. Due place ought, on the other hand, to 
be given to those words and phrases of special types which, 
without having locutional sentence-form congenitally, 
have secondarily acquired it. I refer to such constructions 
as the exclamatory infinitive, e.g. I OFFER mischief to so 
good a king! MOURIR sans tirer ma raison! Mir DROHEN! 
or as the infinitive of command, e.g. Partir! Umsteigen! 
or again as the French use of the form of an indirect ques-
tion for emphatic statements,1 e.g. Si je l'ai connu! In all 
these cases a certain incongruence is still felt, the use as 
sentences being obviously less normal and natural than the 
more literal employments. 
§62. Quoted words . Thusfar no allusion has been made 
to the peculiar phenomenon of quoted words, and since 
these on the one hand have an appearance of incongruence, 
albeit illusory, and on the other may consist of whole 
sentences, the present seems a suitable opportunity for 
discussing them. The problem is to determine the exact 
status of quotations. I will begin by giving a few examples: 
(1) mere words or phrases: The Latin 'dic' is an imperative; 
'Maison' is French for a house; The mere sound of the word 
'asphodel' is beautiful; No passage in Shakespeare is more 
familiar than that beginning 'To be or not to be'; (2) entire 
sentences: 'Come in!' he said; Everyone knows the proverb 
'A rolling stone gathers no moss'; 'Tantum religio potuit 
suadere malorum' is a Latin hexameter. 
In all these examples the quotation functions as a noun .2 
But it is evident also that this function does not annihilate 
or in any way exclude the morphological or syntactic 
1
 For a similar use in other languages see Jespersen, Philosophy, p. 304. 
2
 Quotations may, however, on occasion be used as adjectives, e.g. his 
go-and-he-hanged look; a devil-may-care appearance. 
3920 
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status of the words concerned. Dic! remains an imperative, 
Come in! continues to be a request, gathers does not cease 
to have a rolling stone as its subject and no moss as its object. 
All feeling of incongruence is absent from the quoted 
words themselves. And yet they are somehow wrested 
from their normal employment. How is this puzzle to be 
solved ? The t ru th is that , in relation to the sentences of 
which they form part, the quoted words are not word-
signs at all, but very nearly the actual things-meant which 
the speaker intends to communicate. It is as though I 
were to forget the name of someone whom I am intro-
ducing, and were to complete my introduction with a 
gesture towards him: Allow me to introduce Mr In 
this case, Mr. Stewart, or Sampson, or whatever his name 
might be, would himself stand in apposition to my word 
Mr. But the strange predicament in which he would thus 
find himself would not deprive him of whatever rank or 
status he possessed before. So too it is with quotations, 
only here the words are not precisely the things-meant to 
which the speaker is referring, but faithful copies. They 
had life and being only in their original situation, and it is 
mere counterfeits which are resuscitated in the new one. 
To put the matter in a different way: when words are 
quoted, they are given to the listener as things interesting 
in themselves and worth attending to on their intrinsic 
merits. In order to evaluate their linguistic status, the 
context or place from which they are taken has to be con-
sidered. Thus Dic, maison, and asphodel are mere words, 
not, as they are here quoted, specimens of speech at all. 
The quotations from Shakespeare and Lucretius are to 
be regarded as real speech, as though their authors were 
themselves speaking them. 
Words quoted are thus exterior to, and independent of, 
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the speech of their quoter, and in this respect resemble 
anything else to which he may refer.1 They differ from 
such a thing only in the manner in which they are 
brought to the listener's attention . Instead of being 
described by class-names, they are directly reproduced, 
even as a picture is reproduced by photography. But the 
speaker presents them, like anything else he may speak 
about, in a particular aspect. Sometimes he may point to 
the sense, at other times, as in asphodel and in the hexa-
meter from Lucretius, to the mere sound or rhythm . 
This observation enables us to estimate the status of the 
sentences found in grammars and manuals of composition. 
When instances are there quoted from original sources 
they are live samples of speech, and there can be no 
suspicion of their genuineness. Made-up examples, on the 
other hand, are barely actual sentences, since their words 
have relevance neither to real things nor to a specific 
listener. But they are as good as actual sentences, since 
they conform to the rules which the grammarian meant 
them to exemplify, and since imaginary situations could 
be invented for them, if this were demanded. Though 
sentences merely in form, they will serve their purpose; 
for if they were impugned on this score, an act of the 
imagination could easily convert them into full-blooded, 
meaningful sentences functioning congruently. 
§ 63 . Conclusion. This chapter has been mainly de-
voted to showing how a speaker's purpose in referring to 
his subject-matter makes itself felt. But irrespective of the 
1
 In course of time quotations often repeated may become new elements 
in a language. See the examples, p. 233, n. 2; and such Latin quotations 
as verb, sap., vice versa. Egyptian is fond of these uses, particularly for 
forming proper names, cf. Whenever-he-will-he-does as a designation of the 
great god of primordial times. Other examples in my Egyptian Grammar, 
§194. 
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extent to which that purpose is betrayed by the intonation 
or the words, an utterance is a sentence when the speaker 
can be recognized as having put into it, taken as a whole, 
all that is necessary for conveying an intelligible purpose. 
It differs from any sequence of words that is not a 
sentence by the sense of relevance and appositeness 
which it leaves in its train . A mere phrase is either 
unapplied language or else simply a fragment of a sen-
tence. A genuine sentence is a unit of actual speech, 
i.e. language meaningfully applied to some state of things, 
and purposefully addressed to some listener. 
It might, on first hearing, perhaps seem a strange con-
tention to assert, as I have done, that it is the function of a 
sentence which declares it to be such and fixes its kind, 
whereas the nature of a word is fixed by its form. But the 
explanation lies in the correlated truths (1) that the word 
is the unit of language, while the sentence is the unit of 
speech, and (2) that form is a fact of language and function 
a fact of speech. Naturally the unit of language must be 
judged by the facts of language, and the unit of speech by 
the facts of speech. To make form (in the linguistic sense) 
the criterion of the sentence is really to deny that this 
is the unit of speech, and Ries's fundamental error seems to 
me his attempt to tie down the sentence to certain external 
forms of utterance, and to refuse the name to others. For 
my part, I do not deny that every sentence must have some 
element of form, but it is not the form which makes it into 
a sentence. To speak and to pause when the utterance is 
ended is, indeed, a certain minimal indication of sentence-
form, and one which occurs in all speech. 
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ADDITIONAL NOTE TO CHAPTER IV 
Note E (on p. 182). Remarks on some definitions of the sentence, 
mostly recent. 
Ries is so admirable as a destructive critic that he has left but 
little work to be done in the way of demolishing those theories of 
the sentence which we are at one in condemning. I shall therefore 
devote these notes to the views of the few scholars with whom I am 
in partial agreement. Among the many definitions of the sentence 
quoted by Ries, Was ist ein Satz?, pp. 208 foll., the purposiveness 
which for me constitutes its essence is hardly ever alluded to. A 
notable exception is Georg Franklin, a scholar who lived at the 
end of the eighteenth century. His definition may be rendered: 
'Speech [by this Franklin clearly means the sentence] is a notifica-
tion, consisting in words, of the speaker's feelings (Gesinnung) 
towards the object denoted by those words.' 'Feelings' are not 
'purposive attitude', but this definition was a good start. Wegener 
gives no formal definition, but his opinion is indicated in the state-
ment that 'the purpose of our speech is always to influence the will 
or the perception of someone in a way which the speaker considers 
to be of importance' (Grundfragen, p. 67). My own former defini-
tion ran upon the same lines: 'A sentence is an articulate sound-
symbol in its aspect of embodying some volitional attitude of the 
speaker towards the listener,' Word and Sentence, p. 355. Though 
this resembles Wegener's formula, it was reached by a different 
method, namely by the effort to find a principle common to all 
four classes of sentence. The like holds good of Kretschmer's 
revised definition (Sprache, p. 60): 'The sentence is a linguistic 
utterance through which an emotion or volitional impulse is dis-
charged' ('eine sprachliche Äusserung, durch die ein Affekt oder 
Willensvorgang ausgelost wird'). This formulation is so close to my 
own, that it seems almost cantankerous to quarrel with it. Never-
theless, I feel it necessary to point out how near Kretschmer comes 
to identifying all sentences with exclamations; one cannot guess 
from his definition that sentences describe anything. My own 
attempt (which Kretschmer wrongly criticizes on the ground that 
it takes the listener into account) eluded this objection by being 
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juxtaposed to a definition of the word, which ran, 'A word is an 
articulate sound-symbol in its aspect of denoting something which 
is spoken about.' When my article was written, I had not yet per-
ceived the difference between language and speech, or realized that 
the word is the unit of the former, so that I defined only the spoken 
word. That was a mistake. Another difficulty about Kretschmer's 
standpoint is that in 'questions' and 'requests' the speaker's inten-
tion is not fully discharged until the listener has done what is 
demanded of him. But this I do not press, since 'ausgelost' should 
perhaps be rendered 'released' rather than 'discharged'. 
The great merits of Bühler's view are not well seen from his 
final definition, which reads: 'Sentences are the simple, indepen-
dent, and self-contained functional units of speech, or briefly, the 
sense-units of speech' ('die einfachen selbständigen, in sich abge-
schlossenen Leistungseinheiten oder kurz die Sinneinheiten der 
Rede'), Theorien des Satzes, p. 18. These expressions disguise his 
recognition of the fact that speech comprises the three functions 
of 'proclamation' (= exclamation), 'evocation' (= demand), and 
'depiction' (= statement), a correct analysis (see above, p. 188) 
which would, however, have gained greatly in clarity and fertility, 
had it been expressed in terms of the speaker's varying purpose. 
Bühler shrinks from using the word 'purpose', and though he may 
have good psychological grounds for this, his linguistic theory has 
suffered in consequence. Dempe (Was ist Sprache? pp. 33 foll.) 
holds, in my opinion rightly, that no adequate theory of speech can 
fail to insist upon the speaker's purpose. Unfortunately Bühler 
never explicitly states (though I have it from him orally that on 
this point he has been misunderstood) that his three functions are 
present in every sentence whatsoever. This oversight is pointed out 
also by Dempe (p. 20), though the latter will not admit the possi-
bility of such a position. In spite of these defects, Bühler's outlook 
seems to me fundamentally sound, and to require merely a sharpen-
ing of focus. Dempe's own definition disarms criticism by purport-
ing to be a merely logical description ('logisch bestimmt' in heavy 
type, op. cit., p. 108), wherefore I will not discuss it. 
This brings me to an end of the theories having any measure of 
resemblance to my own. The genetic definitions given by Paul and 
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Wundt will be dealt with in the next chapter (§ 65). Justice de-
mands, however, some further comment on Ries's book Was ist ein 
Satz? assuredly the most learned and methodical treatise on this 
theme ever published. In its controversial aspects the work is very 
able, and it is a mine of information with regard to previous 
hypotheses. Ries's own positive contribution appears to me doomed 
in advance to failure by the narrow outlook he adopts. He refuses 
to attend to any factor of speech but the words themselves, the 
listener being deliberately rejected, the speaker barely glanced at, 
and the things spoken about entirely ignored. His definition (p. 99) 
reads thus: 'A sentence is a grammatically formed smallest unit of 
speech, which brings its content to expression with an eye to this 
content's relation to reality' ('Ein Satz ist eine grammatisch 
geformte kleinste Redeeinheit, die ihren Inhalt im Hinblick auf 
sein Verhaltnis zur Wirklichkeit zum Ausdruck bringt'). The 
one great merit which I find here is the recognition that the 
sentence is the unit of speech. From the rest I cannot but dissent. 
For passages in this book where I deal with the criteria advanced 
by Ries see as follows: 'grammatically formed', above, p. 213; 
'smallest', above, p. 208; 'content', above, p. 26, n. 1; 'relation to 
reality', below, p. 298, n. 1. 
V 
T H E SENTENCE A N D ITS L O C U T I O N A L 
C O N T E N T 
§ 64. The content of the sentence. The last chapter was 
concerned almost exclusively with that purposiveness 
which in my view constitutes the essence of a sentence— 
the quality which makes sentences out of what would 
otherwise be mere words or phrases. Our next task is to 
study the content of the sentence. Given that the speaker 
has chanced on a topic to speak about, what does he 
actually say ? What words does he choose, and how does 
he set about choosing them ? But before we embark on 
this problem, the manner in which it has been formulated 
calls for comment . In the first place let it be noted that 
no contrast is here drawn between the purposiveness 
which makes sentences what they are and a lack of purpose 
in the content of sentences, for clearly the speaker intends 
and purposes the words which he utters no less than he 
invests them with a further intention and purpose in the 
main external to them . Indeed, we shall find as we proceed 
that the chief defect in previous theories has been the 
failure to recognize that the sentence is volitional through-
out, just as though speech were nothing but perception or 
thought passively reflected in a new and audible medium . 
I shall premise, therefore, that every sentence embodies 
two distinct, though interdependent purposes, the one 
affecting the thing or things spoken about, and the other 
affecting the way in which the listener is to receive or react 
to what is said. In devising his sentences, the speaker has 
to pay attention alike to the 'why' and to the 'what' of 
them. The second comment I have to make is that, in 
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now describing the 'what' of the sentence as its content, 
I am not contradicting my often-repeated thesis that 
the thing meant by any sentence necessarily lies outside 
it . I mean by the 'content ' of the sentence its com-
ponent words or, otherwise expressed, the series of ap-
propriately arranged word-meanings which it offers as 
clues. 
These points being settled, we can proceed with our 
problem. At once we are confronted by two rival hypo-
theses, associated with the names of Paul and Wundt 
respectively. Both are concerned only with the content 
of the sentence, and their difference turns mainly upon the 
way in which this content comes about. The view favoured 
by Paul may be characterized as ' the synthesis hypothesis', 
while that of Wundt may be called ' the analysis hypo-
thesis'. Presented in an English version, Paul's definition 
of the sentence runs as follows: 'The sentence is the lin-
guistic expression, or symbol, for the fact that several 
presentations or groups of presentations have become com-
bined in the mind of the speaker, and is the means of 
producing a like combination of the like presentations in 
the mind of the listener.'1 Wundt's definition is later in 
date, and was framed in conscious opposition to that of 
Paul: 'A sentence is the linguistic expression for the 
arbitrary dismemberment of a complex presentation into 
its component parts, these being placed in logical relations 
to one another. '2 Readers of the last chapter will at once 
1
 'Der Satz ist der sprachliche Ausdruck, das Symbol dafür, dass sich die 
Verbindung mehrerer Vorstellungen oder Vorstellungsgruppen in der 
Seele des Sprechenden vollzogen hat, und das Mittel dazu, die nämliche 
Verbindung der nämlichen Vorstellungen in der Seele des Hörenden zu 
erzeugen.' Prinzipien, p. 121. 
2
 'Hiernach können wir den Satz nach seinen objektiven wie subjektiven 
Merkmalen definieren als den sprachlichen Ausdruck für die willkürliche 
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realize the criticism I am bound to make upon these 
definitions. While both seek to explain how the sentence 
takes shape, neither affords the slightest indication of what 
it actually is, or how it differs from any combination of 
words which is not a sentence. Each of the two definitions 
is applicable alike to the phrase a beautiful sunset and to the 
sentence The sunset is beautiful.1 No one could possibly 
guess from them that sentences may be classified into 
statements, requests, questions, and exclamations, for they 
offer no hint of the purposive attitude towards the listener 
which is the principle of that classification. Wundt does 
not mention the listener at all, nor for that matter does he 
mention the speaker. Paul is careful to name both parties 
to the act of speech, but only in order to make of the 
listener a partner, for no apparent reason, in some psychic 
experience of the speaker. Lastly, an obvious defect of 
both definitions is that they ignore the one-word sentence. 
Paul and Wundt might perhaps not be expected to include 
in their purview all the one-word utterances which I insist 
on classifying as sentences. But it might fairly have been 
demanded of them not to forget imperative sentences like 
Come! where there is obviously neither 'synthesis' nor 
'analysis' in the sense intended by the definitions. 
§ 65. The origination of sentences. If the definitions 
of the sentence given by Paul and Wundt are thus inade-
quate as definitions, at least we may ask how far the one or 
the other suffices as a description of the way in which sen-
tences come into being. From Paul's answers to Wundt 's 
objections it is clear that he conceives the contro-
Gliederung ciner Gesamtvorstellung in ihre in logische Beziehungen 
zueinander gesetzten Bestandteile.' Die Sprache, ii, p. 245. 
1
 Ries makes the same criticism as regards Wundt, see Was ist ein Satz?, 
P. 4. 
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versy to turn solely upon whether the sentence emerges in 
the mind (1) as a complete whole, or (2) piecemeal and in 
consecutive stages. Tha t in certain cases the latter account 
may be true he seeks to prove by an episode eventuating 
in the sentence The lion roars. A roaring is heard, and then 
'this at first isolated auditory impression awakens the 
presentation of a lion'; hereupon, says Paul, the speaker 
'comes to ' the sentence The lion roars.1 But Paul is anxious 
to do justice to the listener as well as to the speaker, and 
he rightly reproaches Wundt for neglecting this important 
factor in the transaction. In the case of the listener, Paul 
maintains that the sentence clearly originates piecemeal; 
one word falls after the other and adds, as it falls, a new 
presentation to those preceding. Now for our present 
inquiry the behaviour of the listener is entirely irrelevant. 
I have already explained wherein this behaviour consists. 
We have seen the listener attending to the intonation, 
previous experiences of which provide the basis for a cor-
rect deduction as to the attitude which the speaker expects 
of him; we have seen him attending to the clues given by 
the words, form and meaning alike helping him to his con-
clusions; and lastly, we have seen him attending to the 
situation (or perhaps I should say, the rest of the situa-
tion), and from all these factors combined drawing his 
inference concerning the thing meant by the speaker. 
The interpretation of speech, like all linguistic processes, 
has become highly mechanized and is, therefore, almost 
instantaneous. But if we could behold interpretation 
1
 'Jemand weiss, dass sich in der Nähe ein Löwe befindet, den er aber im 
Augenblick nicht sieht, und an den er auch nicht denkt; da hört er ein 
Gebrüll; dieser zunachst für sich gegebene Gehorseindruck ruft die Vor-
stellung des Löwen wach; er kommt zu dem Satz der Löwe brüllt; hier ist 
doch nicht erst die Gesamtvorstellung 'der brüllende Löwe' in ihre Teile 
zerlegt'. Prinzipien, p. 122. 
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immensely slowed down, as the movements of horses or 
athletes may often be seen at the cinema, we should un-
doubtedly recognize it as gradual, and to some extent 
following the consecutive fall of the words. That , how-
ever, is not our problem here. The present investigation 
turns upon an entirely different question, namely, how the 
speaker sets about constructing his sentences. Thus at 
least for our particular purpose, Paul's argument from the 
standpoint of the listener may be ignored as irrelevant. 
Paul's definition is obviously framed to accord with the 
assumption that every sentence must contain both subject 
and predicate. The objections to this view have been 
stated in § 58. Nevertheless, sentences of that bipartite 
kind are extremely plentiful, and it is interesting to in-
quire how, in Paul's opinion, they come about. When we 
scrutinize his account of The lion roars, we are surprised to 
find that the transition from thoughts to words has simply 
been left out. An auditory impression (Gehörseindruck) 
graves itself upon the speaker's mind, and with it comes 
the word roars. Then follows a presentation of the lion, 
and this gives the word lion. A few pages further on Paul 
explains that one of the two elements may push itself to 
the front of the speaker's consciousness before the sentence 
is uttered, so we must not reproach him with a failure to 
explain how the word-order The lion roars, instead of 
Roars lion, came about.1 But so far as I can see, he makes 
no attempt to account for the definite article. It would be 
difficult to find a more complete identification of thought 
and speech. According to Paul, a sentence containing 
subject and predicate is the outcome of two successive 
thoughts, one for the subject and one for the predicate. 
And he must somehow conceive of the thought of each 
1
 Prinzipien, p. 127, 
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thing as simultaneously the meaning of the corresponding 
word, so that thought and word arise together in con-
sciousness as it were automatically. 
If such be an accurate account of Paul's views, they are 
so naive that further examination is superfluous. Turning to 
Wundt, I have little doubt that it was under the influence 
of his definition that I came by my notion of a complex 
thing-meant later differentiated into a number of parts, 
and I take this opportunity of acknowledging my in-
debtedness. But as regards the exact formulation of his 
definition all manner of doubts assail me, though it is only 
with diffidence that I put forward criticisms of a position 
confessedly not linguistic, but psychological. My first 
difficulty arises over a presentation which is subsequently 
divided up into its parts. To me the term 'presentation' 
suggests something momentarily presented to the mind 
and being just what it is, either relatively complex or 
relatively simple, but anyhow unique and indivisible. As 
I conceive of presentations, one may follow another, but 
can the second be part of the first ? And further, can any 
presentation be simply the meaning of a word ? For when 
Wundt talks of his part-presentations (Teilvorstellungen) 
'being placed in logical relations to one another' in the 
sentence, it is difficult to avoid the impression that he 
is speaking of words, one being made subject, the next 
object, and so forth. 
Wundt's formulation is so abstract that I return with 
relief to my own more workaday distinction of 'things' and 
'words'. Intermediate between them are, no doubt, 'pre-
sentations', the reflections of things within the mind, but 
it has been seen that linguistic theory has no difficulty in 
dispensing with these troublesome intervening factors, 
except when word-form and word-function are under 
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consideration. And even then we may still treat the ob-
jects referred to in speech as 'things', merely qualifying 
the term with epithets like 'presented as a thing', or 'as 
an attribute' , or 'as an action' (§ 42). To revert to Paul's 
example, The lion roars, it seems clear that, when the thing 
referred to by this sentence first came before the speaker's 
mind, it was as a relatively undifferentiated whole, not 
divided up into the three separate things subsequently 
designated by the words the, lion, and roars respectively. 
If—as I desiderated above for interpretation—the mental 
operations leading up to this act of speech could be slowed 
down and revealed to the speaker introspectively, he 
would probably become aware of some such events as the 
following. First of all the unexpected sound has braced 
his mind to sudden attention and activity, having as 
immediate result the thought of a lion, possibly already 
more or less distinctly verbalized as the word lion. The 
sense of danger and the need for action now bring in rapid 
succession thoughts of this being the particular lion which 
has worked such havoc in the neighbourhood, of the 
proximity of a companion, and of the desirability of 
letting the latter know, not only that the roar is that of 
the lion in question, but also that he, the speaker, is fully 
aware of the situation. Speech is decided upon, and various 
considerations are weighed to determine the exact words 
to be uttered . If the danger were imminent, brevity 
would be imperative, and the speaker might either say 
Hark! or The lion! his choice depending upon whether it 
seemed more important to stimulate the listener's atten-
tion or to identify for him the cause of the sound. In the 
latter case, the definite article would be prefixed to lion, 
both because language dictated that use, and also because 
the particularity of the lion presently heard forbade the 
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alternative A lion! The word roars would be added only 
if the occasion were less pressing, the animal being at some 
distance. And now note that though thus far the chain of 
thought might well have been the same for an Englishman 
and a German, the sentence would undoubtedly turn out 
differently for each. The German would probably choose 
the form Der Löwe brüllt (= The lion roars), that being the 
way in which he was wont to express present momentary 
occurrences. For the Englishman the natural form would 
be Tha t ' s the lion! omitting any mention of the roaring, 
but prefixing a demonstrative indicating its source, and 
adding to this the copula to give the utterance a more 
objective and less emotional turn.1 
Anyone who has ever found himself in circumstances 
impelling him to utter this particular sentence may at first 
be inclined to dismiss my description of its genesis as fan-
tastic, but on second thoughts he will probably be pre-
pared to admit that something of the kind actually 
happened. He will not know for certain, because speech 
takes place almost spontaneously and at all events un-
introspectively. My account will gain in plausibility the 
longer he reflects upon it. After all, the lion was at some 
distance. And his companion was at least as alert and as 
quick of hearing as himself, so that it would be more im-
portant to show that he himself had heard the roar than 
to bid his companion to hearken. And again, in the cir-
cumstances, the form he adopted in the end did. seem the 
most appropriate, and the most in harmony with his 
mother-tongue. But there are other tests by which he 
1
 In English, so far as I can see, The lion roars could only (1) refer to 
custom, (2) characterize the lion, (3) narrate a present occurrence, not as 
an isolated occurrence, but as an incident, e.g. in stage-directions, or (4) be 
the statement of a past event employing the historic present. 
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might verify the correctness of my analysis. Suppose his 
companion had been a nervous child, would he not have 
elected to be silent ? Had the roar come from the distant 
hills, and the listener been a visitor new to the country, 
might he not have given the utterance some such form as 
Did you hear that sound a moment ago, far over there in the 
hills? Well, that must he the lion we've been trying to get for 
three weeks or more. If he himself had been the new arrival, 
might he not have put the question Was that a lion? To 
sum up, though a small proportion of the things referred 
to in any sentence may be reached by analysis of the global, 
undifferentiated thing-meant which was its starting-point, 
the bulk will have been derived from various other sub-
sidiary things-meant or considerations, both factual and 
linguistic, which have put in an appearance only after the 
intention to speak was formed. And above all, the whole 
utterance is governed by the speaker's needs and caprice. 
Thus Wundt 's analysis hypothesis, although containing an 
important nucleus of t ruth, is very far from describing the 
real genesis of most sentences. 
Leaving now Paul's test-case, let us consider the pro-
blem in a more general way. Rapid and easy as is most 
speech, there are nevertheless some circumstances in which 
we nearly possess the experimental conditions needful to 
display the motives and hesitations which usually go to the 
making of a sentence. Writing is much more laborious than 
uttered speech. Do not I, in penning this very paragraph, 
often stop in the middle of my work, search for a word, 
cross out one and substitute another, wonder whether 
what I have written is good English, and perhaps remould 
the entire passage ? How far removed are such proceed-
ings from the dismemberment of a whole into its parts 
postulated by Wundt! Nor is his thesis saved by the word 
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'arbitrary' (willkürlich), with which he hints that the 
analysis of a sentence may not always turn out alike. For 
firstly the notion of 'analysis' seems to imply a more or 
less complete resolving of something into its ingredients, 
whereas some of the most important of these, as we have 
seen, may be entirely left out, e.g. roaring in That's the 
lion! And secondly, much may be added which was not 
present when the sentence was first conceived. To take a 
fresh instance. A child is seen to dash across the road right 
in front of an oncoming taxicab. Someone cries out : 
Look at that stupid little girl! The exclamation is almost 
spontaneous, and yet its gradual development is scarcely 
open to doubt. Are we to imagine that the notions of the 
child's stupidity, its size, and its sex were already present 
when the word look was decided upon ? As I see this 
utterance, it reflects a crescendo of indignation at the 
child's folly gradually welling up out of a first impulse of 
sympathetic fear. Stupid qualifies that folly directly, little 
is partly a sign of contempt derived from the ill-judged 
scorn which is habitually cast upon the undersized, and 
girl has a classificatory identifying aim. Unless I am 
mistaken, this rapid utterance thus contains a whole 
sequence of expressive inventions, admirably contrived 
and planned to exhibit the speaker's purpose and feeling. 
My quarrel with Wundt is twofold: firstly, that he has 
overlooked the purposeful, calculating character of speech; 
and secondly, that he takes far too static a view of thought . 
He seems to ignore the fact that the mind is as volatile and 
as restless as a flowing river. His definition cannot be 
saved by the contention that, before a sentence is spoken, 
a new complex presentation has arisen out of a multi tude 
of previous presentations, and that it is this new presenta-
tion which is analysed into words. The difference between 
3920 
250 SPEECH AND LANGUAGE §65 
our standpoints seems due to Wundt 's failure to look 
at, or at least to mention, the objective world to which 
speakers actually refer. My own conception is rather that 
of a mental eye ranging over an ever-widening field: an 
eye whose activity does not stop short an instant before 
utterance, but which continues to explore new ground 
right down to the end of the sentence, when its doings 
cease to have immediate interest. And concurrently with 
this process, I seem to see the mind busily fitting word-
clues to the things upon which its eye has momentarily 
rested. Of the two, mind and eye, it is the former, in my 
conception, which supplies the controlling force, per-
mitting the latter to travel only in such directions as will 
suit the sentence's general trend and objective. Inexact 
psychology this, no doubt ; but the imagery will serve to 
counteract Wundt 's rigid and static view of sentence-
formation. 
But on this conception of yours, I may be asked, what 
becomes of the complex thing-meant of which you have 
talked so much ? This, I reply, obtains its final shape only 
as the last word of the sentence is uttered . Perhaps the 
speaker himself never quite realizes it as a whole, having 
lost sight of the beginning by the time he reaches the end. 
But the mind of the listener, if rightly attuned, catches it 
up in passing, though promptly proceeding to convert it 
into something new; for the listener's mind, like that of 
the speaker, is for ever on the move, actively creating and 
transforming. I will add nothing to what I have written 
about the thing-meant in § 27. As we saw there, a certain 
fixity and definiteness are given to it by the speaker's depth 
of intention. 
To conclude, my verdict that previous writers have 
treated speech as though it were nothing but perception 
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or thought passively reflected in a new and audible 
medium (p. 240) seems amply justified by the examination 
to which the views of Paul and Wundt have here been 
subjected. Wundt regards the gist of a sentence as some-
thing definite presented to the mind which later is simply 
reproduced in analytic linguistic form. Paul regards the 
sentence as taking shape by successive steps, but merely as 
the result of perception, the part of the speaker being 
nothing more than that of a sounding-board. In opposi-
tion to such views, my conception emphasizes the intensely 
purposive character of every sentence. Not only is this the 
outcome of a speaker's decision to speak and of his choice 
of the manner in which he desires to influence the listener, 
but also it is he who selects the things to be referred to, 
and who actively devises the precise form in which they 
shall be presented. Speech is, in fact, at once a repro-
ductive and a creative activity. The element of t ru th in 
Wundt's analysis hypothesis is that no speech takes place 
without an external stimulus, data arising from which are 
analysed in the sense of being classified under their kinds. 
And the element of t ru th in Paul's synthesis hypothesis is 
that the construction of sentences undoubtedly takes place 
by consecutive steps. This, indeed, is practically implied 
by Wundt 's own definition. Bühler agrees that the two 
standpoints are not irreconcilable, and that each has its 
share of t ru th and falsity.1 Jespersen adduces evidence to 
show how gradually many sentences come about, additions 
being made down to the very end.2 One example that he 
quotes is There I saw Tom Brown, and Miss Hart, and Miss 
Johnstone, and Colonel Dutton, which is both arrived at and 
pronounced differently from There I saw Tom Brown, Miss 
Hart, Miss Johnstone, and Colonel Dutton, where the main 
1
 Theorien des Satzes, pp. 13-15. 2 Philosophy, pp. 27-8. 
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lines of the sentence were foreseen from the start. And he 
makes the further correct observation that all cases of 
anacoluthon are due to imperfect prognostication of the 
finished sentence at the moment of its inception. 
§ 66. Concessions to the expressionistic hypothesis. 
Among those who hold that the purpose of speech is the 
expression of thought (§ 1) we may perhaps distinguish 
two schools. Firstly, there are some who, like Wundt , 
regard the spoken sentence merely as an analysed repro-
duction of a previously conceived thought, a point of 
view which has been criticized in the preceding para-
graph. But there are others, like Croce, Vossler, and 
J. A. Smith,1 who equate speech with the aesthetic im-
pulse, and look upon speaker or writer as the arbitrary 
author of all he says. It would be unfair to these thinkers 
if I failed to point out how near I have come to admitting 
their contention, though in reality dissenting from it 
fundamentally. I have chosen to represent one and the 
same thing, namely the heard roaring of a lion, as the gist 
of a number of different sentences formulated under 
slightly different conditions. But from a shifted stand-
point it is obviously absurd to contend that Hark! can 
ever mean the same thing as Was that a lion? even though 
one and the same perceived circumstance served as the 
point of departure for both utterances, and was intended 
as the goal for the listener's attention . The fact seems to 
be that the speaker always creates a considerable propor-
tion of his things-meant as he proceeds with his speech. 
Without a stimulus impinging upon the speaker from a 
more or less objective source speech does not arise. This 
holds good, I think, whether the stimulus be an external 
event, as in the case here envisaged, or whether it be, as 
1
 See the quotation from the latter above, p. 57. 
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often happens, the culmination of inner reflections or 
emotions. Speech, to put it briefly, is always of the nature 
of a reaction. But when once the determination to speak 
has emerged, an enlivened sense of reality brings all manner 
of new things into view, and these provide stimuli for 
further linguistic reactions. The term 'reaction' here must 
not give rise to misunderstandings on account of its 
chemical or biological associations. The reactions of which 
I speak are, if not wholly, at least to a large extent voli-
tional. The speaker chooses the things to be spoken about, 
though, viewed from another angle, those things are borne 
in upon his consciousness from outside to serve as the 
stimuli evoking his speech. 
I maintain that speech is inexplicable without the two-
fold assumption of (1) stimulating circumstance, and (2) 
volitional reaction. Assuming only the first, the same cir-
cumstances would always, as it seems, lead to the same 
speech, and the erroneous implication of both Paul's and 
Wundt's theories, namely that speech is the passive replica 
of presentations, here comes into view. Assuming only the 
volitional character of speech, we fall into the fallacy of the 
Crocian expressionists, whose statements seem to imply 
that at any moment we may say whatsoever we choose, 
without reference to the situation or to conditioning cir-
cumstances. 
To do full justice to realities, equal stress must be laid 
upon the liberty of speech and upon its dependence. No 
pressure from without can compel a man to open his lips, 
if he is determined to keep them closed. But when he does 
speak, what he says is a matter of his individual choice; le 
style c'est l'homme. On the other hand, only the words 
of a raving lunatic fail to have relevance to the situation 
wherein speech arises. Out of that situation the speaker 
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extracts those things-meant which appeal to his personal 
caprice and particular purpose. Taciturn and loquacious 
alike are restricted by a dependence upon the situation. 
Seeing a shooting star, I should find it extremely difficult 
to bring any of the words discipline, oxygen, or fig into my 
comment; in fact, I am not free, or at least as a practical 
man I am not free, to say what I like. The things to 
which I am entitled to refer must in a sense be dug out of 
the situation. 
To what things, then, may a sentence refer, whilst re-
maining within the bounds of proper relevance and con-
forming to ordinary habits of speech ? The answer must 
be as follows. No word is legitimate unless it refers, 
directly or indirectly, to one or other of the factors with 
which the sentence was concerned at the outset. Far more 
often than not the originating stimulus, e.g. the roaring 
lion, supplies the finished utterance with ingredients. 
Descriptions of these ingredients are common, e.g. (a) 
dangerous (lion), and descriptions of those descriptions may 
also occur, e.g. very (dangerous). The speaker often alludes 
to himself, or to actions or attributes of his, e.g. I thought 
I heard . . ., and these again may lead to descriptive rami-
fications. The listener likewise may be brought into the 
picture, together with his doings and attributes, or any-
thing which may hitch on to these, e.g. Did you hear . . . ? 
Hush! Get hack! And lastly, a great many words belong 
solely to the outer linguistic structure into which the more 
significant words have to be fitted, e.g. whether, was, the, 
and which in I wonder whether that was the lion which . . . 
These last instrumental and auxiliary words are by no 
means without semantic relevance, and if we look deep 
enough, will always be found to have some real connexion 
with the matter in hand. But their employment is barely 
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subject to the speaker's choice. They are a legacy from his 
ancestral habits of speech, and from these he cannot 
escape without giving a perverted aspect to the thing he 
seeks to convey. Thus the whole of speech and sentence-
making arises out of the four factors enumerated in my 
first chapter, however complex the sentence, and however 
remote from the originating nucleus some of the words 
employed may at first sight seem. Apart from this stipu-
lation, however, the speaker is at liberty to choose as he 
will, and his temperament, attitude to the listener, 
emotional or aesthetic reactions to his theme, and finally 
linguistic preferences all give him wide scope for the 
assertion of personality. 
§ 67. Predication as a process involved in all speech. 
The argument of the last two sections has pointed ever 
more insistently to the conclusion that all formulation in 
words necessarily constitutes an addition to the thing 
formulated. I wish to indicate my hat, and in course of 
doing so linguistically with the words That is my hat I am 
compelled to indicate also the yonderness of my hat (that), 
its 'being' yonder (is), and its belonging to me (my). The 
thing-meant, however simply or vaguely conceived of by 
the speaker before he makes up his mind to speak, becomes 
much more complicated and distinct as the result of that 
decision. This thought leads on, by a natural transition, 
to the topic of predication. For predication, in its 
shortest and pithiest definition, consists in saying something 
about something, and this very way of describing the opera-
tion implies an act of adding. Now our main concern 
with predication in the next few sections will be in con-
nexion with the division of many sentences into two 
parts, (1) the part referring to the thing spoken about, 
which is called the subject, and (2) what is said of the 
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subject,1 namely the predicate. In the present section, 
however, I wish to dwell upon the fact that predication 
is involved in all use of words whatsoever. 
In considering predication from this point of view, we 
shall find that our att i tude towards words as employed in 
speech must be enlarged to embrace a wider perspective. 
Hitherto we have looked upon the meanings of words 
solely as instruments, as clues to certain things that are 
meant by them. In doing so we have been too ready to 
forget that we mean our meanings as well as the things 
which we mean by their help. When I point at a tree and 
call it a tree, not only do I indicate the tree, but I also 
imply the fact that it is a tree, that it belongs to the class 
' t ree ' . If I do not assert, at least I assume, that there is 
something about the thing so described which justifies me 
in attaching to it the label tree.2 For me as speaker this 
character in the thing is identical with a character in the 
meaning of the word I employ (C = x in Fig. 6 above, 
p. 151), and if all goes well, the listener will take the same 
view. Thus in choosing my word, although in intention I 
refer to something outside speech, actually I refer to part 
of the meaning of that word. The neglect to recognize 
that in speaking the word tree I am adding to the object 
signified a comparison with other trees previously seen and 
recognized as such is a neglect of too common a kind. A 
1
 This is an abbreviation for 'what is said of the thing meant by the 
subject'. 
2
 'Sagen wir, z. B., diese Birne ist hart, so müssen wir erst den Gegen-
stand, von dem wir etwas aussagen wollcn, unter die allgemeine Kategorie 
Birne, die Eigenschaft, die wir an ihm bemerkt haben, unter die allgemeine 
Kategorie hart gebracht haben. Wir müssen also um unser Urteil auszu-
sprechen noch zwei Hilfsurteile gebildet haben,' Paul, Prinzipien, p. 132. 
T h e position could hardly have been better put. It is a pity that Paul has 
not kept it in view more consistently, see above, p. 58. 
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parallel is the insensibility of some people to war itself in 
their excitement over war-causes and war-aims. And yet 
for the proper accomplishment of a purpose the instru-
ment must, as a rule, be fairly and squarely envisaged, as 
well as the purpose itself. Nay more, the instrument must 
be willed; he who wills the end wills also the means. 
Let us admit, therefore, that whenever we employ a 
word we at least implicitly intend, purpose, or mean two 
things: not the thing-meant alone, but also as much of the 
word-meaning as is applicable to the thing-meant. But in 
adopting this new position precautions must be taken 
against making certain assumptions which here easily arise. 
Firstly, it must be recognized that in the application of 
some words meaning and thing-meant are so nearly juxta-
posed that only in a limited degree can they be regarded 
as separate objectives; they may be compared to the nearer 
and remoter stations of one and the same town, some 
trains stopping at the hither station, while others run on to 
the terminus; the town itself is reached by both kinds of 
train. A meaning is said of a thing-meant; but the listener 
may be induced to stop at the meaning, in which case the 
thing-meant, though still there, fades into momentary 
insignificance; or else he may have his attention drawn on 
to the thing-meant, passing clean through the meaning, 
which is then merely a station upon the way. 
Our new standpoint still regards words as instruments 
or clues, and their extensive areas of meaning as fields 
within which the listener's keen selective intelligence has 
to identify the objective intended by the speaker. But 
that objective presents alternative possibilities. Either it 
is the ultimate thing-meant; or else it is 'as much of the 
(total) word-meaning as is applicable to the (ultimate) 
thing meant' , and this second alternative may be called 
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the proximate thing-meant. In more commonplace par-
lance, the proximate thing-meant is the aspect in which 
the ultimate thing-meant is seen. Here we come to the 
second of the possible assumptions to which our new 
standpoint may give rise, and against which special pre-
cautions must be taken. The two things-meant are not on 
the same footing. Our previous example tree in yonder tree 
will illustrate this fact more convincingly than abstract 
statement could do . The ultimate thing-meant belongs 
outside both speech and language. The proximate thing-
meant, on the other hand, holds together closely with the 
word and with the previous experiences associated with 
the word. If this proximate thing-meant be described as a 
thing, i.e. by a noun, the description will take the form 
of an abstract, e.g. ' the treeness' or ' the being-tree' of 
yonder tree. When I say Let us run to that tree my ob-
jective is the ultimate thing-meant, the tree itself as the 
goal of our race. When I say The thing you imagined was a 
signpost is only a tree my objective is the proximate thing-
meant, the fact that the thing mistakenly classified by the 
listener is really a tree, the being-tree or treeness of the-
thing-you-imagined-was-a-signpost. 
Now in some spoken words, and especially in those 
which play a subsidiary part in the sentence, the balance 
is held so evenly between proximate and ultimate thing-
meant that it is impossible to say which of the two was the 
more intended. Take the preposition over in She looked 
over the wall; what exactly is meant by over ? If it makes 
us see the place where, in relation to the wall, Mary looked, 
the word has evidently fulfilled its office. If, on the other 
hand, this preposition has made us realize that the place 
in respect of the wall where Mary looked was over it, 
clearly it has again fulfilled its office. A slight deflexion 
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of interest in connexion with the word over has removed 
our attention from the place in question and directed it 
to the fact of this place 'being-over' the wall. If the 
proximate thing-meant is to be emphasized at the expense 
of the ultimate thing-meant, a vocal stress will achieve 
that end. We are hardly likely to stress over in She looked 
over the wall since, if the wall be a good example of its 
kind, Mary will be unable to look under it. There is 
more point, however, in stressing over in She looked over 
her spectacles, since as a rule people look through spec-
tacles, and the preposition here seeks to enforce the fact 
of the place where Mary looked 'being-over' (not 'being-
through' or 'being-under') her spectacles. Such a stressed 
use of a word is in grammar called a predicative use, and 
this technical term shows us where the importance of 
predication as a concept in linguistic theory lies. Predica-
tion is the act of saying one thing about another, but the 
fact that this mode of action is involved in every use of a 
word whatsoever may be ignored with impunity whenever 
the ultimate thing-meant is the sole objective. When I 
say Let us run to yonder tree or This tree is going to be jelled, 
it is true enough that being-a-tree is here predicated of 
the tree in question. But the listener's selective attention 
is not called upon to focus that point, and in such cases 
predication belongs merely to the machinery of the lin-
guistic drama, and takes no place among the stage effects. 
Predication is of importance to linguistic theory only as a 
technical term for what happens when, as is extremely 
often the case, the proximate thing-meant is of greater 
moment than the ultimate thing-meant. 
In the sentences She looked over her spectacles; Mind you 
come early; I called John, not Emily; Venice is my favourite 
among the Italian towns, the words over, early, John, Emily, 
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and Venice are all used predicatively, since it is the nature, 
quality, or, in the case of the proper names (§ 13), simply 
the differentiating label, which is here brought into 
prominence. But these words merely 'function' predica-
tively, there being nothing about their locutional form 
to favour the meaning (proximate thing-meant) at the 
expense of the (ultimate) thing-meant. There are, how-
ever, certain kinds of word or, as they are commonly 
called, parts of speech the form of which is essentially 
predicative from the very start. The adjective is a word 
congenitally so constituted as to exhibit its meaning and 
to hide its thing-meant; beautiful displays 'beauty' as an 
attribute of something, but leaves that something to be 
revealed by the situation or by another word. A finite 
verb is not quite so simply characterized, since among 
its implications, as I have already observed (§ 59), is the 
suggestion of an assertive or some such atti tude on thepart 
of the speaker. But if this character be disregarded, the 
finite verb resembles the participle in exhibiting the verb-
meaning as exerted by something mentally imaged as a 
personal being; lovest displays 'loving' as enacted by some 
person or thing addressed. I am encroaching, however, 
upon the topic of my second volume and will, therefore, 
now turn to the discussion of subject and predicate as 
distinct parts of the sentence. 
§ 68. Subject and predicate. From the broadest point 
of view all speech is a meaning put upon things, or in 
other terms, every sentence is a predicate, the subject of 
which, in the very nature of the case, must remain un-
expressed. In admitting this t ruth, we do not deny the 
various other subject-predicate relations which scholars 
have discovered in speech. A relation which holds be-
tween a given whole and something outside that whole 
§68 SUBJECT AND PREDICATE 261 
may equally, and without contradiction, hold also of parts 
of that whole and other similarly correlated lesser things. 
In the minds of some philologists there has been real con-
fusion on this score, it being thought that, on the one 
hand, the fact of entire sentences serving as predicates to 
the states of affairs underlying them, and on the other, the 
recognition of predication as involved in the use of single 
words (§ 67), are incompatible with the grammatical con-
cept of subject and predicate with which we have next to 
deal.1 I shall now show that the dichotomy of subject and 
predicate visible in many sentences, e.g. Pussy | is beautiful, 
John I has come, as well as in various sentence-like parts 
of sentences, e.g. (the man) who | called yesterday, (I know) 
Ralph I to be brave, viribus | unitis, exemplifies exactly the 
same principle of predication as was discussed in the last 
section. In these cases there are, however, the differences 
(1) that the word or group of words called the predicate 
is presented as in course of being said of the underlying 
subject-matter, and (2) that this subject-matter, instead of 
remaining unexpressed outside speech, is brought con-
veniently to the listener's notice in a locutional description 
which is known as the subject. 
Jespersen has given to this subject-predicate relation, 
as exhibited in whole sentences or parts thereof, the name 
of 'nexus', and he rightly insists on the fundamental 
duality of the relation. The dog | barks furiously is an 
example of nexus, while a furiously barking dog is not.2 
Jespersen admirably illustrates the numerous construc-
tions in which this relation comes to light, and as regards 
1
 For this mistake see (e.g.) Kalepky, Neuaufbau, pp. 19 foll. On Jesper-
sen's standpoint see below, p. 274.. In summing up, below, p. 292, I recog-
nize five kinds of predicate, all compatible with one another. 
2
 Philosophy, pp. 114. foll. 
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the actual material to be studied one could wish for no 
better guide. But while stressing the duality which dis-
tinguishes The dog ] barks furiously from a furiously barking 
dog, he is at a loss to explain it. I think we may well retain 
the term 'nexus', though it will be clearer to extend it into 
'predicational nexus'; the relation seen in a furiously bark-
ing dog Jespersen calls 'junction', and 'furiously barking' 
is in his terminology an 'adjunct'. He seems reluctant1 
to give the names 'subject' and 'predicate' to the cor-
related parts of a nexus like (I know) Ralph | to be brave, 
but to this there is little objection so long as it is realized 
that in one and the same sentence subordinate subjects and 
predicates can coexist with a main subject and predicate. 
Take, for example, the sentence Joan having asked her 
mother, the latter advised her to persevere in the course she 
had adopted. Here the main subject is the latter and the 
main predicate advised her . . . adopted. But side by side 
with these are no less than three subordinate predicational 
nexuses, namely (1) Joan (S) having asked her mother (P), 
(2) her (S) to persevere . . . adopted (P), and (3) she (S) had 
adopted (P). In all four nexuses the predicate is felt as 
being presently said of its subject, and the warm-blooded 
vitality evidenced by all grammatical predicates contrasts 
markedly with the lifelessness which distinguishes their 
subjects. Each predicational nexus, whether main or 
subordinate, seems to reflect a separate act of speech 
assuming its characteristic aspect of saying something 
about something. And this aspect persists, notwithstand-
ing the fact that all four nexuses are linked together both 
formally and functionally as each playing its respective 
part in the achievement of a common purpose. 
After this brief summary of the facts our next task is to 
1
 Philosophy, p. 145. 
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seek for their explanation. We have noted that all speech 
is a meaning put upon things or, from a rather different 
point of view, the speaker's reaction to a stimulus. But in 
adopting in reference to speech the metaphorical term 
'reaction' I must again warn the reader against certain 
implications which that term has derived from chemistry 
and physical science. Blue litmus-paper, if dipped in an 
acid solution, turns red; if dipped in an alkali, it shows no 
reaction. Some human reactions are doubtless almost as 
automatic and invariable as that of litmus-paper; a man 
writhes or flinches when he feels intense pain. But speech, 
at all events, is neither automatic nor invariable, and in 
regarding it as reaction to a stimulus we merely recall the 
facts that some relatively objective thing must impinge 
upon the mind before speech arises, and that , when speech 
does arise, it both stands in a causal relation to the stimulus 
and is of a lively and purposive quality. Above all, it must 
be observed that human beings can react to one and the 
same thing in many different ways. This is true, indeed, 
even of perception; man has five senses, and each sense 
provides him with a different way of perceiving an identical 
presented object; a cigar can be seen, touched, smelt, 
tasted, and its crackling heard. But the higher reaches of 
thought enable human beings to react to things in a well-
nigh innumerable variety of ways. A given house can be 
looked upon, not merely as being-a-house, but as being 
high, or empty, or far away, or as having been built, or as 
tumbling down, or as costing too much. Now all these 
different potential reactions are strictly parallel to the kind 
of predications described in the foregoing section. Some-
thing (an ultimate thing-meant) is assigned to a class of 
previous experiences on account of a factual similarity 
which we called the proximate thing-meant, and when 
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such a reaction occurs the proximate thing-meant or 
meaning, as it may equally well be called, comes very 
prominently into view. This is true of mere thinking, and 
if so, still more must it be true of speech, for we do not 
speak unless something interests us or has meaning for us, 
and apart from those portions of speech which are com-
pletely mechanized and not specifically willed, every word 
spoken necessarily insists with greater or less emphasis 
upon the proximate thing-meant. But here, as we shall 
soon see, there are differences of degree. Now the reac-
tions to things which are, as a rule, of the greatest interest 
to human beings, those reactions in fact which incite to 
speech, are the more fortuitous and less obvious aspects 
in which things present themselves. In the course of a 
country walk we see many trees, but the fact of their 
being trees does not strike us on each occasion, nor do we 
feel called upon to say tree about every specimen that 
meets the eye. In Patagonia, where the men are said to be 
exceptionally tall, not every tall man encountered would 
evoke the utterance tall. Suppose, however, that here in 
England a very tall woman presents herself to our notice, 
this is a case of 'tallness' which may well call for speech. 
The predication springs to our minds, and also to our lips 
if we decide that it shall. Such predications are not, of 
course, restricted to adjectives. Along the same lines we 
may say of something that it is gold (a case of being-gold), 
there (a case of being-there), that it fell to the ground (is 
a case of having-fallen-to-the-ground), or whatever may 
be our reaction or the category which has chanced to 
impress us. 
Now in solitary thought this is often the way in which 
predications present themselves. The kind or class-label 
or proximate thing-meant or however else we may choose 
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to describe it claims conscious attention, and the stimulus 
(the ultimate thing-meant) which has evoked it may only 
dimly be descried in a sort of demonstrative ( ' that ') or 
pronominal ('it', 'he') way. Speech likewise is often mere 
predication. Wonderful! I exclaim, without saying what is 
wonderful; Here! I call out, without mentioning that what 
I want is for a ball to be thrown to me here; Fire! may be 
heard at dead of night, without indication as to which 
house is on fire. From the speaker's standpoint such 
utterances are wholly satisfying. He knows, or at least 
knows well enough, to what stimuli these reactions refer. 
The listener, however, receives only the speaker's reac-
tion. All that is vouchsafed to him is that something 
immediately interesting the speaker belongs to the class 
wonderful, is wanted here, or involves fire. Whether he can 
or cannot guess what this something is depends upon cir-
cumstances. Tha t part of the sentence which is called the 
subject is the word or group of words designed to help the 
listener in his quest for the ultimate thing-meant. 
This simple explanation of predicational nexus is due to 
Wegener.1 It is so simple that it has made no visible im-
pression upon many scholars who have read and quote his 
book. Wegener prefers for 'subject' the term 'exposition' 
to describe the words which disclose to the listener what 
any utterance is about. Whether a 'subject' or 'exposition' 
is really indispensable depends on the situation. Suppose 
two friends, John and Henry let us call them, are watching 
some athletic sports. One of the athletes wins a race and 
breaks the record, whereupon John ejaculates Splendid! 
1
 Grundfragen, pp. 19 foll. Curiously enough, Wegener does not mention 
the listener, but the latter is clearly implied in his formulation, which reads 
as follows (p. 21): 'Die Exposition dient dazu, die Situation klar zu stellen, 
damit das logische Prädikat verständlich wird.' 
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Henry, the listener, can see without difficulty to what this 
ejaculation applies; no mention of the actual feat is neces-
sary. The predication Splendid! itself is at least compara-
tively indispensable, since it reveals that the speaker is 
attending and interested, and aims at creating or rein-
forcing the same effect in the listener. Suppose again that 
the two friends are sitting at breakfast, and one of them 
says Splendid, wasn't it? The addition wasn't it leads the 
listener to infer that he himself was in the situation to 
which reference is made, and for that reason he will now 
have but little trouble in identifying the ultimate thing-
meant as the concert attended by both on the previous 
night. But if, in the same situation, only Splendid! were 
said, it would be excusable if Henry scolded John with 
the irritated query What is splendid? To this John would 
have to reply The concert which we heard last night. 
The 'subject' or 'exposition' is thus for Wegener a word 
or set of words which aims at explaining to the listener 
exactly what thing is being exhibited in the aspect of the 
predicate. Just as a sentence cannot be successful unless 
the listener is able to infer how he is meant to take it, so 
too it cannot be successful unless the subject to which the 
predicate is applied be made accessible to him. The predi-
cate Splendid! alone does indeed reveal the fact that the 
speaker is assigning something to the class 'splendid' and 
wishes this to be known; but the listener, being no passive 
automaton, will not enter into his friend's enthusiasm 
without knowing what it is all about. Let us see exactly 
how the word or words known as the 'subject' operate. I 
have already insisted that human beings have the power of 
reacting to the same thing in different ways, and that the 
predicate is ordinarily some mode of reaction which is for-
tuitous, exceptional, or surprising. This latter condition 
§68 EXPRESSION OF THE SUBJECT 267 
carries with it the consequence that the predicate is 
seldom the simplest and most direct way of designating 
the ultimate thing-meant. A child learning to speak may 
certainly practise that art, or exhibit his cunning, by saying 
mo'car! [motor-car] concerning every example of the kind 
he sees, and then such utterance is truly self-sufficient. 
Splendid! refers, on the contrary, to a multitude of dis-
parate objects, persons, acts, and what not; the word 
points indeed to an attribute, a proximate thing-meant, 
but not directly to any definitely located stimulus or 
ultimate thing-meant. Now language has created certain 
words which travel as directly to their ultimate thing-
meant as an arrow to its mark. The words employed as 
subjects should be of this kind. The most effective among 
them are proper names like John or London, or demonstra-
tives like this, that. If no proper name be available, and 
no demonstrative be sufficient, the speaker may reach the 
ultimate thing-meant by successive stages; what is splendid 
is not merely a concert, it is the concert which we heard; but 
again not merely the concert which we heard, but the concert 
which we heard yesterday. Each of the really essential 
words in the subject is a class-name and a clue helping the 
listener to see the ultimate thing-meant. The 'subject' 
cannot fail to be predication in the sense of § 67, for all use 
of words is this. But it differs from the 'predicate' of the 
sentence wherein it occurs in having a purely instrumental 
purpose, in not exhibiting, or seeming intended to exhibit, 
more of the proximate thing-meant than is absolutely 
necessary, and in being felt as merely a concession to the 
listener, not part of the real aim of the speaker.1 
1
 Here I am referring to predicational nexus in its original form. In 
highly developed speech the subject can be an integral part of the speaker's 
communicative purpose, and can convey information of an important kind, 
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To put my argument somewhat differently, both sub-
ject and predicate are in a sense names of one and the same 
thing, reactions to the same stimulus, but the predicate 
embodies the speaker's interest and principal aim, while 
the subject is vouchsafed merely as a help to the listener. 
No doubt the speaker purposes the subject as well as the 
predicate, but a marked difference in his personal interest 
is always felt between the two. No better a posteriori proof 
of the essentially communicative character of speech could 
be adduced than the division of most sentences into sub-
ject and predicate, if, as I hope is now clear, the predicate 
exists for the sake of the speaker, and the subject for the 
sake of the listener. 
The following definition of 'subject' and 'predicate' will 
be found roughly adequate: Whenever a sentence or other 
set of words can he divided into two parts of which the one 
part is felt to convey something as in course of being said about 
the thing meant by the other part, the former part is called 
the predicate, and the latter the subject. This definition 
takes into account subordinate as well as main predica-
tional nexuses, and by stressing the different feeling 
awakened by the two parts clearly distinguishes a furiously 
barking dog from the dog barks furiously. The predicate 
makes itself felt as alive, the subject as relatively dead. In 
comparison with the subject, the predicate is what the 
speaker really wishes to say. And just for that reason its 
meaning must be carefully attended to, whereas the mean-
see the discussion of 'The steep climb up the other bank was very tiring, below, 
p. 278. The addition of epithets to the subject is a favourite way of making 
implicit statements, e.g. the word steep in the sentence quoted above. 
Non-defining relative clauses are, indeed, explicit statements couched in 
the grammatical form of an epithet, this form functioning incongruently 
as a parenthetic sentence; for example, Tour brother, whom I met in the 
street yesterday, told me . . .'. 
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ing of the subject is, or may be, merely a clue to the thing-
meant lying behind it. 
The terms 'subject' and 'predicate' are derived from 
Aristotelian doctrine, and accordingly date from a time 
when grammar and logic were inseparable. As used in 
linguistic theory, they are to be regarded as designations of 
words or groups of words, though not of course without 
regard to the things meant by these. Primarily they be-
long to speech, not to language, i.e. they refer primarily to 
function, not to form. To give an illustration: however the 
word London be employed, it is always a noun, but in London 
is a very great city it is the subject and in This is London it 
is the predicate, or best part thereof, while in I live in London 
it is only a fragment of the predicate. Thus 'subject' and 
'predicate' are merely temporary qualifications of words as 
they occur in some particular sentence, in opposition to 
those designations, like 'noun', 'adjective', and so on, which 
adhere to words permanently. The contention that the 
terms 'subject' and 'predicate' belong to speech is not con-
tradicted by the fact that finite verbs are words of a kind 
constitutionally adapted to serve as predicates. As such, of 
course, they are facts of language, but they do not become 
actual predicates until so employed in particular sentences. 
Are there any 'parts of speech' beside 'subject' and 
'predicate'? This dichotomy affords no place for sentence-
qualifiers, i.e. words which either qualify the purport of 
the sentence as a whole, like doubtless and perhaps, or else 
describe its relation to the gist of some other sentence, like 
accordingly, moreover. Apart from 'subject', 'predicate', 
and 'sentence-qualifiers', there are, so far as I can see, no 
further parts of speech.1 
1
 Under the heading of sentence-qualifiers we must include words in 
anticipatory emphasis, see below, p. 290. 
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Are we entitled to use the term 'predicate' when the 
subject is not expressed ? This seems necessary in some 
cases of real ellipse, like Thank you kindly, Sir!l It is cer-
tainly also legitimate in others where the predicate is of a 
form which presupposes a subject in thought; I should not 
find it a heinous crime to call Wonderful! a predicate when 
it stands alone. The same applies to the Latin imperative 
Dic! and of course also to those cases in which the in-
flexion of a finite verb points to the subject, as in Latin 
Vixi. Obviously the term 'predicate' should not be used 
of exclamations like Yes! No! Alas! James! Truly? though 
all these are predications in the sense indicated at the be-
ginning of this section. That certain cases of 'predicate' 
cannot be brought strictly within the scope of my defini-
tion does not invalidate the latter, but merely confirms 
what I have had to say about the infirmities of definition 
in general. Jespersen gives an excellent conspectus of the 
various possibilities of a predicate without any expressed 
subject.2 
The above account of predicational nexus will be found 
to have much in common with the logical doctrine that 
the subject of a proposition is used in extension, and the 
predicate in intension. This formula will stand, provided 
it is understood to emphasize only the greater prominence 
of ultimate thing-meant over proximate thing-meant or 
vice versa; for every use of a word carries with it a reference 
to both things-meant (§ 67). But Wegener's genetic ac-
count puts the matter on a much more human footing, 
1
 I take the term 'ellipse' in a wide sense to embrace all those types of 
incongruent function where the feeling of an omission is awakened. A very 
complete attempt to classify such types will be found in E. Wellander, 
Studien zum Bedeutungswandel im Deutscben, second part, Upsala, 1923. 
This author restricts the term to a much narrower field. 
2
 Philosophy, pp. 141-4. 
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and we also cannot dispense with some explanation of the 
vital warmth so apparent in the predicate as compared 
with the cold rigidity of the subject. 
§ 69. Grammatical and logical subject and predicate. 
Fixed linguistic habits, have, as elsewhere, grown up in 
connexion with predicational nexus, 'subject' and 'predi-
cate' having each its own appropriate form in particular 
languages. These forms are both elocutional and locu-
tional, and as in sentence-form (§ 54), so too in predica-
tional nexus the elocutional criteria are more decisive than 
the locutional. It is probably true of most languages that 
a vocal stress is laid on the word or words which function 
as predicate, while the subject is correspondingly un-
stressed. As regards the locutional form, languages differ 
both in the word-order and in other respects. Statements 
in English are normally of the form X is Y or X does Y, 
and in any sentence of the kind, simple inspection arouses 
the expectation that the information which the speaker 
really wishes to convey will lie in the words is Y or does Y, 
while the remaining element X will merely instruct the 
listener as to whom or what the information is about. 
Formally, therefore, is Y or does Y is the predicate and X 
the subject.1 When the expectations aroused by the form 
are fulfilled, and is Y or does Y actually is the predicate in 
the functional sense explained in the last section, a slight 
vocal stress is placed on the most important word in it, 
e.g. John is my friend or Henry has arrived. In that case 
form and function agree, and there is complete congruence 
of employment. But this does not always occur. For 
1
 It is now usual, and on the whole satisfactory, to take the copula as 
part of the predicate. Nevertheless it is often convenient and, where there 
can be no confusion, also legitimate, to use the term 'predicate' of the 
word or words serving as complement to the copula. 
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reasons to be discussed later, the locutional form of predi-
cational nexus may sometimes be used incongruently, the 
formal subject functioning as the real predicate. When-
ever this happens, the vocal stress is transferred to the 
formal subject, so that we have now the sentences John is 
my friend and Henry has arrived, the sense being 'The one 
who is my friend is John' and 'The one who has arrived is 
Henry'. But though the point which the speaker particu-
larly wishes to emphasize here lies in the proper names, the 
locutional form nevertheless continues to exert a certain 
force, as it was found to do in other examples of incongru-
ence studied above (§§ 45, 61). It is as though the speaker 
had said 'I have a friend, and that friend is John' or again 
'Someone has arrived, and that someone is Henry'. Form 
will never brook complete eclipse, but its force is always 
much impaired when function is incongruent. 
To Paul belongs the merit of having recognized the 
distinction between 'formal' and 'functional' subject and 
predicate, and of having stated explicitly that the first of 
these is gradually built up on the basis of the second.1 But 
though the interaction of language and speech is thus not 
unknown to him in practice, it has not assumed in his eyes 
the importance of a guiding principle, nor has he recog-
nized that 'form' is the character of language which corre-
sponds to 'function' in speech. Consequently the terms 
employed by him are different from mine. Where I have 
hitherto written 'formal subject' and 'formal predicate', 
he has grammatical subject and grammatical predi-
cate ; and for my 'functional subject' and 'functional 
predicate' he has 'psychological subject' and 'psycho-
logical predicate'. His former pair should be retained, 
being perfectly clear and also having acquired a certain 
1
 Prinzipien, § 87, beginning. 
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measure of general acceptance. His latter pair rest, how-
ever, upon a view which I shall refute below (pp . 280-1), 
and must therefore give place to the terms logical sub-
ject and logical predicate in common use among gram-
marians and logicians alike. We may now settle upon the 
following as our final definitions: 
A word or phrase which junctions in speech as subject is 
called the Logical Subject. 
A word or phrase which junctions in speech as predicate is 
called the Logical Predicate. 
A word or phrase which has the locutional form of the subject 
is called the Grammatical Subject. 
A word or phrase which has the locutional form of the predi-
cate is called the Grammatical Predicate. 
To these definitions we can add a terminological rule: 
When ''subject and 'predicate' are used without further 
qualification (as above in § 68) it must be understood that 
grammar and logic, or what amounts to the same, form and 
function, are here in agreement, and that the terms refer to 
congruent function. 
An easy way of discovering the logical predicate is to 
cast the sentence into the form of a question, when the 
words corresponding to the interrogative pronoun will 
be found to yield the required result. Thus Henry has 
arrived answers the question What has Henry done? and 
therefore has arrived must be the logical predicate. The 
question answered by Henry has arrived is Who has arrived? 
and consequently Henry is here the logical predicate. In 
questions themselves the logical predicate is always the 
interrogative word or the phrase in which it occurs, as the 
strong stress laid upon it bears witness. 
So many different notions have been attached by scholars 
to the terms 'grammatical', 'psychological', and 'logical' 
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predicate, that Jespersen appears at first sight to be taking 
the only sensible course in refusing to recognize any kind 
of subject and predicate except the grammatical. As to 
the latter, says Jespersen, every one is able to tell them at 
sight.1 But concurrence in this view is not possible for 
those who draw a distinction between language and 
speech, and who have attained to the conviction that all 
forms created by language are nothing but well-tried and 
standardized methods of fulfilling certain semantic func-
tions. To recognize 'grammatical' or 'formal' subject and 
predicate, while rejecting those of the 'logical' or 'func-
tional' variety, is to ignore the very reason for which the 
first-named exist. The evil which comes of attaching 
over-great importance to mere outer form is here glaringly 
illustrated. Even if there were no sentences in which 
'grammatical' and 'logical' predicate clash, the concept of 
the logical predicate would nevertheless be necessary to 
explain the purpose of the grammatical predicate. Nor 
is it true that the grammatical predicate can always be 
discerned at sight. For the most part it can be, especially 
in modern languages like English, French, and German, 
where in ordinary statement-form the grammatical predi-
cate is regularly announced by a finite verb or by the 
copula, the grammatical subject having the form of a noun 
or noun-equivalent, e.g. Cain slew Abel, To-day is Tues-
day. But how are we to tell which is the subject and 
which the predicate in exclamatory statements like A good 
fellow, Charles@!Ein vorzüglicher Wein, dieser! Des men-
songes, tout cela? Here two nouns or noun-equivalents 
are simply juxtaposed, so that the rule just mentioned 
avails us no longer. Examination of a number of sentences 
of this kind proves that the first member is always logical 
1
 Philosophy, pp. 149-50. 
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predicate, since it regularly contains the information which 
the speaker wishes to drive home . Having established this 
fact in individual cases, we can go on to the generalization 
that in such exclamatory statements the word-order is 
(1) grammatical predicate, (2) grammatical subject, or 
more briefly (1) predicate, (2) subject, since unless the 
contrary is said, we must always assume congruence, i.e. 
coincidence of the grammatical and logical elements. It is 
true that if we heard these sentences pronounced we 
should note a vocal stress on the first member, and could 
thus answer our question on the evidence of outer elocu-
tional form alone. But frequently the grammarian has to 
work on texts that are merely written, and there the 
elocutional criterion fails him. On similar lines we come 
to the conclusion that in proverbial utterances like No cure, 
no fay; Araignée au soir, espoir; Lange Haare, kurzer Sinn, 
the first member is the subject and the second the predi-
cate. In dealing with some Oriental languages the criterion 
of logical function is of special importance, since here the 
copula is regularly omitted . What are we to make of a 
sentence in Old Egyptian like r•k r n bhs, literally ' thy 
mouth the mouth of a calf' ? A wide survey shows that the 
second member of an Egyptian sentence having a noun or 
noun-equivalent in both positions is generally the logical 
predicate and contains the real point, so that the rule can 
be established that in this type of sentence the normal 
word-order was (1) subject, (2) predicate. None the less, 
contrary examples are sometimes found, and unless these 
belong to definitely established types we conclude that 
they are incongruent, and conjecture that their import 
was made clear to the listener by means of a special stress 
on the first member, as in the English John is my friend.1 
1
 For examples of grammatical subject as logical predicate in Middle 
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The outer characters marking grammatical subject and 
predicate as such differ in different languages, and no 
rules of universal application can be given. The broadest 
generalization that can be made concerns the subject, 
which is nearly always a noun or some recognized equiva-
lent of a noun. The reason is clear. Predication as ex-
hibited in predicational nexus consists in putting a mean-
ing upon something. T h e thing upon which the meaning 
is put is naturally regarded as a thing; every operation of 
attribution assumes something solid and substantial which 
may serve as its base. It is for just such uses that the noun-
form has been evolved. Nevertheless the generalization 
that the subjects of sentences must be nouns is not com-
pletely immune from exceptions. If we agree with Paul,1 
as I think we must, that proverbs such as Safe bind, safe 
find; First come, first served; Like master, like man, ex-
emplify predicational nexus, then here we have instances 
where the subject is not a noun. Next in order of wide-
spread validity comes the generalization that the predicate 
should be introduced by a finite verb. I have dealt with 
this contention above in § 59, where it was seen to have 
many exceptions. 
Great interest attaches to the question whether the 
subject should come before the predicate or vice versa. 
Wegener has seen that two opposing tendencies have been 
at work, some languages representing the one, and some the 
other.2 Primitive, emotional man was doubtless prone to 
blurt out his reaction to things without reflecting that the 
listener could not understand him unless he knew what 
was being reacted to. Not until a look of incomprehension 
Egyptian see my Egyptian Grammar, §§ 126,130, end. For cases where the 
inversion has stabilized itself as congruent see § 127. 
' Prinzipien, p. 125. 2 Grundfragen, pp. 33-4, 107-8, 181. 
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was seen on the listener's face would such a speaker add the 
subject as a corrective. This state of affairs must be the 
ultimate source of such exclamatory statements as A good, 
fellow, Charles! which have become a recognized form in 
many languages. It is a far more sophisticated and intel-
lectual method to name the subject first, and to add the 
predicate afterwards. This procedure has some title to be 
held superior to the other, both because it ostensibly gives 
the actual order in which the event narrated occurred to 
the speaker, i.e. (1) stimulus, (2) reaction, and also because 
it manifests more consideration of the listener's con-
venience. In point of fact, however, it is of little moment 
which word-order is adopted, for the listener's interpreta-
tion will be based upon the sentence as a whole, and is 
barely influenced by the sequence of the words. When-
ever the speaker has liberty of choice, as in English, the 
word-order (1) predicate, (2) subject, e.g. A good fellow, 
Charles!, is symptomatic of an emotional attitude towards 
the statement, whereas the reverse order, (1) subject, (2) 
predicate, e.g. Charles is a good fellow, produces the effect 
of calm, unimpassioned judgement . These inferences do 
not hold good, however, of languages like Hebrew, Arabic, 
and Old Egyptian, where the predicate, if a verb, regularly 
precedes the subject. Here the more primitive word-
order has become congruent as regular statement-form, 
and having once acquired that status is bereft of its 
former emotional quality. 
§ 70. The subject becomes a matter of choice. 
Sentences of the kind which provided Wegener with his 
explanation of subject and predicate are still sometimes 
heard. On issuing from a theatre where a lurid melodrama 
is being given one might easily catch the utterance 
Horrible—that play! with a perceptible pause after the 
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first word. The speaker has voiced an almost spontaneous 
reaction to the piece still obsessing him, and it is only as 
an afterthought that the subject is added through a semi-
conscious realization that by this time his companion's 
mind may be otherwise occupied. In ultimate analysis 
such an utterance consists of two predicates, each without 
a subject: Horrible [it was; the thing I refer to is] that play.1 
Of these two predicates the first vibrates with emotion, 
and is ejaculated almost involuntarily; the second is due 
to deliberate design, and its less impulsive character is 
marked by a lesser intensity of stress. But if we select a 
random example among the sentences which occur by 
thousands in our books or daily newspapers, probably this 
will be found to have travelled very far from the model 
just analysed. The following is taken from this morning's 
paper: The steep climb up the other bank was very tiring. 
Most of the things said about subject and predicate in the 
last two sections still apply here. The dichotomy is still 
evident. Very tiring is both logical and grammatical 
predicate, and is affirmed of the thing directly denoted by 
the steep climb, the phrase which constitutes the subject. 
And yet there is an unmistakable air of artificiality about 
the structure of the sentence as a whole. We feel that the 
central point in what the lady-artist who wrote it wished 
to convey was the fatigue she experienced as the result of 
a climb up a certain bank, this being steep, but she has 
chosen to depict her own physical condition in terms of an 
action producing it, this action being predicated of another 
action of which the performer is unnamed, and which, to 
crown all, is qualified by an attribute appropriate, not to 
itself, but only to the object affected by it. I am not 
criticizing the writer adversely. It is an excellent sentence, 
1
 On this sentence see further below, p. 291. 
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clear and concise; indeed, it would be impossible to better 
it. The deduction which I wish to be drawn is that the 
evolution of speech has brought about a complete trans-
formation in the character of predicational nexus. This 
originated in nearly spontaneous linguistic reactions which 
proved ineffective because only the character of the re-
action (i.e. the speaker's meaning) was named, so that a 
description of the (ultimate) thing-meant had later to be 
added for the listener's enlightenment. In modern speech, 
however, predicational nexus has become no more than a 
sentence-form having the two advantages (1) that it con-
veys an immediate impression of completeness (§ 58), and 
(2) that the dominant notion can be suitably stressed, 
without being overstressed. There is only a slight vocal 
stress on the predicate of ordinary English statements, so 
that, although the predicate normally indicates the high-
water mark of interest in a given sentence, the possibility 
of interesting information being given by the subject is 
not excluded. The writer of the sentence quoted had not 
previously said anything about the other bank or about her 
climbing of it. Thus in one pithy sentence she contrives to 
include four implicit predications: I came to the other bank 
and climbed it; it was steep, and at the end of my climb I was 
very tired. 
How has the transformation of predicational nexus 
come about ? Faced with this question, I must recall that 
my book is not a history, but a diagnosis of speech, and 
that though it has been impossible to exclude all genetic 
problems, I am under no obligation to go further with 
them than inclination prompts me. Paul has used great 
skill and learning in dealing with the later developments 
of predicational nexus.1 He shows how both subject and 
1
 Prinzipien, §§ 96 foll., 197 foll. 
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predicate came to be multiplied and enlarged, so that an 
abundance of information could, in developed speech, be 
conveniently housed within the structure of a single 
sentence. And he proves that objects and adverbial quali-
fications of verbs, epithets of the subject, and so forth are 
nothing but degraded predicates rendered subservient to 
a fundamental and planned dichotomy. 
I shall content myself with discussing one important 
point not emphasized by Paul—a point, indeed, wherein 
he has gone grievously astray. The point in question 
touches the very origin of predicational nexus, and Paul's 
error is intimately connected with his fallacious conception 
of the sentence, examined at length in a previous section 
(§ 65). He contends that the logical subject (I substitute 
'logical' for his 'psychological', see pp. 272-3) is always 
that notion which arises first in the mind of the speaker, 
and to which the predicate is later added.1 He ignores the 
fact that, between the emergence in consciousness of a 
topic to speak about and the actual utterance, a whole 
series of psychical events has usually taken place. Chief 
among these is the decision to speak, and this may bring 
in its train a number of considerations which are the main 
determinants both of the form ultimately given to the 
sentence and also of the things chosen to be described to the 
listener. Above all, it is upon these considerations that 
depends what constituent of the total thing-meant shall 
be taken by the speaker as his starting-point or subject. 
In disproof of Paul's contention let us examine a simple 
1
 'Der Subjektsbegriff ist zwar immer früher im Bewusstsein des 
Sprechenden,' Prinzipien, p. 127. In a footnote Paul explains that he is 
referring to the psychological subject, and the whole trend of his argument 
shows that by this term he means what is here meant by 'logical subject'. 
Indeed, at the beginning of § 198 he substitutes the latter term, evidently 
by an oversight. 
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statement, namely Mary has toothache. Since Mary, be-
sides being the grammatical subject, is here also the logical 
subject, the thought of her ought, on Paul's hypothesis, 
to have preceded the thought of her toothache. In given 
circumstances this may actually be the case. Mary may 
have been bustling about the room, collecting the break-
fast things, making up the fire, and all the while inspiring 
her employer with a drowsy satisfaction at possessing the 
advantage of her services. Suddenly he notices her swollen 
cheek, and in due course may make the remark that Mary 
has toothache. In this case the sight of Mary has preceded 
the sight of her toothache . But that selfsame remark 
might well be the outcome of different conditions. 
Imagine an employer usually so absorbed in his news-
paper at breakfast-time that Mary's ministrations are wont 
to pass unobserved. To-day, by way of exception, her 
swollen cheek attracts his attention . Waiting until she has 
left the room, he says to his wife, Mary has toothache. In 
this case, if we can fairly say that either Mary or the tooth-
ache first attracted his attention, assuredly it must be the 
toothache. We thus see that the order in which the con-
stituents of a complex thing-meant emerge in the mind 
has no necessary connexion with the order in which they 
are subsequently referred to linguistically. In sum, Paul's 
notion of psychological subject and predicate rests upon a 
misconception, and this nomenclature should disappear. 
In the great majority of cases, before a speaker proceeds 
to determine the exact structure of a statement, he has 
present to his mind the general drift of the whole which 
he intends to communicate. Exceptions certainly occur, 
as might happen if a timid visitor found himself under the 
necessity of complimenting a young mother upon her 
baby. In this predicament he might start off with the 
3920 
282 SPEECH AND LANGUAGE §70 
subject TOUT baby . . . or Really, your baby . . . without 
having any clear idea how to finish his sentence. Usually, 
however, when a statement is projected, there is an 
appreciable interval between reception of the stimulus 
and verbal reaction. Herein lies one of the most important 
differences between statements and exclamations. A 
corollary of this generalization is that the subjects of state-
ments are not imposed upon the speaker from outside, but are 
chosen by him arbitrarily. In the kingdom of statements the 
speaker is an absolute monarch, and may dispose of his sub-
jects according to his good pleasure. This does not signify, 
of course, that he will make his decision regardless of his 
material. All I am maintaining is that the subject of a 
statement is not preordained, as is necessarily the case 
when an exclamatory predicate like Horrible . . .! has pre-
ceded, but that it is the result of intelligent design and 
considered motives. So far from statements being mirrored 
replicas of external circumstances, they are perhaps the 
most purposive of all utterances. 
How, then, are the subjects of statements chosen ? In 
literary style there is almost complete freedom of choice, 
and an author may be swayed by all manner of considera-
tions not at first sight obvious—desire for variety, striving 
after vividness, euphony, economy of means, to name but 
a few. In everyday parlance, however, some sort of rule 
can be discerned. This topic has been already touched 
upon in connexion with word-form. We there saw that 
The horse neighs is preferred to The neigh horses, not with-
out good reason (p. 139). The permanent, substantial, 
humanly valuable things which man cannot do without, 
his fellow-men, his animals, his weapons, his property, and 
his food—these are the predestined subjects of sentences. 
And correspondingly, the fugitive experiences of life, 
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events and actions, the attributes discerned in things, the 
relations of one thing to another—these are the pre-
destined predicates. But at this point the reader may dis-
cover a difficulty. I have sought to show that it is the 
predicate of the sentence, not the subject, which com-
municates what is interesting, and this contention seems 
borne out by the fact that a vocal stress is laid upon the 
predicate. But here am I maintaining that the things 
really important to man are the material objects and the 
creatures which he takes as his subjects. Is this a contra-
diction ? I think not, and will give a psychological reason 
which disposes of the apparent inconsistency. Everyone 
knows that the deepest affection does not call for words. 
When the beloved is tranquil and happy the lover simply 
takes her existence for granted; she is rarely named. But 
the least little thing which affects her, any new aspect in 
which she may show herself, any action she may perform, 
assumes at once an importance proportionate to the love 
that is felt. The like holds good in varying degree about 
all the things that are valuable to us. We are keenly 
sensitive to their vicissitudes, while the same vicissitudes, 
if happening to indifferent subjects, would be lacking in 
any particular interest. The sight of a dead human being 
inspires horror, while a dead fly may pass unnoticed. This 
proves that our interest is not in death, but rather in who 
dies. And yet if it comes to speech, the predicate dead is 
what will seem important, and its unstressed subject will 
be given only because this is the accustomed and well-
motivated way with purely descriptive sentences. 
Plain, straightforward statement thus takes concrete 
things for its subjects, leaving to become predicates what 
is transitory, incidental, or too widely diffused for conve-
nient use as subject. However, the advance of civilization 
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shows an ever-increasing range among the things deemed 
worthy to form the basis of descriptions; even speech 
and the theory of speech may be made the subjects 
of whole books. Abstracts like patriotism, fair-play, un-
employment now become all-absorbing themes, dealt with 
under every conceivable aspect. Actions like motoring, 
golf, divorce are equally common subjects both of single 
sentences and of entire conversations. Naturally there are 
many abstracts and nomina actionis which are confined to 
the talk of the educated, so that the employment of these 
tends to be felt as a mark of refinement or literary culture. 
Quite simple sentences such as This man is very rich 
acquire alternatives with an abstract as subject, e.g. The 
wealth of this man is stupendous. The uses and abuses of 
these new modes of parlance are discussed by Jespersen in 
some of the most illuminating of his pages. His final con-
clusions are summed up in the following words: 'When 
we express by means of nouns what is generally expressed 
by finite verbs, our language becomes not only more ab-
stract, but more abstruse, owing among other things to 
the fact that in the verbal substantive some of the life-
giving elements of the verb (time, mood, person) disappear. 
While the nominal style may therefore serve the purposes 
of philosophy, where, however, it now and then does 
nothing but disguise simple thoughts in the garb of 
profound wisdom, it does not lend itself so well to the 
purposes of everyday life.'1 
Far less acceptable are certain other remarks which 
Jespersen has to make about subject and predicate. Since, 
as we have seen, the act of predication consists in assigning 
something to a class of past experiences, it follows that the 
subject of a sentence cannot have greater extension, in 
1
 Philosophy, p. 139. 
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the logical sense, than the predicate. But this way of 
looking at predicational nexus, though true, requires more 
reasonable handling than it receives from Jespersen. His 
view is formulated as follows: 'The subject is compara-
tively definite and special, while the predicate is less 
definite, and thus applicable to a greater number of 
things. ' r This principle, according to Jespersen, will in 
some difficult cases enable us to decide which is the subject 
and which the predicate. But on examination we shall 
find Jespersen's principle a very poor substitute for the 
time-honoured logical test of asking ourselves what is being 
spoken about. Had Jespersen contented himself with say-
ing that the subject is always definite, and the predicate 
less definite, his argument would have been defensible. 
At all events it would have been unassailable as regards the 
subject, since, as I have shown (pp . 266-7), the main purpose 
of the word or phrase known as the subject is to locate and 
define the thing which the predicate refers to under a non-
defining aspect. The objectionable features in Jespersen's 
view are the additional stipulations that the subject is 
comparatively special and the predicate applicable to a 
greater number of things. If these stipulations alone were 
considered, a strange position would arise in regard to such 
often heard exaggerations as All men are hypocrites. Since 
in point of fact there are undoubtedly fewer hypocrites 
than people in the world (whatever the speaker of this 
sentence may have thought) we should here, if we followed 
the second half of Jespersen's rule, have to declare that 
hypocrites is the subject, and All men the predicate. The 
t ruth is that his appeal to reality is entirely irrelevant as a 
linguistic criterion. It is the same fallacy as displayed itself 
in the strange contention of his Modern English Grammar 
1
 Philosophy, p. 150. 
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that a primary word (i.e. a noun) is always more special 
than a secondary word (i.e. an adjective), in support of 
which he adduced as illustration the phrase a very poor 
widow; widow is a primary, he maintained, and poor a 
secondary, because there are more poor persons in the 
world than widows.1 Jespersen here forgot that speech is 
as capable of dealing with fiction as with fact, and that if 
there were not enough widows in the world to make widow 
a secondary word, a few million more imaginary ones 
(some could be found in novels) could easily be added in 
order to attain this result. 
Again, Jespersen tells us that when two subjects con-
nected by is are equally indefinite in form, it depends on 
the extension of each which is the subject, e.g. A cat is a 
mammal.2 He then proceeds to affirm that one can say A 
spiritualist is a man, but not A man is a spiritualist with 
man as subject. Jespersen loads the argument in his 
favour by giving an example the original of which is not 
very probable, and the converted form of which would 
absolutely never occur outside a book on logic or grammar. 
Nevertheless, I venture to assert that it is quite possible to 
say A man is a spiritualist with man as subject. Many false 
and even absurd statements are linguistically flawless, and 
in this case the affirmation might even pass unchallenged 
and unridiculed in a roomful of people if made more palat-
able by a few deprecatory qualifications: Every man is a 
bit of a spiritualist. Furthermore, Jespersen's criterion 
fails altogether when, in a sentence with the copula, sub-
ject and predicate are coextensive. With regard to this 
1
 A Modern English Grammar, Part I I , Syntax, vol. i, p. 3. See Sonnen-
schein's valuable criticisms in his paper 'Recent Progress in the Movement 
for Grammatical Reform', in Proceedings of the Classical Association, 
vol. xx, pp. 41 foll. 2 Philosophy, p. 151. 
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case, Jespersen says that the two terms may now change 
places as subject and predicate, and that 'this is what Keats 
implied in his line: Beauty is truth; truth, beauty'.1 Do I 
entirely misconstrue Jespersen's point, or is he maintain-
ing, as he appears to do, that Keats was wishing to bring 
home to his audience a purely grammatical fact ? Surely 
this is to do monstrous injustice to the poet, whose deeply 
felt aphorism was clearly meant to say that whenever our 
minds dwell on Tru th , we shall always find it revealing 
itself as Beauty, and that whenever our minds dwell on 
Beauty, this will always reveal itself as Tru th . Which is a 
wholly different matter . 
One concession may be made to Jespersen's standpoint. 
On rare occasions the fact that the predicate must be a 
class does seem to determine the choice of the subject. A 
case in point occurs among the many interesting examples 
of predicational nexus quoted in Jespersen's book. The 
word-order My brother was captain of the vessel carries with 
it an implication which is not present in The captain of the 
vessel was my brother. In its first form the statement sug-
gests that the speaker possessed only one brother, unless 
indeed a particular brother has been mentioned in the 
preceding context. The second form leaves it open 
whether the speaker had only one brother or several. The 
reason for this difference is that the subject seeks to tie 
down the thing it means to some definite identifiable unit, 
and if a speaker employs the phrase my brother to do this, 
the suggestion is that there are no other brothers who 
might have been understood from the words. 
To sum up : in the course of its history predicational 
nexus has undergone a great change. Its origin is revealed 
not only by certain survivals of the primitive type, but also 
1
 Philosophy, p. 153. 
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by the traces left in highly developed speech. The starting-
point was an exclamatory predicate to which, since it did 
not suffice to tell its own tale, a noun had to be added as 
an afterthought to indicate the subject. At a later stage 
predicational nexus has become a mere grammatical form. 
As such, however, it is of so great utility that it provides 
the regular form of statements and questions, besides 
having been taken over to serve as a substitute for single 
words, i.e. as the form of subordinate clauses. In these 
derivative states, the subject is no longer a mere corrective 
following automatically from the predicate, but has be-
come a matter of the speaker's choice. The problem before 
the speaker is transformed; he still has to ask himself, 
'Shall I predicate ?' but to this question a second is now 
annexed, namely, 'What shall I take as my subject ?' 
Speech has thereby grown less simple, but it is more 
effective. The range has become much wider, for the 
things to which an exclamation is the appropriate reaction 
are strictly limited in number. Merely impulsive speech 
has given place to an intellectual mode of utterance. The 
evolution of predicational nexus is, in fact, the evolution 
of the statement. 
§ 71. The predicative use of words. I return now to 
the consideration of sentences where the grammatical 
predicate does not fulfil its duty as the logical predicate, 
where indeed it fails to indicate the real centre of interest 
in a communication. In such incongruent predicational 
nexus the part of the logical predicate is played by some 
other word, e.g. by Henry in the previously quoted ex-
ample Henry has arrived. There is no serious ground in 
this particular sentence why the grammatical subject 
should not be called the logical predicate, and indeed to 
put the position thus yields a striking antithesis. Never-
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theless, this nomenclature has the disadvantage of suggest-
ing that has arrived is the logical subject, which, of course, 
the form of the phrase precludes it from being. It will, in 
point of fact, nearly always be found that , when the logical 
predicate does not coincide with the grammatical predi-
cate, the words representing the logical subject need to be 
converted into another form in order to present the aspect 
suited to a subject. But in grammatical analysis words and 
phrases must be classified as they stand, and it is not 
legitimate first to cast them into a different mould. For 
this reason it is better not to employ the terms 'logical 
subject' and 'logical predicate' in connexion with incon-
gruent predicational nexus. Happily grammar possesses a 
term which gives the sense of 'logical predicate' without 
implying the presence in the sentence of a 'logical sub-
ject '; this is the adjective predicative, together with its 
adverb predicatively.1 These names have come before us 
already in connexion with the twofold possibility of 
reference involved in all use of words (§ 67), and it was 
seen that, when a word is used predicatively, it both bears 
a marked vocal stress and draws attention to its meaning 
rather than to the thing ultimately meant by it. Among 
the examples quoted were She looked over her spectacles and 
Mind you come early. If the sense of these sentences be 
rendered in such a manner as to make over and early not 
only logical, but also grammatical predicates, very un-
couth forms result, namely, The way in which she looked 
was over her spectacles; Mind that the time when you come 
is eárly. 
The predicative use of words is thus an elocutional 
1
 From the Report of the Joint Committee on Grammatical Terminology, 
p. 9, Recommendation II , it does not seem likely that they would have 
assented to so extended a use as is here given to these terms. 
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trick by which the complete remoulding of a sentence to 
obtain congruent predicational nexus can be avoided. The 
predicative word or phrase may occur either in the gram-
matical subject or in the grammatical predicate. Examples 
of the former are The red pencil belongs to Mary (= the 
pencil which belongs to Mary is the one which is red); 
The house over there belongs to the Murrays (= the house 
which belongs to the Murrays is the one which is over 
there). Or again, the predicative word may be com-
pletely outside the grammatical subject and predicate, 
e.g. Certainly you may tell him (= that you may tell him 
is certain). On the same lines as this last example is the 
very common anticipatory use of nouns, often preceded 
by as to or the like, e.g. As to your last argument, it is 
completely beside the point. In some languages this employ-
ment is so stereotyped that it can barely be called predi-
cative any longer. Thus French questions with a noun as 
their subject normally take the form Jean est-il venu? 
Particularly interesting is the fact that some sentences 
may have two or even more predicative words, e.g. James 
is much older than Jóhn and Máry, where the speaker has 
contrived to make no less than four points, namely, 'a much 
older child than John and Mary is James', 'The amount by 
which James is older than John and Mary is much', 'James 
is much older than another child whose name is John' , 
'James is much older than another child whose name is 
Mary ' . 
Someone may object that in my last example James 
and John and Mary are not logical predicates, but logical 
subjects, and applying our criterion of asking to what ques-
tion the statement responds this objection seems vindi-
cated at least in the case of James. For it cannot be denied 
that the statement answers the question What have you to 
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tell us about James? In this apparent contradiction we 
penetrate to the very heart of the mechanism of speech. 
What is the predicate or linguistic reaction at one instant 
may become the subject or linguistic stimulus at the next. 
Indeed, this is the inevitable sequence of events in every 
many-word sentence. Take Horrible, that play!1 At first 
horrible is the speaker's reaction to the stimulus of which 
the influence is being exerted upon him . Hardly is the 
word out of his mouth, however, than it becomes the sub-
ject of what follows. 'What are you meaning by horrible?'' 
'The horrible thing I am meaning is that play.' In other 
terms, the word horrible, though not having the form of a 
subject, provides the clue to what must be taken as the 
subject or stimulus evoking the succeeding words. Each 
word as it falls is a predicate rapidly passing into a subject-
None the less, in Horrible, that play!—I am now envisaging 
the case that the pause between the two members has 
become very brief—we are grammatically forced to regard 
Horrible as the predicate, and that play as the subject. The 
reason is that the speaker has contrived to prescribe this 
analysis by his mode of utterance. A greater stress has 
been laid upon horrible than upon that play, and the 
listener, thereby enabled to gauge the speaker's depth of 
intention, fastens upon the first word as that which indi-
cates the speaker's point. To return to James is much 
older than Jóhn and Máry, subsequent reflection might 
doubtless justify the listener in arguing that something has 
been said about John and Mary, but primarily and so far 
as the intention of the speaker was concerned, the words 
John and Mary merely mark important factors in what has 
been said about James. As regards James, the speaker has 
willed his name to be interpreted in two distinct ways. As 
1
 See above, pp. 277-8. 
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grammatical subject, it is a mere clue to the person about 
whom the statement is made. As a predicative word, the 
name insists that the person about whom the statement is 
made is James and no one else. 
James and no one else—this last stipulation of mine calls 
attention to the fact that a word predicatively employed 
practically always implies a denial.1 Mind you come early, 
not late; Henry has arrived, not John; The red pencil be-
longs to Mary, not the blue one; The house over there belongs 
to the Murrays, not the one you are looking at ; Cértainly 
you may tell him; you have no reason to doubt it. This 
useful implication supplies an additional motive for the 
predicative employment of words. Note that a congruent 
grammatical predicate may itself be stressed for this very 
purpose. That play is hórrible, not charming, as you main-
tain ; He rode, he did not walk. 
I have reached the end of my account of predication. 
Looking back, the reader will see that the existence of at 
least five kinds of predicate has been admitted: (1) every 
word is a predicate in the sense that it declares the nature 
of the thing to which it refers, the class to which the thing 
belongs; (2) every sentence as a whole is a predicate or 
reaction to a state of things which lies outside i t ; (3) every 
word as it falls is predicate of a state of things to which the 
preceding words have provided clues; (4) in all sentences 
exhibiting the dichotomy of subject and predicate, the 
grammatical predicate says something about the thing 
denoted by the grammatical subject; and (5) any given 
word in a sentence may be used predicatively or in the 
sense of a logical predicate, i.e. may convey an implicit 
1
 Inclusion in one class is necessarily exclusion from the contradictory 
class, but it is only when stress is laid on an inclusion that the corresponding 
exclusion comes prominently into view. 
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statement concerning the gist of the sentence as a whole. 
I must recall the contention with which § 68 began; the 
existence of one type of subject-predicate does not pro-
hibit the existence of another type. Not all the five kinds 
of predicate mentioned above are, however, of gram-
matical importance. How shall we discriminate between 
them ? The answer to be given harmonizes well with the 
conclusion which the argument of this chapter is bringing 
into ever-increasing prominence; it is the speaker's pur-
pose which lends to every element of speech its significance 
and interpretative importance. Among the five kinds of 
predicate enumerated above, the first three are inherent in 
the mechanism of speech, and are not specially intended 
by the speaker. The last two, on the contrary, are 
definitely meant by him. Accordingly, grammar can dis-
pense neither with the notion of grammatical subject and 
predicate, nor yet with that of the logical predicate. But 
the rest can be ignored. 
§ 72. Statements. No detailed discussion of the four 
kinds of sentence (§51) could be undertaken until pre-
dicational nexus had been closely examined, since it is this 
which gives to statements their characteristic form, and 
differentiates them from pure types of request and ex-
clamation. I shall now treat of the four classes in turn, 
but shall deal only with really typical examples of each, 
since, as we have seen, the classes merge into one another, 
the rudiments of all being present in every sentence what-
soever. I begin with statements. A few remarks are need-
ful in regard to their external form. The most completely 
developed specimens exhibit both subject and predicate, 
the subject being a noun or noun-equivalent. More often 
than not the predicate is ushered in by a finite verb. If 
this be merely the copula, it has to be supplemented by 
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some predicative word or phrase, a noun (e.g. He is king), 
an adjective (good), an adverb (here), or the equivalent of 
one of these (the man whom I saw, of noble birth, at home). 
The word-order differs in different languages. English, 
French, and German usually follow the scheme X is Y, 
X does T. Latin is more free, but shows a preference for 
subject, object, verb, e.g. Romulus urbem condidit. The 
Semitic languages favour the type verb, subject, object, 
e.g. katala Zaidun ragulan, literally 'killed Zaid a man'. In 
some languages the subject, if merely pronominal, mani-
fests itself as an inflexion of the verb, e.g. amas in Latin. 
At a later stage a pronoun is often added so as to yield 
forms like tu aimes. A very important feature of state-
ments is that they can be negative as well as affirmative. 
They are negated by means of an adverb (not, never) which, 
though having the force of a logical predicate (Henry has 
not arrived = that-Henry-has-arrived is not-the-case), is 
often without vocal stress, e.g. Henry hasn't arrived yet. 
The negative word is thus on much the same footing as 
the sentence-adverbs indicating the degree of assurance 
with which a statement is made, e.g. certainly, perhaps 
(§ 60). Only passing mention need be made of those forms 
of statement which approximate to exclamations, e.g. 
How well he sings! A good fellow, Charles! or of those 
which are elliptical, e.g. Twopence, as answer to How much 
did that cost? 
It has been seen that the greater degree of prominence 
accorded to one or other of the three factors of speech 
apart from the words is the principle underlying the three-
fold division of sentences into statements, demands, and 
exclamations (§ 51). T h e statement is that class of sentence 
in which 'things' predominate. The function of state-
ments has, accordingly, much in common with that of 
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words. Except for one remarkable peculiarity to be dis­
cussed below, statements are simply complex names of 
thing?. Their aim is to describe things objectively, and to 
eliminate speaker and listener as far as possible. Both may, 
it is true, have a place among the things referred to by 
statements, being represented by the personal pronouns I 
and you. But it is only in objectivated form that they are 
there presented; the speaker alludes to himself and to the 
listener just as if they were on the same footing as any­
thing else that might be spoken about. To hark back to 
the example quoted from Jespersen, the gist of any state­
ment is comparable to the gist of the words a furiously 
barking dog. But those words constitute no statement, 
whereas The dog barks furiously does so. We now see 
wherein the peculiarity of statements lies; they predicate 
something of something. Or to use the term customary 
in this connexion, statements 'assert'. Assertion is of two 
kinds, positive and negative. The positive kind is affirma­
tion, and the negative denial. Statements say either that 
something is or does something, or else that it is not, or 
does not do something. 
The recognition of this essential character of statements 
goes back to Aristotle. 'Ail speech', he wrote, 'is significant, 
but not all is declarative, only that in which the telling of 
t ruth or falsehood is inherent . However, this is not in­
herent in all kinds, for example, prayer is indeed speech, 
but it is neither true nor false.'1 What Aristotle says here 
about prayers, i.e. requests, might equally well be said 
1
 ΄ΕΣΤΙ ΔΕ ΛΌΓΟΣ ΆΠΑΣ ΜΕΝ ΣΕΜΑΝΤΙΚΌΣ ... ΑΠΟΦΑΝΤΙΚΟΣ ΔΕ ΟΥ ΠΑΣ, 
αλλ' ενω αληθεύειν η ψεύδεσται υπάρχει. ουκ εν άπασι δε υπάρχει, 
οιον η ευχη λόγος μέν, αλλ' ούτε αληθης ούτε ψευδης, de Interpreta-
tione, cap, iv (17a). I have striven to keep my rendering free from technical 
terms, but for 'all speech' it might have been preferable to write 'every 
sentence'. 
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about exclamations. Questions, on the other hand, not 
only are directly concerned with t ru th and falsehood, but 
also have the outward appearance of affirmations or 
denials (§ 73). In another sense, however, they clearly 
neither affirm nor deny. Leaving questions on one side 
for the moment, we see that the genius of Aristotle has 
discerned the true differentia of statements. They alone 
can assert. A more positive turn can, indeed, be given to 
the generalization; all statements must either affirm or 
deny. That is their nature, and it always makes itself felt, 
even in subordinate clauses which are statements only in 
form. The problem before us is to investigate exactly 
what assertion is, whence statements derive the power to 
assert, and to what ends they exercise it. 
The generalization that all statements assert should not 
be confounded with the logical doctrine that statements 
must be either true or false.1 That is a very different 
thesis, and one which, in the light of our previous con-
clusions, can only signify that the particular things referred 
to by statements must either be, or not be, in conformity 
with the facts of the universe. But this conformity of 
things with reality is a relation lying completely outside 
speech, which is concerned solely with communication to 
a listener. We have seen that speech refers to actual and 
imaginary things with strict impartiality. Language has 
created no forms to distinguish the real from the unreal. 
Nobody and everybody are alike nouns, non-existent and 
existent are adjectives with equal title, and we can make 
absurd and impossible references like Please jump over the 
moon or if you had jumped over the moon with exactly the 
same syntactic constructions as sensible and practical 
1
 Bühler seems to have made this mistake, see Theorien des Satzes, 
pp. 7-12. 
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references like Please lend me five founds or if you had lent 
me five founds. The argument can now be extended to 
things asserted. Two and two make four is a statement 
referring to the proposition that two and two make four, 
and this, in most situations, is true or in accord with 
reality as we know it. But the assertion Two and two make 
five, which refers to a thing which is false or out of accord 
with reality, has exactly the same linguistic appearance. 
From this we may conclude that the nature of speech is 
entirely independent of the t ruth or falsity of the things 
referred to by it. Serious confusion has arisen from the 
ambiguity of the terms 'statement' and 'assertion', which 
are sometimes used of the words employed, and sometimes 
of the things referred to by them. If the thesis that state-
ments must be either true or false had to be understood of 
the words, naturally linguistic theory would be compelled 
to take cognizance of it. But such is not the case. 
The ground will be still more effectually cleared for 
the analysis of 'assertion', if I first discuss one or two other 
points in which the activity of speech comes into contact 
with truth, or falsity. Speech and language are as little 
affected by the belief of the speaker as they are by the 
t ruth or falsity of the things spoken about . Lies have pre-
cisely the same form as those statements which reflect 
knowledge or honest belief.1 Linguistic theory is indeed 
concerned with all intentions on the part of the speaker 
which make themselves felt as implications of the sentences 
or words spoken, but the intention to lie is not among the 
1
 Surely Bühler is mistaken in finding the function of Kundgabe specially 
prominent in lies (Theorien des Satzes, p. 11). The essence of a lie consists 
in concealing one's desire to misinform the listener, not in proclaiming it . 
Linguistically it is impossible to 'tell' a lie. So far as the telling is concerned, 
this is mere description of a proposition, its t ruth being at most implied. 
Speech, of itself, is always a fairly innocent proceeding. 
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number. On the contrary, the speaker of a lie does every-
thing in his power to have it taken as the t ruth, though the 
methods he adopts for this purpose may be as diverse as 
violent protestation and casual, unobtrusive suggestion. 
Another way in which t ru th and falsity may be thought 
of in connexion with speech is in measuring the success or 
lack of success with which a speaker finds words or forms 
of expression adapted to his purpose. If he uses a word 
perfectly suited to the thing which he wishes to convey, 
or again if he employs the type of sentence calculated to 
influence the listener in the way desired, then there is a 
correspondence of t ru th between aim and result. Here, 
however, the ethical terms 'right' and 'wrong', or the 
normative 'correct' and 'incorrect', are more in place 
(§ 48). I come last of all to a point of the highest impor-
tance. In its ultimate origin speech was a natural, 
automatic reaction, and at this stage the cry of anguish, 
or whatever it may have been, was the true effect of its 
cause. Later on the intervention of will and purpose 
completely transformed this causal relation, but utterances 
still retain a character of truth inasmuch as the speaker's 
sincerity and genuineness of purpose are normally taken 
for granted. No one doubts the t ruth of an exclamation of 
enthusiasm, unless it is uttered in a lukewarm manner . 
Commands are accepted as signs that the speaker really 
wishes the performance of the action commanded, and 
questions that he is seeking a true answer.1 Only if elocu-
1
 This does not mean that exclamations and commands assert in the 
same sense as statements and questions for specification. The latter imply 
t ruth , while the former assume it, which is not the same thing. In point 
of fact, both the implication and the assumption may be wrong. More-
over, a relation of truth between the speaker's intention and reality is 
clearly distinguishable from a similar relation between the things meant by 
him and reality. The fact that speech not only is itself a fact of reality, but 
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tional indications contradict the locutional, as in irony or 
playful requests, does the listener hesitate to interpret 
speech literally. 
These observations lead on directly to the topic of 
'assertion', the definition of which is contained in the 
following formula: All statements assert, i.e. present their 
predicate either as true or else as false of the thing denoted by 
their subject. We have seen that, historically, predicational 
nexus, i.e. statement-form, originated in exclamations. 
The truthfulness generally attributed to exclamations 
still adheres to the statements descended from them; 
whenever the speaker is kept in view, it is habitually 
assumed that his statements are honestly meant. Nay 
more, his knowledge of what he states is usually assumed, 
so that unless there are grounds for suspicion, statements 
are accepted as true. When I ask the price of a box of 
cigarettes and am told it costs two shillings, I do not doubt 
the statement. This implication of truthfulness is ob-
viously due to the fact that, in the overwhelming majority 
of cases, the things stated have indeed been found 
factually true. When a particular statement is recognized 
by the listener as false, it is for him an incongruent use, 
which awakens in his mind a feeling of deception. We now 
come to the strangest characteristic of statements, namely, 
that the objectivity to which allusion was made at the 
beginning of this discussion should be combined with a 
compelling force such as is usually attributed to human 
agency alone. Not only is the thing meant by a statement 
also is either assumed or implied to refer to something true, probably 
accounts for Ries's stipulation that the sentence must have a Beziehung zur 
Wirklichkeit, see for his definition above, p. 239. His own explanations of 
this phrase appear to me very muddled, and in places self-contradictory. 
He would have been on safer ground had he stipulated that every sentence 
must have a relation, not to truth, but to human interest. 
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taken as true, but its t ru th seems to find authoritative 
expression in the sentence itself. Tha t 'statements assert' 
can be said with much more legitimacy than is usual when 
human actions are ascribed to things. The probable reason 
is that statements possess in subject and predicate repre-
sentatives both of the stimulus which has incited to speech 
and also of the reaction to that stimulus. Between these a 
causal relation appears to subsist, and accordingly the act 
of speech here seems somehow removed from its exter-
nal environment and enacted within the uttered words 
themselves. However this may be, in hearing statements, 
and still more in reading them, their author is often 
forgotten, attention being fixed on the things spoken 
about. Only in the case of false or absurd statements, or 
of those that are provocative in some other way, does the 
speaker flash into sight, proving that this factor of speech 
has really been present, though unnoticed, all the time. 
Statements may be negative as well as affirmative.1 The 
unique character given to speech by its power of negation 
is well brought out by Raleigh in his essay on Style: 'Other 
arts can affirm, or seem to affirm, with all due wealth of 
circumstance and detail; they can heighten their affirma-
tion by the modesty of reserve, the surprises of a studied 
brevity, and the erasure of all impertinence; literature 
alone can deny, and honour the denial with the last re-
sources of a power that has the universe for its treasury.'2 
It seems obvious that this peculiarity is due to the co-
existence of a listener with the speaker. There seem good 
grounds for thinking that denial had its origin in contra-
diction, in the refusal to accept assertions as true. Thought 
1
 Jespersen has an interesting chapter on negation (Philosophy, pp. 322 
foll.), but the problems which he treats, and his manner of treating them, 
are quite different from my own. 2 W. Raleigh, Style, p. 18. 
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is so much under the influence of linguistic habit that 
negative propositions now undoubtedly play a considerable 
part therein; but most people would probably admit that , 
when alone, they are more apt to think affirmatively than 
negatively. The derivation of negative words in general is 
difficult to determine; in Old Egyptian there is a possi-
bility—it is no more—that the word n 'not ' is connected 
with the verb ni 'to reject', but in that event the verb 
may well be secondary. It seems a likely hypothesis that 
the word for not everywhere originated in an exclamation 
of refusal. This likelihood seems borne out by the syn-
tactic form universally shown by denials. Whereas the 
vast majority of human reactions may be linguistically 
represented by the predicate of a predicational nexus, this 
is not true of the non-acceptance of statements; we do not 
say That X is Y is not. Negative statement is managed 
quite differently. Mere inspection of instances shows that 
the affirmative statement is reproduced as a whole, and 
then qualified by an adverb which annihilates the predica-
tion. Can it be doubted, then, that negative statement is 
in essence the affirmation of a real or supposed speaker into 
which the listener's exclamation of refusal has been in-
sinuated ? Thus negative statement is genetically an 
affirmation, and as such bears the stamp of truthfulness 
which we found inherent in all statement-form; in sum, 
denials, no less than affirmations, present their gist as true 
assertions. Psychologically, however, negative statements 
have undergone a transformation. They are no longer felt 
as predications first affirmed, and then subjected to re-
fusal. Language has changed them into attributions 
rejected from the very start. Hence it comes that we 
must define assertions as statements which present their 
predicate either as true or false. All statement is assertion, 
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and to that extent presents what it says as t rue; but it is 
also either affirmation or denial, and when considered in 
that light presents its gist as either true or false. 
Since statements keep speaker and listener as far out of 
sight as possible, the purposes with which this sentence-
form is used are less obvious than in the other classes of 
sentence. Indeed, those purposes are exceedingly various, 
and no more is here possible than to glance at a few. 
Information given for practical ends and scientific formu-
lation are perhaps the fields in which the statement reaches 
its climax of objectivity and apparent truthfulness. 
Expressions of opinion and valuations of any kind bring 
the speaker into view much more conspicuously, and in 
face of these the listener is apt to assume a critical and 
sceptical attitude from the outset. There are a number of 
cases where it is irrelevant to introduce the criterion of 
t ru th and falsehood. A novel may open with the words 
The sun was sinking slowly towards the horizon; here we 
do not ask whether the statement is false or t rue; that it 
contains an assertion is indubitable, but this is merely a 
consequence of the linguistic form which the writer has 
chosen to adopt. The like holds good of playful statements 
such as You are a little fig! Types of statement also exist 
where the personality of the speaker, so far from remaining 
hidden, is obtruded with an even painful emphasis. In 
threats like You'll rue it! the intonation dominates over 
the objective locutional form, and leaves a sinister impres-
sion of danger approaching from the speaker. I have 
previously dealt with commands like You shall obey me 
(p. 231), and have also shown cause for the satisfying 
sense of completeness arising from the use of statement-
form (§58). 
It is difficult and often even misleading to fight against 
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the ambiguity inherent in words, and in the course of this 
section I have used the term 'statement' freely in no less 
than three senses: (1) a sentence functioning as a state-
ment; (2) a sentence with statement-form; and (3) the 
proposition referred to by a statement . I make no apology, 
for in taking this course I have merely employed language 
as its nature dictates. The reader has cause for complaint 
only if I have misdirected or mystified him. 
§ 73. Questions. I now turn to the two kinds of sen-
tence in which the listener may be considered the pre-
dominating factor, since it is upon his performance of 
some action that the success of the utterance depends. In 
requests some specifically named action is demanded by 
the speaker, whereas in questions a relevant verbal response 
is desired. I shall deal with questions first, these being 
especially closely related to statements both in form and 
function. The mere fact that a desire for a relevant verbal 
response is evinced by questions shows that 'things' are 
there almost as important a factor as the listener, for the 
purpose of words is always to point to things. On the 
other hand, there is obviously a very close kinship between 
questions and exclamations, the speaker's desire being ex-
tremely prominent, particularly from the listener's point 
of view. There is, indeed, no class of sentence in which the 
interaction of all four factors of speech is more conspicu-
ous, or in which the relationship to the other classes is 
more apparent. As regards the outer form of questions, 
intonation is, as always, the principal means of conveying 
the sentence-quality. The type of intonation adopted 
varies according to the nature of the particular question 
that is being asked. Predicational nexus constitutes, as in 
statements, the main framework of the locutional form. 
But this, though usual, is not absolutely indispensable, 
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seeing that a single word like headache may serve as a 
question {Headache?), no less than as an exclamatory 
statement (Headache!). 
Questions fall into two main groups. In the first of 
these, which I shall call questions for corroboration, the 
entire gist of the predication is submitted to the listener's 
arbitrament, and the expected answer is either Yes! or 
No! In the second group, which may be conveniently 
termed questions for specification, the speaker's inquiry 
centres upon some special point in connexion with the 
predication, the general t ruth of the latter being accepted. 
Here some interrogative pronoun, adjective, or adverb is 
necessary to indicate the exact point in respect of which 
an answer is required. I shall discuss these two groups 
separately, since both in form and in function they present 
considerable divergences. But before embarking upon 
this undertaking, it will be well to call attention to another 
grouping which cuts across that already mentioned. In 
questions of the most authentic kind the speaker is really 
asking for information. He may, it is true, have a shrewd 
idea what the answer will be, and may even find a way of 
intimating the fact. None the less, he is not certain, and 
the purpose of his question is to ascertain what is still 
unknown to him. In the other variety, called rhetorical 
questions, the speaker knows, or thinks he knows, what the 
answer will be, and is merely anxious to see the listener's 
reaction, is trying to make him admit something, or the 
like. These are also genuine questions, in so far as an 
answer is really sought, but they tend to become mere 
statements, as in the case quoted above, p. 204. 
(1) In questions for corroboration the original locu-
tional form was identical with that of the statement. An 
assertion was actually contained in them, but was made 
§73 Q U E S T I O N S FOR CORROBORATION 305 
only to be called in doubt by means of the intonation. 
Such questions are really incongruent statements, the in­
congruence consisting in the fact that the speaker's purpose 
is not to give information, but to receive it. In He told 
you so? which is not the usual question-form in English, 
the incongruence is still felt. But many languages have 
succeeded in obliterating all sense of incongruence by the 
mere insertion of an interrogative particle, like Greek η, 
μή, άρα, Latin num., -ne. Modern European languages 
possess in inverted word-order an equally successful 
alternative to the use of interrogative particles, e.g. Vient­
il? Ist er da? So characteristic of questions do such inver­
sions seem to us, that it is by no means easy to realize that 
this word-order has not been universally felt necessary. 
We have already seen that such is not the case; historically, 
indeed, the inversion is demonstrably secondary, having 
been copied from questions for specification (see below). 
Nevertheless, there is a good psychological reason why the 
practice, once inaugurated, should have been retained; as 
all exclamatory sentences show, a strong tendency exists to 
start with a word on which special interest hinges or con­
cerning which the speaker feels at all deeply; and such a 
word, in questions for corroboration, is the finite verb 
introducing the predicate. I will only mention in passing 
the fact that, where an auxiliary verb is used, this alone is 
placed before the subject, so that here both the desire to 
mark interrogation and the feeling that the subject should 
precede the predicate can be simultaneously satisfied, e.g. 
Est-il venu? Hat er geschrieben? In English the same 
arrangement is carried even into the present and past 
tenses, compare Does he know? Did he know? with Weiss 
er? Wusste er? French reaches a similar result by a different 
road, e.g. Est-ce que vous l'avez vu? Negative questions 
3920
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belonging to this group present various subtleties which 
cannot be discussed in detail. Nevertheless, I will attempt 
to explain briefly what seems to me the main principle. 
Whenever a proposition is questioned, the possibility of 
the opposite being true is if so facto entertained. But denial 
carries with it a sense of contradiction not ordinarily in­
herent in affirmation. For instance, He is rich merely 
affirms, but He is not rich suggests 'You may have thought 
he was rich, but he is not ' . Consequently, whereas Is he 
rich? implies no expectation with regard to the answer, 
Is he not rich? has the implication 'I thought he was rich; 
are you going to tell me he is not ? If so, I should be sur­
prised.' 1 This may help to explain why tag-questions, as 
Jespersen calls them, are of different quality from the 
statement they accompany, e.g. He is rich, is he not? He is 
not rich, is he? No doubt a question like Are you not going 
to school to-day? may actually be answered either way. 
But the speaker's implication is, 'If you tell me you are 
not, I should be surprised'. Accordingly, it is on the whole 
true to say that negative questions for corroboration ex­
pect the answer Yes! Cf. Latin nonne, Hebrew halō. 
(2) Still closer to statements are questions for specifica­
tion, where the interrogation rests on a single word or 
phrase. For here the remainder of the sentence definitely 
asserts, and apart from the emphasis laid on the initial in­
terrogation, English questions of this kind have an intona­
tion indistinguishable from that of an ordinary statement. 
Interrogative stress at the end, as well as at the beginning, 
occurs only when the speaker, surprised at a preceding 
assertion, desires its repetition in order to make sure that 
1
 Jespersen states that Is John rich? and Is John not rich? are perfectly 
synonymous, Philosophy, p. 3Z3. It will be seen from the text that I hold 
a different view. 
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he has not misheard, e.g. When did you come? in the sense 
of 'When did you say you came ?' The utility of interro­
gative pronouns (e.g. who? what?), adjectives (e.g. which? 
what?), and adverbs (e.g. where? how?) resides in the fact 
that they give more or less precise directions to the 
listener with regard to the thing concerning which the 
speaker desires information. The result is brought about 
mainly by their syntactic employment. For example, in 
To whom did George give the book? the dependence of 
whom upon the datival word to shows that the query con­
cerns the recipient of George's gift; the answer may or 
may not repeat the preposition, e.g. To Mary or simply 
Mary. But most interrogative pronouns, adjectives, and 
adverbs also possess in their form a means of suggesting to 
the listener the kind of thing to be named in his reply; for 
instance, who? assumes that this thing will be a person 
presented as the source of some action or action-like pro­
ceeding. Apart from such implications, the stem-meaning 
of all these interrogative words is identical; it marks the 
thing to which they refer as belonging to the class 'things 
concerning which immediate specification is desired'. 
There can be no doubt that questions for specification 
are derived from questions for corroboration having an 
indefinite word as a component. A question like You 
saw someone?, though couched in a form which seems to 
anticipate Yes! or No! as the reply, is, as a rule, not satis­
factorily answered, if the answer be affirmative, unless a 
name corresponding to someone is vouchsafed. Now it is 
a remarkable fact that in many languages the interrogative 
and indefinite words are related; well-known cases are 
those of Greek ΤΊΣ, 'who ?' τις?, 'someone', Latin quis, 'who ?' 
quis, 'anyone', Arabic man, 'who? ' 'someone', ma, 'what ?' 
'something'. In the past, however, most scholars have 
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either refrained from discussing the problem of priority, 
or else have pronounced in favour of the interrogatives. 
Decisive evidence that the interrogative meaning is secon­
dary and derived from the indefinite is, however, forth­
coming from Egyptian. As Sethe has recognized,1 Coptic 
the Late-Egyptian ih, 'what?' from iht, '(some)thing'; 
an even clearer case is Late-Egyptian wēr, 'how much ?' 
from wēr, 'much'. Meillet stands almost alone among Indo-
European scholars in advocating the view here adopted. 2 
Note in the same connexion a curious rhetorical use to 
which questions of this category, when negative, are not 
seldom p u t : the question Whom have you not told? may be 
intended to mean 'You have told everyone', 'There is no 
one whom you have not told'. The origin of this use will 
be clearly seen if we analyse the question as signifying 'I 
should be surprised if there is anyone you have not told'. 
Here again the close affinity between the interrogative 
and indefinite pronouns is apparent. 
In nearly all languages the interrogative word or phrase, 
as being the centre of the speaker's interest, is placed at the 
beginning of the sentence. This is true, not only of the 
classical languages and their modern descendants, but also 
of Hebrew and Arabic, and wherever verifiable, an em­
phatic intonation is found to rest upon the interrogative 
word. Old Egyptian is the only language known to me 
to which the rule that the interrogative word or phrase 
1
 Zeitschrift für ägyptische Sprache, vol. xlvii (1910), pp. 4-5. 
2
 A. Meillet, Introduction a V etude comparative des langues indo-europe-
ennes, Paris, 1912, p. 356. Paul discusses the two possibilities, but refuses 
to pronounce between them, Prinzipien, p. 136. C. Brockelmann, Grund-
riss der vergleichenden Grammatik der semitischen Sprachen, Berlin, I908-13, 
vol. i, p. 328, § 113, favours the view that the indefinite meaning is derived 
from the interrogative. 
'what ?' can be derived only from wa', 'one', and 
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should be placed at the beginning does not apply, and even 
here a tendency in that direction exists.1 But the com-
moner practice of Egyptian is to place such a word in the 
position which the answer would occupy in a correspond-
ing assertion; for instance 'What shall I do ?' shows the 
form 'I shall do what ?' and 'To what god shall I announce 
thee ?' is represented by 'I shall announce thee to whom 
(being) as a god ?' This arrangement adds to the clarity 
of the question, while subtracting from its interrogative 
force. Sporadic examples of the same practice occur in 
Arabic and other Semitic languages (cf. Egyptian Arabic 
inta mîn? literally 'thou (art) who ?'), but only by way of 
exception.2 
It remains to discuss the inverted word-order (1) verb 
(or auxiliary), (2) subject, seen in English, French, and 
German, e.g. Why do you say so? Pourquoi taisez-vous ? 
Was wollen Sie? Philologists tell us that this word-order 
is only one case out of a number where the more recent 
tendency of the Indo-European languages to place the 
verb immediately after the opening word has prevailed 
over the earlier tendency to favour the word-order (1) sub-
ject, (2) predicate.3 A dilemma arose when, out of a desire 
for emphasis, some word other than the subject was placed 
at the head of the sentence; in that case one of the two 
preferences just mentioned had to be sacrificed. In Ger-
man it is the subject-verb preference which has gone to 
the wall, e.g. Hier sind wir, Schon sieht er aus. In French 
the inversion verb-subject has prevailed only after à peine 
1
 A. H. Gardiner, Egyptian Grammar, § 495. 
2
 C. Brockelmann, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 194, § 116. 
3
 See a particularly lucid exposition of the facts in F. Sommer, Ver-
gleichende Syntax der Schulsprachen, 2nd edition, Leipzig, 1925, pp. 118 
foll.; also Jespersen, Language, pp. 357-9. 
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and peut-être. In Old English the same use was frequent, 
but in more recent times only a few survivals are found, e.g. 
There is, are . . ., Here lies . . . Hence it would seem that 
the inverted word-order Whom did you see? for all its 
present interrogative feeling, is as a historical fact purely 
accidental. 
§ 74. Requests. The types of sentence best classified 
under this head are so multifarious that it is no easy matter 
to find a formula which will suit them all. Strong feeling 
on the part of the speaker is almost everywhere present, 
and at first sight this might tempt us to regard requests as 
exclamations of a particular kind. On the other hand, the 
nature of the act desired is carefully specified in all cases 
except vocatives, which are not usually placed in this 
category or indeed admitted to be sentences at all; some 
might feel inclined, therefore, to rank certain subspecies 
of request, e.g. unfulfilled wishes, under the heading of 
statements. Neither alternative, however, does justice to 
the most salient feature of all the sentences here united by 
a common label, namely, the speakers desire for an action 
not dependent solely upon his own will. This is the true 
differentia of requests, and since the listener is either 
directly appealed to for help, or else at least included 
among the powers whose assistance is invoked, we are 
justified in specially connecting requests with the listener, 
and in treating them as one of the two types of demand 
(§ 51). The chief varieties of sentence generally accepted 
as belonging to the class of requests are commands, en-
treaties, prayers, advice, permission, exhortations, and 
wishes, beside negative forms like prohibitions, warnings, 
and so forth. To these I add vocatives, which qualify as 
sentences because they reveal intelligible purpose complete 
in itself, and which bring the listener no less prominently 
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to the fore than imperatives, demanding from him an 
act of attention. Indeed, in the Indo-European lan­
guages imperative and vocative possess in common a 
peculiarity of outer form, namely, the fact that they con­
sist of the bare word-stem, cf. Ζευ, Μενέλαε, Balbe with 
παυσαι, φέρε, age. Nevertheless, it must be allowed that 
the vocative differs from all other requests in that it names 
the listener and does not specify the action which he is to 
perform. Imperative and vocative may, of course, be 
combined in a single sentence, as in Tu regere imperio 
populos, ROMANE, MEMENTO. Apart from vocatives, the 
only requests which do not name the desired action, or at 
least its main constituents, appear to be those employing 
such interjections as hey, hi. These, like many brief non­
verbal requests, e.g. Silence! To work! Hats off! All hands 
on deck! should find a place in treatises on syntax under 
both requests and exclamations. 
The most indisputable and characteristic type of re­
quest is that expressed by the second person of the im­
perative, with or without supplementary words. The 
intonation employed by the speaker is usually incisive 
enough to make unnecessary any mention of the listener, 
but every nuance is possible, from the imperious tones of 
the sergeant-major down to the whining prayer of the 
mendicant. It is probably on account of the highly signifi­
cant character of their intonation that imperatives and 
vocatives are able to dispense with significant inflexions, 
and the same fact accounts for the employment of the 
infinitive for a like purpose, as is found in a number of 
languages, e.g. German Einsteigen! French Ralentir! and 
regularly in Coptic; in Italian and Old French this use is 
particularly common in prohibitions, cf. also the Greek Οις 
μη πελάζειν. Almost everywhere there may be observed 
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a tendency to replace the imperative by other forms, or 
at least to mitigate its peremptoriness by the addition 
of some courteous word or phrase, e.g. pray, if you please, 
please. Reference has been made already to the new form 
of requests which has developed out of questions, e.g. 
Would you please pass the salt? (p. 231). Paraphrases like 
I beg you to . . . have the same effect, though with the 
appropriate words the identical method may serve to 
increase the force of a command, e.g. I insist on your leav­
ing at once. A curious fact which requires closer psycho­
logical investigation is the reluctance displayed by many 
languages to use the imperative with a negation. In the 
Semitic languages this use is impossible, forms analogous 
to Greek ΜΗ ΕΊΠΗΙΣ, Latin ne dixeris, being employed. In 
the Indo-European languages the same position seems to 
have existed at the beginning, and though modern tongues 
like English, French, and German take no exception to 
commands of the types Go not! Do not wait! Ne viens pas! 
Spreche nicht!', Latin is very sparing in their use (Ne time 
in Plautus), and Greek restricts them to a particular case, 
e.g. μη λεγε, 'do not make a practice of speaking'. Old 
Egyptian employs a negative verb (to not, as it were), 
using the imperative of this and accompanying it by a 
special verbal form or else the infinitive, cf. noli putare in 
Latin. I used to think that these avoidances of negative 
plus imperative were due to the inherent positive directive 
force of the latter, so that the coupling of it with a nega­
tion would be practically a contradiction in terms (Ne 
time = 'don ' t—do fear!'). However, this supposition no 
longer seems to me quite convincing. 
Surveying the various 'acts' which a speaker may de­
mand of his listener, we find that they put some strain upon 
the term, since purely negative behaviour has to find a 
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place among them . For imperatives may be formed not 
only from verbs signifying physical acts (e.g. go, take, buy, 
speak)1 and psychical acts (e.g. think, feel), but also from 
others denoting states (e.g. remain, be, sleep) and privative 
notions (e.g. refrain, schweigen). Greek and Latin possess 
passive imperatives, e.g. accingere, πέπαυσω, but these are 
only partly passive in force; cf. also in German Seid 
umschlungen, Millionen. Since speech is concerned with the 
world of imagination no less than with that of external 
reality, there is no reason why the commands that may be 
given should be within the listener's competence. Thus 
the door is opened to the inclusion, under the head of 
requests, of many desires where the listener becomes a 
merely partial or even completely Active participant. 
Various languages employ an imperative meaning 'let' or 
the like to introduce requests where no intervention on the 
part of the listener is actually expected, e.g. Let there be 
light! Lasst ihn sprechen; so, too, in Egyptian imi sdm n•n 
nb•n nht, literally 'give (thou) hearken to us our powerful 
lord', with the corresponding passive m rdi sdm•n•tw n•sn, 
literally 'not (thou) give be hearkened to them', i.e. 'let 
them not be hearkened to ' . 
Requests in the first person plural, like "Ιωμεν, Μη είπομεν, 
Hos latrones INTERFICIAMUS, GEHEN wir, combine an exhorta­
tion to the listener with the intimation that the speaker is 
willing to play his part in joint action. T h e forms used in 
the above examples are not termed imperatives, because 
their origin and their other employments demand that 
they should be placed in a different category, namely the 
subjunctive; but their function is closely similar to that of 
1
 In view of such imperatives as speak, tell, declare, it is impossible to 
distinguish questions from requests by saying that the former call for verbal, 
and the latter for non-verbal responses. 
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the imperative. French stands alone in possessing a form 
which can best be described as first person plural of the 
imperative, e.g. marchons; in Coptic there is a similar, but 
Late-Egyptian mi•n, 'let us come', apparently imperative 
plus suffix-pronoun, first person plural. At the outset the 
notion of requests in the third person may seem self-
contradictory, since the third person of a finite verb is a 
device whereby the action is presented as springing from a 
source different from both speaker and listener. Neverthe-
less, we cannot do otherwise than treat as requests sub-
junctive examples like VALEANT cives mei, The Devil TAKE 
the hindmost, VIVE la République, Er LEBE hoch, or Greek 
optatives like ΖΩΙΗ; indeed, grammarians have always 
classified as imperatives the active and passive forms found 
in Ταυτα μην δη ταυτηι ειρήσθω, Regio imperio duo SUNTO, iique 
consules APPELLANTOR, though of other antecedents than 
the true imperative. T h e formulation of a request in the 
third person is sometimes due to the fact that the pros­
pective performer of the desired act cannot be directly 
addressed, but often such formulation serves merely as a 
mechanical contrivance to provide a convenient starting-
point for the description of that act, in other terms to put 
the request in the form of a predicational nexus. T h e 
source from which the speaker expects help in such a case 
may vary greatly: sometimes it is the present listener who 
is thus indirectly given an order, e.g. Que ce monsieur 
m'attende un instant; on other occasions the addressee is 
quite indeterminate, and the request may be simply a 
pious wish. When that wish is impossible of fulfilment, the 
sentence becomes a mere statement of desire. It is not for 
a theoretical book of this kind to dictate how any practical 
grammarian shall arrange his facts, so that I shall not 
from 
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discuss whether unfulfilled wishes should be placed under 
the heading of statements or requests.1 In point of fact, 
grammars as now written seldom classify their data in this 
way at all, preferring rather to approach the different 
kinds of sentence from the side of morphology and the 
discussion of the uses of the 'moods' of verbs. Brunot 
stands almost alone in his advocacy of a semantic outlook 
in language-teaching.2 His pedagogic method is extremely 
interesting, and perhaps has a brighter future than is 
generally believed. Here I have wished merely to show 
once again that the different kinds of sentence merge into 
one another. 
§75. Exclamations. There remains to be discussed that 
class of sentences in which the speaker looms forth more 
insistently than any of the other three factors. Not that 
his person is necessarily indicated; on the contrary, ex-
clamations containing direct references to the speaker, e.g. 
How miserable I feel! are the exception rather than the 
rule. The essence of exclamations is that , whether by way 
of description or only through implication, they emphasize 
to the listener some mood, attitude, or desire of the 
speaker, in extreme cases to the exclusion of all else. Thus 
they approximate more closely than any other kind of 
sentence to the spontaneous emotional cry. From the 
listener's point of view, indeed, such a cry cannot fail to 
be regarded as a kind of speech. The quality of the sound 
awakens in him the memory of past experiences, and points 
to some present experience of similar quality on the part 
of the utterer. Emotional cries are speech in so far as they 
1
 I must plead guilty to having given advice of the kind on several 
occasions. However, such has not been intended to imply that there is only 
one way in which good books on syntax may be arranged. 
2
 F. Brunot, La pensée et la langue. 
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display both a meaning and a thing-meant; they fall short 
of speech only to the extent that they are involuntary. 
Once we are sure that such a cry is intentional, the bridge 
between the linguistic and the non-linguistic has been 
crossed. The most primitive of all exclamations are 
stereotyped vocal performances like the sucking in of the 
breath (fff!) at the sight or smell of some delicious dish. 
This is true speech, and the sound employed is a real word, 
even if it chance not to be recorded in the dictionary. 
Not words, on the other hand, or exclamations in the 
linguistic sense, are the strange noises which small boys 
often take pleasure in making. These are intentional, in-
deed, but fail to qualify as either speech or language be-
cause their sound is not fixed and cannot, accordingly, evoke 
significant recollections; they are but meaningless sounds. 
Writers have invented spellings for some of the meaning-
ful cries just alluded t o ; ow is an expression of pain, pah 
one of disgust, pshaw one of contempt or impatience. As 
words or stereotyped units of language, such sounds are 
called interjections, and may be defined as words having 
reference to given types of psychic reaction and arousing an 
expectation of use in reference to a particular mood, attitude, 
or desire presently experienced by the speaker} Like other 
words, interjections may have extended areas of hetero-
geneous meaning; oh, for example, covers a whole range of 
1
 It is incomprehensible to me how Bühler (Theorien des Satzes, p. 10, 
n. 1) can maintain 'Überhaupt keine Nennfunktion haben die primären 
Interjektionen (au! oh! aha!)'. Because interjections used as exclamations 
proclaim the speaker, it does not follow that they do not simultaneously 
describe something which must be regarded analytically as distinct from 
him, namely a specific emotion. Moreover, Bühler does not distinguish, 
as he should, between interjections and the use of them as exclamations. 
An interjection, as such, does not proclaim or make manifest some single 
speaker, but all the speakers who have ever used the word. What an inter-
jection names is a specific reaction on the part of any speaker. 
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diverse emotions. Some interjections not only refer to a 
psychic reaction on the part of the speaker, but also imply 
a desire for a particular type of response on the part of the 
listener; thus sh asks for silence, eh? demands the repeti-
tion of a remark, fie seeks to excite shame. Though the 
meaning of words of this class is not less precise than that 
of other words, it is more complex and less differentiated. 
Pah may be paraphrased by I am disgusted, but the 
speaker and the disgust felt by him are blended in indis-
soluble fashion. As regards their inner form, interjections 
derive their particularity from the anticipation they carry 
with them of employment as exclamations, i.e. as purpose-
ful references to something presently experienced by the 
speaker. This word-class is swelled by accessions from 
other classes—by nouns like rubbish and fiddlesticks, and 
by verbs like hark and bother. When such a word has ob-
tained general currency as an exclamation, the rank of an 
interjection must be conceded to it in addition to its 
original rank. As we have seen, there is no reason why a 
word should not belong to more than one word-class; 
silver, for example, is at once noun and adjective and verb. 
Accordingly, the fact of rubbish being a noun does not 
prevent it from being also an interjection; but to qualify 
as an interjection, a word must needs be habitually, 
not merely exceptionally, used as an exclamation.1 To 
1
 I am here polemizing against Jespersen, who, in discussing the habit of 
regarding interjections as a 'part of speech', writes as follows (Philosophy, 
p. 90): 'The only thing that these elements have in common is their ability 
to stand alone as a complete "utterance", otherwise they may be assigned 
to various word-classes. They should not therefore be isolated from their 
ordinary uses. Those interjections which cannot be used except as inter-
jections may most conveniently be classed with other "particles".' But 
what Jespersen depreciatingly stigmatizes as the 'only thing' distinguishing 
interjections from other words is so important and so striking that it 
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conclude, let it be noted that interjectional phrases are 
very frequent, e.g. O dear me, woe is me, alackaday, for 
shame, good heavens. 
Interjections have been discussed at some length be-
cause the purest and most thoroughgoing exclamations are 
those which employ them. But I trust that it has been 
made perfectly clear that interjections are merely a class 
of words, while exclamations are sentences. The former 
are a category of language, while the latter are a category 
of speech. Speech is applied language, and exclamations 
always apply to some present experience of the speaker, 
real or simulated. The last qualification is necessary, since 
an exclamation like Alas! may be insincere or ironical just 
as easily as it may be honest and uttered with literal intent . 
In exclamations employing interjections, these generally 
stand alone, though occasionally they are combined with 
other words, e.g. Ah me! Alas, it is quite impossible! It is 
only with extreme incongruence that interjections can be 
used as predicates, e.g. My present feeling is damn! Since 
every sentence possesses something of the quality of all the 
four classes, exclamations are never completely confined 
to self-revelation. Even the interjectional forms may be 
classified as veering more in one direction than in another. 
Fie! and Hark! are obviously exclamations of request, 
Eh? is practically a question, and Pshaw! may at least be 
paraphrased as a statement. Similarly, some sentences in 
the form of statements, requests, or questions are more 
exclamatory than others, as I have repeatedly had occasion 
amply justifies the placing of them in a separate category. Moreover, a 
noun like nonsense habitually used as an exclamation is not on the same 
footing as a noun like fire only exceptionally so used. Jespersen would not 
have taken this line if he had been clear about the distinction between 
'language' and 'speech', and if he had realized that the so-called 'parts of 
speech' are categories of language. 
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to note (e.g., p. 274). As regards all sentences intermediate 
between exclamations and sentences of some other class, 
the grammarian has necessarily to consider in which cate-
gory he shall include them. The course to be taken de-
pends upon external form more than upon anything else. 
For example, the word-order in How beautiful she is! and 
What a troublesome time you have had! differs sufficiently 
from that of statements to warrant separation from them 
and classification under the head of exclamations; on the 
contrary, the Egyptian translation of the former sentence, 
nfr•wy sy, can obviously not be kept apart from the corre-
sponding statement nfr sy, 'she is beautiful', since the ex-
clamatory quality of the former is indicated simply by the 
use of the particle •wy, in origin simply the dual ending, 
cf. Twice beautiful is she! 
Mention may be made of a few criteria of outer form, 
elocutional and locutional, which tend to stamp a sentence 
as an exclamation. All emotionally spoken sentences are 
ipso facto exclamatory, though not every exclamation is 
emotional. Yes! and No! are obviously better classed 
under this head than as statements, though they are often 
bereft of all eagerness or special emphasis. Concise utter-
ances are usually exclamatory, because social convention 
favours the more wordy forms of diction, except under 
stress of emotion. We saw above (pp . 276-7) that the word-
order (1) predicate, (2) subject, is more impulsive than the 
inverse order; accordingly, where there is a choice between 
the two possibilities, the former tends to indicate ex-
clamatory quality. Lastly, exclamations are often recog-
nizable by some peculiarity of intonation, by strong 
accentuation or the like. 
§ 76. Quantitative classifications of the sentence. At-
tempts have not been wanting to supplement the classi-
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fication discussed above with another having quantitative 
considerations as the principle of division. Thus the Joint 
Committee on Grammatical Terminology recommends 
that sentences shall be distinguished as (1) 'simple', (2) 
'complex', and (3) 'double' or 'multiple'.1 Simple sen-
tences are defined as those 'containing only one predica-
tion', e.g. The quality of mercy is not strained, and complex 
sentences as those 'containing one main predication and 
one or more subordinate predications', e.g. He jests at scars 
that never felt a wound. A different mode of quantitative 
classification is given in a further recommendation which 
reads as follows: 'That the terms Double or Multiple be 
used to describe any Sentence or any member of a Sen-
tence which consists of two or more co-ordinate parts. ' 
As examples of a 'double sentence' are quoted God made 
the country and man made the town; The tale is long, nor have 
I heard it out; Words are like leaves, and where they most 
abound, | Much fruit of sense beneath is rarely found. Along 
similar lines, Veni, vidi, vici might have been given to 
exemplify a 'multiple sentence'. For the interpretation of 
this recommendation it is significant that Conticuere omnes 
intentique ora tenebant is cited, not as a double sentence, 
but only as having a 'double predicate'; a 'multiple predi-
cate' is contained in Après quoi, Jean entra dans la maison, 
se débarrassa de son sabre, remplaça son képi par un vieux 
chapeau et s'en alla retrouver le curé. Evidently it has not 
been thought suitable to apply to these examples the terms 
'double' and 'multiple sentence', since the separate predi-
cates have here one and the same subject. It is clearly the 
opinion of the Committee that to warrant the term 
'double' or 'multiple sentence' the combination subject + 
1
 On the Terminology of Grammar, pp. 12-13, Recommendations VI 
and VII. 
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predicate must recur in its entirety at least twice in the 
body of one and the same sentence. 
The distinctions as thus stated bristle with difficulties. 
The example Words are like leaves, and where they most 
abound, \ Much fruit of sense beneath is rarely found is given 
as a double sentence, and no objection can be raised to this 
classification. But is it or is it not also a complex sentence ? 
The strict terms of the definition, as formulated in the 
Committee's pamphlet, leave the point uncertain . Is 'one 
main predication' to be understood as 'only one main 
predication' ? If so, then the example in question is 
neither a simple nor yet a complex sentence, despite the 
similarity in form of its second half to Quand il reviendra, 
je le lui dirai, quoted among the examples of complex 
sentences. It would be more reasonable to consider this 
at once a double and a complex sentence. One might then 
call If you want me to come, I'll come, but if you don't want 
me, I won't at once a double and a doubly complex sen-
tence. Again, the instance Après quoi, Jean . . . le curé is 
left entirely outside this quantitative classification; it is 
neither a simple nor a complex sentence, nor yet is it a 
multiple sentence. Moreover, according to the strict terms 
of the Committee's proposals, He who hesitates is lost 
would be a complex sentence, while Old Mr. Jones, a 
school-friend of my late father, went to tea with my mother 
yesterday afternoon, taking with him a bouquet of magnificent 
roses as a tribute to her on her eighty-fifth birthday would be 
a simple sentence. What is worse, this last example could 
be turned into a complex sentence by the mere inter-
calation of who was before a school-friend. 
In my opinion the diversity of possible sentence-forms 
is too great to be satisfied by any such rigid terminological 
distinctions. Ought we not to rest content with calling 
3920 
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simple those sentences which are obviously simple, and 
complex those sentences which are obviously complex ? In 
any case a new category will have to be created for the 
locutionally formless sentences discussed in § 56. Perhaps 
here we might speak merely of 'formless sentences', 
though it must be remembered that no sentence can be 
really elocutionally formless, since utterance itself imposes 
a certain minimum of form. Every sentence is bounded 
fore and aft by a silence, and when spoken and not written, 
also provides by its intonation some inkling of the speaker's 
specific purpose. It is impossible to lay down strict rules 
for deciding whether a speaker has uttered a single sen-
tence, or whether he has uttered several. Whenever an 
utterance is divided in such a way as to display, when 
written, a full stop in the midst, then doubtless we must 
agree that more than one sentence has been spoken. But 
is a pause equivalent to a semi-colon always sufficient to 
reveal the presence of a plurality of sentences ? If, as I 
have proposed (p. 208), the sentence be quantitatively 
defined as an utterance 'which makes just as long a com-
munication as the speaker has intended to make before 
giving himself a rest', clearly the criterion distinguishing, 
as among sentences, between one and several must be 
highly subjective. I will only add that for the presence of 
a single sentence homogeneity of special sentence-quality 
is not essential. For example, I should regard You are not 
angry, James, are you? as a single sentence, although it 
consists of a statement plus a request for attention plus an 
abbreviated question. It comes to this: on the formal side 
the quantitative criterion of a sentence is purely elocu-
tional and depends upon whether the continuity and 
melodic composition suggests a unity or not. Let it not 
be objected that I am here making form, not function, the 
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criterion of the sentence, and so am contradicting my own 
point of departure in § 50. I should retort by referring 
the objector to p. 205, where it was expressly laid down 
that elocutional form is always congruent, so that as 
regards the elocutional criterion of sentences, it matters 
not whether we speak of form or function. 
The advantages of a highly complex sentence, like that 
concerning old Mr. Jones on p. 321, are firstly that it per-
mits a maximum of information to be compressed into 
a minimum of space, and secondly that to each of the 
separate predications involved can be meted out exactly 
the measure of importance to which it is entitled. The 
disadvantages are that such a sentence imposes a greater 
intellectual strain on both speaker and listener than either 
is prepared to accept in ordinary conversation. For this 
reason sentences of real complexity are found mainly in 
written speech. It may be of interest to examine a little 
more closely the working of the example to which allusion 
was made at the beginning of this paragraph. The core, 
so to speak, is a compliment paid by Mr. Jones to 'my 
mother' on her birthday, and it seems likely that the words 
Jones, my mother, and birthday were among the first lin-
guistic elements to crystallize in the speaker's mind. We 
have to assume in that speaker a somewhat verbose habit, 
which causes him to incorporate in his sentence, as it pro-
ceeds on its leisurely way, a number of references scarcely 
likely to have been held in view at the first moment of its 
conception. Mr. Jones, being the active party concerned, 
is naturally made the subject. The predicate old is thrown 
in, partly for purposes of identification, and partly from 
mixed emotional motives difficult to diagnose. A school-
friend of my father is a little excursion into the past of 
Mr . Jones not originally intended, and due to a vice of 
3920
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reminiscence which we cannot fail to detect in the 
narrator. However, this new predicate, being presented 
as an apposition, is thereby indicated to be purely paren-
thetic. 'My father', a constituent of this parenthetic 
predicate, is subject of yet another parenthetic predicate 
late, supplying a further unpremeditated piece of informa-
tion. The main verb went is quite unessential to the 
purport of the sentence as a whole; it introduces a fact 
necessarily involved in the little drama here described, and 
merely provides a peg upon which the other incidental 
news can be hung. It is unnecessary to pursue this analysis 
further. In the dozen or so words discussed a most com-
plicated structure has already been revealed, and had the 
analysis been continued down to the end of the sentence, 
a far more richly coloured and carefully shaded picture 
would have been disclosed. If all the predications con-
tained in this are set forth in separate sentences, the result 
is long-winded and monotonous in the extreme. The first 
part then runs as follows: There is a certain Mr. Jones. 
He is old. He was a school-friend of my father. My father 
is dead. This Mr. Jones went, &c, &c. One sees how im-
possible such a narrative becomes when all the predicates 
are peaks of equal height, and when a pause is inserted 
between each predicational nexus. Judged by ordinary 
standards, the complex sentence describing old Mr. Jones's 
doings is no miracle of art. But when it is examined from 
the angle of linguistic theory, we can but marvel at the 
results which a somewhat prosy and commonplace speaker 
has been able to achieve. Not only is a mass of information 
imparted, but the less important features are admirably 
subordinated to the really salient points. Civilized man, 
imbued with a never-failing purposefulness and his wits 
sharpened by constant practice, has attained a wellnigh 
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incredible skill in speech. But side by side with the most 
finished products of oratory, there survive utterances 
which are almost on a level with the cries of the ape. 
From the living speech of to-day may be culled evidence 
of every different stage of linguistic development. 
§ 77. Conclusion. The final section of this chapter 
brings me to the end of the present volume, and some 
general retrospect seems to be called for. The task which 
I set before myself was to give a roughly adequate account 
of the mechanism of speech, and I ventured to believe that 
the performance of this task would incidentally involve 
the elucidation of the grammatical terms current among 
philologists. I am not without hope that the first part of 
my programme has been accomplished, but as regards the 
second only a beginning has been made. We have learnt 
to distinguish between language and speech, between 
sentence and word, and between form and function. Sub-
ject and predicate have been investigated, and some pre-
liminary notions have been gathered with regard to the 
so-called 'parts of speech'. A further volume will be 
needed to delimitate the concepts of language and word 
more closely, as well as to explain a host of terms, e.g. object, 
phrase, clause, pronoun, tense, case, to which hitherto only 
the briefest of allusions have been possible. The defini-
tions of these terms given by other investigators seldom 
yield satisfaction, and I must frankly confess that in many 
instances my own mind is still utterly in the dark. Never-
theless I am confident that, following the path which 
Wegener opened up and along which I, among others, 
have made further progress, scholars will have no great 
difficulty in attaining an acceptable and reasonably detailed 
linguistic theory. When this end has been accomplished, 
general books on language will cease to be collections 
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of interesting but relatively uncoordinated facts, as is, 
I fear, the impression usually left by those written in 
the past. As regards my own book, I shall feel myself un-
touched by any criticism which remarks upon the paucity 
of the phenomena which I have studied. The quarry I 
have been pursuing is theory, not facts. What I have 
striven to envisage is speech as an organized functional 
whole, and exceptional details have been none of my 
concern. 
One unforeseen result has emerged with increasing in-
sistency, and most of all in this final chapter. It is the 
purposiveness of speech. To speak is to convey meaning, 
and meaning has tended, in the course of my exposition, 
to become displayed ever more conspicuously in its 
original etymological sense of human purpose or intention 
—purpose to influence a listener in a particular way, and 
purpose to call attention to specific things. Out of these 
two purposes has been born a third, which properly speak-
ing does not belong to the subject-matter of my book, but 
which can only enhance the interest of its problems. I 
refer to the purpose of comprehension, which the habit of 
speech has inculcated and has taught us to regard as 
desirable in itself. In his effort to influence the mind of 
others, man has learnt to instruct his own. Whilst 
elaborating a sentence, the speaker does not completely 
divest himself of the receptive listening attitude which 
alternates so regularly and easily with his creative role as 
speaker. He is, in fact, always a fellow-listener, and hence 
also a fellow-learner. From this necessity arises the possi-
bility of employing language as the instrument of silent 
thought. When something is obscure, purposeful effort is 
employed to reduce it to verbal form, and when this has 
been done, we realize our enrichment and become aware 
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that our intellectual power has increased. Thought is, no 
doubt, presupposed by speech, but the habit of speech has 
given us lessons in thinking. And so, by reciprocal action, 
thought and speech have developed hand in hand. It is no 
exaggeration to say that the history of speech is also the 
history of the human understanding. 
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